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ABSTRACT 
'Victims of our history', The Labour Party and In Place of Strifeg 1968 to 
1969 
This thesis consists of a detailed chronological examination of the events leading 
up to the publication of the white paper, In Place of Strife in January 1969, and its 
subsequent replacement with a 'solemn and binding' agreement with the Trades 
Union Congress in June 1969. The work seeks to address four propositions that 
have emerged from the historiography: that Barbara Castle was unduly influenced 
by anti-trade union officials; that the contents of the white paper were a knee jerk 
reaction to the Conservative proposals; that neither Castle nor Harold Wilson 
understood the trade union movement; and that the final agreement, was a failure 
that demonstrated the inability of a Labour government to escape from its trade 
union roots. 
In Place of Strife has received considerable coverage in the diaries, 
autobiographies and biographies of politicians and trade union leaders. However, 
there remain a number of important gaps, notably; the respective roles of civil 
servants, politicians and outside advisors; the detailed debates of the 
parliamentary Labour party and the internal discussions of the trade unions, 
especially the TUC general council. Drawing from a range of primary sources 
including; newly released government papers this study addresses the gaps in our 
knowledge and evaluates the existing historiography. 
What emerges from this study is that, rather than being unduly influenced by her 
officials, Barbara Castle was the main instigator of the white paper. Similarly, 
whilst the white paper was influenced by the publication of the Conservative 
proposals, it was grounded in a well thought out philosophy of trade union rights 
and responsibilities. Similarly, whilst confirming that Castle and Wilson 
demonstrated considerable naivety in failing to anticipate the extent of the 
antagonism shown by trade unions towards the proposals, the study also reveals a 
depth of trade union intransigence that came close to challenging the 
government's right to govern. Consequently, Wilson in particular emerges as a 
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skilled negotiator who extracted as much as was possible given the constraints 
placed on him. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Uo [sic] Haines had passed Harold a note saying some members of the G. C. 
had been calling out of the window to the industrial correspondents, 
"Another half hour and we've won. " Vic [Feather] was shocked at the 
idea. " 
In Place of Strife 
In January 1969 Harold Wilson's second Labour government published proposals 
for the refon-n of industrial relations. The white paper, In Place of Strife, A Policy 
for Industrial Relations 2, was envisaged by its creator, Barbara Castle, the 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, as a statement of trade union 
rights and responsibilities designed to protect and enhance the standing of the 
trade union movement. As Castle was to emphasise, the proposals included much 
that the trade unions were calling for; rights of trade union recognition; the right 
of individuals to join a trade union; and protection against unfair dismissal. 
However, the white paper also gave the secretary of state discretionary powers to 
order a strike ballot before official strikes, and to order a 'conciliation pause', an 
immediate return to work lasting for up to 28 days in the case of unconstitutional 
or unofficial strikes. 
Castle had envisaged that, once published, the white paper would stimulate a 
debate that would inform legislation in the autumn of 1969. However, a series of 
events led to pressure for more immediate solutions, and consequently to proceed 
with an 'Interim' bill for introduction in June 1969 that would include one or more 
of the penal clauses and a limited number of the new trade union rights. In 
response the general council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) produced its 
own set of proposals that were published as Programme for Action in early June 
3 1969 and overwhelmingly endorsed by a special meeting of congress on 5 June 
On the strength of this endorsement the general council made it clear they would 
proceed with their own proposals only if the government dropped the penal 
clauses from the interim bill. There then followed two weeks of intense 
negotiations during which Castle and Harold Wilson sought to obtain the 
1 Barbara Castle's diary, unpublished transcript, 18 June 1969, Barbara Castle Collection, 
University of Bradford 
'In Place ofStrife, A Policyfor Industrial Relations, Cnind 3 88 8 (HMSO, January 1969) 
'Programmefor Action (TUC, 1969) 
7 
necessary assurances that Programme for Action would be as effective as the 
interim bill, culminating in their failure to gain Cabinet support to continue with 
the bill in the face of trade union intransigence, and the agreement of the general 
council to sign a 'solemn and binding' undertaking to manage industrial disputes 
within the guidelines set out in Programmefor Action. 
In Place of Strife came closer to splitting the Labour movement than any event 
since Ramsay MacDonald fori-ned his national government in 1931. It not only 
represented a final throw of the dice by a Prime Minister desperate to restate his 
post-devaluation credentials for governing, but it also demonstrated the 
claustrophobic nature of the bonds that linked a Labour government to the trade 
4 
union movement and the limitations that these placed on significant reform . 
Drawing on recently released, and previously unused, government papers, 
political and trade union archives, as well as interviews with many of the key 
personalities and contemporary press coverage, this thesis provides a detailed 
study of In Place of Strife, from the appointment of Barbara Castle to the newly 
formed Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP) in April 1968, 
through the emergence of the white paper, the subsequent debates within Cabinet, 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), and with the general council of the TUC, to 
the final tortuous negotiations that led to the 'solemn and binding' agreement in 
June 1969. 
What is known and where are the gaps -A note on sources 
Any student of In Place of Strife is both helped and hindered by three 
comprehensive diarists; Barbara Castle; Richard Crossman; and Tony Benn 5: 
helped because they offer unmatched insights into day-to-day events, but hindered 
because each is a much a triumph of selection as it is revelation. Similarly, whilst 
both Castle and Benn claimed to write up the day's events on the same evening, 
Crossman was often known to wait for over a week before completing an 
apparently contemporaneous entry. Castle's method was to take shorthand during 
The pound was devalued on 18 November 1967 with a change in parity from $2.80 to $2.40 
Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70 (George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, London 
1984), Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume Three, Secretary of Statefor 
Social Services, 1968-70 (Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London 1977), Tony Benn, Office 
without Power, Diaries 1968 - 72 (Hutchinson, London 1988) 
8 
meetings that she then typed herself either on the same day, or more often at 
weekends. When she came to prepare the diaries for publication she eliminated 
much of the specialised detail and sections dealing with specific subjects that, 
whilst important, were not in the mainstream of the diaries. In addition, she wrote 
the introduction, linking passages and footnotes. Finally, in order to ensure 
veracity, she bequeathed the original typed version to Bradford University, where 
it has been lodged since her death in March 2003. It has therefore been possible 
to compare the original typescripts with the published version to determine what, 
if anything was omitted from the passages dealing with In Place of Strife. In 
general, Castle was true to her objective and the majority of the transcripts are 
reproduced verbatim in the published text. There are a number of relatively small 
exclusions and, where relevant, they are referred to in the text 6. However, if the 
three diaries are taken in conjunction with the autobiographies and biographies of 
most of the major political figures of the period, it is possible to build up a 
detailed account of the 'high politics' of the period. 
As is to be expected, Castle's diaries provide a blow-by-blow account of the 
negotiations with the TUC general council, as well as giving her own perspective 
on Cabinet debates and discussions within the PLP. Crossman and Benn provide 
differing perspectives on the Cabinet discussions, with Crossman also providing 
insights into the discussions of Wilson's 'inner cabinet', and, as a member of 
Wilson's inner circle, into the thinking of both Wilson and Castle during crucial 
periods of the negotiations. These accounts are reinforced by those of Wilson, 
James Callaghan, the Home Secretary and Roy Jenkins, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 7, such that it is possible to build up a detailed understanding of events 
and the main drivers behind them. Each of these, however, has its limitations. 
The Wilson memoir was written immediately after losing office in 1970 and 
sought both to justify the previous six years and attack Edward Heath and the 
Conservatives as part of his re-election strategy. Consequently it admits to few 
errors over In Place of Strife, and is noticeably vague or silent on the full extent of 
Wilson's involvement in events. Similarly, both Jenkins and Callaghan appear to 
6 Barbara Castle Collection, University of Bradford (henceforward BCQ 
7 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70 (Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, 1974), James 
Callaghan, Time and Chance (Collins, London 1987), Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre 
(Papermac, London 1994) 
9 
wish to forget the episode. Jenkins because of residual guilt over the way he 
abandoned Castle and Wilson, and Callaghan perhaps because of a guilty 
conscience over his role as principal plotter and opponent. Consequently, all three 
accounts leave important gaps over the sequence of events and their role in them. 
By contrast, Peter Jenkins has provided a comprehensive blow-by-blow account 
of the whole episode in The Battle ofDowning Street, which, written within a year 
of events, draws on his own detailed knowledge of the main events and 
protagonists as seen from his perspective as the Guardian's political commentator 
8 and columnist . Most recently Ann Perkins, in her official biography, has been 
able to draw on Castle's private papers and recently released official papers to 
offer further perspectives on the origins of the white paper and the eventual 
settlement 9. Finally, whilst not as well served as the politicians, the trade union 
perspective is covered in some detail by Jack Jones in his own memoirs; by 
Geoffrey Goodman in his biography of Frank Cousins; and by Eric Silver in his 
biography of Vic Featherlo. 
In addition, a number of commentators have drawn on In Place of Strife as part of 
a wider study. Robert Taylor sets out the main events in his history of trade 
unions since 1945, and Gerald Dorfinan includes a detailed account in a study of 
government - trade union relations Taylor's account is confined to existing 
sources, most notably Peter Jenkins, and whilst Dorfinan includes interviews with 
a number of unnamed trade union officials, he is unable to offer a detailed account 
of the negotiations and the issues arising from them. Similarly, Castle's 
permanent secretary at the Department of Employment and Productivity, Sir 
Denis Barnes has co-authored a book on trade union history that, whilst offering 
detailed coverage of the events, adds little that is not available from other 
8 Peter Jenkins, The Battlefor Downing Street, (Charles Knights & Co., London, 1970) 
9 Anne Perkins, Red Queen, The Authorized Biography of Barbara Castle (Macmillan, London 
2003) 
10 Jack Jones, Union Man, An Autobiography (Collins, London 1986) Geoffrey Goodman, The 
Awkward Warrior, Frank Cousins: His Life and Times (Davis-Poynter, London 1979), Eric Silver, 
Vic Feather, T U. C (Victor Gollancz Ltd. London 1973) 
11 Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics, Government and Unions since 
1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), Gerald A. Dorfman, Government versus Trade Unions in British 
Politics since 1968 (Macrrflllan, London 1979) 
10 
published sources". Most recently, Jim Tomlinson has covered the episode in his 
study of Wilson's economic policy. Tomlinson does draw on official papers, but 
his focus is on the potential impact of In Place of Strife on prices and incomes 
po icy, rather than on the detailed events themselves. 13 
However, even with this wealth of detail, there are significant gaps in our 
understanding of events that this study sets out to fill. Despite Castle's account of 
the development of the white paper, her diary is somewhat opaque in its 
description of the origins of the white paper, and the respective roles of civil 
servants, politicians and outside advisors. To this end, official papers released 
under the thirty-year rule shed considerable additional light on policy formulation. 
Similarly, whilst she covers the Cabinet debates and detailed negotiations in some 
detail, official papers should provide a fresh perspective on the discussions. 
Whilst the fonnal Cabinet politics are already covered in some detail, there is next 
to nothing in the published sources covering; the detail of the PLP discussions; the 
attitudes emerging from Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) in the form of 
motions to the National Executive Committee (NEQ; or the debates of the NEC 
itself, especially the crucial meeting at which Callaghan backed the NEC against 
the Cabinet. Once again, papers covering these events are now available from the 
Labour party archives and form an important part of the overall story. 
Finally, however, the largest gap is in the discussions of the trade unions. As has 
been noted, we have the views of Jones, who was one of the main protagonists, 
and secondary accounts of the views and roles of Feather and Cousins, but there is 
nothing to match the Cabinet diarists. To this end, essential elements in this study 
are the official records of the TUC and the larger unions, along with union 
publications and official statements. As will become clear, minutes of the general 
council and the finance and general purposes committee tend to be more candid 
than the corresponding government conclusions and consequently provide 
12 Denis Barries and Eileen Reid, Government and Trade Unions, The British Experience, 1964-79 
(Heinemann Educational Books, London 1982) 
13 Jim Tomlinson, The Labour Governments 1964-70, Volume 3 Economic Policy (Manchester 
University Press, 2004) 
11 
invaluable insights into the thoughts and behaviour of both trade union and 
government protagonists. 
Received wisdom - the historiography of In Place ofStrife 
Whilst there may be gaps in our knowledge of the period, this has not stopped the 
growth of received wisdom. Overall four general propositions have emerged from 
the historiography of In Place of Strife: that Barbara Castle was unduly influenced 
by anti-trade union officials who found in Castle a minister receptive to their own 
reform agenda; that the contents of the white paper were an ill thought out, knee 
jerk reaction to the Conservative proposals contained in Fair Deal at Work, and 
were neither philosophically coherent, nor practically effective; that neither Castle 
or Wilson were of, or understood the trade union movement, and consequently 
failed to understand both the visceral impact any proposals impinging on the right 
to strike would have on the Labour movement and the PLP; and that the final, 
'solemn and binding' agreement, however much it was dressed up by both sides as 
an honourable compromise, was a failure for Castle and Wilson that demonstrated 
the inability of a Labour government to escape from its trade union roots. 
Both participants and commentators have argued the view that Castle was in the 
thrall of anti-trade union officials. Geoffrey Goodman comments that the case for 
legal intervention in industrial relations had been around in draft form in the 
Ministry of Labour for some time waiting for a suitably compliant minister to 
pursue it14 . an argument supported 
by Jack Jones who challenged Castle and 
Wilson to explain why a Labour government was peddling, 'the anti-trade union 
15 ideas of top civil servants' . 
Similarly, among more recent commentators, Robert 
Taylor has argued that, during the early 1960s, a more 'robust' attitude began to 
emerge towards trade unions within the Ministry of Labour and this was 
reinforced by a number of senior appointments from outside the Ministry 
16 
. Three 
general issues emerge; that the creation of the DEP led to the arrival of a much 
more interventionist philosophy; that this served to reinforce a growing view 
14 Goodman (1979) p. 572 
15 Jones (1986) p-204 
"Taylor (1993) pp. 157-159 
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within the department that something needed to be done about industrial relations; 
and that Castle provided a ready ear for such advice. 
The view that the white paper lacked a coherent philosophy owes much to general 
criticisms of Harold Wilson's style of government and was certainly not helped by 
his reported remark on first reading In Place Strife that Castle had 'not so much 
out-heathed Heath as outflanked him' 17 . As Ben Pimlott has remarked, 'Wilson 
was apt to distil a major policy choice in a quip' 18 , but such remarks continue to 
exert their influence over thirty years later: Anne Perkins refers to In Place of 
Strife as a 'short term political fix, a way of scoring off the Tones' 19 . This sense 
of yet another Wilson gimmick undoubtedly led to the view that the paper lacked 
a coherent philosophy, but the proposals also suffered ftom Castle's attempt to 
forge a middle way between the legalistic approach favoured by the Conservatives 
and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) on the one hand, and the refusal 
by the unions and their representatives to contemplate anything that hinted at 
coercion. In the circumstances, it suited both sides to argue that the proposals 
would not work, and this in turn has led to the perception that the pursuit of such 
limited proposals was not worth the schism that it seemed to be creating. 
Similarly, their opponents advanced the view of both Castle and Wilson as 
academics with little or no understanding of the trade union movement from the 
outset. Leading trade unionists such as Jack Jones made it clear from the moment 
that he became aware of the contents of the white paper that he regarded them 
both as, 'basically academics', who it was difficult to persuade to see things, 
920 'from a shop-floor angle Similarly, Geoffrey Goodman quotes Feather on 
Castle thus, 'Barbara's knowledge and understanding of how trade unions work 
and function is nil 21 Cabinet opponents eagerly took up the charge, most notably 
Jim Callaghan who was anxious to enhance his own reputation as an ex-trade 
union official who understood the movement, the 'keeper of the cloth cap' as 
17 Castle (1984) p. 566 entry for 4 December 1968 
Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (HarperCollmsPublishers, London 1992) p. 527 
Perkins (2003) p-324 
20 Jones (1986) p-204 
21 Geoffrey Goodman, From Bevan to Blair, 50 years reportingftom the politicalfront line, (Pluto 
Press, London 2003) p. 125 
13 
Peter Jenkins expressed It22 . This sense that they 
just didn't understand the trade 
union movement continued to be expressed by senior trade union figures such as 
Len Murray 23 , who argued that Castle was, 'not within a million miles of making 
it [In Place of Strife] saleable'24 . 
Finally, there is an almost universal acceptance that the final agreement 
represented a failure for both Castle and Wilson. Significantly, and 
understandably, Wilson sought to present the solemn and binding agreement both 
as an honourable outcome, in which the TUC's proposals had been accepted only 
because the unions had, 'moved forward forty years in a month 25 , and as the 
logical culmination of a negotiating process in which he had always been prepared 
to adopt the TUC proposals in preference to his own if they could be demonstrated 
to be as effective and as fast-acting as the government's own proposals. Needless 
to say, his contemporaries and future commentators rejected Wilson's analysis. 
Richard Crossman, Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, concluded, 
on hearing that Wilson and Castle had rejected any future legislation for sanctions 
that, 'they had just chucked it all away' and, following the meeting of the PLP at 
which Wilson outlined the terms of the agreement, concluded that, 'They [the 
PLP] had got the climb-down they wanted 926 . Equally 
damning were the 
comments of Castle's permanent secretary, Denis Barnes that, 'The attempt to 
reform industrial relations with a degree of urgency greater than that of the 
Donovan Commission [Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers 
Associations, Lord Donovan was the chairman] or the TUC had failed ý27 . 
How far was the white paper a product of the Civil Service, and how far did it 
represent an attempt to frame a coherent philosophy of industrial relations? Was 
it the ignoble failure that it came to appear, or was Wilson right to present it as the 
negotiated settlement he had always wanted, and how far did the Outcome 
22 Jenkins (1970) p. 82 and Kenneth 0. Morgan, Callaghan A Life (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1997) p. 333 'Callaghan's view was that Barbara Castle and most of her associates were 
ill- 
informed about industrial relations, unlike a participant like himself, and oblivious to the 
intensity 
of the TUC's reaction'. 
23 At the time Murray was the TUC's head of research 
24 Quoted in Pimlott (1992) p. 530 
25 Wilson (1974) p-833 
21 Crossman, (1977) p. 529, entry for 18 June 1969 
27 Barnes and Reid (1982) p. 126 
14 
demonstrate serious misjudgements and a fundamental lack of understanding on 
the part of Wilson and Castle? The aim of this study is to address these four broad 
areas and, taking into account new and existing sources, seek to determine how far 
the newly emerging evidence supports the received wisdom. 
A growing sense of crisis: 1964 - 1968 
When Harold Wilson launched his 1964 election campaign at the annual meeting 
of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and called on the unions to become, 
4partners in a great adventure' 28 , there was little sign of what was to come. The 
manifesto made no mention of trade union reform, rather the national plan was to 
square the circle of full employment and wage inflation via increased productivity. 
Similarly, whilst the Conservative manifesto did mention industrial relations, it 
confined its commitments to an early enquiry into trade union law following 
'recent decisions in the Courts' that had highlighted 'aspects of the law affecting 
trade unions and employers' associations'29 . However, whilst neither party 
seemed prepared to acknowledge it, the previous ten years had seen a sea-change 
both in trade unions, and in the public perception of them, that was to undermine 
the somewhat complacent tone that dominated the 1964 election. 
The election of Frank Cousins as general secretary of the transport and general 
workers union (TGWU) in 1956 is generally regarded as the point as which 
30 
attitudes within and towards trade unions began to change . Up until 
1955, the 
TUC was dominated by a triumvirate of Arthur Deakin, general secretary of the 
TGWU, Sir William Lawther, president of the national union of mineworkers 
(NUM), and Thomas Williamson, general secretary of the national union of 
general and municipal workers (GMWU). These three, all on the right of the 
Labour party, oversaw the emergence of the TUC as an establishment body that 
flourished in the pro-trade union environment of the early 1950s, and ruled over 
the trade union movement with an authoritarian air that created considerable 
resentment among many rank and file members. However, the death of Deakin 
in 
28 Quoted in Taylor (1993) p. 13 0 
29F. W. Craig, British General Election Manifestos 1918 - 1966 (Political Reference Publications, 
Chichester, 1970) p. 219 
30 Eric Wigham, What's Wrong with the Unions?, (Penguin Books Ltd, Middlesex 1961). Wigham 
offers a near contemporary account of these changes. 
15 
1955 and his replacement by Cousins in 1956, following the short-lived rule of 
Arthur Tiffin 31 , heralded a change in leadership and attitudes that were to gain 
ever-greater momentum as the decade continued. 
According to Denis Barnes, Cousins favoured a return to what he considered to be 
a more 'democratic' role in which 'the overriding purpose of officers of the 
unions, including himself, was to give effect to the immediate aims of the 
members as expressed by their more active and militant spokesmen'32 . Cousins' 
philosophy reflected the growing power and influence of shop stewards, whose 
role had grown steadily during the full employment of the 1950s, and who had 
become increasingly alienated by the authoritarian leadership of Deakin and his 
colleagues. Cousins was the first example of the 'shop floor' reasserting control, 
and he was to be followed by both Jack Jones of the TGVvTU and Hugh Scanlon of 
the Amalgamated Engineers Union (AEU), both of whom were to play a major 
role in the struggle over In Place of Strife, and in which, as will become clear, 
they were to reflect the militancy of the shop floor as against the establishment 
tendencies of a number of their TUC colleagues. 
The growing strength of the shop floor, coupled with a worsening economic 
situation after the 1955 general election, was reflected in a growing number of 
unofficial strikes, particularly in the motor manufacturing industry, where the 
interrelated nature of individual manufacturing plants meant that a small strike in 
one factory could have a much wider effect on related plants. As an example of 
the exaggerated impact a small dispute could have, Eric Wigham, writing in 1961, 
quotes the example of a strike by 500 door assemblers in one factory leading to 
9300 workers being laid off in related plants 33 . By 1959, newspapers 
had started 
to adopt the American term, 'wildcat strikes', when referring to unofficial strikes, 
and such was the concern that the TUC announced an inquiry into unofficial 
strikes and the position of shop stewards, whilst the Conservative Minister of 
Labour, John Hare, convened a series of meetings with representatives from each 
31 Arthur 'Jock' Tiffm was elected General Secretary in succession to Deakin in June 1955. He 
died of cancer on 27 December 1955, and Cousins was elected to succeed him in May 1956. See 
Goodman (1979) pp - 100- 113 32 Barnes and Reid (1982) p. 27 
33 Wigharn (196 1) p-97 
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of the more strike prone industries, including motor manufacturing, to seek 
solutions to the growing problem. 
Growing industrial unrest and militancy was also reflected in popular culture, 
often a useful barometer of changing social attitudes. Two films, I'M All Right 
Jack, released in 1959, and The Angry Silence, released in 1960, highlighted the 
almost dictatorial power of the local shop steward, and the tyranny of the closed 
shop, whilst a popular television series, The Rag Trade, broadcast in 1961, 
satinsed a growing belief in the prevalence of strikes with the phrase, 'Everybody 
out'. It was not just popular culture that was reflecting this change. Andrew 
Shonfield, economics editor of the Observer, and the aforementioned Eric 
Wigham, industrial relations editor of The Times, both published books that were 
critical of existing attitudes among the trade unions. Shonfield wrote of the, 'new 
belligerent mood of labour' 34 , whilst Wigham wrote a 1961 Penguin special 
entitled, 9,1hat's Wrong with the Unions?, in which he identified 23 specific 
complaints ranging from, 'The structure of the movement is out of date', to, 'The 
closed shop restricts individual freedom' 35 , and suggested that an inquiry be held 
into the implications of making collective agreements legally binding. It was 
perhaps not surprising that, when Wilson decided to appoint a royal commission 
to review industrial relations, both would become members. 
Wigham's reference to legally binding procedure agreements reflected, from the 
union perspective, the most worrying strand in growing concerns over trade union 
activities: the role of the law. In 1958 the Inns of Court Conservatives produced a 
pamphlet, A Giant'S Strength, in which they called for a new legal framework for 
industrial relations, including the loss of all legal privileges in the event that a 
union went on strike in defiance of union rules. According to Robert Taylor, the 
pamphlet had a limited impact, but was influential when the Conservatives came 
36 to develop new policies after the 1964 election . Four years 
later, however, a 
ruling by the House of Lords in the case of Rookes vs. Barnard was to re-open the 
relationship of trade unions and the law with significant results. The ruling 
34 Quoted in Taylor (1993) p. 116-117 
35 Wigham (196 1) p. 197 
36 Taylor (1993) p. 107 
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indicated that Rookes, a non-unionist who had been sacked because the union had 
threatened to strike in support of the closed shop, was entitled to damages from 
the union. The ruling made it clear that the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 did not give 
the blanket protection assumed by trade unionists to have existed for nearly 60 
years. 
George Woodcock, then general secretary of the TUC, pressed immediately for a 
Bill to restore the protection trade unionists thought they had under the 1906 Act, 
offering to accept in return the appointment of a royal commission to consider 
wider aspects of trade union relations. The Conservatives however, felt that the 
implications would need to be examined as part of a wider inquiry, hence the 
manifesto commitment highlighted at the outset. Wilson, on the other hand, 
committed his future government to the reverse the decision, whilst taking up 
Woodcock's agreement to a royal commission. Thus it was that when Wilson 
took office he immediately charged Ray Gunter, Minister of Labour, with 
reversing Rookes vs. Barnard and establishing a Royal Commission. In addition, 
as a public demonstration of his commitment to work with trade unions, Wilson 
invited Cousins, in a clear echo of Winston Churchill's appointment of Ernest 
Bevin, to join the government as minister for technology. The reversal of Rookes 
vs. Barnard was achieved quickly with the Trade Disputes Act, 1965 and, in the 
same year, the government appointed a Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers Associations to investigate and review the existing state of industrial 
relations. However, whilst Wilson may have felt that he had kicked industrial 
relations into the long grass, a series of economic crises dragged government and 
trade union relations increasingly to the forefront of both the political and the 
public mind, exposing all the issues that had been emerging since the middle of 
the 1950s. 
In 1966, a seven-week strike by the National Union of Seamen (NUS) 
demonstrated both the fragility of government attempts to control incomes, and 
the growing frustration of Wilson with what he saw as politically motivated 
attempts to damage his government. As Cabinet conclusions from 19 May 1966 
record, concessions to the NUS would lead to the country suffering, 'both the 
industrial dislocation of the strike itself and the grave economic consequences of 
18 
concessions on pay which would totally undennIne the Govemment's Policy on 
prices and incomes"'. Just over a month later, on 20 June, Wilson launched an 
attack on what he saw as the militant elements within the union, famously 
referring to 'a tightly knit group of politically motivated men ý38 . 
The ensuing economic crisis saw the government introduce a six month freeze on 
prices and incomes, to be followed by a further six months of 'severe restraint'. 
In response Cousins resigned his Cabinet post and returned to the union, but , in 
September 1966, the Cabinet agreed to a system of fines to be applied to both 
individual trade unionists and trade unions in the event of non-compliance with 
the freeze 39 . By the following autunm, trade union patience was running out and 
the TUC congress passed a resolution condemning the government's statutory 
approach. 
Whilst the tightening of prices and incomes was creating pressure on 
govemment/trade union relations, a steady rise in unofficial strikes was leading to 
increasingly loud calls for legal measures to restrict 'unconstitutional' action. As 
early as September 1965, the Cabinet had considered a report from Gunter on the 
frequency of disputes in the motor industry. In his report, he noted that 'already 
in 1965 there had been one hundred and twelve stoppages of which only five had 
been official strikes' 40. Furthermore, he reported that it was 'privately 
acknowledged by the leaders of the unions concerned that they no longer had 
adequate control over the actions of their members in the industry'. 
The growing tensions between trade unions and government, and trade unions and 
industry led inevitably back to the Royal Commission. When Wilson was forced 
to devalue the pound in November 1967, heralding a further period of economic 
restraint, George Brown urged the introduction of immediate trade union 
legislation 41 . Similarly, such was their sense of the worsening state of 
industrial 
37 National Archives, Public Record Office [hereafter NA, PRO] CAB128/41 CC(66) 25 th 
Conclusions 19 May 1966 
" Quoted in Pimlott (1992) p. 407 
39 ibid. 44hConclusions 1 September 1966 
40 ibid. 46ffi Conclusions I September 1965 
4 'Eric Wigharn, Strikes and the Government 1893 - 1981 (The Macmillan Press Ltd, London & 
Basingstoke second edition 1982) p. 142 
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relations, that the Confederation of British Industry gave further evidence to the 
Commission in December 1967, arguing that, since they first gave evidence in 
November 1965, opinion had hardened and they were now in favour of penalising 
individuals who took 'unconstitutional' action, the legal enforcement of procedure 
agreements, and suggested that a new registrar of trade unions be empowered to 
take action against unofficial strikerS42. Wilson had referred to royal commissions 
taking minutes and spending yearS43 , and the standard response to Brown was that 
44 
the government needed to wait for Donovan . Whilst 
Gunter was to see Donovan 
in early 1968 to try and hurry the report along, it was clear that he was not to be 
hurried. The report was though eventually published in June 1968, by which time 
Barbara Castle had replaced Gunter and the storm clouds were gathering. 
42 Barnes and Reid (1982) p. 95 
43 Jenkins (1970) p. 15 
44 Lord Donovan was chairman of the Royal Cominission and the report became known generally 
as the Donovan report. 
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CHAPTER ONE - SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS: APRIL - OCTOBER 
1968 
1.1 Introduction 
When Harold Wilson appointed Barbara Castle as First Secretary and Secretary of 
State for Employment and Productivity in April 1968, the appointment was 
regarded widely as a last ditch attempt to retrieve prices and incomes policy from 
the post-devaluation cul-de-sac that had become characterised by confrontation 
and wage constraint. However, the decision by the Conservatives to publish Fair 
Deal at Work, their prescription for industrial relations reform, on Castle's first 
day in office, coupled with the imminent publication of the report of the Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 45 , meant that 
industrial relations were never far from the surface. Subsequently, as her officials 
began work on a response to both reports, Castle was faced with a series of 
official and unofficial strikes during the summer of 1968 that highlighted the need 
for urgent reform. When both the TUC and the CBI responded to Donovan with a 
simple reaffirmation of their previously stated positions, and her own officials 
appeared to endorse Donovan's gradualist approach to reform, Castle was left 
with little choice but to develop her own proposals. 
1.2 A new department and a new minister 
When Castle's new appointment was announced, the press had little doubt as to 
her main priority. The Guardian led with, 'Mrs Castle put in charge of wages 
P011CY, 46 , the 
Daily Telegraph, 'Pay freeze job for Mrs Castle 47 , and 
The Times, 
'Mrs Castle will run pay policy from new ministry' 48 . 
This is confirmed in her 
own account of the appointment. According to her diaries, Castle was offered 
initially the post of first ever Lady President of the Council and Leader of the 
House with responsibility for collective Cabinet strategy and the public promotion 
of government polic 9. She rejected this, arguing that an economic post was 
45 Royal Commission on Trade UnIons and Employers Associations 1965-68, Cnind. 3623 
(HMSO, London 1968) Subsequently referred to as 'Donovan' or 'the Donovan report' after the 
Commission's chairman, Lord Donovan 
46 Guardian, 5 April 1968 
47 Daily Telegraph, 5 April 1968 
48 The Times, 5 April 1968 
4'Castle (1984) p. 417, entry for 2 April 1968 
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more appropriate and suggested the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). As 
early as February 1968, she had been arguing in Cabinet that, 'we had never 
50 known what type of P and I policy we were trying to pursue' , and , in early April, 
she reiterated the point to Wilson, arguing that the only way out of the, 'disastrous 
51 negative stance', was to raise wages through increased productivity 
Whilst Wilson agreed with her approach to prices and incomes policy, he was 
lukewarm about sending Castle to the DEA, suggesting that Roy Jenkins would 
not accept it because a strong minister at the DEA would lead to conflict with the 
Treasury such as had occurred between Jim Callaghan and George Brown, 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 52 . 
After discussion, Wilson suggested the 
Ministry of Labour with the addition of prices and incomes policy and the 
suggestion of a new title, Minister of Employment and Productivity. In the gaps 
between discussions, Castle had spoken to Richard Crossman and told him of 
Wilson's concerns about an appointment to the DEA. Crossman was due to dine 
with Jenkins that night and agreed to raise the issue with him. On the following 
day, he confirmed to Castle that Jenkins was opposed to the idea because he didn't 
want a strong minister at the DEA, and this was followed by Jenkins asking to see 
Castle to explain his reasoning. According to Castle, Jenkins explained his 
concerns over a potential conflict and, whilst she argued against him, 'he was 
, 53 clearly not convinced . Subsequently, 
Castle was summoned to see Wilson who 
again put the idea of the Ministry of Labour and was again met with a lukewarm 
response. It was only on the following day, following an intervention by 
Crossman, who suggested to Wilson that he offer Castle the title of First Secretary 
as well as Minister of Employment and Productivity, that Castle accepted the new 
post. 
The focus on a new start for pnces and incomes policy was evident in a telephone 
conversation between Wilson and George Woodcock, General Secretary of the 
50 Castle (1984) p. 386, entry for 29 February 1968 
51 ibid. p. 418, entry for 2 April 1968 
52 Jenkins (1994) p-249. In his view he had just succeeded in 'reknitting together the power of the 
Chancellor within the Goverm-nent' 
5'Castle (1984) p. 419, entry for 3 April 1968 
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TUC, on 5 April 1968 54 . Wilson opened 
by explaining that he had decided to take 
prices and incomes policy away from the DEA and put it into a new department to 
be known as the Ministry of Employment and Productivity. Wilson was effusive 
in describing the characteristics of the new ministry, 'a modernised and bigger 
Ministry of Labour whose policies would put the emphasis on growth and 
measures towards a high wage economy'. He continued in the same vein that 
Castle would be in charge of the new department and, 'the emphasis would be 
much more on productivity bargaining and an expansionist approach than in 
recent months'. Wilson concluded that he had never intended the DEA to play a 
major role in prices and incomes policy but that, 'Mr Brown, as First Secretary, 
had been for D. E. A. [sic] to take the lead in this policy and his two successors had 
become "bogged down" with prices and incomes policy'. 
The upbeat tone was still in evidence at a meeting between Wilson, Castle and the 
President of the CBI on 10 Apn155 The aim of the meeting was to explain the 
background to the decision to transfer responsibility for prices and incomes policy 
to the DER Wilson's opening comments covered slightly different ground from 
the call to Woodcock. He said that 'he had felt for some time that it was 
inappropriate to separate the responsibility for the "theology" of prices and 
incomes policy from the responsibility for the practical implementation by the 
Ministry of Labour'. In her comments, Castle stressed the positive aspects of her 
role as she had set them out for Wilson, 'She wanted to get away from the 
negative concept of Prices and Incomes policy; she therefore attached particular 
importance to productivity agreements - but only where they were what the Prime 
Minister had termed "copper bottomed"'. 
The accounts given by Castle, Wilson and Jenkins, coupled with the official 
records, give a number of insights into the reasons for Castle's appointment and 
the direction it was likely to take. Firstly, Wilson's logical justification for the 
shift of prices and incomes responsibility hid a typical mix of politics, pragmatism 
54NA, PRO, PREM13/2128, Note of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr 
George Woodcock at 7-15P. M. on Friday, April 5 
55NA, PRO, PREM13/2128 'Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the First 
Secretary of State with the President of the Confederation of British Industry at 
10, Downing 
Street at I 1.00a. m. on Wednesday, April 10,1968'. 
23 
and policy. In the first instance, if Jenkins had not objected, Castle could well 
have ended up at the DEA and if she had done so it would seem likely that prices 
and incomes policy would have remained with her. In his memoirs, Jenkins notes 
that Peter Shore, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 'by an unfortunate 
performance during the Budget debate had made it clear that he did not have the 
guns to carry through the House of Commons the new Prices and Incomes 
legislation'. 56 Shore has acknowledged subsequently that he did not have the 
political weight necessary to carry through the legislation 57 . As such, a political 
heavyweight like Castle was required and, given that the DEA was barred to her, 
transferring the policy to her new department was the pragmatic alternative 58 . 
Finally, Castle's stress on productivity agreements and the development of a high 
wage economy was in accord with Wilson's own focus on increased productivity 
as a way out of the negative stress on wage restraint, and a way of offering a more 
positive way forward to both the trade unions and elements within the PLP, both 
of whom were likely to vote against further legislation as soon as the opportunity 
arose. 
However, in all these discussions industrial relations reform was very much the 
dog that did not bark in the night59 . None of the press quoted above referred to 
Donovan and the imminent publication of his report, and, as we have seen, nor did 
it figure in the discussions between Castle and Wilson or in those with Woodcock 
or the CBI. Castle has since recalled that when Wilson offered her the Ministry of 
Labour he made it clear that he thought her very good with the unions 60 , but no 
explicit mention was made of Donovan or the likely response to it. However, 
there is some evidence that reform was beginning to appear on the ministerial 
radar. Since January, Ministry of Labour officials had been receiving draft 
56 Jenkins (1994) pp. 248-9 
57 Interview with Lord Shore of Stepney, House of Lords, 10 May 2000 
58 Jenkins has made it clear subsequently that it was split control over macro-economic policy that 
concerned him. He did not consider the detailed working through of prices and incomes 
legislation to present a major challenge to the Treasury and as such was happy for Castle to take 
responsibility for it. Inter-view With Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, London, 20 September 2001 
59 See, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 'Silver Blaze' in The Complete Sherlock Homes Short Stories 
(John Murray Ltd, London 1976) pp. 326-327, ' "The dog did nothing in the night-time", "That was 
the curious incident", remarked Sherlock Homes' 
601nterview with Baroness Castle of Blackburn, Buckinghamshire 3 March 2000. According to 
Castle, Wilson's opinion was based on her resolution of a dispute with the transport unions over 
the introduction of 'open' transport terminals. See Castle (1984), p. 84, entry for 29 December 1965 
and p. 230, entry for 2 March 1967 
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chapters from Donovan, and had held a series of meetings to agree on a likely 
legislative timetable and work programme that would have figured in early 
ministerial briefings 61 . 
Of more immediate significance, on 8 April, Castle's first day in office, the 
Conservatives launched Fair Deal at Work, their own proposals for industrial 
relations reform, and the official records contain a note on the same day from 
Wilson to Castle referring to its publication and requesting a discussion as to 'how 
we can mount under your direction a serious study of the proposals 62 . 
Furthermore, he suggested that Castle establish a small ministerial committee to 
supervise the work and pointed out that the work was 'fairly urgent'. In response 
Castle reported that she had met Lord Donovan to discuss likely publication dates 
for his report, further indicating that reform was higher in her mind than the 
earlier exchanges suggest, given that she had only been in post for a matter of 
days. Donovan had told her that the report should be completed by the end of 
May and Castle suggested that, 'it would be sufficient for the Committee to be in 
being ready to consider the Royal Commission's Report just as soon as this is 
available 63 . 
1.3 Fair Deal at Work 
When Castle did come to look at the reform of industrial relations, there were two 
broad models available to her. The first, Fair Deal at Work drew heavily from the 
submission to Donovan by the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, 
proposals that began from the premise that a clear legal framework was an 
essential prerequisite for effective industrial relations. The detailed proposals 
focused on two main issues, the rising number of short unofficial strikes, and 
61 See NA, PRO, LAB 10/3418 'Royal Commission on Trade Urflons and Employers 
Associations' 15 March 1968. It was noted that the Cabinet Secretary had asked that the 
department 'give the earliest possible waniing of the point at which some collective ministerial 
discussion of the Report 1111ght be needed', and agreed that the permanent secretary should write to 
the Cabinet secretary as soon as the publication date was known. It was also agreed that 
preparatory work should begin based on the draft chapters that were beginning to come in from the 
commission and that they should identify those items on which action by the government would be 
needed, whatever the precise final recommendations of the commission 
62NA, PRO, PREM 13/2165 Note from Harold Wilson to Barbara Castle, 8 April 1968 
63 ibid. Note from Barbara Castle to Harold Wilson, 10 April 1968 
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strikes, both official and unofficial, that were considered to be against the national 
interest. 
Unofficial strikes were to be dealt with by making it obligatory for collective 
agreements to be legally enforceable, with unions liable for any action by their 
members in breach of such an agreement. Furthermore, for a wide range of 
strikes, including; sympathetic strikes and the blacking of goods or services of a 
different employer not in dispute with his employees (a significant problem in the 
motor industry); inter-union disputes; and strikes aimed at enforcing the closed 
shop, it was proposed that the legal definition of a trade dispute should be 
amended to remove the legal protection accorded to unions under the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906. 
In respect of official disputes that might affect the national interest, the Minister of 
Labour would be empowered to set up a Board of Inquiry to report on the dispute. 
The Minister would then be able to apply to a newly created industrial court for 
arbitration. If the parties did not accept the decision of the court, the Minister 
could apply for an injunction to delay the strike for a specified period during 
which there would be a secret ballot on the employer's most recent offer 
64 
. 
As we have seen, the significance of the proposals was not lost on Wilson. 
However, the initial press response was lukewarm and split broadly along existing 
party lines, suggesting that Castle was right to suggest waiting until Donovan was 
published before undertaking a detailed analysis. The proposals did not ment 
mention in the Guardian, whilst The Times concluded that there was a case for 
new laws, but only if they could be shown to improve industrial relations. In this 
context, the Conservatives had been 'insufficiently selective', and whilst a number 
of their proposals were sensible, 'it would not be useful to bind people, as they 
suggest, to observe a collective bargaining system which has ceased to 
function'. 
Rather the priority was to reform the system 
65 
. By contrast, the 
Daily Telegraph 
commented that the proposals were a 'commendable policy document' that started 
64NA, PRO, LAB 10/3422 RCR(68)4, 'Conservative Political Centre Publication Fair Deal at 
Work: The Conservative approach to modem industrial relations. Summary and comparison with 
Royal Commission Recommendations', 24 May 1968 
65 The Times, 9 April 1968 
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4very properly' from the premise that trade unions must be brought within the 
normal framework of the law 66 .A point supported 
by the Economist, albeit in a 
back-handed manner, 'the good part of their policy is traditional stuff by now', 
arguing that the Conservatives were finally supporting a policy that the paper had 
been advocating for a number of years and that it had 'hardly grabbed the 
67 headlines' 
The Conservative attempt to pre-empt Donovan was largely overshadowed by 
Wilson's reshuffle, and did little to ignite a debate about the future shape of 
industrial relations. However, as will become clear, it did reflect an emerging 
tendency towards a legalistic approach and highlighted the limitations of Donovan 
68 
and, as Ann Perkins has commented, closed down several avenues for Castle . 
Although, when In Place of Strife was published, many in the Labour Party were 
to accuse her of borrowing 'Tory' policies, and the Conservatives were to 
welcome her proposals as a step in the right direction. 
1.4 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 
The Royal Commission's report was published on 13 June 1969. It had taken 
three years to produce, ran to 145,000 words and had considered evidence from 
450 organisations and individuals. At its heart was an analysis of what it called 
Britain's 'two systems' of industrial relations, 'the one is the formal system 
embodied in the official institutions. The other is the informal system created by 
the actual behaviour of trade unions and employers' associations, of managers, 
shop stewards and workers' 69 . 
According to the Donovan analysis, it was the 
conflict between these two systems that was at the heart of Britain's industrial 
relations problems, and the solution was to bring the formal systems more closely 
into line with the informal through the medium of the factory-wide agreement, 
which would 'put an end to the conflict between the pretence of industry-wide 
570 agreements and the realities of industrial relations 
66 Daily Telegraph, 8 April 1968 
67 Economist, 12 April 1968 
68 Perkins (2003) p. 277 
69 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68 (Cmnd-3623), 
paragraph 46 70 ibid. paragraph 176 
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In order to facilitate the move towards factory-level agreements and improve 
collective bargaining, Donovan proposed an Industrial Relations Act in order to 
place an obligation on companies with over 5000 employees to register their 
collective agreements with the Department of Employment and Productivity as a 
means of encouraging good practice. In addition, it proposed the establishment of 
an Industrial Relations Commission that would be expected, on a reference from 
the Secretary of State, to investigate and report on cases and problems ansing 
from the registration of agreements. Significantly, whilst a failure on the part of a 
company to register its agreements would result in some form of monetary 
penalty, Donovan rejected penalties for failure to carry out the recommendations 
of the Commission, or for companies that refused to recognise trade unionS71. 
Having diagnosed the problem and offered a solution, Donovan then addressed the 
more controversial issue of enforcement and systematically rejected various 
proposals; making collective agreements into legally binding contracts; 
compulsory strike ballots; cooling-off periods; and automatic sanctions against 
those striking in breach of procedure agreements. The one exception to this was a 
majority view that protection offered under section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act 
1906 should be limited to those acting on behalf of a trade union, although the 
report was at pains to stress that 'none of us sees this as the primary means of 
securing a reduction in the incidence of unofficial strikes'72 . 
None of this was to 
say that Donovan was 'in principle' opposed to the use of legal sanctions for the 
enforcement of agreed procedures. However, they concluded, 'sanctions will 
remain unworkable until a fundamental change in our system of industrial 
relations has led to a situation in which employers may be able and willing to use 
such rights as the law gives them . 573 . 
Whilst the main body of the report reflected the two systems analysis, there were 
dissenting opinions. Peter Jenkins provided a valuable insight into the internal 
divisions within the Royal Commission over the direction of the report and these 
7' The refusal to endorse sanctions was not supported by all of Donovan's members and led to 
notes of reservation that will be returned to later. 72 ibid. paragraph 488 
73 ibid. paragraph 502 
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are reflected most clearly in Andrew Shonfield's note of reservation 74 . Shonfield, 
an economic journalist, argued for the introduction of the law into industrial 
relations on the grounds that, 'If organisations are powerful enough to act the 
bully then very special grounds are necessary to justify the decision not to subject 
their behaviour to legal rules., 75 Specifically, he proposed that the Industrial 
Relations Commission should have a more autonomous function, instigating its 
own investigations and able to exercise independent judicial authority in certain 
matters relating to collective bargaining. Under Shonfield's proposal, the 
Commission would be able to order both sides to 'bargain in good faith', and, in 
instances where either side had been found to disregard this, the Commission 
would have the power to fine those responsible. Shonfield's proposals were 
significant. Not only did they expose some of the tensions within the 
Commission, but they were also the subject of serious consideration by both the 
Department of Employment and Productivity, and Cabinet ministers when they 
came to consider strengthening the main Donovan proposals. 
Reaction to Donovan was not dissimilar to that to Fair Deal at Work. The Daily 
Telegraph rejected the report as 'complacent', concluding that, 'The advocates of 
trade union reform -a relatively new cause - are obviously not yet as practised or 
as eloquent as the experienced defenders of the status quo. 
76 By contrast, the 
Guardian supported the overall analysis that, 'purpose and will cannot be 
legislated into existence', and concluded that the report had 'wisely rejected the 
temptation to seek a solution in law 77 . The 
Times was more balanced. It was 
noted that the bulk of the report was a skilful attempt to steer a course between 
'legalist' and 'traditional' schools, and whilst there was some substance to 
Shonfield's criticism, overall the report was 'a remarkably forward looking 
document'. However, there was a slight sting in the tail, as the paper concluded 
that 'it could have been guessed that the report would come at a moment when 
78 
major strike threats are emphasising the urgency and difficulty of the problems' 
74 See Peter Jenkins (1970) Chapter 2, for a detailed account of the workings of the Royal 
Commission. 
75 Royal Cominission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68 (Cmnd. 3623), p. 290, 
paragraph 7 76 Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1968 
77 Guardian, 14 June 1968 
78 The Times, 14 June 1968 
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For Castle and the DEP this was the main problem with Donovan, for in 
grounding its prescription in the voluntary model and comprehensively rejecting 
enforcement and sanctions, it was forcing the government either to endorse an 
approach that was already under threat and accept a system that was buckling 
under the stress of increasing industrial tension, or to go beyond Donovan and 
embrace some form of enforcement and the sanctions that came with it. As 
Castle's officials concluded, the effects of implementing either set of proposals 
would be hard to predict, although for different reasons. In respect of Fair Deal 
at Work, 'it cannot be foretold how far employers and trade unions would use the 
new powers that would be given to them'79 . 
Whilst the effect of the Donovan 
proposals were unpredictable because 'it is hard to say how quickly and 
effectively employers and unions themselves can bring the changes in bargaining 
80 machinery about. ' It was for Castle and her officials to try and find a way 
forward. 
1.5 The political response 
Ministerial concerns about the direction Donovan was taking had been expressed 
as early as October 1967 when Ray Gunter, then Minister of Labour, had warned 
Wilson that the report was not likely to propose any radical solutions, rather it was 
likely to stress the need to strengthen the existing institutional framework and to 
81 reject proposals for any general legislation . 
Subsequently in January 1968 
Gunter met Hugh Clegg, a member of the Royal Commission and principal 
architect of the two systems analysis. According to Bill McCarthy 82 , 
Gunter 
complained to Clegg that the report was not radical enough. Gunter pressed for a 
more radical approach so that the government could be seen to be taking a more 
moderate stance. Clegg's response was succinct, if the minister wanted such a 
report he should write it himSelf83. 
79ibid. 
80 ibid. 
81 NA, PRO, PREM 13/2165, Note from Ray Gunter to Harold Wilson 27 October 1967 
82 Bill, now Lord, McCarthy was head of research for the Royal Commission 
" Interview with Lord McCarthy, Oxford, 26 May 2000 
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The concern that the report would not be radical enough was clearly on the 
ministerial agenda when Wilson suggested an urgent analysis of Fair Deal at 
Work and the setting up of a ministerial committee to consider the shape of any 
future legislation. On 22 April, Castle met Wilson to discuss the composition of a 
new committee and, following the suggestion of Wilson's Secretary of the 
Cabinet, Sir Burke Trend, it was agreed that membership should be drawn from 
two distinct groups. The first from those whose departments had a direct interest 
in both Donovan and Fair Deal at Work. In this group Trend included, the 
Treasury, Department of Economic Affairs, Board of Trade and the DEP. Whilst 
the second should include, 'one or two Ministers in a personal capacity' on the 
grounds that the committee might be responsible for 'formulating policy for 
legislation' 84 
. In the second group Trend included Fred Peart 
85 
, Richard 
Crossman, Fred Lee 86 and Jim Callaghan. Trend also proposed terms of 
reference; the committee was to consider the Donovan report and 'related matters 
which would comprise inter alia the Conservative Party proposals and to submit 
proposals for action' 87 . 
After a sequence of notes between Wilson's private office, Trend and Castle, 
membership of the second group was eventually finalised as: Gerald Gardiner 88 
Richard Crossman, Fred Peart and Fred Lee. In the light of his subsequent claims 
to have been deliberately excluded from the development of legislation, claims 
that will be shown to be true, the most notable absentee was Jim Callaghan. 
Following Trend's initial recommendation, Wilson's private office replied on 23 
April adding the name of Gerald Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, but confining 
comments on the others to, 'he [Wilson] would like, as you suggest, to consider 
these proposals at a later stage' 89 . Callaghan's name 
did not reappear on any of 
the subsequent lists. 
The extent of Wilson's involvement in the composition of the committee and the 
decision not to appoint Callaghan are significant. They demonstrate, along with 
84NA, PRO, PREM13/2165 Note from Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, 21 April 1968 
85Lord President of the Council 
16 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. 
87 ibid. Note from Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, 14 May 1968 
88 Lord Chancellor 
89 ibid. Note from Prime Minister's Private Office to Burke Trend, 23 April 1968 
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his concern for an urgent briefing on Fair Deal at Work, the level of his 
involvement from the outset, something on which his own account of the period Is 
notably vague9o. Furthermore, the decision to exclude Callaghan was perhaps a 
reflection of his close relationship with the trade unions. Callaghan had been 
elected as Labour Party Treasurer at the party conference in October 1967 and 
Kenneth Morgan has noted that, for the first time, his election 'built up a powerful 
alliance with the unions, whose spokesman Callaghan now to some degree 
became'91. Consequently, the decision to exclude him appears to indicate that 
Wilson was already concerned that any legislative proposals could antagonise the 
trade unions. 
The Industrial Relations Committee met for the first time on 30 May 1968. In 
attendance, along with Castle, were Gerald Gardiner, Peter Shore, Sir Elwyn 
Jones, Richard Crossman, John Diamond and Harold Walker 92 . The committee 
had been circulated with a memorandum from Castle dealing with the 
implementation of the report and the timetable for inclusion in the legislative 
programme. Attached to the memorandum were three annexes; a summary of the 
main points of the report; a draft of Castle's statement on Donovan; and a 
summary of Fair Deal at Work 93 . The 
first section of the memorandum dealt with 
the overall response to Donovan and, under the heading 'Should the report be 
implementedT set out Castle's initial response that 'the report is generally 
acceptable'. However, it was also noted that the Conservatives and 'organised 
management' were likely to contest the rejection of the legal enforcement of 
collective agreements and action against unofficial strikers 94 . Furthermore, the 
level of consultation would make it very difficult to legislate before the 1969/70 
session, and this would raise legitimate objections that reform was needed 
urgently and should start as soon as possible. 
90 See Wilson (1974), p. 746 - 747, 'In early December, the First Secretary, who had been working 
with a small group of ministers on her scheme, discussed the proposed timetable with the 
Chancellor and me'. There is nothing here to indicate that he instigated and chaired the group'. 
91Morgan (1997) pp. 285-287 
92 Respectively, Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Attorney-General, Lord 
President, Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the 
Department of Employment and Productivity. 
93 NA, PRO, CAB 134/2936, IR(68)2 Ministerial Committee on Industrial Relations, Action on the 
report of the Royal Commission on Trade unions and Employers' Associations, Memorandum 
by 
the First Secretary of State. 
94 ibid. 
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In discussion Castle noted that not only would the Conservatives and the CBI 
object to the lack of legislative recommendations, but the TUC were also likely to 
be 'wary' of the key recommendation that the emphasis of collective bargaining 
should be at the factory, rather than at the industry level. As a consequence of 
these reactions and the need for considerable consultation and further study, 
, 95 Castle suggested that her statement 'should be brief and as neutral as possible . 
Furthermore, the consultation process was likely to last until early October, 
suggesting that a white paper could not be published until the end of the year. In 
respect of the timing of any legislation, Castle reiterated the issues detailed in her 
memorandum and noted that the government had publicly stressed the need for 
early action on the report and that the opposition would expect it. In the 
circumstances, 'it was important that the Government should not be thought to be 
delaying action because of indecision 96 . As such, Castle proposed that she ask for 
a provisional place to be earmarked for a short bill late in the 1968-69 session and 
that there should be a second bill in 1969-70. In discussion, it was agreed that 
Castle should make a neutral statement, subject to endorsement by the Cabinet. 
Instead of being considered by the full Cabinet, Castle's statement was referred to 
the Cabinet's parliamentary committee that was chaired by Wilson 97 . Wilson was 
briefed on the key issues by Trend on 10 June, and the committee considered the 
statement on II June. In his briefing note, Trend summarised the views of the IR 
committee and offered his own analysis of likely public reaction. In Trend's view 
'there may well be considerable public support for the likely Opposition criticism 
of the report. And Ministers, when they have had time to digest the report and 
public reaction to it, may themselves want to go further on some points than the 
95 
ibid. 96 ibid. 
97 Peter Hennessy has defmed the role and responsibilities of the Parliamentary Committee thus: 
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report recommends. ' However, 'because action on the report could have profound 
and lasting effects on the structure of the British economy which need to be fully 
considered in advance', Trend supported the adoption of a neutral line and argued 
that Castle should avoid being drawn on the substance of the issues 'more than is 
absolutely unavoidable or to commit the Government on any specific 
98 recommendations' 
In discussion, two broad opinions emerged. There were those who supported the 
line taken by the IR Committee and argued that it was wrong to be defensive 
about a report whose analysis 'was in line with Government thinking and with that 
of most informed observers'. By contrast, there was wide support for the view 
that the government should avoid a blanket endorsement of the report. In a 
passage that echoed Trend's briefing, and therefore suggests that it came from 
Wilson himself, it was argued that 'the Government should not rule out the 
possibility that they might want to go beyond the Commission's recommendations 
in some respects'. 
Most notably, it was suggested that the government might wish to go beyond 
Donovan in respect of unofficial strikes, where 'it could not be taken for granted 
that implementation of the Commission's recommendations represented all that 
could be done about the problem of unofficial strikes'. In his summing up, Wilson 
noted that the committee endorsed Castle's statement as recommended by the IR 
Committee, but agreed that Castle needed to avoid giving the impression of a 
'blanket endorsement' of Donovan's recommendations, and should make it clear 
that the government did not rule out 'exploring in their forthcoming consultations 
proposals which were not discussed in the report'99. Subsequently, Castle issued a 
statement in which she acknowledged that the report was both detailed and far 
reaching and that consultations on future legislation were starting, as 'a matter of 
urgency" 00 
98 NA, PRO, PREM13/2165 
99NA, PRO, CAB 134/3031 Parliamentary Committee, 7th Meeting 11 June 1968 Item I 'Trade 
Unions and Employers Associations: Report of the Royal Commission' 
100 Guardian, 14 June 1968 
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It is clear from the discussions that took place at both the IR Committee and the 
parliamentary committee that the government was in a quandary as to the best 
way in which to respond to Donovan. For those who supported its overall 
approach there were concerns about how best to deal with the opposition from 
both sides of industry, so that adopting a neutral approach offered the opportunity 
to the use the consultation period to find a way forward. For those who felt that it 
did not go far enough in addressing concerns over trade union behaviour, a neutral 
statement was also supported because it bought time whilst more radical options 
could be considered. However, the need for urgent action could not be avoided. 
The publication of Fair Deal at Work and the supportive reaction of both 
employers and some of the press meant that the government had limited time in 
which to produce its own proposals. The consultation period was due to last until 
the end of October and it was clear that a white paper was needed by the end of 
the year. This gave the government four months in which to resolve its concerns 
and produce some proposals of its own. 
1.6 Seeking Solutions 
In looking to develop her own proposals, Castle was reliant principally on two 
sources; the formal consultation process during which the TUC and the CBI were 
asked to comment on the Donovan recommendations; and the response of her own 
officials as they worked through the detail of the report. In the historiography of 
In Place of Strife, it is Castle's officials who have been credited or blamed, 
depending on the perspective of the writer, for the more controversial elements of 
the white paper. Geoffrey Goodman comments that the case for legal intervention 
in industrial relations had been around in draft form. in the Ministry of Labour for 
some time, waiting for a suitably compliant minister to pursue it'01, whilst Peter 
Jenkins has argued the case for a more robust approach to industrial relations was 
confirmed by the merging of key elements from the Department of Economic 
Affairs (DEA) with the Ministry of Labour to form the Department of 
Employment and Productivity (DEP) in April 1968, an event that was akin to 
'theologians entering a corrupt monastery bearing texts' 102 . 
101 Goodman (1979) p. 572 
102 Jenkins (1970) p. 8 
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However, whilst the above writers have based their case on a Ministry of Labour 
submission to Donovan that appeared to advocate the legal enforcement of 
collective agreements 103 , an examination of the 
departmental papers and 
interviews with a number of those present in the department during this period 
suggest a more complex position. Certainly the creation of the new department 
brought an influx of new functions and personnel that changed the prevailing 
culture of the Ministry of Labour. Most notably this was seen in the creation of a 
prices and incomes division headed by Alex Jarratt who had been secretary to the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) from its inception in 1965 until 
March 1968, and of a manpower and productivity division whose deputy 
04 secretary, George Cattell had previously worked in the motor industry' . At a 
more junior level, the department responsible for dealing directly with Donovan, 
industrial relations one (ER-DI), was to be managed by a new recruit from the 
Department of Economic Affairs, John Burgh. An organisation chart showing the 
new structure is shown in appendix 1. 
How far, however, did this influx of new blood affect the nature of advice 
available to Castle? In order to consider this it is necessary to consider the 
organisational culture of the Ministry of Labour and the changes that occurred 
during the course of the restructuring. Ian Dewar was an assistant secretary in 
HýDl during 1968-69, and as such was responsible for much of the department's 
response to Donovan. Dewar entered the Ministry of Labour in the early 1950s 
whilst Sir Walter Monckton was minister, and confirms the view that, during that 
period, the stress was placed firmly on conciliation and a firm adherence to the 
voluntarist tradition. However, as industrial relations deteriorated during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the conciliatory approach began to come under pressure. 
Dewar recalls an article in The Economist, written towards the end of the 1950s, 
referring to the ministry as 'the expendable ministry', on the grounds that it was 
not perceived to offer any solutions to the rise in industrial unrest. When the 
increase in unofficial strikes in the early and middle 1960s led to discussions over 
103 Taylor (1993) p. 158 
104 Castle (1984) p. 449n. 'George Cattell had been Personnel Director at Rootes before being sent 
to take charge of Rootes' Linwood factory. He had also served on a Motor Industry 
Industrial 
Relations panel under Ray Gunter and had got to know Dennis Barnes who had recommended 
him 
to me as someone who was liberal on industrial relations issues and very interested 
in 
productivity'. 
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the need for a more rigorous approach to industrial relations, the ministry began 
hesitant discussions over the requirements of greater regulation. However, 
according to Dewar, many in the ministry, including himself and a number of staff 
05 working for him, were 'unsympathetic' to this point of view' . 
Another civil servant in the DEP, Alan Brown, reinforces Dewar's perception of 
the changing culture. Brown was a private secretary in Castle's office and recalls 
clear differences between those who advocated the implementation of Donovan, 
such as Dewar, and those who wished to go further and advocated what became 
known as 'Donovan plus' 106 . That position, whilst accepting the general direction 
of the Donovan analysis, felt that it needed to be given 'teeth' in the forrn of legal 
sanctions that could be invoked if the voluntarist approach failed. Among the 
advocates of Donovan plus, according to Brown, were Dennis Bames, Conrad 
Heron' 07 , and the new appointee, John Burgh. 
According to Dewar, Burgh had been brought in especially to deal with Donovan. 
Burgh, whilst claiming no direct proof for it, concurs with the view that he could 
well have been brought in as an outsider with no preconceived ideas. Burgh also 
acknowledges that whilst he was woefully ignorant of the finer points of industrial 
relations, he had seen the impact of unofficial strikes and industrial unrest during 
his time at the DEA and was receptive to the idea that 'something needed to be 
done' about the trade unions. Whilst he lacked the experience to arrive at specific 
policy prescriptions and, according to his own recollections, shied away from 
doing so, he was open to the need for action and became an enthusiastic supporter 
08 of In Place of Strife once it had been conceived' . 
Thus, whilst there is clear evidence of the growing pressure for a 'Donovan-plus' 
approach among senior staff, Dewar's recollections suggest that this was not 
105 Interview with Mr Ian Dewar, Penarth 7 April 2000 
106 Interview with Mr Alan Brown, Godalming 5 April 2000 
107 Douglas Barnes was appointed Permanent Secretary in June 1966, and Conrad Heron was 
appointed as Deputy Secretary with responsibility for industrial relations in the reorganisation of 
April 1968 
"' interview with Sir John Burgh, Sussex 19 July 2000. Burgh noted that he had read early 
extracts from Donovan over the Easter holiday in 1968 and that this was the first time he had come 
across a detailed explanation of the term 'collective bargaining' 
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necessarily shared amongst those within the division that would be charged with 
producing the initial response to Donovan and the early drafts of any government 
legislation, and whilst Burgh may have been amongst those supporting 'Donovan- 
plus' he was insufficiently experienced to impose policy prescriptions on the 
'experts' within his own division. However, there were other pressures for change 
emerging in the form of the new responsibilities for prices and incomes and 
perhaps it would be from here that some alternative policy prescriptions would 
emerge? 
Denis Barnes has written that the transfer of new responsibilities brought 
advantages, since 'it would contain the conciliation activities of the Ministry of 
Labour within a policy for which the new Department was responsible - 
conciliators would no longer be the engineers of inflationary wage settlements'. 
But it also brought disadvantages, for 'it more or less destroyed the remnants of 
any claim the Ministry of Labour still had to provide an "independent" and 
acceptable conciliation service' 109 . This view echoed that of the DEA that, in its 
submission to Donovan drew attention to 'the possible conflict between, on the 
one hand, the Government's responsibility of conciliation in industrial matters as a 
means of maintaining industrial peace and, on the other, their responsibility for 
promoting an effective productivity, prices and incomes policy as an essential 
condition for achieving sound economic growth"' 0. That conflict was confirmed 
recently by Alex Jarratt. 
When he arrived at the DEP as a deputy secretary responsible for prices and 
incomes, Jarratt's perception was of a conciliation ministry whose role was 'to 
keep the machine going', and whose senior staff were steeped in the culture of 
negotiation and compromise to such an extent that the inclusion of prices and 
incomes policy was never going to see the two roles working well together. 
Consequently, according to Jarratt, there was, 'virtually no' relationship between 
the different divisions within the department. However, in his view, reform of 
industrial relations held the key to the impasse that had been reached in prices and 
109 Bames & Reid (1982) p. 10 1 
110 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, Minutes of Evidence 25'h 
January 1966, 'Written Memorandum of evidence submitted by the Department of Economic 
Affairs in advance of the oral hearing' p. 65 2, paragraph 22 
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incomes policy. Jarratt had served for three years as secretary to NBPI during 
which time he had plenty of opportunity to observe the behaviour of trade unions 
at first hand. In his view prices and incomes policy had 'staggered to a halt'. A 
number of NBPI reports had argued that individual trade unions did not have 
sufficient authority over their members to effectively implement the required 
incomes policy. Furthermore, whilst the TUC's early warning and vetting system 
had been welcomed, questions were being raised as to the ultimate ability of a 
body such as the TUC to exert authority over its autonomous members. In the 
circumstances, something else was needed to constrain behaviour that was 
damaging the economy and the country and it followed, according to Jarrett, that 
some constraints on collective bargaining were the logical way forward"'. 
It is clear that a ministry steeped in the culture of consensus and arbitration was 
being yoked to a set of policy objectives that were, by their very nature, 
confrontational. By early 1968, prices and incomes policy was little more than a 
means of freezing wage demands, and as such cut directly across free collective 
bargaining. The old Ministry of Labour was now being forced into a dual role of 
determining incomes policy and then being required to manage the consequences, 
with any sense of an informal arbitrator was being rapidly lost. Similarly, the 
influx of new staff brought attitudes reflecting a different set of priorities. These 
were not staff whose main priority was to manage the existing relationship 
between management and labour. Rather, they were concerned with the wider 
economic situation. If the relationship between management and labour were 
damaging the economy they would be happy to see the relationship redefined. 
Such a change would not have prospered if there had been opposition at the top of 
the department. As has been indicated though, there had been a change in outlook 
amongst the senior staff which, when coupled with the different outlook of some 
of the newer recruits, enabled more interventionist ideas take root. However, as 
will become clear, the introduction of new strands of policy advice did not affect 
directly the initial work that was produced in response to Donovan. As Jarratt 
recalls, there was no direct working relationship between the two different sides of 
111 Interview with Sir Alex Jarratt, London 19 June 2000 
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the department. In addition, there still existed a core group of civil servants that 
remained loyal to the previous role of the ministry and the voluntarist tradition of 
industrial relations. Significantly, aside from Burgh who was still finding his feet, 
IRD I represented just such a group and, if attention is turned to the policy advice 
produced during this period, it is clear that the voluntarist tradition continued to 
prevail. 
Castle's officials spent some time discussing the most effective way to manage 
the Donovan report and concluded that there might be a need for inter- 
departmental committees at both ministerial and official levels,, once 'the 
Ministry had formulated its own views'. Subsequently, they recommended that 
an official committee be established with a small core membership, but with 
12 papers circulated to the other departments that were less directly concerned' . 
Burgh then established an official level committee, the Royal Commission 
Report Working Group (RCRWG) to work through the implications of 
Donovan. 
At the first meeting of the group on I Oth May, Burgh noted that the machinery for 
carrying out inter-departmental consultations 'had not been finally decided', but 
that 'there was likely to be a ministerial committee for this purpose' which would 
be chaired by Castle. If such a committee were established, it 'might be serviced' 
by an inter-departmental official committee. The working group's role would be 
to 'co-ordinate views within the Department, and would service any such official 
committee'. However, whilst the ministerial committee met on 30 May, it did not 
meet again until 6 November, and consequently Burgh's working group took on 
the role of the inter-departmental official committee, although without a 
ministerial committee for it to feed into. Burgh concluded that the group should 
meet 'as necessary' rather than regularly, and that there would not be a fixed 
membership. Rather, 'people should attend according to the subjects which were 
to be discussed. ' The lack of a ministerial committee for the working group to 
feed is significant. As was noted above, the ministerial committee that met on 30 
May to consider a formal response to Donovan did not give any consideration to 
112NA, PRO, LAB 10/3418 D. A. Bayliss to J. C. Burgh 29 March 1968 
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the content of legislation. The reasons for this are unclear, but, given the stress 
placed on consultation, it seems likely that ministers felt there was little need to 
have formal input ahead of the consultation being completed. However, as will be 
made clear below, Burgh in particular was clear about the political pressure 
emerging for a 'Donovan-plus' option, but met with little support from members 
of the working group. It is arguable that earlier ministerial input would have 
helped to focus official minds on more rigorous alternatives. 
The key question was how far the working group limited its role to addressing the 
practical issues of translating the Donovan recommendations into draft legislation, 
and how far it sought to critically appraise the relative effectiveness of the 
recommendations in the light of the identified pressure emerging for a 'Donovan- 
plus' solution. The tension between those who supported the former approach, 
and those seeking more rigour was evident in exchanges recorded during the first 
meeting of the working group. The working group received a paper outlining the 
priorities emerging from the early drafts of Donovan that argued for 'highest 
possible priority' to be accorded to the recommendations relating to the need to 
accelerate the, 'present trend from industry-wide to company or plant bargaining'. 
Furthermore, it was recommended that the government state its support for these 
recommendations immediately, a line that was consistent with earlier 
correspondence between Dewar and Burgh in which the former had argued for the 
release of a statement as soon as possible following publication of Donovan, 
endorsing and supporting the approach set out in the report 113 . 
In the general discussion that arose from the paper however, Burgh argued that 
whilst Donovan was likely to make recommendations on changes in the system of 
collective bargaining, 'it might be criticised for not suggesting more effective 
means of bringing them about'. For, 'Whilst Donovan proposed the registration of 
collective agreements by large firms, its basic voluntarist approach meant that 
further coercive measures were ruled out on the grounds that industrial relations 
could not be reformed by force'. Burgh continued, 'Ministers might take the view 
that a more vigorous approach was necessary' and he proposed that the group 
113 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3425 'Report of the Royal Commission - Reform of Collective Bargaining' 
I. S. Dewar to J. C. Burgh 9 May 1968 
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might consider what could be done along these lines. Consequently, he asked his 
officials to 'circulate a paper on the probable recommendations about the reform 
of collective bargaining, with particular reference to possible ways of enabling the 
Government to bring greater pressure to bear on employers for this purpose 114 
Burgh's intervention was significant. As we have seen, the parliamentary 
committee expressed a concern that the government might wish to go further than 
Donovan and that consequently, Castle should be careful to avoid a blanket 
endorsement of the proposals. It is clear that Burgh as a supporter of the Donovan 
plus approach was more in tune with current political thinking, and likely to be 
more sympathetic to it that the longer standing Ministry of Labour officials 
working for him. Subsequently, his officials produced a paper for the next 
meeting, 'The Reform of Collective Bargaining' 115 that set, as its stated objective, 
the examination of Donovan's assumptions with the aim of pointing out possible 
objections, drawing attention to other relevant recommendations and enquiring 
'whether more drastic action should be proposed by the Government to speed up 
the reform of collective bargaining'. 
The paper set out the basic recommendations of Donovan and noted that 'these 
recommendations [were] very much in line with the Department's thinking'. 
Under the heading of 'Other Possibilities', the paper considered a further five 
proposals that went beyond the recommendations of Donovan; 
a) Increases beyond those recommended by Donovan in the DEP's research, 
infonnation and advisory work, with particular emphasis on successful 
methods of conducting company or plant bargaining. 
b) Making the Commission for Industrial Relations' (CIR) recommendations 
enforceable. Donovan had suggested that the government should 
consider this if necessary. The paper indicated that this might be done by 
enabling the Secretary of State to make an order on the advice of the CIR 
requiring an employer or union to comply with a given recommendation, 
and providing for suitable penalties if necessary. 
c) Enabling the CIR to investigate without a reference to the Secretary of 
State, and giving it quasi-judicial functions. This proposal was drawn 
from Andrew Shonfield's note of reservation that was discussed above. 
114 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3422 RCR(68) 1" Minutes 10 May 1968 
115NA, PRO, LAB 10/3422 RCR(68)8,2nd July 1968 'The Reform of Collective Bargaining' 
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d) Enabling the CIR, if a company failed to register suitable agreements, to 
draft a disputes procedure which the minister might by order make 
binding, along the lines of Lord Tangley's note of reservation' 16 . 
e) Finally, it was suggested that negotiating arrangements could have to be 
formally approved by the department of the CIR, but crucially without 
any direct sanctions on those that were not approved. 
The paper was considered at the second meeting of the group on Thursday, 4th 
July by which time both the ministerial committee and the parliamentary 
committee had met and provided political backing for at the very least an 
examination of measures that went further than Donovan. The working group had 
no problem in accepting the section dealing with the Donovan proposals for 
reform and its measures to speed up the reform, subject to the request for 
additional papers on a number of the subjects raised. However, the section on 
'other possibilities' was greeted with less enthusiasm. Burgh noted that the 
actions outlined in (b) to (d) raised questions that were 'fundamental' to the role 
of the CIR, but, as if to put some steel into the discussions, told the group that 
Castle had told the TUC that 'any decision on the introduction of sanctions would 
depend on consultations, and that since public attitudes to trade unions were not 
favourable at the moment, the public would expect major trade union reforms if 
sanctions were to be avoided". 
In the general discussion that followed however, little steel was on display. 
Shonfield's proposal was rejected on the grounds that the CIR should be 
accountable to Parliament via the Secretary of State. Similarly, option (e) was 
rejected on the grounds that it was not current practice, and 'it could be 
embarrassing if approval were given and a serious dispute then arose. ' The 
discussion concluded by requesting a further series of papers on the details of the 
other proposals. Thus, despite Burgh's reminders of the political context, the 
working group was reluctant to proceed beyond Donovan's analysis. The only 
voice of dissent was that of an unnamed Treasury official who asked whether the 
country could 'afford a specialist "health service" to cure the disease of unofficial 
116 In a supplementary note, Lord Tangley proposed that the Industrial Relations Commission 
should have the power to submit to the Minister a disputes procedure code which the Minister may 
by order make binding on both parties. Donovan (1968)p. 285 
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strikes'. He argued,, 'that the problem was too large and wondered whether It 
would not be better to deal with strikes in other ways, for example by legal 
sanctions' 
117 
. 
However, whilst the working group may have been reluctant to go beyond 
Donovan, they did commission an analysis of legal sanctions that provides further 
insights into the prevalent thinking on the subject within the DER The first draft 
of a paper titled 'Sanctions in Industrial Relations' was produced with the aim of 
evaluating the different types of sanctions that were available to the government 
and 'their relevance and value in the U. K. ' The introduction to the paper set the 
overall tone; it was noted that arguments in favour of sanctions were based on the 
premise that unofficial and unconstitutional strikes were the root cause of the 
country's economic problems. However, the paper continued, 'this premise is not 
based on any quantifiable evidence'. Similarly, many of the arguments in favour 
of sanctions were considered 'too optimistic' about their likely effects. Crucially, 
the government would be resistant to starting penal procedures against workers or 
their leaders, as would employers. It was in this context, therefore, that the 
practicality of sanctions needed to be considered, and the paper then considered 
all of the available penal and civil sanctions before concluding that, 'None of the 
types of sanctions surveyed in this paper is likely to produce any marked 
improvement in the strike situation in this country' 118 . 
However, the paper continued, 'if there were a political decision that public 
opinion demanded some form of sanctions', the furthest a Labour governinent 
could go would be, the withdrawal of the protection of section 3 of the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 from unofficial strike leaders, and the repeal of section 4 of the 
Trade Union Act, 1871, enabling all collective agreements to be made legally 
enforceable if the parties so wished. However, '(1) would be very difficult and (ii) 
rather difficult for a Labour Government to carry through. ' As far as the 
Conservative Party's policies were concerned, it was doubtful whether a 
117NA, PRO, LAB 10/3422 RCR(68) 2nd Minutes 4th July 1968 
118 NA, PRO, LAB10/3422 D. A. Bayliss to I. S. Dewar I November 1968A note from Bayliss to 
Dewar, 1 November 1968 set out the work programme for the immediate future It was noted that 
there were nine or ten papers outstanding for the group to consider including a paper on 
legal 
sanctions. However, the working group 
did consider any of the outstanding papers as it did not 
meet again after 30 October 
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Conservative government would go as far as its current policies suggested. 
However, they might have marginally more options. Aside from the proposals 
outlined above, it was suggested that a Conservative government might wish to 
include two proposals from Fair Deal at Work; the exclusion of sympathetic and 
other forms of strikes from the definition of 'trade dispute' and the related legal 
immunities; and provisions for a cooling-off period in the case of strikes seriously 
endangering the national interest. 
The paper was a significant demonstration of departmental thinking. It followed 
almost exactly the lines of the Donovan report in outlining the practical problems 
inherent in the introduction of sanctions. Furthermore, it was seemingly endorsed 
at the highest levels within the DEP. Firstly, the paper itself was modified by the 
departmental solicitor, and was seen by the pennanent secretary, Dennis Barnes, 
who requested that it be circulated within the department'19. Secondly, and 
perhaps more significantly, the paper formed the basis of a briefing note for Castle 
in advance of a series of meetings with the motor industry in September 1968. The 
note was prepared by Ian Dewar who, as we have already noted, was not a 
supporter of the Donovan plus approach and who, in a covering note made it clear 
that, whilst he had set out a number of proposals for making collective agreements 
enforceable and for introducing new legal sanctions, he had 'no confidence at all 
that these would improve the situation in the motor industry. ' 
In the note, the growing pressure for sanctions was acknowledged: it was noted 
that the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders had written to The Times 
supporting Shonfield's proposals and that this had been reinforced by a letter from 
120 
Lord Hankey calling for 'legal backing to collective agreements' . Whilst the 
briefing stressed that 'at this stage' no government view could be given, it covered 
the same ground as the earlier paper, and its influence was evident in Castle's 
response to the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders when, at a meeting 
on 18 September, she was called on to respond to their call for the introduction of 
119 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3447 Note from D. A. Bayliss to I. S. Dewar with revised draft of sanctions 
paper entitled Sanctions in Industrial Relations' 14 August 1968. Handwritten comment 
from 
Barnes requesting that the paper be circulated dated 14 August 1968 
120 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3447 'First Secretary's Conference with the motor industry, 26th September' 
I. S. Dewar to Mr Marre 24 September 1968. 
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legislation against unofficial strikes. She commented that, 'the Donovan 
Commission had considered very fully the question of legal sanctions with 
particular reference to the motor industry and had concluded that they would not 
provide an immediate practical means of improving relations' 121 . To a certain 
extent Castle was constrained fTom expressing a more detailed view because of 
the ongoing consultation with both the CBI and the TUC, but it is also clear that 
the content of the briefing note indicated that the DEP was not proposing anything 
that went beyond the Donovan analysis. 
It is clear that Burgh, as chainnan of the working group was aware of the 
mounting political pressures to speed up the reform of collective bargaining. 
However, the response of the working group indicated that there was little 
enthusiasm for such an approach, and the detailed list of papers discussed by the 
group indicate that they were much more comfortable teasing out the policy 
implications of Donovan than in questioning its approach. When this was coupled 
with a lack of direct political input in the form of a ministerial committee it is 
clear that there was little incentive to question the Donovan consensus. The 
question then remains as to why there was such a lack of enthusiasm, particularly 
given the support for Donovan plus among senior members of the department, and 
here the sanctions paper is pivotal. The paper indicated both the depth of 
opposition to legal sanctions among the officials charged with the policy work and 
the genuine, practical difficulties involved in any attempt to implement them. 
Whilst there may have been a sense of something needing to be done, it was very 
difficult to construct options in the face of such concerted opposition. In the 
circumstances, Castle and her senior officials were left waiting to see if the NJAC 
consultation delivered any more constructive results. However, before then, 
Castle was faced with the more immediate problems arising from a series of 
official and unofficial strikes. 
1.7 The challenge of official strikes 
Official strikes were both quantitatively and qualitatively different from unofficial 
strikes. Whilst unofficial strikes were characterised by sudden, short stoppages, 
12 1 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3447 'Note For The Record, Industrial Relations in the Motor Industry' D. B. 
Smith 19 September 1968 
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generally arising out of local disputes, official strikes tended to be much fewer in 
number but, because they were generally the result of claims affecting a whole 
industry, the effect in terms of working days lost and consequently on the wider 
economy could be much more dramatic. The seamen's strike in 1966, for 
example, resulted in the loss of almost a million working days and triggered the 
July 1966 sterling crisis 122 . However, whilst proponents of reform could highlight 
a breakdown in procedure agreements and the divergence of local and national 
bargaining to explain the growth in unofficial action, official strikes were 
contingent on the wider economic climate. Consequently, the post-devaluation 
tightening of prices and incomes policy saw an increase in official strikes as 
workers protested against wage restraints. However, the fact that such strikes 
were official posed constitutional problems: any government seeking to restrict 
official action would face the charge that they were impinging on the legally 
enshrined right to strike. The Conservative solution was to target their proposals 
at official strikes that were deemed to be against the national interest on the 
grounds that an elected government had a wider responsibility for the economic 
well being of the country. 
For the Wilson government, the focus on prices and incomes policy had drawn the 
problems of official strikes into even sharper relief As early as 1966, the 
Department of Economic Affairs had drawn attention to 'the possible conflict 
between, on the one hand, the Government's responsibility of conciliation in 
industrial matters as a means of maintaining industrial peace and, on the other, 
their responsibility for promoting an effective productivity, prices and incomes 
policy as an essential condition for achieving sound economic growth' 
123 
, and 
through the summer and autumn of 1968 the Cabinet was faced with a series of 
official disputes which brought this conflict into sharp relief, confirming Alex 
Jarrett's conclusion that prices and incomes policy had 'staggered to a halt' 
124 
. 
122 See H. A. Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
3 rd Edition, 1976) p. 337 
123 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, Minutes of Evidence 25'h 
January 1966, 'Written Memorandum of evidence submitted by the Department of Economic 
Affairs in advance of the oral hearing' p. 652, paragraph 22 
121 Interview with Sir Alex Jarratt, London 19 June 2000 
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The first major dispute to reach the Cabinet was that of the railway workers 125 
The Cabinet discussed the dispute on 4 July 1968 where it was clear that the 
economic consequences of strike action were considered to be as important as a 
potential breach of incomes policy. In the general discussion, Cabinet were 
reminded of the impact of the seaman's strike and its, 6serious consequences for 
the economy', and it was agreed that a national strike would be 'a serious matter', 
with the government's willingness to face it being conditioned by 'their 
assessment of the consequences for the economy, the effect on foreign opinion 
and the likelihood of sympathetic action by other groups of workers, for example, 
in the docks' 126 . 
Three weeks later, Castle alerted the ministerial committee on prices and incomes 
to a proposed interim settlement of 15% in the shipping clerks dispute. In her 
diary Castle noted that she pointed out that the settlement was 'totally 
incompatible with P and I policy and that if they wanted me to accept it I should 
have to withdraw the bus standstill as one without the other would be intolerable'. 
According to Castle's account Anthony Crosland 127 'sat up in alarm at this, 
pointing out that 00m of exports would be at stake if the tally clerks came out on 
strike', to which she responded that, 'it is a very different thing to come down 
from the general in P and I policy to the particular' 128 . The point was reiterated at 
the parliamentary committee on the following day. According to Castle, both 
Jenkins and Crosland said 'unequivocally' that 'we could not afford a strike and if 
129 necessary we must climb down. ' 
The shipping clerks dispute did not go away and, on 17 October, the matter was 
considered by the full Cabinet. By this stage the potential for disruption had 
increased. The interim offer of 15% had been made, of which 5% was covered by 
increases in productivity and 10% represented a payment on account in advance of 
125 The dispute began in February 1968 when wage increases offered by the British Railways 
Board (BRB) were turned down and the National Union of Railway Workers (NUR) demanded a 
9% increase irrespective of any productivity deals. This in turn was rejected by the BRB and the 
NUR began a work to rule on 22 June. Following further negotiations, an agreement was 
negotiated on 5 July that gave increases of between 3 and 4.5% that would be paid immediately 
and was, according to Castle, attacked in the press as a 'sell-out'. Castle (1984) p. 477 note 126NA, PRO, CAB 128/43 CC(68)34th Conclusions 4 July 1968 
127 President of the Board of Trade 
128 Castle (1984) p. 498 Entry for 30 July 1968 
129 
ibid. p. 499, entry for I August 1968 
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an expected major productivity settlement. The Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU) and the majority of clerks, with the exception of those working in 
London's Royal Docks, accepted the interim offer. However the clerks in the 
Royal Docks had instigated an unofficial 'go slow' in protest over productivity 
conditions, claiming a general increase of 3-3.5% unrelated to productivity and an 
unspecified additional increase on account of past productivity agreements. The 
employers had decided to send home clerks refusing to undertake normal working 
and as of 17 October the Royal Docks were at a standstill. Castle summed up the 
now common dilemma; 
It was clear that acquiescence in the 15% offer, assuming a settlement 
was now possible on this basis, would have a very serious effect on 
incomes policy generally. On the other hand a major dock strike 
would have the gravest consequences for the economy. In the 
circumstances she thought that the right course would be to secure a 
settlement up to the limit of the 15 per cent interim offer but for less if 
possible; and she sought discretion to proceed on this basis. 130 
The subsequent discussion covered the arguments for and against settlement. 
Among those pressing for a settlement it was argued that the impact of a dock 
strike in London alone might cost the balance of payments f 50-f 70m over three 
weeks and 'deal a severe blow to our post-devaluation economic strategy'. To this 
group a settlement of 15 per cent would be harmful to incomes policy but need not 
be fatal. By contrast those against the settlement argued that to acquiesce 'might 
well be fatal to incomes policy' and that, apart from such practical considerations, 
'it was wrong that the incomes policy should be applied less stringently to those in 
a strong negotiating position than to those who were in a weak position'. 
In his summing up Wilson acknowledged that the dispute 'presented the 
Government with a most difficult choice. While it was clear that to concede the 
15 per cent increase would be harmful to incomes policy, the balance of opinion 
in the Cabinet favoured a settlement within this total if the alternative was a 
stoppage in the docks which would have the most serious effects on our economic 
prospects'. It was agreed that Castle should try and reach a settlement within 
130 NA, PRO, CAB 128/43 CC(68) 42 d Conclusions 17 October 1968 
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15%, but if this proved impossible and a serious strike was likely then 'a new 
situation would be created which the Cabinet would have to consider. 131 
The debate over productivity agreements and the reality of balancing maintenance 
of the prices and incomes norms with the impact of industrial action make it clear 
that, by the autumn of 1968, prices and incomes policy had, in Jarratt's words, 
f come to a standstill'. The 3.5% pay norm was under pressure in a number of 
economically crucial industries and, it is clear from the political debates, ministers 
were vacillating between a tough adherence to the policy and backing down in the 
face of threats of industrial action. Furthermore, the situation was creating 
perverse results, with smaller, less economically vital industries being held to the 
pay norm, whilst the larger, export industries were able to obtain better deals with 
little more justification. When this was combined with the outright rejection of 
any further prices and incomes legislation by the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) at 
their annual congress in September 1968, and the subsequent rejection of the 
policy at the Labour Party conference in October, it was clear that alternative 
measures were needed and attention turned logically to the control of official 
strikes. Donovan had identified the potential impact of large-scale official strikes, 
but had concluded that these were sufficiently infrequent as to not pose a major 
problem for industrial relations reform. Over the summer of 1968 it was 
becoming increasingly clear that not only were official strikes becoming more 
frequent, but some account needed to be taken of the wider national interest 
among those calling them, a potential answer to which was suggested by an 
ongoing dispute in the engineering industry. 
At a meeting of the Cabinet on 24 September, Castle reported on the breakdown 
32 
of wage negotiations in the engineering industry' . The 
dispute was between the 
Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) and the Confederation of Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Unions (CSEU). The national committee of the Amalgamated 
Engineering and Foundry Workers Union (AEF) had voted 31 to 30 to call for 
strike action in support of the claim. This had been critically received by other 
members of the Confederation, but the executive of the CSEU had endorsed the 
13 'NA, PRO, CAB 128/43 CC(68) 42 nd Conclusions 17 October 1968 
132NA, PRO, CAB 128/43, CC(68) 39hConclusions 24 September 1968 
50 
strike action. It was noted that a number of the unions were balloting their 
members and the result of the ballot by the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) was 
expected to show a large majority against the strike. At the next meeting of the 
Cabinet on 8 October 133 it was reported that, as well as the ETU ballot, the 
National Union of General and Municipal Workers (GMW) was also balloting its 
members and they too were expected to show a majority against strike action. It 
was also noted that both the ETU and the GMW had approached Castle, asking 
for the government to intervene. 
Subsequently, on 17 October, Castle was able to report to the Cabinet that general 
terms had been agreed involving clear productivity conditions and a settlement 
proposing wage increases in the region of 10% over three years. In the general 
discussion that followed, it was noted that the claim was of 'crucial importance to 
the economy and to incomes policy, and that the great majority of employees were 
opposed to the strike'. Furthen-nore, in the circumstances it was important 'that a 
satisfactory settlement should be reached which was not a defeat for incomes 
policy or a victory for militancy' 134 . The use of the ballot, in this instance 
therefore, seemed to offer a way of squaring the circle, and that is certainly how it 
appeared to Peter Shore, who has confirmed that he became a firm supporter of 
the strike ballot during this period because he saw it as an opportunity to spell out 
the economic consequences of their action to the wider workforce ahead of 
industrial action being taken and that, on the basis of the engineering dispute, 
there was clear evidence that many workers would respond positively to appeals 
made in the wider national, economic interest' 35 . As will 
become clear, Shore's 
opinion was significant. As an attendee at Castle's Sunningdale weekend a little 
over a month later, his support for the use of strike ballots was to play a 
significant part in their inclusion in the white paper. 
1.8 Unofficial Strikes: reaching an impasse 
Donovan considered unofficial strikes to be a consequence of failures in collective 
bargaining and considered that the problem was to be solved by reform of the 
133 NA, PRO, CAB 128/43 CC(68) 40'hConclusions 8 October 1968 
134NA, PRO, CAB128/43 CC(68) 41" Conclusions 17 October 1968 
135 interview with Lord Shore of Stepney, House of Lords 12 November, 2000 
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bargaining process. By contrast, the Conservatives sought to deal with unofficial 
strikes by making collective agreements legally binding and imposing fines on 
those who took industrial action in breach of the agreements. The Cabinet's 
parliamentary committee had acknowledged that the government might need to go 
further than Donovan in dealing with the problem, although it was hoped that 
solutions would emerge from the consultation process. 
By September 1968, unofficial strikes in the motor industry had once again 
become a major source of concern. Statistics prepared by the DEP indicated that 
the number of stoppages predicted for 1968 was the highest since the govermnent 
came to power in 1964 136 , whilst the number of working days lost (660,000) was 
second only to 1965 137 . The majority of these disputes were unofficial and lasted 
for between one and five days. However, the cumulative effect was a signIficant 
impact on production and subsequently on exports. On 17 September, Castle 
noted in her diary that she thought 'we must do something about the catastrophic 
deterioration which is taking place in industrial relations in the motor industry'138 
and proposed a meeting of both sides of the industry with herself in the chair. 
Whilst discussing this idea with her officials, a message was received from 
Donald Stokes 139 on behalf of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
(SMMT), requesting an urgent meeting. Castle arranged to meet with both 
SMMT and trade union representatives (separately) the next day. 
The Financial Times reported that the meeting with SMMT was called at their 
request, 'after the employers had decided they had to urge on her some form of 
support in combating unofficial and other strikes in car and component 
factories' 140 Castle notes in her diary that 'they were clearly desperate men' who 
argued that they had hardly had a strike-free day in the past few months and that 
the majority of them were 'wild-cat' unofficial strikes. According to the SMMT, 
'they didn't think the situation could be improved until collective bargains were 
136NA, PRO, LABIO/3336 'Industrial Relations in the Motor Industry' Note by the Department of 
Employment and Productivity 24 September 1968 
137 In September 1965 the Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour had instigated a series of 
conferences with the motor industry in response to the number of industrial disputes. 
138 Castle (1984) Entry for 17 September 1968 p. 515 
139Sir Donald Stokes, Chairman of British Leyland Motor Corporation 
NONA, PRO, LAB 10/3336 Extract from the Financial Times, 19 September 1968 
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made legally enforceable' 141 , 
but they agreed to Castle's idea of a joint meeting 
although sceptical. Following the meeting with SMMT, Castle met 
representatives of the trade unions. Castle had invited Hugh Scanlon 142 but he 
failed to attend. Those present 'sat there helplessly while I spelled out my idea' 
143 and noted that the event would fail without Scanlon and the AEF Castle 
concluded that 'my only hope is to force the trade unions to face up to their 
responsibilities publicly. 1144 
Two days later, on Friday 20 September, Castle visited Binningham and took the 
opportunity of discussing with both the West Midlands Engineering Employers' 
Association and the Regional Advisory Committee of the TUC the problem of 
industrial relations in the motor industry' 45 . 
The employers noted that they felt the 
future of the industry to be in jeopardy because of the 'anarchic' situation that had 
developedand made a number of comments on the perceived problems and 
possible solutions. Amongst their proposals was that collective agreements should 
be legally enforceable. By contrast the trade union representatives, in comments 
that mirrored the Donovan analysis, argued that the problems arose from local 
representatives being forced to operate within national pay negotiations and 
dispute procedures. The latter were considered to be 'ponderous, largely 
146 
ineffective and no longer respected by workers' 
Finally, on Thursday 26 September, Castle held her'great meeting'147 on the motor 
industry. Once again, Scanlon was absent due to a prior engagement 148. In her 
introductory remarks, Castle stressed that the majority of strikes were unofficial 
and unconstitutional and that, in the majority of cases, had not been pursued 
14'Castle (1984) Diary entry for Wednesday, 18 September p. 516 
142 General Secretary, Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AEF) 
143 George Barratt, Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions; Les Kealey, Transport 
and General Workers Union 
144 Castle (1984) p. 517 Entry for 18 September 1968 
145 In her diary entry, Castle claims that she was tough on both sides, calling on the employers to 
reform wage structures and the unions to come up with solutions that would produce results. 
Castle 
(1984), p. 518, entry for 20 September 1968 
146NA, PRO, LAB 10/3336 Note to Mr Heron from D. B. Smith 23rd September 1968 
147 Castle (1984) Diary Entry for Thursday, 26 September 1968 p. 521 
148 Scanlon was later to comment that he was fully engaged in negotiations with the Engineering 
employers and did not think it appropriate to break off to have general 
discussions about the state 
of industrial relations. See NA, PRO, LAB 10/3336 Telex report, 'The 
Car Industry Troubles' 26 
September 1968 
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beyond the initial stages of procedure. Responding, the employers confirmed 
Castle's analysis of the significance of unofficial strikes and concluded that the 
only remedy lay in legislation. The union representatives, whilst sharing the 
general concern, reiterated the Donovan analysis that had led to the rejection of 
legislation, and argued that the effectiveness of any such legislation would depend 
on the willingness of employers to instigate legal action, and 'it was unlikely that 
employers would be less reluctant to do so than they were to initiate civil 
proceedings for breach of contract at present' 149 . In her diary, Castle noted that 
the employers were 'obsessed by the need for legislation', but 'made out a sensible 
case for it' 150 , whilst 'drawing out' the unions was much more difficult. It was 
agreed that the meeting should be ad ourned and resumed in early October. i 
The meeting was considered important enough to warrant a seven minute slot on 
151 
that evening's ITV News at Ten . Whilst Castle made encouraging noises about 
the 'atmosphere of the meeting', the report focused on the absence of Hugh 
Scanlon. When interviewed Scanlon was asked about the employers' proposal 
that collective agreements be made legally binding. He reiterated the standard 
union line; employers were already able to sue individual employees for breach of 
contract but declined to do so; and the focus needed to be placed on effective 
collective bargaining as Donovan had recommended. 
The conference was reconvened on 7 October with Scanlon present. In her 
opening remarks, Castle noted that there were three main matters for discussion; 
the enforceability of collective agreements; reform of procedures; and the revision 
of pay structures. In respect of the enforceability of collective agreements, Castle 
once again stressed that this would need to be considered 'in the wider discussions 
which the Government would be having with both sides of industry on the 
152 Donovan Report' Whilst the employers reaffirmed their conviction that 
149ibid. 
150Castle (1968), pp. 521-2, entry for 26 September 1968 
151NA, PRO, LAB 10/3336 Telex report'The Car Industry Troubles'26 September 1968 
152NA, PRO, LAB10/3336 'Industrial Relations in the Motor Industry, Note of a meeting between 
the First Secretary of State and representatives of the motor industry held at the Department of 
Employment and Productivity on 7th October 1968' 
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legislation was required 153 , the meeting was then confined to discussions of 
procedure and pay structures and concluded with a joint commitment to the 
establishment of a national joint council for the motor industry. In spite of Castle 
concluding the meeting by noting that, 'in view of the urgency of the situation, it 
was clearly desirable for the discussions between the two sides to take place in the 
immediate future', the Joint Council for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 
Industry was not established until 26 November 1969. 
It is evident that Castle invested both personal time and prestige in seeking 
solutions to the problems of the motor industry, but the outcome offered nothing 
that could be usefully incorporated into a white paper. The employers remained 
convinced of the need for legislation that was opposed by the unions on both 
practical and political grounds. As we have seen, the practicalities of legally 
binding procedure agreements were questioned within the DEP, whilst politically 
legislation was opposed by the unions and proposed by the Conservatives; a 
combination guaranteed to give Castle pause for thought. In the circumstances, it 
was hoped that the response of both the TUC and the CBI to the Donovan 
consultations would provide a way forward. 
1.9 The outcome of consultation 
As was noted above, one of the reasons given by Castle and the department for not 
making a detailed response to the pressure for sanctions was the ongoing 
consultation with both the TUC and the CBI that was carried out under the 
auspices of the NJAC. Consultation was considered an essential part of the white 
paper process from the outset. The delay in the publication of Donovan and 
subsequent problems in arranging a meeting of the working group, meant that the 
paper was not discussed by the national joint advisory committee (NJAC) until 24 
July 1968, at which point it was agreed that responses would be needed by the 
middle of October 
154 
. 
153 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3 336 'Motor Industry Talks'. In an unsigned and dated briefing on tactics for 
the meeting, it was noted that, whilst the employers are likely to raise the need for legislation 
against unofficial strikes, they are unlikely to pursue 'in great detail or with great vigour' given the 
opposition of the unions and Castle's indication that it will have to be dealt with as part of the 
wider consultation on Donovan. 
154 NA, PRO, LAI310/3417 J. C. Burgh to D. B. Srn1th 21 June 1968 In some frustration, Burgh 
noted the 'overwhelming difficulties' that have been encountered on setting up a meeting of the 
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On 7 October, the DEP received the TUC's 72-page response, and it was clear 
from the outset that they were not minded to provide quick solutions 155 . 
Thus, the 
Donovan analysis failed to distinguish between the issues, 'which are common to 
all industries and those which are specific to particular industries'. Consequently, 
the General Council would need, 'to consult unions on an individual basis before 
they [could] commit themselves to a definite view affecting any particular 
industry 156 . 
The General Council's response had been predicted by Burgh in the 
early meetings of the RCR Working Group, and was to lead to the TUC 
organising a series of industry specific conferences that took place during January 
and February 1969. However, their initial response was of limited use to the DEP 
in its drafting of a more general white paper. It also confirmed the view expressed 
by Castle in her diaries, that the TUC had failed to grasp the urgency of the 
situation 157 . 
The sense of complacency was compounded by the General Council's response to 
all of the possible sanctions. The section dealing with the legal enforcement of 
collective agreements provided the most succinct statement of TUC policy. 'The 
General Council shares the Royal Commission's view that the legal enforceability 
of collective agreements would be both undesirable and impracticable. ' 158 
Similarly, in their response to the section dealing with strikes and the law on trade 
disputes, the General Council made it clear that they agreed with Donovan's 
analysis of the causes of industrial relations and with the analysis of the 
effectiveness of sanctions. As a consequence, strike ballots and 'cooling off 
periods were rejected with the comment that Donovan had 'exhaustively 
examined' the proposals and the General Council had nothing to add to the 
Commission's reasoning for rejecting them. Similarly, amendments to the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 were rejected with equal vigour. For a department and a 
NJAC. He concluded with the request that Castle 'will suggest to Mr Woodcock and Mr Davies 
that they should give instructions to their officials to co-operate in arranging an earlier meeting'. 
155 NA, PRO, LablO/3422 'Consultative document on the Royal Commission - Statement by the 
TUC General Council' 7/10/68 
156 ibid paras. 1-2 
157 Castle (1984) p. 477, entry for 2 July 1968, '1 can't see any revolutionary changes being carried 
through unless the Government is prepared to impose them on an unwilling TUC' 
158NA, PRO, LAB 10/3422 para. 38 
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minister anxious to produce effective legislation, the TUC response represented 
the worst of all worlds. On the one hand, the Donovan analysis was considered 
too broad-brush for unequivocal endorsement, whilst on the other, all forms of 
sanctions were rejected because, in the view of the General Council, they did 
nothing to solve the underlying problems that were caused by inflexible 
agreements. 
The formal response of the CBI was less ambitious in scope than the TUC 
document and confined to 17 pages but it was no less problematic. In their 
comments on the reform and extension of collective bargaining, the CBI raised 
similar concerns to the TUC. Whilst agreeing with Donovan's emphasis on the 
need for 'greater order in factory and workshop relations', and with the 
identification of the lack of flexibility in some industry-wide agreements, the CBI 
felt that there were a number of 'major defects' which needed to be taken into 
account in the development of a white paper. The 'two systems' analysis was 
considered to be too precise a formulation that overstated both the position itself 
and the conflict that arose as a consequence. 
Consequently, the CBI rejected the 'inference throughout the analysis that 
complacency and a reluctance to innovate, particularly on the part of management 
and of employers' associations, are at the root of most of our present problems'. 
Rather, it was their view that much of the blame for failure should be 'placed on 
factors outside the control of management, e. g. defects in trade union structure 
and organisation, inadequate control by unions over their members, and the 
latitude that the law allows both unions and "unofficial" combinations of 
workers'. Consequently, the CBI took the view that Donovan was being too 
optimistic in the benefits that would flow from the wider implementation of 
factory level agreements, and too simplistic in its general condemnation of 
industry-wide disputes procedures. Finally, the CBI echoed the TUC in rejecting 
the blanket introduction of the Donovan thesis; 'In practice the nature of the 
relationship between industry-wide and factory agreements is bound to depend on 
the circumstances of the industry and of the individual factory and it is neither 
practicable nor desirable to set a pattern for general adoption throughout 
industry. ' 
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However, whilst the CBI may have agreed with the TUC on the generallsed nature 
of the Donovan thesis, there was a significant difference over sanctions. In 
dealing with the section on the legal enforcement of collective agreements, the 
CBI echoed both the motor manufacturers and the Conservatives in stating that it 
did not agree that, 'a satisfactory case [had] been made out by the Commission for 
deferring action to make procedure agreements legally enforceable'. 
Subsequently, they called for a 'selective legal requirement' to be introduced. 
While acknowledging the view that not all procedure agreements would be 
enforceable, it expressed the view that 'where agreements are enforceable, there 
should be legal provision for their enforcement in two circumstances, viz. - where 
the parties to the agreement wish it, or where the CBI (or some other independent 
body 159) certifies it to be necessary in the public interest. ' The CBI acknowledged 
the reluctance of individual employers to initiate legal action against those in 
breach of such an agreement (a point made in the DEP paper on sanctions), and 
suggested that consideration should be given to a neutral body, such as the CIR or 
the Registrar acting in the public interest. 
The position taken on the legal enforcement of collective agreements was 
reinforced in the response to the section on strikes. Whilst agreeing with the TUC 
in rejecting compulsory strike ballots on the grounds that they 'would not be 
effective in practice and might indeed prevent the early settlement of strikes', the 
CBI were less convinced of the commission's arguments against cooling off 
procedures and felt that this was an area that they wished to consider further. 
Similarly, they were supportive of the proposals regarding the removal of 
protection for unconstitutional strikers currently offered under section 3 of the 
Trade Disputes Act 1906 160 . 
1.10 The way forward? 
Following the production of both responses, John Davies, director general of the 
CBI, wrote to Barbara Castle on 23 October on behalf of himself and George 
Woodcock, setting out a number of recommendations concerned with the 
159 It is not clear who was being referred to here 
160 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3422 'Confederation of British Industry, Report of the Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations' 7 October 1968 
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improvement of collective bargaining on which they were agreed. These included 
a joint review to; define the scope of both industry-wide and factory wide 
agreements; ensure that industry-wide agreements were appropriate to present-day 
circumstances; and ensuring that industry-wide agreements gave suitable 
encouragement to the development of effective collective bargaining at the factory 
or company level. However, as with Donovan itself, none of this proceeded from 
the sense of urgency that Castle and her supporters were beginning to feel, and 
conspicuously avoided any mention of the role and potential effectiveness of 
sanctions. In the circumstances, the responses to consultation provided little by 
way of immediate solutions and, when coupled with the conclusions of the 
working group pointed clearly in the direction of implementing Donovan rather 
than developing Donovan plus. For a minister in search of more immediate 
solutions, however, they offered little by way of a solution. It was becoming 
increasingly evident that, if Castle wanted solutions she would have to come up 
with them herself 
1.11 Summary 
Contrary to the received view, that the civil service were just waiting for a 
receptive minister on whom to foist their anti-trade union views, the new evidence 
indicates that, if left to their own devices, Castle's civil servants would have 
progressed little further than Donovan. Despite the best endeavours of the likes of 
John Burgh it is clear that, among those charged with developing policy, not only 
was there little enthusiasm for a more rigorous approach, there was active support 
for the Donovan analysis. Furthermore, the weight of experience of those 
developing policy made it very difficult to argue with either their support for 
Donovan or their opposition to the legal measures outlined in Fair Deal at Work 
and this in turn led inexorably back to the need for a political solution and the 
pivotal role of Castle. Wilson may have appointed her initially to tackle prices 
and incomes, but he would have been very aware that her interventionist 
tendencies would lead to a much greater involvement in policy development than 
might have been the case with other ministers. After all, one of the reasons 
Jenkins objected so strongly to her going to the DEA was a well grounded concern 
that her energy and enthusiasm would bring her into conflict with the Treasury. 
Whatever policy emerged from the DEP, it was always going to have Castle's 
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stamp on it, but it is now clear that her officials gave her little choice but to role 
up her sleeves and jump in. 
By the autumn of the 1968, Castle was caught in a cleft stick. Donovan had failed 
to deliver the radical prescription that many had hoped for, and whilst there may 
have been support for a 'Donovan plus' approach within the higher echelons of 
the DEP, the combination of a lack of clear political direction, the limited impact 
of departmental outsiders, and the strength of intellectual argument against more 
interventionist approaches, limited the available policy options. However, it was 
clear that Castle could not just limit herself to implementing Donovan. Prices and 
incomes policy was running into the sand, with the power of key groups of 
workers too strong to impose arbitrary levels of wage restraint in areas of such 
economic importance as the docks. Similarly, the rising number of unofficial 
strikes, especially in the motor industry, suggested industrial relations were 
running out of control as well as doing serious damage to key exports. 
Castle's challenge was made all the harder by the publication of Fair Deal at 
Work, which indicated that the Conservatives were prepared to consider radical 
options that went well beyond the existing consensus. Furthermore, the CBI 
supported their proposals, and could argue that their support arose from practical 
experience. By contrast, the TUC was not prepared to consider any options that 
went beyond Donovan and were reluctant to commit to any detailed proposals 
ahead of discussions with individual unions. 
Against this backdrop Castle's problems were significant; she was required to find 
a forrn of middle ground between the apparent extremes of Donovan and Fair 
Deal at Work that was both intellectually coherent and politically attractive. It is 
arguable that, left to her own devices, Castle would have left action against 
official disputes out of the proposals; ideologically she opposed crude wage 
restraint and was inclined to see attempts to control official strikes in such tenns. 
However, the problems associated with unofficial disputes did require action, and 
it was her attempts to find a way between these two extremes that forms the basis 
of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2- IN PLACE OF STRIFE: OCTOBER 1968 - JANUARY 1969 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the period from the genesis of a white paper in October 1968 
to its publication as In Place of Strife in January 1969. Detailed consideration Is 
given to the development of the white paper, and the respective roles of Castle, 
her officials, advisors and a range of outsiders, and to the evolution of an 
industrial relations philosophy that sought to offer something distinct both from 
the voluntarist approach of Donovan, and the legalistic approach of the 
Conservatives. Attention is then focused on internal discussions, the 
determination to avoid criminal sanctions, and the opening meetings and 
responses of the TUC and CBI. Finally, there is a detailed examination of the 
series of Cabinet meetings held before the white paper was finally published on 17 
January 1969. 
2.2 First draft: August - October 1968 
The process that was to lead to the white paper began in August 1968. On 19th 
August, IRDI produced an outline of a white paper derived fTom the Donovan 
161 Report . Consisting of 
little more than a list of headings, it was discussed at a 
meeting with the permanent secretary, Denis Barnes, on 22 August and it was 
agreed that, subject to some minor changes, the outline should form the basis of a 
162 first draft ready for discussion with Castle . The 
first full draft was produced on 
4 October, and circulated on 11 October. The paper was intended to form the 
basis of a discussion with Castle that was scheduled for 14 October. In the 
covering note to Castle's private office 163 , Burgh stressed that the term 
'draft 
White Paper' was a misleading description because the paper had been written 
before consultation was complete. Burgh's note drew attention to major points in 
the paper, but excluded any detailed discussion of sanctions. His justification for 
the omission was one of complexity, considering the subject to be 'so vast and 
161NA, PRO, LAB 10/3478 'Outline of White Paper on Donovan Report' 19 August 1968 
162NA, PRO, LAB 10/3420 'Note of conclusions reached at a meeting held on 22nd August 1968 
to discuss the implementation of the Donovan Report between the PUS, Mr. Burgh, Mr. Dewar, 
Mr. Bayliss and Mr. Brimmer' 
163 Ibid 'Donovan' J. C. Burgh to D. B. Smith 11 October 1968 
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important' that Castle might wish to discuss it separately. Consequently he 
proposed submitting a separate note dealing specifically with sanctions 164 
In overall terms, the paper accepted the Donovan analysis and omitted any 
detailed discussion of sanctions. However, it did refer to the proposals considered 
by Donovan; 'cooling-off periods; strike ballots; and the majority 
recommendation proposing amendments to Section 3 of the 1906 Trade Disputes 
Act. In each case, the draft paper included one paragraph for the proposal and 
another one against. In the section on strikes therefore, paragraph 27 discussed 
the introduction of a "cooling-off' procedure and endorsed the Royal 
Commission's rejection of the proposal on the grounds that it had 'not helped 
much in the U. S. A., and that it would deprive the Government of some of its 
freedom of action in a serious dispute. ' However, an alternative paragraph 27 
concluded that 'a procedure of this kind would be a useful addition to the 
instruments which the Government has at its disposal in dealing with a serious 
dispute'. 
Thus the first draft of the white paper was very much in line with the approach 
that the department had taken towards sanctions, offering little more than an 
endorsement of the Donovan analysis. It may have been the case, as suggested in 
Burgh's covering note, that the document was intended to stimulate discussion, 
but it also reflected both a reluctance on the part of the DEP to offer a view ahead 
of Castle's own deliberations, and a more general reluctance to advocate penal 
sanctions 165 . However, 
if Burgh's intention had been to stimulate debate he 
certainly succeeded. The meeting with Castle took place on Monday, 14 October 
and, as her diary records, she was not impressed with the draft: 
I plunged into the day with a lively office meeting on the Donovan 
Report. Burgh has put in a basic paper which is nothing more than a 
catalogue of Donovan recommendations and our suggested reaction to 
164 The paper on sanctions was discussed in chapter one. There is no evidence in the 
files, or in 
Castle's diary, that this paper was discussed with her specifically. However, as we have seen, it 
did form the basis for her meetings with the motor industry in September 1968 and as such she 
would have been aware of her officials' thinking. 
165 John Burgh has since confirmed that sections on sanctions were written in this way on the basis 
that decisions on the form or use of sanctions involved political rather than administrative 
decisions. Interview with Sir John Burgh, Sussex 19 July 2000 
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them. I held forth about the need for us to have our own discussions 
about whether we accept the Donovan analysis and above all our own 
philosophy of the role of the trade union movement in the present day. I insisted we must do a 'Windsor' weekend and fix 15 November on 
the spot. They went off reeling a little, but stimulated, I thinlýto 
produce various analytical papers on the lines I suggested. 166 
The doing a 'Windsor' was a reference to a weekend session that had been held 
recently at the Civil Defence Staff College at Sunningdale to discuss 
developments in prices and incomes policy. Castle regarded the idea of taking a 
group of 'experts' away for a detailed policy session as a success and decided to 
repeat the exercise with industrial relations. This was to lead to the session at the 
staff college over the weekend of 15 - 17 November from which the fully forined 
white paper was to emerge. 
2.3 Doing a 'Windsor': 15 - 17 November 1968 
Castle's comments to Burgh produced an immediate effect. On the day after the 
meeting with Castle he circulated a note on the subject of papers for the 'First 
Secretary's weekend'. In Burgh's view two papers were required; 'First, a 
description of the development of Government/Employers/Trade union 
relationships in the light of social and economic changes leading to suggestions on 
future relationships' 167 . 
This was to be written by Bill McCarthy, who, had been 
the head of research for Donovan and had been recruited subsequently by Castle 
to become a member of the DEP's research department' 68 . 
The second paper 
69 would cover much the same ground as the draft white paper' . 
McCarthy's background is important. He was a close friend and academic 
colleague of Hugh Clegg, and not a natural supporter of government restrictions 
on industrial action. Indeed he remained of the view that prices and incomes 
policy was a more effective means of controlling wage increases and promoting 
industrial efficiency. Consequently his paper sought to provide a historical 
justification for the intervention of the state in industrial relations, whilst rejecting 
166 Castle (1984) p. 528 Entry for 14 October 1968 
167 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3418 'Donovan' J. C. Burgh to Mr Marre 15 October 1968 
168 See chapter one 
169 Subsequently Burgh simply re-circulated the draft that had been discussed with Castle on 14 
October. Conversation with Sir John Burgh, Kew, 28 July 2000 
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general sanctions 170 . 
Subsequently, the paper set itself three objectives: 'first, to 
analyse principles that underline trade union law in Britain and to describe how 
they emerged; second, to relate these to the proposals contained in the Donovan 
Report; third, to pose what appear to me to be some of the main issues that arise in 
171 the contemporary debate about the future of trade union law' 
Firstly, McCarthy sought to demonstrate how a doctrine of collective laissez-faire 
in respect of labour relations developed at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Under this doctrine, the role of the state was confined to providing facilities to 
help the parties to agree, and was characterised by the belief that, 'so far as 
possible the law should be kept out of labour relations and the parties should be 
encouraged to develop their own 'non-legal' sanctions'. However, successive 
governments had undermined the doctrine, in particular in the period from 1964 
onwards, and when this was taken in conjunction with outright attacks on the 
doctrine itself, such as those expressed in Fair Deal at Work, McCarthy concluded 
that there was considerable confusion over the government's role in industrial 
relations. In this context, he argued, Donovan did not advocate a return to 
collective laissez-faire. Rather it recognised the potential for the abuse of trade 
union power especially through the closed shop and sought to enhance the state's 
capacity for useful intervention. However, 'Donovan never [faced] the question 
of the role of the State in industrial relations head on'. 
McCarthy's solution was to spell out the role of the state through a list of general 
principles or objectives that would govem its role and significantly these included, 
'the prevention and settlement of disputes likely to result in an interruption of 
production, especially in circumstances involving a serious threat to other 
important government objectives (e. g. the promotion of exports and the 
maintenance of public safety)'. Furthermore, as far as the use of sanctions was 
concerned, McCarthy argued that these should demonstrate 'specific and 
observable effects' that would 'advance particular policy objectives', and to this 
170 Interview with Lord McCarthy, Oxford, 25 May 2000 
171 Copies of the original paper do not appear *in the DEP files. However, an edited copy of was 
subsequently reproduced in Trade Unions editor W. E. J. McCarthy (Penguin, Middlesex 1972) 
pp. 345-365, under the title 'Principles and Possibilities in British Trade Union Law'. Interview 
with Lord McCarthy, Oxford 25 May 2000 
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end he rejected general measures such as the removal of protection under section 
3 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 on the grounds that it was impossible to say 
what would be the results of enacting them. 
McCarthy's paper was doubly significant. It went a long way to challenging the 
view that Donovan had simply reaffirmed the voluntarist tradition, but it sought to 
make explicit a philosophy of state/trade-union relations from which Donovan had 
shied away. In doing so it provided a theoretical underpinning for Castle's 
dirigiste tendencies. However, in calling for sanctions to be linked to specific 
policy objectives, it also provided Castle with the means to avoid the 
Conservatives' blanket legalistic approach, whilst justifying the use of sanctions 
in relation to specific ends. In retrospect, McCarthy is ambivalent about its effect: 
'I like to think the paper influenced her against general attacks... But they may 
have caused her to think up, or back, the three specific "penal clauses" she 
eventually came out with. -072 
Once the background papers were settled, attention could focus on personnel. On 
5 November, Castle circulated a note to the Ministerial Committee on Industrial 
Relations summarising the current position. She concluded that, 'Our decisions on 
industrial relations policy will be of very great industrial and political importance' 
and as such required careful thought and, in the circumstances, 'I am holding a 
private and confidential weekend conference on 15th-17th November, to which I 
have invited people from both sides of industry, the academic world, and 
government' 173 . The 
list was certainly wide ranging; 'In addition to myself, my 
two junior ministers (Roy Hattersley & Harold Walker), John Fraser and a 
phalanx of officials, I had invited Peter Shore as Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, Campbell Adamson (who was shortly to succeed John Davies as Director- 
General of the CBI), Donald Stokes 174 of Leylands (subsequently replaced by 
George Turnbull, Deputy Managing Director of Leylands), Jim Mortimer 175 , Len 
172 Letter from Lord McCarthy I June 2000 
173 NA, PRO, CAB 134/293 6, 'Progress Report on Consultations' 5 November 1968 
174 Stokes had been present at Castle's meeting with the Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders on 18 September 1968. NA, PRO, LAB 10/3447, 'Note for the record, Industrial Relations 
in the Motor Industry' D. B. Smith 19 September 1968 
175 National Official, Draughtman's and Allied Technicians' Association (DATA) and member of 
NBPI since May 1968 
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Neal 176 , Aubrey Jones' 
77 
. Professor Clegg of the Donovan Commission and 
178 Professor Robertson of Glasgow, another of the Department's trouble-shooters' 
Perhaps the most striking thing to emerge about the list of invitees was the 
absence of senior trade unionists. Jim Mortimer was a full-time union official and 
had recently co-authored a book calling for certain trade union rights to be 
enshrined in law, but he was still a relatively junior figure and did not, for 
example, sit on the TUC general council 179 . His attendance suggests a genuine 
attempt to get beyond the kind of stock responses that had been all too evident in 
the formal responses of the TUC and CBI to Castle's consultation document. 
Whatever the seniority of those present however, those invited were almost 
guaranteed not to provide a consensus. Adamson and Turnbull could be expected 
to follow the interventionist line advocated by the CBI and expressed by the 
Society of Motor Manufacturers, whilst Mortimer would be expected to support 
extended trade union rights; Clegg was unlikely to deviate from the arguments 
made in Donovan. In the circumstances, an environment was being created in 
which an 'open' discussion was inevitable and such proved to be the case. 
A note of the weekend does not appear in the official records and there are doubts 
as to whether a formal record of the weekend was taken 180 . As such, the only 
written account is that found in Castle's diaries. However, if this is taken together 
with the eye-witness accounts of a number of those present, it is possible to piece 
together an impression of the main events. According to Castle's diaries, the 
weekend started with a dinner on the Friday evening and then continued all day on 
181 Saturday . There is no diary entry for Sunday 17 November and entries resume 
on Monday 18 November. However, according to two of those present at the 
176 From 1967 labour relations advisor to Esso Europe Inc. Member of British Railways Board 
from 1967 to deal with labour relations side. Came into contact with Castle during railway guards, 
6go-slow' in Septmber 1967. See Castle(1984) Entry for 25 September 1968 and footnote p. 298 
177 Chairman of NBPI from inception in 1965 and former Conservative minister 
178 Castle (1984) p. 549, entry for 15 November 1968 
179 C. Jenkins & J. E. Mortimer, The Kind of Laws the Unions ought to Want, (Pergamon Press, 
Oxford 1968) which called for the enshrining in law of certain trade union rights including the 
right to free collective bargaining. 
180 Alan Brown, former private secretary in Castle's office, was the organiser of the weekend. He 
did not take a formal record, assuming that IRD1 would be doing so. However, no such record 
appears in the relevant files. Interview with Mr Alan Brown, Godalming, 5 April 2000 
181 Castle (1984) pp. 549-5 5 1, entries for 15,16 November 1968 
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weekend, McCarthy and Burgh, a crucial meeting took place on the Sunday that is 
not recorded in either the published diaries or the original transcripts. On the 
basis of their accounts, the formal discussions were completed on the Saturday at 
which point the majority of those present left. However, officials were retained 
for a meeting with Castle on the Sunday. At this meeting Castle outlined the 
proposals that she wanted included in the white paper and McCarthy was charged 
with producing the first draft. There is no record of the meeting with officials in 
the original transcripts 
The majority of Castle's account is contained in an italicised section between the 
entries for Friday 15 and Saturday 16 November. These sections were not 
contemporaneous, but were added when the diaries were prepared for publication 
as linking passages or points of explanation. According to the section covering 
the conference, the two most contentious elements of the white paper, the 
conciliation pause and the strike ballot, 'began to emerge' from the general 
discussion, with Peter Shore identified as the principal instigator. The section 
concludes, 'altogether there was a surprising amount of agreement between us, 
182 though some would have preferred to go further' . However, this claim of a 
gradually emerging consensus is directly contradicted by three of those present. 
According to McCarthy, Castle refused to be drawn during all of the discussions 
on Donovan, both prior to and during the Sunningdale debates 183 . Whilst she was 
prepared to comment on departmental proposals, she was not prepared to offer her 
own views. Similarly, during the discussions at Sunningdale she was prepared, in 
McCarthy's words, for the 'battle to rage' between the various interests 
represented at the meeting whilst reserving her own position. In particular, 
McCarthy recalls Clegg systematically destroying each of the arguments put 
forward for greater intervention and the use of sanctions but, such was the lack of 
resolution that, after Castle had gone to bed on the Saturday evening, McCarthy 
182 Castle (1984) pp. 549-550 Throughout the diary Castle uses italicised 'linking' sections to 
explain the background to particular events or policies and, although not made explicit, it would 
seem that these were added at the time of publication to add clarity or context. Generally, they are 
included between individual diary entries, for example between pp. 560-562, entries for 28 
November and 2 December 1968, giving details of the white paper. The section quoted is unusual 
in that it breaks up the single entry for 15 November. 
183 Interview with Lord McCarthy, Oxford 25 May 2000 
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recalls asking Bernard Ingham' 84 what she was going to say in the morning and 
Ingham professing that he had no idea. Others present at the weekend, notably Ian 
Dewar and Alan Brown, also recalled a robust debate. Dewar recalls the overall 
atmosphere being pro intervention and being one of the minority speaking out 
against a more interventionist approach' 85. Similarly, Brown recalls Jim Mortimer 
making the case for trade union rights, only to be countered by the representatives 
from industry who called for these to be matched by a greater sense of trade union 
responsibility 186 . 
In this revised context, Castle's presentation of the emergence of the penal clauses 
needs some qualification. Whilst Peter Shore has confinned that he was an 
advocate of both the conciliation pause and the strike ballot 187 , 
it would seem 
likely that these were raised as options within the overall debate rather than being 
agreed upon as a general way forward. This would account for an entry in Tony 
Benn's diary for Saturday 16 November 188 . He recounts the 
details of a dinner at 
Chequers on that evening at which Peter Shore was present having, presumably, 
come directly fTom Sunningdale. During the course of dinner the discussion 
turned to industrial relations and Benn noted that those present agreed that the 
strike ballot and the conciliation pause were to be supported. This appears to 
confirm that they were at least discussed at the conference as it seems highly 
likely that Shore, having proposed the measures, would have been keen to enlist 
Wilson's support when given the opportunity. However, that does not confirm that 
they were agreed at Sunningdale, merely that they were discussed. This would 
also account for Jim Mortimer's recollection of the weekend, subsequently 
confirmed in interview, that the specific penal clauses were not discussed while he 
was there' 89 . 
184 Castle's Press Secretary 
185 Interview with Ian Dewar, Penarth 7April 2000 
186 Interview with Alan Brown, Godahning 5 April 2000 
187 Interview with Lord Shore of Stepney, House of Lords 10 May 2000 
188 Benn (1988) pp. 121-123, entry for 16 November 1968 
189 J. E. Mortimer, A Life on the Left (The Book Guild Ltd, Sussex 1998) p. 247 'The discussion 
centred around proposals for a new Commission for Industrial Relations, employment rights, 
industrial relations at the workplace level and trade union recognition. I do not recall any 
signIficant exchange of views about possible new legislative sanctions against trade unions'. 
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All of the guests departed on Saturday night, leaving Castle and her officials to 
discuss the content of the white paper. McCarthy recalls waiting for Castle to 
emerge from breakfast on Sunday morning and having no idea what to expect, 
whilst Burgh remembers Castle make a 'stately' entrance, sitting down and 
proceeding to give a skeleton of the main contents of the white paper. McCarthy 
has confirmed this. According to his account, he was told to get a pencil and take 
down what was to be done. The substance of her proposals followed Donovan 
but, 'Just as I thought we were out of the woods she came up with the three penal 
clauses' 190 . The three penal clauses being the strike ballot, conciliation pause and 
the enforcement of decisions of the CIR 
What emerges from this revised version of events is that the white paper was 
almost entirely Castle's creation. As we have seen, this was always likely to be 
the case once it became clear that the TUC, CBI and even her own department had 
little to offer beyond well rehearsed positions. It did not emerge out of the 
consensus that her diary seeks to portray and this is crucial to an understanding of 
much that followed. Castle's unwavering faith in the white paper reflected its 
genesis on that solitary Saturday night and Sunday. The lack of consensus 
amongst those present continued to provide an insurmountable barrier to its 
progress in the months that followed, whilst Castle's strength of conviction led her 
to alienate many of her Cabinet colleagues through failures of consultation. In the 
circumstances it is perhaps understandable that she should seek to present the 
events of that weekend in a very different light. 
2.4 'Partners in Progress' 191 
McCarthy wrote the first draft of what was to become In Place of Strife in the two 
days following Sunningdale. Provisionally entitled 'Partners in Progress, A 
Policy for Industrial Relations', the first draft had just 6 sections, unlike Donovan 
and the pre-Sunningdale draft that had 16 and 15 sections respectively. McCarthy 
recalls that Castle did not like his title, but that, in turn, he thought her choice, 'a 
bit daft - if only because my first sentence began, "There 
has always been 
190 Letter from Lord McCarthy, I June 2000 
191 'Partners in Progress -A Policy for Industrial Relations', undated first draft provided by Lord 
McCarthy, I June 2000 
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conflict.. "' Significantly, whilst there were a number of additions and 
amendments before its publication in January 1969, the majority of In Place of 
Strife remained as drafted by McCarthy in the two day period following 
Sunningdale. 
McCarthy's draft reduced the somewhat cumbersome DEP submission to a more 
manageable size. The first two chapters covered much the same ground as his 
Sunningdale paper, setting out the case for state involvement in industrial 
relations, and the case for action under four broad headings: the refonn of 
collective bargaining; the extension of collective bargaining; aid to those involved 
in collective bargaining; and measures that were needed to deal with the 
outstanding problems that would remain 'even within a refori-ned and extended 
system of collective bargaining. ' 
Castle has always maintained that In Place of Strife was intended as a statement of 
trade union rights and responsibilities with its main aim being the strengthening of 
trade unions and the rights of individual trade unionists 193 . This claim was 
derided by her opponents from the moment the proposals became known, with all 
attention focused on what were to become known as the 'penal clauses'. 
However, a detached reading of McCarthy's first draft reveals just how far this 
was the case. 
The chapters on the reform and extension of collective bargaining were largely a 
reaffirmation of Donovan. Proposals for the reform of collective bargaining 
accepted the Donovan 'two-systems' analysis and called for a reappraisal of 
collective bargaining arrangements by management and trade unions, to be 
supported by the establishment of the CIR and the registration of agreements 
(initially confined to companies with over 5000 employees). Similarly joint 
moves for the legal enforcement of collective agreements were to be encouraged 
through the amendment of section 4 of the 1871 Trade Union Act, although they 
were not to be made compulsory. However, in a direct attack on the Conservative 
proposals, the paper rejected compulsory legal enforcement: 'The 
Governinent 
192 Letter from Lord McCarthy 25 August 2000 
193 Interview with Baroness Castle of Blackburn, Buckinghamshire, 3 March 2000 
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does not believe, however, that a more ordered system of collective bargaining 
can be achieved by a law designed to change non-legal obligations into legal 
obligations. ' Furthermore, the paper argued that the trade unionists had a right to 
expect adequate information to enable them to take a view on new management 
proposals. To this end, the paper proposed to give trade unions a legal right to 
certain categories of information from employers with whom they negotiated. 
Similarly, considering the extension of collective bargaining, the paper proposed 
to give the CIR powers to intervene in recognition disputes, both between firms 
and trade unions and between two or more trade unions seeking recognition within 
the same firm, based on the premise that the goverm-nent sought to, 'encourage the 
growth of collective bargaining based on strong and independent trade unions'. 
To this end, the paper also proposed to make it illegal for employers to sack 
workers for being members of a trade union and proposed the establishment of a 
trade union recognition fund to support an increase in full time trade union 
officials and expand shop steward training, concluding that its proposals aimed, 
'to assist union growth, extend recognition and expand collective bargaining'. 
It is clear that the bulk of the proposals were aimed at strengthening and 
improving collective bargaining largely through an extension of trade union 
rights. The only area of likely contention in these sections related to proposals for 
the government to hold a reserve power to fine both employers and trade unions in 
the event of either failing to abide by a ruling of the CIR during a recognition 
dispute. The final section of the paper moved on to 'problems that remain' and 
once again opened with the rights of the worker and the problem of unfair 
dismissal. Whilst it might 'be possible to rely on collective bargaining' to resolve 
the problem, this would take time and in the interim the government was prepared 
to legislate against unfair dismissal. However, with a hint of what was to come, it 
was argued that, 'when action is taken to reinforce and extend the influence of 
trade unions ... it is arguable that some 
degree of public regulation is both required 
and justified'. To this end, a special section of the Industrial Court would be 
empowered to hear complaints from both unionists and non-unionists concerning 
allegations of arbitrary exclusion from trade union membership and related 
matters. 
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Finally, the section turned to the issue of strikes, noting that, 'these reforms may 
take some time, and that even when they are complete there is still the possibility 
of disruptive and economically disastrous strikes which Britain can ill-afford. ' To 
this end, the paper proposed two 'selective' measures, the first to deal with official 
strikes and the second to deal with unofficial strikes. In the case of the former, the 
strike ballot was to be invoked, whilst in the latter the 28-day 'cooling-off period 
or conciliation pause was to be used. In both cases, the Secretary of State was to 
be given the discretionary power to enforce such measures and the power would 
only be used where the Secretary of State believed that 'the strike proposed 
would involve a serious threat to the general economy or the national interest5. 
Much emphasis was placed on the discretionary nature of the power and the fact 
that it was not intended to be used in a blanket manner. Similarly, the sanctions 
behind both measures would be for the government to determine. The paper went 
as far as to say that, in the case of a refusal to comply with a compulsory ballot, 
the sanction would take the form of a fine against the union concerned. However, 
in the case of the conciliation pause it was assumed that the unions would not take 
any action to undermine an order requiring a return to work, but 'it follows that if 
the order is not complied with action will have to be taken against certain 
individuals or groups. ' It was this proposal that the trade unions were to condemn 
immediately as the start of the criminalisation of strikers. 
At first glance the proposals seemed to mirror those of the Conservatives who had 
proposed the use both of the strike ballot and the conciliation pause. However, 
there were significant differences; the overall approach of the draft confirmed the 
validity of the Donovan analysis; there were a series of proposals that offered a 
considerable extension of trade union rights; and the paper rejected the legalistic 
approach to sanctions of Fair Deal at Work. Under Castle's proposals, the power 
to order a strike ballot or instigate a 'cooling-off period was given to the Secretary 
of State rather than the courts. The decision became political rather than legal. 
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As Castle has since noted, it would be her responsibility to put the case before the 
194 House of Commons and justify her reasoning on a case-by-case basis 
Finally, the Conservatives had proposed the use of a conciliation pause and strike 
ballot for official strikes whilst seeking to rely on the legal enforcement of 
collective agreements to deal with unofficial action. By contrast, Castle had 
rejected the legal approach and opted to use strike ballots for official strikes 
considered to be against the national interest and the conciliation pause in the case 
of unofficial strikes. The difference was significant. Castle has always argued 
that she was opposed to strike ballots and that they were Wilson's idea. There is 
no direct evidence of Wilson's involvement and in his own record of the period he 
restricts his comments to the decision in April 1969 to leave ballots out of the 
interim white paper 195 . His close colleague Peter Shore was a 
firm supporter of 
the strike ballot, concerned primarily with the economic effects of industrial 
action. In Shore's view, calling a strike ballot in cases considered to be contrary 
to the national interest gave the government the opportunity to go over the heads 
of the trade union leaders and make the economic case directly to the workers 
involved' 96 . For a prime minister who 
had seen his economic strategy blown off 
course by small groups of 'politically motivated men', being able to appeal above 
their heads to the wider workforce would have seemed an attractive proposition. 
If the approach to official strikes was driven by wider economic considerations, 
the approach to unofficial strikes was more firmly rooted in the day-to-day 
problems of industrial relations. Once the legal approach had been rejected, there 
were limited tools available. The choice of the conciliation pause, however, 
satisfied a number of considerations. It was not a blanket sanction, but rather 
would be applied on a case-by-case basis, and remained a political decision 
governed by consideration of the national interest. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly from the industrial relations perspective, under the terms of the 
conciliation pause, both sides were to return to the status quo. This meant that 
whatever incident had led to the dispute, for example a perceived unfair 
dismissal, 
194 Interview with Baroness Castle of Blackburn, Buckinghamshire 3 March 2000 
195 See Wilson (1974) p. 808 
196 Interview with Lord Shore of Stepney, House of Lords, 12 November 2000 
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was to be rescinded to give both sides a chance to either negotiate a settlement or 
put in place the procedures required to enable settlements to take place. 
According to Castle this meant that it was generally the employers who were 
required to make the first move because of the number of disputes arising from 
'arbitrary action by management' 197 . 
The first draft of what was to become In Place Of Strife sought then to balance a 
number of considerations. It accepted and supported the Donovan analysis; it 
rejected the legalistic approach being proposed by the Conservatives and the 
employers associations; it recognised that Donovan's proposed reforms could not 
take place fast enough to avoid ongoing disputes and that measures would be 
required to control strike action; it proposed the extension of trade union rights 
into a number of important areas; and it proposed two specific measures which 
were carefully designed to control those strikes considered damaging to the 
national interest without placing blanket restrictions on the basic right to strike. 
As such, it can be argued that the draft paper contained a well balanced set of 
proposals which provided a coherent analysis of the current state of industrial 
relations, and sought to couple enhanced trade union rights with a wider set of 
responsibilities. However, it can equally be argued that it was naive to assume 
that the carefully balanced set of rights and responsibilities would survive the 
realpolitik of Cabinet and trade union negotiations, assuming that the trade unions 
would have allowed it to work anyway. It is to these 'smoke-filled rooms' that 
consideration must now be given. 
2.5 First Reactions: November 1968 
McCarthy worked very quickly, and his draft was with the DEP by Wednesday 19 
November. In parallel, the DEP was producing its own sections, initial drafts of 
which were circulated within the department on Thursday 20 November 
198. work 
was then undertaken to bring the two elements together, and the first draft was 
completed on Wednesday 27 November'99. In practice, aside from a few technical 
additions, the draft remained as McCarthy had written it. It was sent to 
Castle and 
197 Interview with Baroness Castle of Blackburn, Buckinghamshire 3 March 2000 
198 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3478 I. S. Dewar to J. C. Burgh, 20 November 1968 
199NA, PRO, LAB 10/3478 Note from J. C. Burgh to A. W. Brown, 27 November 1968, 'Draft White 
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copied to all senior staff within the DER In the covering note, Burgh noted that 
the draft arose from the weekend conference and was based on a first draft written 
by McCarthy, which 'incorporates part of an alternative paper written by Mr 
Dewar'200 . It was also noted that the paper had not been cleared within the 
department before going to Castle and asked that any amendments be submitted 
by Friday 29 November. 
In parallel with the production of the draft, discussions were taking place about 
the 'tactics and timing for consultations'201 . At a meeting on 20 November, Sir 
Denis Bames, Conrad Heron and Burgh considered the key events of the coming 
weeks. The draft white paper would be circulated to ministers and discussed by 
the ministerial committee on industrial relations during the second week of 
December. The Cabinet office had already been alerted to the need for meetings 
on 10 and 16 December. Subsequently, a joint meeting was planned for early 
January to which the CBI, nationalised industries and the TUC would be invited. 
At this meeting it was suggested that Castle would outline her proposals and seek 
views on 'such questions as the enforcement of collective agreements, control of 
unconstitutional strikes, recognition disputes, and inter-union demarcation 
, 202 issues. However, it was noted that she would prefer not to circulate 'any 
document outlining the Government's proposals. ' 203 Finally, the final version 
would need to be approved by the Cabinet, and possibly by the ministerial steering 
committee on economic policy (SEP) by the end of the second week of January. 
The need for such speed was explained by both the political desire to counter the 
Conservative proposals, and the demands of the legislative timetable. In a 
briefing note for Wilson, Trend noted that Castle was hoping that discussions 
within the Industrial Relations Committee would clarify 'whether a first 
204 
instalment of legislation on industrial relations is to be introduced this session' 
Whilst parliamentary time had been allocated for the introduction of a bill in the 
200ibid. 
201 NA, PRO, LAB 10/3420, Note from A. W. Brown to Mr Burgh, 20 November 1968, 'Industrial 
Relations White Paper' 
202 ibid. 
203 ibid. 
204NA, PRO, PREM 13/2165 'Industrial Affairs', Note to Harold Wilson from Burke Trend, 20 
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spring, Trend noted that the proposals were of such 'complexity and importance' 
that the programme looked 'extremely tight). In the circumstances, Trend 
suggested that Wilson might wish to ask Castle if she thought there was still 
sufficient time to reach a decision and introduce legislation in the current session. 
Castle had her first meeting with officials to discuss the draft on 2 December. Her 
diary entry records her satisfaction with the document, 'really excellent for a first 
draft 9205 . However, strikes in the motor industry were once again at the forefront 
of public opinion following a strike at car component manufacturer, Girling 
Limited. Girling was virtually the sole supplier of disc brakes to the motor 
industry and, on II November, 22 members of the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering and Foundry Workers (AEF) walked out following a demarcation 
dispute with members of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial 
Staffs (ASTMS). According to a briefing prepared by the DEP the strike was a 
consequence of past managerial weaknesses and the activities of a group of 
'irresponsible trouble makers )206 - Despite having little or no support among their 
fellow AEF members at the factory, and disregarding appeals from local and 
national officials, the men remained on strike until 6 December when, following 
the personal intervention of the AEF president, Hugh Scanlon, they returned to 
work. Such was the interrelated nature of the motor industry, that by the time they 
returned to work, 500 other employees at Girling had been laid off, along with a 
further 7000 in other parts of the motor industry. 
Castle was subsequently to use the Girling dispute as a good example of an 
unofficial strike that would be covered by the conciliation pause, but in early 
December she was more concerned that Edward Heath was, 'trying to whip up the 
207 issue of legal sanctions' Consequently, she was determined to bring 
publication of the white paper forward in order to, 'take everyone by surprise' 208 . 
This in turn, meant avoiding leaks, and therefore she decided to ask Wilson if, 
following a meeting of the industrial relations committee, she could report directly 
205 Castle (1984) p. 562, entry for 2 December 1968 
206 NA, PRO, CAB134/2937 Ministerial Cominittee on Industrial Relations, 'Use of the 
"Conciliation Pause"', Note by the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Employment 
and Productivity, 6 January 1969. 207 Castle (1984) p. 562, entry for 2 December 1968 
208 ibid. 
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to the Cabinet rather than via the ministerial standing committee on economic 
policy (SEP), on which, she concluded, there was, 'more than one blatherer'209 . 
Castle's proposal to by-pass SEP was recorded formally in a note of the meeting 
circulated by her private office on the following day. A meeting of the Industrial 
Relations Committee was being organised for 11 December and, 'the P. U. S. 
agreed to have a word with Sir Burke Trend to see whether it would be acceptable 
to by-pass the Ministerial Steering Committee on Economic Policy (to which the 
I. R. Committee would ordinarily report). ' Furthermore, Castle was also anxious to 
bring forward the joint meeting with the TUC, CBI and nationalised industries 
from early January to the middle of December, 'in order to expedite the process 
leading to publication of the White Paper 210 . 
On 3 December Castle's private office sent a copy of the draft to Wilson 211 . In the 
covering note, it was stressed that the draft was still subject to departmental 
amendment but 'the First Secretary hopes it will indicate the main lines along 
which her thoughts have been going. ' Castle then met Wilson on 4 December to 
discuss the process for consultation and the role of the ministerial committee. 
Castle's diary entry for Wednesday 4 December covers the meeting in detail: 
At 6.15 went in to see Harold. He had just read the first draft of our 
White Paper and was quite lyrical. He said we had obviously done a 
first-class job and a lot of hard work. 'As I said to Marcia, Barbara has 
not so much out-heathed Heath as out-flanked him. ' He is not only as 
keen as I am to get the report out quickly but he is even keener on 
stopping leaks. He is therefore scrapping the ministerial committee he 
set up and intends to call just three or four Ministers together as soon as 
possible under his chairmanship to discuss my White Paper. From there 
it will go straight to Cabinet. He is even prepared to call a special 
Cabinet meeting on 2 January if he can persuade Burke Trend to come 
back to work in time. Of course, I was pleased but a little nervous, 
too. 212 
209 
ibid. 
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There is no official note of the meeting between Castle and Wilson2 13 , however 
Castle met with her officials on the following day, Thursday 5 December, and a 
note from this meeting confirms the decision taken with Wilson the previous day. 
At the meeting Castle outlined plans for the publication of the white paper and 
that, 'the draft will be discussed towards the end of next week by a small group of 
Ministers and not (as originally envisaged) by the Ministerial Committee on 
Industrial Relations' 214 . The final draft would then be circulated to the Cabinet for 
discussion on either 2nd or 6th of January with publication 'about two days after it 
has been agreed by Cabinet' 215 . Finally, its was confirined that the meeting with 
TUC, CBI and the nationalised industries had been brought forward to the week 
beginning 30 December. 
The decision to by-pass the ministerial committee was to prove a source of major 
controversy, leading to accusations that Castle and Wilson were attempting to 
'bounce' the proposals through the Cabinet. The official notes, together with 
Castle's diary, confirm that, while Castle was concerned about leaks, they were 
confined to the SEP. It was Wilson who took things a stage further and sidelined 
the standing committee on industrial relations in favour of an informal group of 
ministers 216 Wilson's own account of these events is vague. According to his 
memoir, his involvement at this stage was minimal; 'In early December, the First 
Secretary, who had been working with a small group of ministers on her scheme, 
discussed the proposed timetable with the Chancellor and me.. As I understood it, 
her ministerial group would finalise her draft just after Christmas and would then 
217 report to Cabinet on 3 January' . It is notable that 
he fails to mention both his 
involvement in the decision to create a 'small group of ministers, and his own 
chairmanship of that group. Wilson seems to have been deliberately vague. It is 
clear that he chose to chair the small group, and difficult, given that he would 
have had access to the papers, to accept that he was mistaken on most of the key 
details. 
213 It appears to have been a private meeting without officials. 
214NA, PRO, LAB 10/3420 Note from A. W. Brown to P. U. S. 6 December 1968 
215 ibid 
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Other sources have confinned the secrecy surrounding the circulation of the first 
draft of the white paper. Richard Marsh 218 recalls that he heard rumours of an 
informal ministerial committee in early December and confronted the Cabinet 
secretary about its existence. According to Marsh, Trend denied its existence 219 . 
Roy Jenkins has confirmed that both Castle and Wilson were concerned about the 
prospect of Jim Callaghan leaking the proposals to trade unionS220 and, perhaps 
most significantly, John Burgh recalls specific instructions being given within the 
DEP that the first draft should not be circulated to the Home Office 221 . Finally, 
when papers were circulated for the first meeting of the ministerial group, they 
were not only classified as secret but, 'in view of the particularly sensitive nature 
of its contents it is being circulated on a personal basis for the information and use 
of the Ministers concerned 222 . 
It was ironic, therefore, that the leak, when it came, should come not from 
Callaghan but from Roy Jenkins. Wilson's infortnal group were due to meet on 
19 December and Jenkins, as a member of the group, received the papers during 
the previous week. According to Ann Perkins, Jenkins showed them to his 
parliamentary private secretary Tom Bradley who, promptly leaked them to Ian 
Aitken of the Guardian 223 . The Guardian ran a story on 12 December, 
focusing 
on the conciliation pause and the similarity with the Conservative proposals. 
Aitken was quick to see the 'obvious problem' with enforcement and, 'some kind 
of legal sanctions', raising the prospect of a similar row to that which had taken 
place over the enforcement of prices and incomes policy24 . The cat was at 
least 
partially out of the bag, and that weekend Castle and Wilson decided it might as 
well be released. 
A meeting of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), was 
scheduled to take place at Chequers over the weekend of 14-15 December. In her 
diary entry for Sunday 15 December, Castle records that a small group consisting 
218 Minister of Transport 
2191nterview with Lord Marsh of Mannington, House of Lords, 28 June 2000 
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of, Frank CousinS225 , Jack 
Cooper 226 
ý Alf Allen 
227 
, Roy Jenkins and Fred Lee 
remained after the majority had left. Castle noted that 'Harold had already plotted 
with me that we would have an informal chat with them after dinner about some 
of my proposals for action on Donovan. 228 In the discussions that followed Wilson 
outlined the two controversial ideas, the conciliation pause and the power to order 
a strike ballot. The response was mixed; Cousins, 'bridled at the very suggestion', 
Allen said that, 'trade unions just didn't like the idea of legislation at all', whilst 
only Cooper accepted that the conciliation pause, 'might be acceptable' 229 . Castle 
excluded from the published diaries a 'little tiff that she had with Wilson later the 
same evening that gave an early indication of his more pragmatic approach. 
According to the original transcript, Castle became annoyed as Wilson suggested 
that industrial relations legislation 'might be bartered for dropping statutory 
powers on P&F, to which Castle 'snapped', "I'm not suggesting this because it's 
electorally popular but because I believe it is right. , 230 
However, by now a head of steam was developing. The TUC general council met 
on 18 December and Jack Jones raised the press reports suggesting that the white 
paper would propose some form of 'repressive legislation'. He asked if it was 
known whether the government intended to consult in advance of publication and 
suggested that the general council should 'publicly declare their total opposition to 
any legislation restricting the right to strike'. Cousins, who argued that both the 
general council and Woodcock had stated on many occasions that there must be 
no attempt 'to control the trade union movement and their activities by legislation' 
supported him. Woodcock responded that it would 'not be desirable for the 
General Council to be put in the position when it was thought that they were not 
susceptible to argument and discussion'. In that way, he argued, they would be 
isolated firom decision-making 
231 
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On the following day Woodcock met Castle and, when she decided 'on an 
impulse' to take him into her confidence over the white paper, it is likely that the 
exchange with Jones and Cousins was uppermost in his mind. Castle outlined all 
of the main proposals to which, 'to my surprise, [Woodcock] said that he didn't 
think there was anything there that need alarin the trade union movement. I could 
hardly believe my ears! ' Woodcock then went on to propose that Castle also take 
the TUC finance and general purposes committee into her confidence by seeing 
them separately at the next round of consultation, rather than together with the 
CBI and the Nationalised Industries as had been planned. Castle was unsure. She 
knew that whatever she told the TUC would leak and it would be obvious that she 
had consulted them ahead of the Cabinet. Woodcock acknowledged the risk, but 
'was sure it would reap dividends. The TUC would then never be able to say they 
had not been consulted fully before the Government had made up its mind'. The 
meeting closed with Castle agreeing to 'think it over'. Subsequently she decided 
to meet the TUC alone on 30 December, but news of the meeting leaked and there 
was considerable anger among the Cabinet 232 
Doubts have been expressed as to the veracity of Woodcock's response to Castle. 
In his biography of Vic Feather 233 , Eric Silver quotes Woodcock as recalling that 
what he actually said was 'There's nothing here that surprises me 1234 . Silver 
continued, 'After the Government's grudging welcome to the Donovan Report, 
world-weary George was hardly astonished that it was going to introduce penal 
sanctions against unofficial strikers. 235 Neither Len Murray, who was head of the 
TUC research department, nor his deputy David Lea, have any recollection of 
Woodcock discussing the contents of his meeting with Castle 236 . However, 
it 
seems equally likely that, given the exchange that had taken place with Jones and 
Cousins at the general council, Woodcock's overwhelming priority was to keep 
the trade unions at the negotiating table. Whatever his recollection, and Silver 
232 Castle (1984) pp. 574-575, Entry for 19 December 1968 
233 Formally succeeded Woodcock as TUC General Secretary in September 1969. Acting General 
Secretary from February 1969 following Woodcock's appointment as chairman of the Commission 
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234 Silver (1973) p. 134 
235 ibid 
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notes that he may have 'been more precise in retrospect than he was at the time, 237 
it is clear that Castle was sufficiently convinced by his response to risk a serious 
row with the Cabinet and consult the TUC first. As Silver concludes, the exact 
words spoken were 'immaterial', what was important was that Castle was 
'impressed with what she thought he said, and accepted the general secretary's 
advice to discuss the document with general councill238 . 
The decisions taken in November and early December 1968 over the production 
and consultation on the white paper characterised many of the problems that were 
to arise over the forthcoming months. The late production of the first draft 
imbued the process with a great sense of urgency resulting in rushed decisions 
over who and when to consult. Wilson, contrary to his published account, was 
heavily involved from the outset and it is clear that decisions on which ministers 
to involve and at what stage were as much his as Castles. The fear of leaks and 
the desire to out-flank Heath were central to the decision to by-pass the 
established ministerial committee, whilst Castle was sufficiently encouraged by 
Woodcock's reaction to consult the TUC in advance of the Cabinet. These 
decisions were to shape the opening Cabinet debates, and the relative isolation in 
which Castle and Wilson operated was to characterise the months of negotiations 
with both Labour Party and TUC. Significantly, in his account of events, Wilson 
quotes a letter he received from Richard Crossman some time afterwards, in 
which Crossman gave his view that the decision to talk to the TUC first was one 
of the biggest mistakes made during this period. A view Wilson was by 1974 
forced to agree with 
239 
. 
2.6 Soundings and Leaks: December 1968 
Such were the pressures of the legislative timetable, that Castle was now forced 
into consulting ministerial colleagues and fine-tuning the white paper whilst 
conducting her opening meetings with the TUC and the CBI. Furthermore, her 
decision to talk to the TUC alone meant that she felt obliged to offer the same 
opportunity to the CBI. In the outside world, the rumours of draconian legislation 
237 Silver (1973) p. 134 
23'ibid 
239 Wilson (1974) p. 747 
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continued to do the rounds and Cabinet ministers like Marsh were, as we have 
seen, beginning to ask what was going on. Against this backdrop, the first 
meeting of ministers was scheduled for 19 December, to be followed by the TUC 
on 30 and CBI on 31 December. 
The ad hoc ministerial group, which was now officially called the Cabinet 
committee on industrial affairs, MISC 230, was made up of Wilson, Castle, 
Jenkins, Fred Lee, Gerald Gardiner, Fred Peart and Elwyn Jones 240 . The inclusion 
of Jenkins emphasised the increasing economic importance of industrial relations 
and reflected the need to gain early support from one of the most powerful 
members of the Cabinet. Gardiner and Jones the Attorney- General, had both been 
members of the original ministerial committee and Jones' inclusion indicated the 
importance that both Wilson and Castle were to place on the development of 
effective sanctions which avoided the 'criminalisation' of strikers. Finally, Peart 
and Lee were Wilson loyalists who could be relied on not to leak the proposals 
and to give Wilson active support in both Cabinet and the wider Labour party. 
In her diary, Castle records that the meeting went well and that all of those present 
backed her, 'unquestioningly', although Fred Lee had some 'queries' about the 
conciliation pause 241 . Her account 
is borne out by the official minutes that 
concluded that there was 'general agreement' that the proposals, taken as a whole, 
'provided a balanced and valuable programme of action. However, it was also 
noted that 'it would be necessary to consider carefully the detailed proposals and 
in particular those for new legal sanctions and penalties'. Arguments for and 
against strike ballots were seen to be 'fairly evenly balanced. The point was made 
that such proposals involved 'practical difficulties' and that the experience of other 
countries cited in Donovan was not encouraging. However, it was also noted that 
the presence of such powers might make union leaders more ready to accept a 
settlement without threatening a strike. 
By contrast, there was general agreement on the desirability of the conciliation 
pause. It was noted that the CBI were likely to oppose the return to the status quo, 
240 Attorney-General 
241 Castle (1984) p. 574, entry for 19 December 1968 
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but agreed that it was important to take this power because 'many unofficial 
strikes were caused by management decisions to change existing custom and 
practice without adequate consultation'. Castle was asked to consider the 
possibility of taking a further power to extend the period of delay for a second 
242 
period of 28 days if it was felt to be required 
The discussion then returned to the issue of enforcement. It was agreed that the 
Industrial CoUrt243 was a more appropriate body to consider the enforcement of 
sanctions ansing from non-compliance with the penal clauses, although it was also 
argued that this would prejudice its role as a conciliating body, and suggested that 
a possible solution would entail setting up a new court, consisting of the President 
of the Industrial Court and two trade union assessors. It was agreed that Castle 
should consult with the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General over the 
practicalities of this suggestion. As for the sanctions themselves, concern was 
raised that differences between civil and criminal law could lead to 'the somewhat 
paradoxical situation that civil proceedings might lead to harsher penalties than 
crinlinal ones 
244 
, and it was agreed that Castle should discuss this too with the 
Lord Chancellor and the Attorney- General. 
The rest of the proposals were agreed with limited comment, and Wilson was able 
to sum up by concluding that the meeting 'agreed generally' with the draft. It was 
agreed that a revised version should be circulated for consideration by the Cabinet 
on Friday 3 January, and that the committee would resume on Thursday 2 
January, when Castle would be able to report on the outcome of her consultations 
with the TUC and the CBL Wilson concluded that, subject to Cabinet approval, 
the government should aim to publish the white paper as soon as practicable after 
3 Januar/45. 
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Subsequently, a meeting took place between the senior law officers in the DEP, 
Elwyn Jones, the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and the chairman of the 
Industrial Court to discuss the problems of enforcement and any resulting 
penalties. The meeting agreed that such cases should be dealt with by the 
chairman of the Industrial Court sitting with trade union panel members (members 
of the Industrial Court) in the case of a hearing against a trade union, and with 
both employer and trade union representatives in the case of a hearing against as 
employer. It was agreed that the body should be called the Industrial Board and 
should be distinct from the Industrial Court. It was also agreed that the penalties 
imposed by the Industrial Board would be treated as civil debts and as such would 
be registered in the County Court for recovery purposes 246 . 
Following the meeting, Castle wrote to the Lord Chancellor, Gerald Gardiner, on 
31 December. In the letter she noted that the proposals were likely to 'revive all 
the controversy we experienced over the prices and incomes legislation about the 
possible imprisom-nent of trade unionists who refuse to pay fines 247 . 
Alluding to 
the recent meeting, Castle noted their view that it ought to be possible to avoid 
imprisom-nent, even in circumstances where fines were not paid and asked for 
Gardiner's views. Gardiner replied on 1 January 1969248 . 
He stressed the need to 
emphasise that financial penalties should be enforceable as civil debts by 
attachment of wages and not by imprisonment and, in a second letter, included a 
redraft of the enforcement section that stressed that the new Industrial Board 
would, 'have the power to impose financial penalties, which will be recoverable in 
the appropriate county court by means of the usual civil remedies, including 
attachment of wages and without liability to imprisonment in default of payment 
or on account of a failure to obey an order' 
249 
. 
246NA, PRO, LAB43/538, Note from Frank Lawton to John Burgh, 'White Paper', 23 December 
1968. 
247NA, PRO, LAB 10/3478 Letter from Barbara Castle to Gerald Gardiner, 'Draft White Paper on 
Industrial Relations'31 December 1968 
248NA, PRO, LAB10/3478 Letter from Gerald Gardiner to Barbara Castle, 'Draft White Paper on 
Industrial Relations', I January 1969 
249NA, PRO, LAB10/3478 Letter from Gerald Gardiner to Barbara Castle, 'Draft White Paper on 
Industrial Relations', 2 January 1969 
85 
The attention given to sanctions and the need to avoid imprisonment was 
indicative of Castle's sensitivities to the issue. She was aware of the problems that 
had been faced with both the Cabinet and the trade unions over the imposition of 
sanctions as part of the prices and incomes legislation and was determined to 
avoid the same pitfalls with the white paper. Castle and her officials were 
assuming crucially that, once the legislation was in place, the trade unions would 
comply. However, it became clear very quickly that such was the level of 
opposition that a significant number of trade unionists were prepared to defy the 
proposals even if they became law, 
While Castle's officials were trying to resolve the tangled issues of enforcement, 
Castle was embroiled in the opening meetings with the TUC and the CBI. She 
opened the meeting with the TUC finance and general purposes committee on 30 
December with a plea for confidentiality, 'as I had not yet put my ideas even to 
my Cabinet colleagues, I was taking a great risk and could only tell them what 
was fn my mind on condition that no one in the room communicated what I had to 
say to any person or organisation outside the room 5250 . Needless to say, whilst the 
plea was met with 'silence and portentous nods', the following day's press were 
full of accounts of what took place 251 . The meeting 
itself was quiet and restrained. 
Castle stressed that the proposals were based firmly on the Donovan philosophy 
and that legal sanctions on their own could not bring industrial peace. However, 
'the law had a role to play at a few specific points where it could have an 
immediate practical effect without damaging the essential freedoms of the trade 
union movement, including the right to strike' 252 . The committee confined their 
response to questions of clarification and an agreement to produce an initial 
response by 2 January. 
Similarly, at the meeting with the CBI and the nationalised industries, Castle made 
it clear why she had rejected the call for legally enforceable procedure 
agreements, arguing that such a policy would remove responsibility from the 
250 Castle (1984) p. 576, entry for 30 December 1968 
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management to resolve disputes, and 'if employers were seldom prepared 
themselves to exercise their legal rights to sue employees who acted in breach of 
their individual contracts of employment, it did not seem sound policy for the 
Government to seek to do the job for them 253 . As with the TUC, those present 
confined their comments to questions of clarification and it was agreed that a 
second meeting would take place on 2 January at which point they would in a 
position to give initial reactions. Just as with the TUC, however, the following 
day's papers were full of reports of the discussions; the Guardian reported a 
'scathing attack' by the CBI director-general John Davies, who described the 
proposals as 'like taking a nutcracker to crack a cannon ball' and reiterated the 
call for collective agreements to be made legally enforceable 254 . 
Castle had been quite right to be concerned about the reaction of the Cabinet if 
they leamt that she had spoken to the TUC first. In a telex message to Wilson, his 
private office noted that Richard Marsh had telephoned Burke Trend's office 
regarding the white paper saying that, 'he knew about it (sic) he had obtained from 
today's press and ministers should not have to rely on the press for information on 
the government's proposals 255 . The telex 
is undated, but Marsh's comments 
suggest he was responding to the press reports of Castle's meeting that appeared 
on 31 December. Trend's office had responded that he should have had the draft 
white paper 'which was circulated this morning' for the meeting on Friday256 . 
Furthermore, Marsh recalls contacting Callaghan as soon as he received his copy 
of the draft to make sure that he had seen it, so concerned was he as to its 
contentS257 . Finally, Richard 
Crossman requested a meeting with Castle on 1 
258 
January to discuss the white paper, the draft of which he had already received 
At the meeting, Castle noted, Crossman was 'torn between a reluctant admiration 
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of it and his pique at being excluded from the ministerial group which had okayed 
it9259. 
Thus, in the space of six weeks the first draft on In Place of Strife had been 
written and shared with both the TUC and the CBI. There was no doubt that a 
combination of the legislative timetable and 'events' in the form of rising 
unofficial strikes and press leaks pushed Castle into the early discussions that 
were to cause so much anger among her Cabinet colleagues. However, it was 
already clear, from the leaked reactions of both the TUC and the CBI that neither 
side were happy with the proposals, and that, in seeking to occupy the centre- 
ground, Castle was in danger of slipping down through the middle. 
2.7 Detailed responses and dead ends 
If Castle and Wilson had hoped to spring a surprise with the launch of their 
proposals, they had failed. On I January, the Guardian reported that the 
forthcoming Cabinet discussion was likely to take place in 'a mounting 
atmosphere of criticism and hostility', as many left-wing backbenchers reacted to 
Castle's proposals in, 'something close to horror' 260 . 
Acknowledging that the key 
question was how far the relatively moderate membership of the trade union group 
of MPs would unite with known left-wingers, the paper quoted John Mendelson 
MP, a leading member of the left-wing 'Tribune' group who said that, if the trade 
unions came out against the proposals, 'it would be the duty of all MPs who 
regarded themselves as trade unionists to oppose the Government'. In the 
circumstances,, the reaction of the TUC was going to be crucial. 
Castle met the TUC finance and general purposes committee for a second time on 
2 January. The committee held a special meeting at 2.30pm, prior to the meeting 
with Castle that was scheduled for 5pm 261 . Each of 
Castle's proposals was 
discussed individually, and it was agreed that more inforination was needed before 
decisions could be made. However, on the two most controversial proposals, 
strike ballots and the conciliation pause, the opposition was clear. Strike ballots 
259Castle (1984) p. 581 Entry for I January 1969 
260 Guardian, I January 1969 
26 'MRC, MSS 292B/24.1/8, Trades Union Congress, Finance and General Purposes Committee, 
Minutes of fifth (special) meeting held at 2.30prn on Thursday, January 2,1969 
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were considered to be of 'no practical value whatsoever' and counter to the 
Donovan recommendation, and it was agreed that the proposal should be 
discussed with Castle 'on the lines of the Committee's views'. 
In dealing with unconstitutional strikes the committee was slightly more 
equivocal. Whilst it was agreed that the general answer to unconstitutional strikes 
was to provide 'more adequate constitutional procedures', it was acknowledged 
that the trade union movement did not have an alternative proposal to deal with 
the problem, and that the action of as little as twenty workers could 'throw 5,000 
out of work , 262 . Furthermore, it was recognised that such strikes threatened the 
economy of the country. Against this it was argued trade union acquiescence in 
proposals of limited practical value could open the door for the government to 
take further powers and, 'it was a dangerous road on which to start' 263 The 
committee agreed they would state their 'great reservations' and seek further 
information and clarification. 
According to Castle's account, the second meeting took matters little further than 
the first, 'all they could tell me was that they could not give me final comments 
because a special meeting had been called of the General Council for Tuesday 
next'. Once again, however, Castle records Woodcock's comments as being 
favourable. In a private meeting after the committee had left, at which she offered 
him the chairmanship of the CIR, she recorded him as commenting that the white 
paper was 'excellent', and that she had 'given the trade unions the opportunity he 
had wanted them to be given 264 . However much Woodcock hinted that 
he wished 
to help, the DEP record of the meeting on 2 January indicates that this did not 
extend to public support for the penal proposals. The surviving record of the 
meeting is a handwritten note taken during the meeting by Denis 
BarneS265 and, on 
262 A clear reference to the Girling dispute 
263 MRC, MSS 292B/24.1/8, Trades Union Congress, Finance and General Purposes Committee, 
Minutes of fifth (special) meeting held at 2.30pm on Thursday, January 2,1969 
264 Castle (1984) p. 582, entry for 2 January 1969 
265NA, PRO, LAB 10/3478 Untitled series of handwritten notes of the consultations with the TUC 
and the CBI that took place between December 1968 and January 1969 taken by Sir Denis Barnes, 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Employment and Productivity. In a covering note dated 8 
June 1969, Barnes commented 'Perhaps these scribbled notes of the contentious meetings before 
the publication of "In Place of Strife" should go on an appropriate file. As far as I know, no more 
formal record was kept of these meetings, so they may be of historical value. ' 
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each of the three areas in which sanctions could be evoked, inter-union disputes, 
strike ballots, and the conciliation pause, Woodcock expressed his doubts about 
both the practicality of the proposals and the likelihood of its being agreed by the 
General Council. In relation to inter-union disputes, Woodcock 'queried the 
usefulness of penalty', and similarly, commenting on the proposal for strike 
ballots, 'don't see it will be of any practical value' and didn't think it would pass 
the General Council. Finally, he expressed doubts about the value and 
practicability of the conciliation pause, worrying that it would be applied too 
crudely. 
The TUC record of the meeting offers a more detailed account of the their initial 
concerns. Attention focused on three areas; the strike ballot; the conciliation 
pause; and likely penalties. Opposition to strike ballots and the conciliation pause 
was in line with the discussion at the pre-meeting, whilst on penalties, the 
committee asked what form they might take. Castle stressed that she was 
determined to eliminate any risk of imprisonment and avoid any recourse to the 
criminal courts, but the committee remained sceptical as to how this could be 
managed when some measure would be needed to ensure that fines were 
collected. The meeting closed with an agreement that the committee would meet 
Castle again on 8 January, after the special meeting of the TUC General Council 
66 that had been called for 7 January2 . 
In meeting Woodcock privately, Castle was establishing a pattern that was to 
continue throughout the negotiations and survive the change of leadership from 
Woodcock to Vic Feather. In allowing the general secretary this exclusive access, 
Castle was endowing him with considerable influence. We have already seen 
Woodcock's influence in convincing Castle to consult with the TUC early in the 
process, in this instance his influence was evidenced in a telephone conversation 
between Castle and Wilson on the following morning, during which Castle 
reported Woodcock as saying that he was, 'personally happy' with the package 
but could not guarantee the support of the general council. However, he did feel 
that the strike ballot was more likely to be opposed than the conciliation pause, 
266 MRC, MSS292B/20/9, TUC Minutes of the sixth (special) meeting held on Tuesday, 7 January 
1969 
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presumably a reflection of the discussion at the finance and general purposes 
committee on the previous day, and his view was enough for Castle to decide to 
report this to the Cabinet267. 
As it turned out, Woodcock appeared initially to have underestimated the strength 
of opposition to the whole package at the general council. Once again, Castle's 
diary provides a useful starting point. In her entry for 7 January, Castle notes that 
that Denis Barnes telephoned her following a conversation with Vic Feather, 
during which Feather outlined the main points of the meeting. According to 
Feather, Cousins had moved a resolution rejecting the whole white paper. This 
was rejected in favour of a statement that had been prepared by the TUC office; 
Woodcock had delivered a 'little homily' at the end of the meeting during which 
he told the GC that it would be difficult to get any changes in industrial relations 
unless there were sanctions behind them 268 . 
The TUC record confirms that Cousins was the main focus for outright opposition 
to the white paper 269 . Once the general council had discussed the individual 
proposals, matters were opened out for a general debate. Cousins argued that the 
proposals were misguided, which was a 'grave reflection on them and on the 
whole trade union movement'. Whilst Castle had argued that her underlying 
philosophy was to strengthen the union movement, 'all the proposals were an 
extension of power to limit and control'. In Cousins' view, the general council 
should reject all the proposals that widened government control, especially those 
relating to legal sanctions. If the role of the unions was to be modified or changed 
in any way 'the transfer of power should be given to the TUC itself and not to 
either the CIR or the DEF. 
Cousins was supported by Danny McGarveY170 , who opposed any 
kind of 
271 1- 
penalties on trade unionists and Sid Greene , who argued that certain proposals 
267NA, PRO, PREM 13/2724, Confidential note for the record, 3 January 1969 
268 Castle (1984) p. 584, entry for 7 January 1969 
269MRC, MSS292B/20/9, Trade Union Congress, Minutes of the sixth (special) meeting (1968-69) 
held on Tuesday, January 7,1969 
270General Secretary, Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and 
Structural Workers. Kenneth Morgan notes that McGarvey was one of several trade unionists that 
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such as the registration of procedure agreements were acceptable, but opposed the 
use of ballots and thought penalties would cause problems. The chairman, John 
Newton 272 , put Cousins' proposals to the meting as a motion stating that the GC 
'entirely rejects' proposals which give government greater control in official 
disputes and provide for legal sanctions. As an alternative, it called for an 
overhaul of existing arbitration machinery, coupled with legal protection against 
unfair dismissal. Finally, it called for the government to delay any final decisions 
until after the special Conference of Trade Union Executives arranged for 27 
February. 
Opposing the motion, Woodcock argued that it was not suggested that the white 
paper proposals should be supported as they stood. However, there were a wide 
range of proposals and he thought the general council was under an obligation to 
give their views on them. In his view, 'the General Council would not be living 
, 273 up to their responsibility if they rejected the proposals out of hand 
Furthermore, he had a paper to put to the meeting commenting on all of the 
proposals in the white paper. The choice before the general council therefore, was 
between a short statement concentrating on the unacceptable proposals and one 
that commented on the detail of all the proposals. On reading Woodcock's draft, 
Cousin's withdrew his motion. 
Whilst Castle's account focused on Cousins' opposition, the TUC record also 
included a number of voices raising concern over the impact of unofficial strikes 
and the lack of a TUC response. George Lowthian 274 referred to the public dislike 
of unofficial strikes and the reluctance of individual unions to surrender any 
authority to the TUC to settle disputes. Jack Pee1275 supported the Woodcock 
document, but thought that there should be some comment on what the general 
council was prepared to do about the problem of unofficial strikes. Les Cannon 
276 
Callaghan kept in close contact with throughout the period of the white paper. Morgan (1997) 
p. 338 
27 'General Secretary, National Union of Rallwaymen 
272 General Secretary, National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers 
273 MRC, MSS292B/20/9, Trade Union Congress, Minutes of the sixth (special) meeting (1968-69) 
held on Tuesday, January 7 
274 Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers 
275 National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers 
276 Electrical Electronic Telecommunications Union/Plumbing Trades Union 
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felt that they needed to acknowledge both public and trade union concern over 
unofficial strikes, although he did not support the government proposals for 
dealing with them. William Anderson 277 thought that the TUC should start 
dealing with the problem of unofficial strikes and was 'appalled by the fact that 
even recently when major strikes were threatened the General Council had not 
1278 "uttered one word" . In his view, 'the General Council had a responsibility to 
the trade union movement to take some action'. Finally, Jack Jones 279 
acknowledged that, whilst opposed to legislation, it 'could not be disguised that 
legislation would be proposed if trade unionists behaved irresponsibly and refused 
to go through established machinery'. In his view, 'it was perhaps a weakness of 
the document that the General Council could not themselves say how unofficial 
strikes should be adequately dealt with. ' 
The general council meeting was an important event. It was the first opportunity 
the council had to discuss Castle's proposals, and it is evident that there was 
almost blanket opposition for the penal clauses and next to no recognition of the 
her intended charter of trade union rights. Significantly, the moderating voices 
did not speak in favour of Castle's proposals, but more in a belief that the TUC 
needed more authority to deal with disputes, a point acknowledged even by 
Cousins and his deputy Jones. Whilst this did not hold out much hope for an 
agreement, the other significant strand to emerge was Woodcock's determination 
to keep the TUC at the negotiating table, a position that had emerged clearly in the 
early discussions during December, and his willingness to engage in debate. Once 
again, here was an emerging pattern that was to continue throughout the 
negotiations, as first Woodcock and then Feather worked to stay at the negotiating 
table whilst the more extreme elements within the general council threatened to 
walk away. The tangible evidence of Woodcock's approach was his policy 
document280. The opening paragraphs acknowledged those sections of the white 
paper which 'could in principle' help to improve industrial relations, including the 
establishment of the CIR and the right to join trade unions. It also acknowledged 
277 National and Local Government Officers Association 
278 MRC, MSS292B/20/9 Trade Union Congress, Minutes of the sixth (special) meeting (1968-69) 
held on Tuesday, January 7,1969 
279Assistant General Secretary, Transport and General Workers Union 
280The statement was included in ftill in the TUC Report 1969, Report of the I Olst Annual Trades 
Union Congress (Co-Operative Printing Society Limited, London, 1969) pp. 205-208 
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that trade unions recognised the need to make changes in their organisations 'as 
are required to promote the social and economic advance of the nation'. however, 
these needed to be based on voluntary action, and not on government imposed 
constraints and restrictions. 
Turning to the specific issues, the statement built on the view that there was scope 
for a wider role for the TUC. Specifically, it was noted that the general council 
was already looking at ways in which the TUC could play a stronger role in the 
resolution of inter-union disputes through the strengthening of existing 
procedures, and in the improvement of trade union organisation and membership. 
However, as in the general council debate, the penal clauses were rejected 
unequivocally. Strike ballots were rejected as 'completely misguided and quite 
281 unacceptable' It was argued that the imposition of ballots would remove from 
responsible trade union leaders the right to exercise any responsibility over the 
calling of strikes and this would undermine confidence in those leaders, 
encouraging unofficial action. Similarly, it was argued that Donovan had made an 
'exhaustive examination' of the use of 'cooling off periods' for both unofficial and 
unconstitutional strikes and had reached the unanimous conclusion that they were 
not beneficial282. 
Finally, it was noted that Castle had acknowledged that it was not possible to 
define in statute those unconstitutional or unofficial strikes that were 'likely to be 
serious' 283 and that as such the relevant minister would define them. In these 
circumstances, the document argued that it did not accord with democratic 
procedures, 'to give a Minister unfettered discretion to invoke powers to fine 
workpeople solely on the grounds that in his opinion the results of the strike are 
likely to be serious, using such criteria as he may think appropriate'. 
28 libid 
282NA, PRO, LAB43/538, Trades Union Congress, White Paper on Industrial Relations - 
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The paper was despatched to the DEP in advance of the meeting with Castle on 
the following day, and a copy, annotated by Castle survives in the official papers. 
Castle's handwritten notes in the margins make clear her response: the TUC, 
having dismissed the positive elements of the proposals with the statement, that 
these, 'could in principle help to improve industrial relations and to promote trade 
union objectives' was met with, 'ungenerous! '284. Similarly, TUC comments on 
the proposed working of the conciliation pause were met with, 'Misunderstanding 
of what is proposed'. However, the meeting itself was, according to Castle, 
'absurdly constrained'285, with little being said beyond a stress on the unanimous 
support among the general council for the TUC document. The TUC minutes 
record Castle's welcome for the proposed changes in structure and organisation of 
affiliated unions and for the recognition of responsibility for the handling of inter- 
union disputes. In response, the general council said that they thought the 
statement was a 'clear expression of the General Council's views and apart from 
answering any question, they had nothing to add at this stage, 286. Castle sought to 
clarify matters relating to the 'cooling-off period' and unofficial strikes, but 
nothing further was resolved. 
Castle's published account is as constrained as the meeting itself, however, the 
original transcript indicates just how frustrated she had become: 
Having seen the document [TUC response] I was all ready to see if there 
were any items we might negotiate (e. g. the strike ballot against the 
conciliation pause). But I was warned that the document was a precariously 
poised common denominator which the TUC didn't want disturbed for fear 
of revealing their own disagreements. This was all very well for them but it 
disguised the fact that the criticisms were in reality far from unanimous. 
As they left the meeting, Barnes commented that it had gone well. Castle 
subsequently wrote 'I didn't agree. I thought this uneasy patched up compromise, 
which leaves them all free to attack something whose merits they refuse to argue, 
is a symbol of what is wrong with the t. u. movement. 
287 
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The initial consultations with the TUC set the tone for the negotiations that 
followed. The general council was intransigent in its opposition to the penal 
clauses and in its support for Donovan as published. Woodcock appeared initially 
to offer the hope that the General Council would not object. There was no 
evidence that this was likely to be the case, although the general council debates 
did serve to highlight a strand of opinion that was calling for some degree of 
internal reform, and this was to prove important in the months that followed. For 
Castle, however, these opening exchanges were deeply frustrating. The TUC had 
given little more than a grudging acknowledgment to her proposed extension of 
union rights, refused to countenance the limited additional responsibilities, and 
failed to offer any alternatives of their own. In the circumstances, it was perhaps 
not surprising that Richard Crossman recorded her as being, 'in a way 
288 contemptuous' of the TUC's response, 'saying how silly they were' 
The CBI were as uncompromising as the TUC: they felt the proposals were 
'inadequate to deal with the problems the country faced ý289 . The majority of their 
concerns were expressed over the workings of the conciliation pause, the main 
objection being that the proposals would only operate once a strike had begun. 
Employers were concerned to discourage strikes before they started, whilst 
Castle's proposals seemed like 'fire-fighting'. They were also concerned at the 
suggestion that a return to the status quo would apply in all cases, and asked if the 
government would be prepared to impose a procedure agreement in instances 
where the existing one was inadequate and an unofficial strike was taking place. 
In response, Castle acknowledged the difference in approach over attempts to pre- 
empt strike action, but once again emphasised that the CBI proposals would 
require a degree of government intervention that she was not prepared to support. 
Similarly, whilst she hoped satisfactory procedure agreements could be developed 
during a conciliation pause, she was not prepared to force an agreement on 
'unwilling parties'. Finally, she acknowledged that the exact application of the 
288 Crossman (1977) pp. 311-312, entry for 8 January 1969 
289NA, PRO, LAB 10/3454 Government proposals on *industrial relations, note of a meeting with 
representatives of the CBI and Nationalised Industries held at 8 St. James Square on Thursday, 2 
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status quo would require more discussions after the white paper had been 
published. 
The discussions were thus as problematic as those with the TUC. Faced with 
Castle's rejection of the proposal for legally enforceable procedure agreements, 
the employers were left welcoming the proposals for strike ballots and the 
conciliation pause whilst expressing their view that neither proposal was sufficient 
to deal with the current state of industrial relations. At the end of the first round 
of consultation Castle was in much the same position as she had been before the 
Sunningdale Conference: caught between the extremes of unprecedented legal 
intervention and a continuation of existing doctrines of voluntarism. In the 
circumstances her carefully crafted 'middle-way' looked vulnerable. 
2.8 Finally to Cabinet 
As we have seen, the atmosphere leading into the first Cabinet discussion could 
not have been worse. Initial indications were that the details of Castle's proposals 
would be overshadowed by her decision to consult with the TUC and the CBI in 
advance of the Cabinet. Castle phoned Tony Benn to confirm his support and, 
according to Benn, she told him that her decision to discuss the white paper with 
the TUC in advance had created 'a tremendous row' 290 . Richard Marsh's anger at 
the sequence of events has already been noted, as has Crossman's concern that 
'other people' might argue 'that [Castle had] made a mockery of Cabinet'291 . 
However, when the meeting opened, both Castle and Crossman were surprised at 
the lack of concern over the order of consultation. Castle commented that no one 
criticized her and that 'my critics went out of their way to explain (contrary to 
Dick's gloomy warnings) that they had no complaints on that score at all'. Whilst 
anger over the order of consultation may have subsided, Wilson and Castle had 
clearly lost the initiative. The white paper was discussed at three meetings of the 
full Cabinet before it was finally agreed and, such was the demand for further 
details, that Wilson reconvened the Cabinet industrial relations committee five 
times during this period to work through the detail of Castle's proposals. As 
290Benn (1988) pp. 140-14 1, entry for 3 January 1969 
29 'Castle (1984) p. 581, entry for I January 1969 
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Castle was to note, somewhat bitterly, after the first Cabinet, 'his [Wilson's] short 
cuts haven't worked, after all, 292. 
The first meeting was held on 3 January, and opposition was divided between 
those who disagreed with the overall philosophy of the white paper, and those 
who were concerned with the working of specific elements of the proposals. Jim 
Callaghan led the former group with support from Richard Marsh, whilst the latter 
focused around the concerns of Anthony Crosland and Richard Crossman. 
According to Castle, 'Jim opened the bowling by saying that the theme in the AT 
was all wrong. It did not deal in any substantial way with the basic theme of 
Donovan to the effect that penal measures were "futile and hannfUl"'293. Castle's 
account is reinforced by Crossman, who recorded Callaghan's acknowledgement 
that he'd been speaking to the unions, "'They're all old friends of mine... and, as 
Labour party treasurer, "'we are bound to discuss it9q. )294. Callaghan's response, 
given his links with the unions, was predictable, and the general nature of his 
concerns could be countered with Castle's now standard retort that the unions had 
failed to produce an alternative. Of perhaps greater concern were the detailed 
questions from Crosland and Crossman because they had the potential to 
unden-nine the effectiveness of Castle's proposals. 
Concern focused on two specific areas. According to Castle Crosland, 'personally 
believed the rule of law should be extended to the trade unions but he wanted a 
series of papers spelling out why we had rejected the Shonfield arguments for 
295 
giving legal powers to the CIR and the whole-hog line of the CBF . 
Crosland's 
view was expressed clearly in a letter. Whilst he agreed with the need to go 
beyond Donovan, the issue was to find the most effective way of doing so. He 
dismissed the ballot proposals as being of 'not much importance either way, 
296 
, 
but 
rejected the 'peace-pause' as being 'not only provocative but (much more 
important) ineffective'. The proposal would mislead the public into thinking that 
it could be applied effectively to all unofficial strikes and when it became evident 
292 Castle (1984) p. 583, entry for 3 January 1969 
293 Castle (1984) p. 582, entry for 3 January 1969 
294 Crossman (1977) p. 305, entry for 3 January 1969 
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296NA, PRO, PREM13/2724 Note ftom Anthony Crosland, President of the Board of Trade to 
Wilson, 'Donovan Report' 6 January 1969 
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that use was to be highly selective, 'the government would appear ineffective, the 
public would be disillusioned, and the field would be left open for more violent 
Tory proposals'297 . Consequently, Crosland favoured the Shonfield proposals to 
give the CIR more strength, independence and statutory powers. 
Crosland's letter was important because it made clear his indifference to the strike 
ballot and opposition to the conciliation pause. Once the Shonfield and CBI 
options had been re ected, Crosland was left, at best, a lukewarm supporter of the 
remaining proposals, and therefore easily persuaded that the cause was not worth 
the fight when matters came to a head in June. At this stage, however, it was 
agreed that there were four possible courses of action; to accept Donovan as it 
stood and establish the Commission for Industrial Relations (CIR) without legal 
powers; to follow Shonfield's recommendations and give the CIR quasi-judicial 
ftinctions; to support the legal enforcement of collective agreements as called for 
by the CBI; or to support the proposals in the white paper. Consequently, Castle 
was asked to prepare a set of briefing papers for the industrial relations committee, 
setting out the case for each option. 
The second area of concern was the conciliation pause. Castle was surprised; 
'curiously, it appeared that the majority were prepared to support compulsory 
strike ballots (which I would happily withdraw) while digging their toes in on the 
298 
conciliation pause' . In 
her opening remarks, Castle stressed that the proposal 
related to unconstitutional or unofficial strikes that, by definition, had not 
followed agreed union procedures. As such, unions ought to 'welcome the 
299 
proposal which would strengthen their hands' . 
Opponents of the pause, who 
Castle listed as; Crossman; Judith Hart 300 ; Roy Mason 
301 ; and Fred Lee 302 , argued, 
as Crosland was to do in his letter to Wilson, that, once in place, Castle would be 
under constant pressure to invoke the pause. In such circumstances, the first 
297ibid 
298 Castle (1984) pp. 582-583, entry for 3 January 1969 299NA, PRO, CAB 128/44 CC(69) I st Conclusions, meeting held on 3 January 1969 
300 Paymaster General 
301 Minister of Power 
302 Lee was a member of Wilson's informal group, MISC 230 and there is a certain irony in his 
opposition, given his position as a Wilson loyalist. However, Castle did note that he 
had expressed 
doubts about the pause at the first meeting of the group. 
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major case that could not be enforced would result in lost credibility. Against this 
it was acknowledged that whilst it could not be proved that the pause would be 
effective, something had to be done to tackle strikes like that at Girlings, and that 
'psychologically' the existence of the power might make workers more thoughtful 
about unofficial action. Once again, Castle was asked to prepare a paper for the 
industrial relations committee, explaining how the pause would work in a typical 
case, and the Lord Chancellor was asked to prepare a brief report on the 
enforcement proposals. 
From Castle and Wilson's perspective, the first Cabinet meeting was not a 
success. Far from gaining an agreement to go ahead, they were forced to cede 
ground and produce a series of briefing papers on the detailed working of the 
proposals. Whilst, on the following day, the Guardian was to report that, 'an 
overwhelming majority of Cabinet Ministers approved her general approach 303, it 
was clear that there were serious concerns over the working of the conciliation 
pause. Indeed, such were these concerns that Wilson was to come close to 
rejecting it. In a meeting with Jenkins on 7 January, Wilson noted that he was 
concerned about the 'peace pause'. According to a note of the conversation, 
Wilson 'said he recognised it was necessary to have something in the White Paper 
to deal with the problem of unofficial strikes, but he felt that the First Secretary's 
case for the peace pause had been somewhat "dented" by the discussion the 
previous Friday afternoon at Cabinet'304 . In the circumstances, the onus was on 
Castle to make the case to the industrial relations committee. 
The ministerial committee on industrial relations met for the first time on 7 
January. Membership was exactly the same as the original committee that had 
been convened in May 1968 to consider Donovan and Fair Deal at Work, with the 
addition of Judith Hart, the Paymaster Genera1305 . The one member of the original 
committee not present was Richard Crossman. Crossman had been Lord President 
of the Council in May 1968, and membership of the committee listed the Lord 
303 Guardian, 4 January 1969 
304NA, PRO, PREM13/2724 Note for the record, conversation between Jenkins and Wilson, 7 
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President as a member. However, Crossman had moved to health and social 
security in October 1968 and been replaced by Fred Peart. Officially Crossman 
was left off the committee as a result of this oversight, and once Wilson realised, 
Crossman was reintstated in time to attend the third and fourth meetings. 
However, given Crossman's opposition to the conciliation pause, it seems possible 
that the omission was a clumsy attempt to keep him quiet. If this was the case it 
did not work 
306 
. 
In line with Wilson's request, the committee considered a number of papers 
dealing with the Shonfield and CBI proposals, along with papers on the 
conciliation pause and intended enforcement procedures. There was general 
agreement with Castle's argument that the Shonfield proposal to give the CIR an 
independent judicial function with direct powers of enforcement excluded the 
government from an effective say in the development of industrial relations, and 
put the CIR in the position of being 'friend and advisor' to both sides of industry 
whilst also being their judge. The committee also rejected the CBI proposals for 
the compulsory enforceability of procedure agreements, but supported Castle's 
proposal for reserve powers to enforce CIR recommendations in the case of inter- 
union disputes, and to impose pre-strike ballots. Surprisingly, given the 
controversy it was to rouse with the unions, there was also agreement to the Lord 
Chancellor's enforcement proposals under which enforcement would be the 
province of the civil courts and would not involve imprisonment but attachment of 
earningS307. However, there was no such consensus when it came to the 
conciliation pause. 
The relevant paper had been prepared, outlining the intended use of the 
conciliation pause and the reasoning behind its inclusion 
308. Using by now well- 
rehearsed arguments, Castle outlined the reasoning behind the pause. Donovan's 
focus on local procedure agreements was a 'lengthy process' that failed to solve 
306 See Castle (1984) p. 584, entry for 7 January 1969. Castle quotes Wilson on the omission of 
Crossman, 'adding ingenuously that of course the Secretary of State for Social Services should be 
a member of the Cominittee, indeed it was all a mistake that he hadn't attended 
before'. 
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the problem of 'wildcat strikes'. The only concrete proposal was the 
recommendation to amend the 1906 Act and this would be opposed by the trade 
unions 309 . The employers had indicated that they would not be prepared to use the 
amended act and the amendment would result in a general change in the law, 
leaving the government with no discretion over its use. Similarly, the CBI 
proposals for legally binding agreements and centrally imposed disputes 
procedures would put all the responsibility on the government. In the 
circumstances, the choice being faced, 'was therefore either to conclude that there 
was nothing the Government could do in the immediate future to deal with 
unofficial strikes or to accept her recommendation that there were certain limited 
situations in which it would be possible and proper to invoke the reserve power of 
a conciliation pause, 310. 
In discussion, there was a general rejection of amending the 1906 Act but there 
was concerted opposition to the conciliation pause from Judith Hart and Fred Lee, 
who argued that the unions would get round the pause by making all strikes 
official, that legal sanctions were ineffective, serving only to antagonise the 
unions into further action, and that it was better to concentrate on the urgent 
implementation of Donovan's recommendations. However, Lee and Hart were in 
the minority, and Castle summed up that, whilst some remained doubtful, the 
majority were in favour of the proposal. The committee then met for a second 
time on the following day to consider a number of minor amendments prior to the 
second meeting of the Cabinet. 
The Cabinet meeting opened with Castle's report on the conclusions of the 
industrial relations committee and attention soon focused on the conciliation 
pause. Castle's account of the meeting indicates that Crossman was 'intransigent' 
on the issue of the conciliation pause. Yv'hilst Wilson thought he had sufficient 
votes (16 for and 7 against) to push the proposals through, he did not push for 
closure, but adjourned until the following day 
31 1. At the reconvened meeting, 
Castle noted that Crossman continued to push for 'green edges' and Wilson 
309AIthough, as noted above, they were not as opposed as Castle thought they would or should 
be 
3 "5NA, PRO, CAB 134/2937, IR(69) I st Meeting, Tuesday, 7 January 1969 
31 'Castle (1984) pp. 585-586, entry for 8 January 1969 
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summed up by asking for further work by the ministerial committee, with a final 
discussion by the full Cabinet on 14 January 312 . She also noted that Wilson 
agreed to make Crossman a member of the committee, blaming an oversight for 
his original exclusion. Crossman, who noted that the meeting went 'fairly well' 
for the opposition, supports Castle's account. He listed the opponents as Hart, 
Marsh, Crosland, Mason, Greenwood, Callaghan and himself which tallies with 
Wilson's count as given by Castle 313 . It is notable that the opponents came from 
across the political spectrum, hinting at the breadth of opposition that was to 
emerge in the later PLP debates. The main focus of the discussion was 
Crossman's attempt to make the proposals as 'green' as possible' and that of 
314 Callaghan and the others to avoid the proposals being rushed through 
The Cabinet conclusions confin-n the emergence of two distinct views. Castle's 
opponents were grouped into two broad groups; those like Callaghan who were 
opposed fundamentally to the white paper and wanted a return to Donovan; and 
those like Crossman who supported some form of action, but questioned the 
efficacy of Castle's proposals. For the second group, the conciliation pause was 
not only 'unworkable and ineffective', but of such limited application that, 'even 
its presentational advantages would be lost when the public realised it could not 
be invoked in the majority of cases'. Consequently, they argued, the government 
would be better off not committing themselves to a particular method of dealing 
with unofficial strikes, but rather should draft the white paper in such a way as to 
leave the way forward for the TUC to come forward with alternative proposals, 
which 'the Government could undertake to consider seriously before introducing 
315 legislation' 
By contrast, Castle and her supporters argued that the pause was an essential part 
of the package of proposals. Whilst acknowledging that the proposal was 'only a 
312 The demand for 'green edges' reflected Crossman and Hart's belief that the section on the 
conciliation pause should be left open ended, In effect taking the form of a green, consultative 
paper, that could be omitted or amended if the TUC came up with a credible alternative. 
313 Lee seems to have dropped off the list of opponents at this point which is odd given 
his 
consistent opposition prior to this. Perhaps it reflects an oversight on Crossman's part. 
314 Crossman (1977) pp. 312-313, entry for 8 January 1969 
315 NA, PRO, CAB128/44, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on Wednesday, 8 
January 1969, resuming on Thursday, 9th January 1969 
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reserve power which could be made effective quickly in appropriate cases', and 
Girling was quoted as just such an example, 'the psychological effect of its 
existence and the threat of its use were, however, expected to be even more 
important". As for opposition, as with the collection of fines where the industrial 
relations committee had concluded that it was unlikely that, 'unofficial strikers 
would go to great lengths to avoid payment' 316 , Castle concluded that, 'If the 
proposal became law, the TUC could be expected to co-operate'. 
Castle's response is important. In the months that followed, and after the eventual 
settlement, both Castle and Wilson were to argue that the measures had been 
designed to get the TUC to make proposals of their own, and that, as this had been 
achieved, the government's proposals could be withdrawn. It is clear from this 
early Cabinet exchange that, at this stage, there was no question of withdrawing 
the proposals: reserve powers were seen as essential not just for practical 
implementation, but also because they were felt to be psychologically important. 
Whilst it was implicit that such powers could remain in reserve if the unions took 
their own action, there was no intention to withdraw them. It was also significant 
that Castle and many of her colleagues believed that, once the proposals became 
law, the trade unions and their members would co-operate. As will become clear, 
one of the most important turning points in the ensuing negotiations was Castle 
and Wilson's realisation that at least some of the unions were prepared to break 
the law rather than comply with the conciliation pause. However, at this stage, 
despite having the votes in his pocket, Wilson decided that further discussions 
were needed and instructed the industrial relations committee to meet once more 
to consider the points raised. Furtherniore, he gave instructions for Crossman to 
be included on the committee. 
According to Castle, the third meeting was the most contentious of all. The 
meeting lasted all day and Crossman 'haggled over verbal point after verbal point', 
after which it was agreed that they would meet again to consider a final draft on 
13 JanuarY317 . 
At the fourth meeting the debate continued, but the minutes 
316 NA, PRO, CAB 134/2937, Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Industrial Relations, Minutes of a 
meeting held on Tuesday, 7th January, 1969 
317 Castle (1984) pp. 586-7, entry for 10 January 1969 
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recorded that the majority agreed that the reserve power to order the pause was 
necessary and that it would encourage the unions to 'intensify their efforts to 
ensure that procedures were observed by their members 018 - Furthermore, 
inclusion in the white paper would be more effective than a passage indicating 
that it might be withdrawn if the unions came forward with alternative proposals, 
the so-called 'green-edges' option. At this point it was agreed that the draft white 
paper, with the conciliation pause as drafted by Castle's officials, should be 
referred back for a final decision to the Cabinet that was due to meet on the 
following day. 
That third and final meeting of the Cabinet focused on two issues; the exact nature 
of the conciliation pause; and the timing of subsequent legislation. In a note to 
Wilson, Castle commented that 'there now seems to be unanimous agreement 
within IR that the proposal for a conciliation pause should be included in the 
White Paper and that there should be at least some hint to the TUC that 
satisfactory alternative proposals will be considered 3 19. However, she also noted 
that Crossman and Hart considered that the relevant paragraph should 'emphasise 
more strongly the Government's willingness to consider alternatives' and that 
Crossman was circulating his proposed draft to the Cabinet 320 . 
The meeting opened with Crossman's arguments for presenting the pause as an 
outline scheme that could be withdrawn if the TUC came forward with an 
acceptable alternative. Castle countered that the ministerial committee had 
rejected all of the known alternatives and that nothing new had been proposed by 
either Crossman or the TUC. In her view, the real choice was between presenting 
the existing proposals as a 'workable and credible contribution to dealing with 
what all agreed was a serious problern, 321, or abandoning them and doing less than 
318 NA, PRO, CAB 134/2939, Ministerial Committee on Industrial Relations, minutes of a meeting 
held on Monday, 13 January 1969 
3 19NA, PRO, PREM 13/2724 Note from Barbara Castle to Harold Wilson, 13 January 1969 
320 Subsequently, the relevant section of the white paper read, 'To the extent, of course, that unions 
succeed in securing the observance of dispute procedures, the use of the Goverm-nent's reserve 
powers will not be necessary. ' In Place of Strife, A Policy for Industrial Relations 
(Cmnd. 3888 
January 1969) paragraph 96, page 29 
321NA, PRO, CAB 128/44, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday 14 January 
1969 
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Donovan had proposed 322 . In the ensuing debate the arguments about the purpose 
of the pause crystallised. Castle's opponents argued since the majority of 
unofficial strikes were resolved within the two weeks that it would take to initiate 
the pause, its main purpose therefore was presumably to 'spur the trade union 
movement to produce their own effective measures to deal with unconstitutional 
323 strikes' . However, given that the pause was sure to embitter both the trade 
union and the Labour movement, it was arguable as to how effective this approach 
would be. 
By contrast, Castle's supporters countered that there were no other workable 
alternatives and whilst accepting that it would only be effective in a small number 
of cases, success in such cases would mean that 'its influence would begin to bear 
more widely on the whole problem'324 . Furthermore, 
if the TUC were able to 
come forward with effective alternative proposals it would be made clear that the 
reserve powers would not be evoked. Crossman and Hart maintained opposition 
to the pause with support from Callaghan, Marsh and Mason 325 . However,, as at 
the previous meeting, the majority supported Castle and Wilson finally summed 
326 up in favour of publication with the publication date fixed for 17 January 
Once the overall shape of the bill had been agreed, the discussion turned to the 
issue of timing. Crossman and Jenkins had argued from the earliest meetings that 
the legislation should be taken 'at a run', with initial legislation introduced before 
the summer recess 327 . The reasoning was twofold; the 
longer the gap between 
publication of the white paper and the introduction of legislation, the greater the 
322 Presumably less because Donovan's proposed amendment to the 1906 Act was considered 
politically unacceptable 
323NA, PRO, CAB 128/44, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday 14 January 
1969 
324 
ibid 
325 See Castle (1984) p. 589, entry for 14 January 1969 
326 ibid. 'It was soon clear that Dick had more supporters than I hoped: Judith, Jim, Dick Marsh 
and Roy Mason, of course. But even Willie Ross had doubts about being too firm on it, while 
Peter, back from his illness looking fit, surprised Harold and me with some rather equivocal 
remarks, considering he was one of the authors of the idea at Sunningdale. However, I was backed 
strongly by Fred Peart, Gerald, Jack Diamond, Roy J., Wedgie, Michael, Ted Short and the two 
Georges, Thomas and Thomson, while Eddie Shackleton and A. J. Irvine said the had become 
enthusiastic as a result of the discussions in YR. De Healey and the two Tonyls were absent 'efit 
a clear majority' 
s 
but with Harold we were home and dry, Harold makin 
327 See Roy Jenkins (1994), p. 287 'Trade union reform, particularly for a Labour Government, 
was so sensitive that it could be carried through only on the run'. 
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opportunity for opposition to develop, especially as both the TUC and the Labour 
Party would have had their autumn conferences and potentially come out against 
the proposals; and, secondly, Jenkins was due to seek a renewal of prices and 
incomes policy in the autumn, and it was questionable whether there would be 
328 
either the time, or the political will, to get both onto the statute book 
In response to the Crossman and Jenkins concerns, Wilson had asked the Lord 
President, Fred Peart, to meet Jenkins and Castle to discuss the practicalities of 
early legislation. The meeting subsequently took place with Roy Hattersley 
standing in for Castle 329 . Peart reported back to the Cabinet that advice from the 
DEP suggested that such a bill could not be presented to the House of Commons 
before July and that even this would require the sacrifice of other legislation. In 
the Cabinet discussion, Jenkins argued that the failure to pass such a bill in the 
current session might close the option of further prices and incomes legislation in 
the autumn. Castle countered that it was essential for the proposals to be included 
in their entirety so that the unions would accept that they were 'directed to 
strengthening the trade unions and not weakening them'330 . Wilson concluded that 
a majority agreed that pre-summer bill was not practical, but that further 
consideration should be given to the proposal in the light of the reactions of the 
parliamentary Labour party (PLP). As will become clear, public, press and PLP 
opinion were all to play a part when Wilson and Castle bowed to the pressure 
from Crossman and Jenkins and agreed to an interim bill. 
2.9 Summary 
It is now clear that In Place of Strife was first and foremost Castle's policy both 
intellectually and emotionally and this goes a long way to explaining her 
attachment to it long after defeat became inevitable. Contrary to the belief of 
those who saw the white paper as little more than a knee-jerk reaction to Fair 
Deal at Work, it is evident that the policy was an attempt to kick-start a debate 
about the roles and responsibilities of the trade unions based on a genuine belief 
328 See Castle (1984) p. 589, entry for 14 January 1969 on Jenkins' motivation, 'Apart from 
anything else he [Jenkins] is worried about having my Bill and a new P and 
I Bill before 
Parliament at the same time next autumn'. 
329 NA, PRO, PREM 13/2724, Note of a meeting held on 13 January 1969 
330NA, PRO, CAB 128/44, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday 14 January 
1969 
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that it offered a strengthening of the both unions and their members. However, it 
is equally evident that neither the trade unions nor a sizeable minority of the 
Cabinet were ready for such a debate and that, for the majority of Castle's 
opponents all that mattered was defeating the penal clauses. It is also clear that, 
rather than being a passive bystander, Wilson was heavily involved in the tactical 
presentation of the policy from the outset, and that he must take an equal share of 
the blame for the decisions to involve the TUC ahead of the Cabinet and to avoid 
formal Cabinet committees, decisions that only served to antagonise his opponents 
and seemingly confirmed that he had something to hide. 
However, perhaps the most striking fact to emerge was Castle's acknowledgement 
at such an early stage that the reserve powers would not be needed if the trade 
unions could produce their own measures. As will become clear, it was the extent 
to which the TUC's proposals were considered an acceptable alternative to the 
white paper on which the final negotiations were to hinge. At this stage it is 
enough to note that, under pressure from her colleagues and perhaps inadvertently, 
Castle had provided herself and Wilson with what would become a vital escape 
route. 
The period between the production of the first draft and publication of In Place of 
Strife established the majority of the issues that were to dominate the following 
five months. The response of the TUC was marked by both ambivalence about 
the objectives of Woodcock, and intransigent opposition from the General Council 
to the penal clauses. Woodcock's enthusiasm when Castle outlined her proposals 
can best be understood in the context of his own objective of internal trade union 
reform. However, as has been indicated, he had little enthusiasm for the detail of 
Castle's proposals and whilst able to prevent an outright rejection of the white 
paper by the General Council, the TUC's formal response indicated the depth of 
opposition to the proposals themselves. Whilst Woodcock left his post shortly 
after publication, to take up the chairmanship of the CIR, his successor Vic 
Feather was no less ambiguous. As will become evident, Feather played an 
invaluable role as 'go-between' in the ensuing negotiations and it is arguable that 
the eventual outcome was a victory, at least in part, for the original Woodcock 
objectives of internal refonn. Similarly, the Cabinet debates were charactensed 
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by the opposition of a small number of ministers to both the general philosophy 
and the specific proposals, with serious doubts being expressed as to the practical 
effectiveness of the measures proposed, and consequently whether they were 
worth the conflict that would inevitably ensue. It was against this backdrop that 
Castle opened her discussions with the PLP. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 'THE GATHERING STORM': FEBRUARY - MARCH 1969 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the period between the publication of In Place of Strife on 17 
January 1969, and the passing of a resolution by the national executive committee 
(NEC) of the Labour Party condemning the white paper on 26 March 1969. 
Opening with an analysis of press and Conservative reaction to the white paper, 
the chapter explores the crucial events that took place during February and March 
1969. It examines the composition of the parliamentary labour party (PLP), 
drawing on the minutes of the PLP debates, and examining the voting record of 
those opposing the govenu-nent, and the relationship between MPs and the trade 
unions, to demonstrate both the nature and the breadth of opposition that was 
emerging and which culminated in 55 Labour MPs voting against the government 
and a further 40 abstaining in the parliamentary debate on the white paper. 
The chapter then examines the growing climate of industrial unrest, particularly in 
the motor industry and most notably a major strike at the Ford motor plant that led 
Castle to conclude that the 'psychologically' the time was right for an interim bill. 
Rumours of Castle's change of mind reached trade unionists, and consideration is 
given to the pressure that was growing on the TUC general council to call a 
special congress and examines in detail the responses of two of the biggest unions, 
the Transport and General Workers Union (TGVv`U), and the Amalgamated Union 
of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AEF)331 . Finally, it considers the growing 
parliamentary and trade union opposition in the context of the NEC vote to oppose 
the white paper, and Callaghan's decision to vote in favour of the NEC resolution 
and against the government that in turn crystallised Castle's decision to introduce 
the interim bill. 
3.2 External Responses 
Press responses to the white paper were mixed. The Guardian and the The Times 
provided the most extensive coverage, and this was to remain the case throughout 
the period. Consequently, they are the most frequently quoted press sources used 
33 1 The AEF was formed in 1968 from an amalgamation of the Amalgamated Engineering Union 
(AEU) and the Foundry Workers. AEF is used throughout this chapter, although newspapers and 
others at the time were still inclined to refer to the AEU 
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in this study and it is worth reflecting on their broader attitudes to the government 
since they inevitably impacted on the tone of the coverage. The Guardian was a 
supporter of the government, and the reporting of their two principal political 
correspondents, Peter Jenkins and Ian Aitken, indicated close links to both the 
Cabinet and the wider PLP. In its coverage of In Place of Strife the paper tended 
to reflect concerns about the damage being done to the Labour Party by the 
dispute, as well as being well informed about the internal conflicts and debates. 
However, despite being a government supporter, the Guardian opposed the 
introduction of penal clauses, preferring instead to support the Donovan analysis. 
Its position remained consistent throughout and reflected largely the views of John 
Cole, its chief editorial writer. Cole has since written that his experience of the 
'cooling off period in America during the mid 1960's coloured his view of such 
penal clauses, and he reflected this in his editorials 332 . 
Thus, commenting on In 
Place of Strife, the paper raised a mixture of practical and philosophical problems. 
Practically, in an argument that echoed Cabinet debates, it argued that the 
conciliation pause would be rarely used and difficult to enforce, and whilst the 
strike ballot was 'more plausible', there was little evidence of unions dragging 
unwilling members out on official strikes. Philosophically, however, the paper 
accepted that the public instinct, 'that something ought to be done about industrial 
anarchy', was sound. However Donovan acknowledged the complexity of the 
issue, hence proposing such 'elaborate machinery' for inquiry and persuasion, and 
concluding, rightly in the Guardian's view, that 'the legislative stick, though 
033 speciously attractive, was likely to break in the wielder's hand 
By contrast The Times was not a supporter of the government, but its senior 
industrial relations correspondent, Eric Wigham, had not only been a member of 
the Donovan Commission, but also enjoyed close relationships with many senior 
figures on the TUC, thus giving the paper strong insights, not only into the day to 
day dealings of the unions, but also into the wider issues of reform. Its approach to 
the white paper, therefore, had a more subtle intent. On first examination the 
paper proved more favourable. Unlike the Guardian, it saw limited merit in strike 
332 John Cole, As it Seemed to Me (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1995) pp. 66-67 
333 Guardian, 18 January, 1969 
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ballots, arguing that it was a relatively small problem and that a ballot could result 
in a delayed settlement. The issue with the conciliation pause, however, was not 
one of, 'desirability', but whether it was practical to enforce it. Whilst the paper 
found it difficult to envisage it working against 'thousands of dockers', it could 
work against small groups in the motor industry. In the circumstances, it 
concluded, the unions would be foolish to try and work up opposition to the 
proposals, since the compulsory measures were 'the least that any Government 
could put forward in the present climate of public opinion 334 . As the dispute 
between government and unions worsened, the paper continued to back Wilson. 
However, as will become clear , its support was designed increasingly to push 
Wilson into a comer from which any concessions were clearly seen as a major 
defeat. 
The Financial Times, echoed The Times, concluding that whilst some of the 
proposals did not go far enough, enactment of the proposals would give 'a better 
chance of escaping from the present industrial jungle'. The penal clauses were 
considered a 'very moderate limitation on the right of trade unions to take action', 
and, in a variation from both The Times and the Guardian, the paper suggested 
that the biggest weakness was an avoidance of legally binding collective 
agreements. Unlike the governinent, the paper rejected the idea that employers 
were not inclined to take unions to court, finding it 'difficult to believe that a 
change in the clear intentions of the law would be totally without effect on 
335 industrial practice' 
The only paper to give unequivocal support to the government was the Daily 
Mirror, whose view was summed up with an opening comment, 'Bloody Good 
Sense! 036 
, arguing that the white paper represented a 
'revolutionary new deal for 
trade unionists and employers'. However, even the Mirror was concerned that the 
proposals did not go far enough, commenting that whilst they could have worked 
in cases such as Girlings, they would not cover very brief 'wildcat' strikes; it was 
here that the white paper was weak and legal contracts could be useful. The paper 
334 The Times, 18 January, 1969 
335 Financial Times, 18 January 1969 
336 Daily Mirror, 18 January 1969 
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concluded that the proposals were 'a good beginning to a job that ought to have 
been tackled years ago'. 
In many respects, the press reflected the differing views expressed by the Cabinet. 
What was clear, however, was that even amongst those supporting the government 
there was only a limited belief in the effectiveness of the penal clauses; even the 
Daily Mirror did not think they went far enough, whilst The Times and Financial 
Times supported them on the basis that something had to be done and that they 
might prompt unions and management into mutual reform. The danger for Castle 
was evident in the response of the Conservatives and summed up by lain 
Macleod 337 , who said that Wilson's New Year resolution 'was to see how much 
Conservatism the Labour Party would stand for'. He continued that Castle's 
conversion to Heath's view that drastic changes in trade union law were vital to 
the structural reform of the economy was welcome 'as a small flag of surrender'. 
However, because 'she dare not capitulate completely to common sense', her 
338 proposals were 'the worst of both worlds' 
As we have seen, Castle was acutely aware of the difficulties inherent in trying to 
occupy the middle ground between voluntarist and legalistic positions, and the 
press and Conservative reaction only served to highlight these difficulties. For, as 
Castle prepared to discuss her proposals with the PLP, it was clear that she could 
expect vitriolic opposition from the left. In the Guardian, Ian Aitken reported that 
bitter criticism was expected from the left, with many left wing backbenchers 
reacting 'with something close to horror' and making it clear that 'the Government 
[could] expect a massive revolt at Westminster if it [went] ahead with them 
unaltered'. The key question posed by Aitken was whether the 'relatively 
moderate' membership of the TU group would unite with left-wingers concluding 
that, 'It is a matter of experience that whenever the two groups have combined in 
outright opposition to the Government over particular issues, the Cabinet has 
339 eventually been forced to offer concessions' . It was a worrying sign of things to 
337 Conservative spokesman on econorMc affairs 
338 Guardian, 6 January 1969 
339 Guardian, I January 1969 
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come, that opposition within the Cabinet had straddled both wings of the partY140 . 
Castle's proposals were relatively modest, but it soon became clear that were a 
step too far for a significant majority of the PLP. 
3.3 The Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) response 
On 3 March 1969, the Commons debated the government motion, 'That this 
House approves the White Paper, "In Place of Strife", Command Paper No. 3888 
as a basis for legislation; and invites Her Majesty's Government to continue 
consultation with a view to preparing legislation. 341 When the House divided at 
the end of the debate, 62 MPs voted against the motion, of these, 55 of them were 
Labour MPs. In addition, over 40 Labour MPs abstained, including the chain-nan 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party, Douglas Houghton. According to Peter 
Jenkins, the revolt was more serious than party managers had expected 342 ,a view 
confirmed by Castle, for in her diary she noted that 'the votes against and the 
abstentions were more than we had anticipated ý 343 . 
However, in a dismissive 
comment, she went on to claim that 'a lot of people took a holiday from 
344 
responsibility in the knowledge that the Tories were going to abstain' 
The element of surprise is significant. Peter Jenkins argues that it reinforced a 
growing sense of dissatisfaction with John Silkin, the chief whip 
345 
. Silkin's 
critics felt that he owed his position entirely to Wilson and that, as such, one of the 
chief complaints made against him was that he tended to tell Wilson what he 
wanted to hear. However, an examination of the voting record of those who voted 
against the government gives an indication of why any sense of surprise may have 
been justified. Of the 55 rebels, nineteen had voted against the government on 
more than four occasions since December 1967, but 25 had not previously 
opposed the government. In the context of getting legislation through the House 
of Commons, it was these 25 who would prove significant346. 
340 See chapter two 
341 House of Commons Debates, fifth series (hereafter H. of C. Debs. 
), 3 March 1969 cols 40-41 
342 Jenkins (1970) p. 68 
343 Castle (1984) p. 61 1, entry for Monday, 3 March 1969 
344 ibid 
345 See Jenkins (1970) pp. 66-67 
346 Derived from Dissension in the House of Commons, Intra Party Dissent in the House of 
Commons'Division Lobbies 1945-1974 Philip Norton (Macmillan, Basingstoke 1975) 
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In order to understand the significance of the rebellion, it is necessary to examine 
the political composition of the PLP. At this time Labour backbenchers could be 
divided into three broad groups; the left wing, consisting of between 20 and 40 
MPs and loosely grouped around the Tribune Group. Leading figures in this group 
included Stan Orme, Ian Mikardo, and Michael Foot, the self styled 'radical 
right 347 ,a smaller grouping than that of the left, drawn mainly from the 1966 
intake and including figures such as David Marquand and Brian Walden; and the 
largest group which consisted of around 190 MPs who were not identified with 
either wing of the party, but rather sat in the centre and whom Peter Jenkins' has 
rather unkindly described as 'stable lobby fodder'. 
The left opposed the majority of the government's post-devaluation policy, 
consistently voting against public expenditure cuts and the prices and incomes 
policy; in the parliamentary vote against In Place of Strife, nineteen rebels were 
drawn from this group. As Peter Jenkins has noted, they represented 'the party of 
protest' 348 , and as such their 
behaviour would not have surprised the government. 
By contrast, the smaller 'radical right' were generally loyal to the government 
although, as supporters of Roy Jenkins, they had become disillusioned with 
Wilson and would emerge as the leading conspirators in moves to unseat him 
during April and May. This left the majority of MPs in the centre, those whose 
support was essential for government to deliver its legislative programme. It was 
therefore of enonnous significant that the majority of those voting against the 
white paper were drawn from this group, and it was this that surprised the 
government. 
At one level, therefore, the surprise was justified. However, there were three 
significant signals of discontent that Castle and the government ought not have 
missed, and which lead to the conclusion that they were either naYve or 
unnecessarily optimistic in their assessment of the likely vote. There was a 
growing sense of lawlessness within the PLP that had culminated in opposition to 
the proposals for refonn of the House of Lords; Castle's meetings with the PLP 
347 Jenkins (1970) pp. 66-67 
348 Jenkins (1970) p. 62 
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Trade Union Group in January 1969 that should have alerted her to the potential 
for a rebellion that went considerably beyond the usual suspects on the left; and 
the tone and content of the internal debates within the PLP prior to the 
parliamentary debate. 
On 19 November 1968, the government introduced its proposals for reform of the 
House of Lords. During the debate, an amendment was moved rejecting the 
proposals and in the subsequent division it was supported by 159 MPs, including 
47 Labour MPs. The 47 included Michael Foot from the left and David Marquand 
from the right. The bill received a second reading on 3 February 1969 and 
proceeded to the committee stage. The committee stage was held on the floor of 
the House of Commons, and during February opponents of reform voted against 
specific clauses, or moved amendments on fifteen separate occasions to block the 
progress of the bi11349. It was eventually dropped in early April when Silkin 
inforined Wilson that he could no longer guarantee it majority support within the 
PLP. Ironically, the public justification for dropping the bill was the need to make 
legislative space for In Place of Strife. 
Thus, by February 1969, the PLP was simmering with rebellion. The left 
continued to agitate over post-devaluation expenditure cuts, many at the centre 
were unhappy with the liberal regime of the whips, and all sides were combining 
in opposition to reform of the Lords. Seeking to introduce trade union reform in 
such an atmosphere was always going to be difficult, but when the largest group 
within the PLP was made up of trade union sponsored MPs, opposition was likely 
to be taken to another level. 
3.4 The PLP Trade Union Group 
The PLP trade union group has been in existence as long as the PLP itself It was 
not a sub-committee of the PLP and has a strong sense of its own independence 
350 
. 
To be a member of the trade union group, an MP has to be sponsored by a trade 
union. When Labour was re-elected in 1966,132 MPs were members, although 
349 Norton (1975) pp. 312-332 
350 Telephone conversation with Alan Howarth (not the MP), current PLP secretary, 6 February 
2003 
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the number had dropped to 127 by 1969351 . The largest trade union sponsor was 
the TGWU with 27 MPs. followed by the NUM with 24 and the AEF with 
seventeen. These three accounted for one-sixth of all Labour MPs. Trade union 
sponsorship, which included part payment of election expenses and the salaries of 
election agents, did not bring automatic and unthinking loyalty from the MPs 
concerned, as shown by the number of trade union sponsored MPs voting for 
prices and incomes policies. However it did bring an expectation of influence and 
a more general sense of loyalty towards the trade union movement, than might 
have been so with non-sponsored MPs. Consequently, both the AEF and the 
TGWU were to meet with their sponsored MPs during February to discuss 
attitudes towards the white paper, and AEF members were to make the most 
significant contribution to the parliamentary debate. 
Castle met the trade union group twice before the PLP debates. The first meeting 
was on Friday 17 January. Parliament was still in recess and only 25 MPs turned 
352 
UP . 
Castle recorded that, having spoken for fifty minutes, the worst she got was 
Stan Orme's comment that 'Barbara's philosophy is so right that her three 
proposals for legal action just don't form part of it'. Orme was a leading member 
of the left and Castle didn't expect the left to vote for her proposals. She noted, 
'What matters is middle-of-the road opinion', and quoted Charles Panne, 1353 as 
saying 'Very good, my love. We all love you'. Castle met the group again on 
Monday 20 January. On that occasion 80 members were present and, according to 
Castle, of the twelve who spoke only one gave her unqualified support. "Ist 
speak for the she dismissed a number of the speeches as those of 'chaps who Crvat 
shop floor' 354 , she concluded gloomily 
'it was clear that most MPs were going to 
follow the line of the unions that sponsor them' and 'we shall have the automatic 
opposition of miners, AEF and TGWU MPs'. 
More importantly, perhaps, than Castle meeting the trade union group, were the 
communications between individual unions and their sponsored MPs. The unions 
351 Quoted in 'The hands that feed Labour' by Keith Harper, Guardian, Tuesday April 22 1969 
P. 10 
352 Castle (1984) pp. 591-2 entry for Friday, 17 January 1969 
353 Minster for Public Works 1964-1966 
354 ibid entry for Monday, 20 January 1969 pp. 592-3 
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used their own publications to put across an uncompromising message. Thus, in 
the February edition of the AEF newsletter, The Journal, Jim Conway, General 
Secretary, published an editorial arguing that 'the proposals for so-called reform 
of the Trade Unions are unworkable and ill-judged'. According to Conway, the 
proposals 'sound the death toll of British Trade Unionism'. Stan Orme MP, who 
was sponsored by the AEF, reinforced Conway's comments. Writing in the same 
edition, Orme concluded that the penal clauses were flying 'directly in the face of 
Donovan and opposing everything that a free Trade Union movement in Britain 
has stood for' 355 . 
Such was the vehemence of Conway's comments that they were 
picked up by the national press 356 . 
Similarly, both Frank Cousins and Jack Jones signed articles in the March edition 
of the TGVIU monthly journal condemning the penal clauses. Cousins' article 
had appeared in the Sunday Mirror on 19 January, and Jones' had appeared in 
Tribune at the same time. Cousins' 'On the road to disaster' opened, 'There has 
been a growing belief in the ranks of even reasonably middle-of-the-road trade 
union members that the Labour Government has lost touch with them'. Similarly, 
Jones' article, 'Britain's Unions are too weak - not too strong! ' argued that 'the 
idea of legally enforced "conciliation pauses"' and official ballots on strikes 
provides further opportunities for delay and frustration within a system of 
357 bureaucratic state intervention' 
As well as contributions from union officials, the AEF j ournal included articles by 
a number of its sponsored MPs that reflected the debate going on within the PLP. 
As was noted above, Stan Orme reflected the stance of the left in his February 
article. In contrast, writing in the March edition, Charles Pannell reflected the 
middle ground, noting that legislation was not due until the next session and 
arguing that this gave the opportunity to 'sort out all of these difficulties together 
in mutual respect' 
358 
. 
355 AEU Journal, January-December 1969, February 1969, Vol 36 No. 2 (MSS259/ASE/4/14/83 
MRQ 
356 The Times, 3 February 1969 
357 T&G Record, March 1969 pp. 35-37 
358 
ibid. March 1969 Vol. 36 No. 3 
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This debate was not confined to the pages of the trade union journals. At its 
meeting on 3 February the AEF Executive agreed to hold a meeting of AEF MPs 
on Monday 24 FebruarY359. The exact nature and outcome of the meeting were 
recorded 360 . However the message emerging from the union executive was 
unequivocal in its opposition to the penal clauses and this would have been made 
clear to the sponsored MPs. In the parliamentary debate one week later five of the 
six Labour speakers were members of the AEF 361 ,a fact brought to the attention 
of the Speaker during the course of the debate 362 . Similarly the TGWTU group of 
MPs held a meeting on 20 February at which they unanimously agreed to support 
their union's opposition to the penal clauses 363 . Against this backdrop the PLP 
held its meetings to discuss the white paper, and it was hardly surprising they 
were dominated by opposition. 
3.5 The PLP debates: February - March 1969 
PLP minutes do not identify the individual contribution of each speaker. Rather, a 
summary of the debate is preceded by a list of the speakers, the only exception to 
this being when a minister makes a statement, or opens the debate. As such, it is 
not possible to attribute statements to individual members directly. However, if 
the list of speakers is compared to their voting record in the parliamentary debate, 
it provides a good indication of their likely stance on the white paper and provides 
a useful starting point for consideration of the nature and impact of the debates. 
The PLP discussion took place over four meetings on, 29 January, 5 February, 19 
February, and 27 February, when 26 members. Of these twelve were 
subsequently to vote against the government 
364 
. seven 
365 
support and five 
366 
359 MRC, MSS259/l/2/194, Executive Committee Minutes January-March 1969, Minutes of 
meeting held on 3 February 1969. 
360 The outcome does not appear in subsequent Executive Committee minutes, and there is no 
evidence of a separate note having been taken. 
361 Tony Gardner, Ben Ford, Stan Orme, Dan Jones, Charles Pannell 
362 H. of C. Debs., 3 March 1969 Col. 122 Mr Alex Eadie (Midlothian) 'Are you aware, Mr 
Speaker, that during this debate three members of the A. E. F. have been called? There are other 
Members on this side of the House who have a point of view on industrial relations as well as 
members of the A. E. F. ' 
363 Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy - The Labour Party, Trade Unions 
and Incomes Policy 1945 - 1974 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976) p. 
182. Panitch 
does not identify the source of his information. 
364 N. Atkinson, S. Bidwell, A. Eadie, J. Hamilton, E. Heffer, J. Homer, R. Hughes, Mrs M. 
McKay, J. J. Mendelson, S. Newens, S. Orme and T. Park, 
365 J. Ashley, J. Barnett, D. Jones, K. Lomas, A. McDonald, M. Maguire and C. Pannell, 
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alu-stained. Of the remaining two, one was a peer, Lord Blyton, and the other, Ian 
Mikardo, was absent from the parliamentary debate. On the basis of this analysis, 
seventeen of the PLP speakers were likely to have expressed outright opposition 
or doubts about the white paper. In addition, Mikardo is likely to have opposed 
the white paper, given his position as a leading member of the Tribune group, and 
one of the speakers who was to vote for the government, Charles Pannell, 
expressed serious concerns over the penal clauses in his speech during the 
parliamentary debate. Finally, while not guaranteeing his opposition, Lord Blyton 
had represented a Durham mining constituency from 1945-64 and had served on 
the Durham miners' executive committee during the 1930s. Consequently, it 
would seem likely that at least nineteen of the speakers expressed reservations, 
doubt or outright opposition to Castle's proposals. Of these nineteen, however, 
ten had voted against the government on at least four occasions during the passage 
of the post-devaluation public expenditure cuts and the prices and incomes 
legislation 367 
. As such, it was easy for Castle to dismiss them as coming from the 
cusual suspects'. However it was difficult to dismiss the remaining nine as easily. 
None of them had opposed the government before, each was drawn from the 
centre of the party, and the majority had a strong trade union background and 
were members of the PLP trade union group. 
The first meeting took place on 29 January and opened with an announcement 
from the chairman, Douglas Houghton, that, in view of the pending strike of Post 
Office workers, the whip would be sent out early, the irony of which seemed to be 
lost on all present. Castle's account of the first meeting, recorded on 5 February, 
is contradictory in its tone. She opened by complaining that 'only' 100 people 
were there and commented, 'So much for the PLP's constantly reiterated demand 
for "participation"'. She concluded by noting that so many people still wanted to 
speak at the end of the meeting, that Houghton agreed to hold another meeting. 
Similarly, whilst commenting that 'the mood was far from bitter' and that there 
were a lot of compliments for the bulk of the white paper, Castle noted that 'there 
were almost non-stop objections' to the strike ballot, conciliation pause and 
366 H. Brown, R. Fletcher, E. Milne, J. Tinn, and E. Wainwright ' 
367 N. Atkinson, S. Bidwell, E. Heffer, J. Homer, R. Hughes, J. J. Mendelson, 1. Mikardo, S. 
Newens, S. Orme and T. Park, 
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especially to the attachment of earnings. In relation to the latter, she concluded 'It 
ý 368 is astonishing how much furore that has created! 
The official record supports Castle's account. In her opening speech, Castle 
sought to emphasise the positive. The white paper, she argued, 'spelt out the 
biggest Charter of Trade Union rights for 60 years )369 ,a reference presumably to 
the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 that had reversed the Taff Vale ruling. However, 
whilst she argued that the white paper had been accepted because it would 
strengthen the unions, 'the Government was entitled to ask for safeguards for the 
Community at large'. It was in this context that the government was proposing 
the strike ballot and conciliation pause. However, in each case, Castle stressed 
that these were 'merely' reserve powers that did not alter the fundamental right to 
strike. Finally, she stressed that there was no question of imprisonment under the 
sanctions. 
Ten people spoke in response to Castle. The minutes recorded tributes to Castle's 
work and 'many aspects of the White Paper', but 'very strong opposition' was 
expressed to the attachment of salary, 'the extension of legal interference' and the 
proposed reserve powers, thus confirming Castle's record. However, the 
arguments had a familiar nng to them; many strikes were only 'unofficial' 
because the unions did not have the funds to support an 'official' strike; ballots 
were of limited use; and unions already had mechanisms for dealing with inter- 
union disputes. As such they are unlikely to have convinced Castle that they 
represented valid reasons for rejecting her proposals. Similarly, it was noted that 
'Members expressed their anxieties as to the White Paper's effect on the Party as a 
whole and its supporters in the country', and that the introduction of a bill based 
on the white paper would 'inevitably split the Party in the House and in the 
country'. Again, this appeal, based as it was on narrow party interests, is likely to 
have done little to convince Castle that her proposals should be dropped. 
Similarly, five of the speakers were drawn from the coterie of left-wingers who 
368 Castle (1984) p. 601 entry for 5 February 1969 
369Labour Party Archives, National Museum of Labour History, Manchester [hereafter LPA], 
Minutes of a Party Meeting held on Wednesday, 29 January, 1969 
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had opposed the majority of post-devaluation economic PoliCY370 . As such, it 
would have been easy for Castle to reject much of the opposition as coming from 
a predictable source. 
In the circumstances, it was possible for a minister who was already frustrated by 
the lack of positive proposals from the TUC and CBI, to dismiss much of the party 
opposition as lacking in creative alternatives, originating from the oppositional 
left, and focused almost entirely on party political considerations. In such 
circumstances, it is easy to see how Castle was able to convince herself that, once 
her proposals were fully understood by the majority of the PLP they would 
become more widely accepted. However, as the ensuing debates were to 
demonstrate, the majority of the PLP were to prove as intransigent as the minority 
on the left. 
The second PLP meeting took place on Wednesday, 5 February and followed a 
similar pattem to the first. Nine members spoke, and of these four voted against 
the government, three supported, one abstained and the other, Ian Mikardo, wasn't 
present. The minutes were very short and simply recorded that 'although a view 
was expressed on one side that the White Paper was acceptable as a whole', the 
majority of members expressed the view that the desirability of the majority of the 
white paper was 'entirely vitiated' by the proposals for strike ballots, the 
conciliation pause and the attachment of earnings 
371 
. 
The final debate took place on Wednesday, 1 9th February and was truncated by a 
series of divisions on the Parliament Bill. Castle recorded that it was a 'mixture of 
farce and triumph', making her now familiar complaint about the small number of 
PLP members present: 'one would never have thought my WP was a major issue 
on which the Party was violently split'. Regardless of these concerns, Castle 
concluded that her winding up speech was 'one of the best speeches I have ever 
made' and noted that Wilson kept saying 'Superb, Superb! ' 
372 
. 
370 N. Atkinson, S. Bidwell, J. Homer, J. J. Mendelson, and T. Park, 
371 LPA, Minutes of a Party Meeting held on Wednesday, 5 th February 1969 
372 Castle (1984) p. 603 entry for 19 February 1969 
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The official minutes record that a further seven members spoke. Of these, only 
one voted against the government, although four abstained and only two voted for 
the proposals. This was the first meeting of the PLP at which known rebels did 
not make up the majority of those speaking, and as such the background of the 
speakers was significant. All four who went on to abstain in the parliamentary 
debate had a strong trade union background; Edward Milne had been area 
organiser for the Union of Shop Distributors and Allied Workers; James Tinn was 
a fom-ler lodge secretary of the National Union of Blast furnace Men; Hugh 
Brown was a former section secretary of the Union of Postal Workers; and 
Raymond Fletcher was a member of the TGWU. As such, this was the first 
significant showing of the silent majority that occupied the centre-ground of the 
PLP and as such, should have rung warning bells with Castle. 
Perhaps because of the different background of the speakers, the debate was more 
wide ranging than at the previous meetings. Whilst the familiar arguments were 
made against the three penal clauses, doubts were expressed about the 'general 
tenor' of the white paper. It was argued that, under the Conservatives, the 
proposals could be used as 'a weapon to bring Trade Unions too much under the 
, 373 influence of the State . In the circumstances, it was argued that 
it would be 
more desirable to treat the document as a 'Green Paper' for discussion, echoing 
Crossman's arguments in Cabinet. Against this, it was acknowledged that a 
decision was needed now on industrial relations policy, but that 'there must be no 
division between the Unions and the Party. Further, it was argued that state 
influence in the unions was 'no bad thing' and that it was regrettable that the press 
had only highlighted that negative aspects of the white paper. However, 
regardless of these elements of support, the debate was once again brought back to 
the conclusion that the government 'was asked to consider removing the three 
offending clauses'. 
In her winding up, Castle expressed gratitude for the 'many kind tributes' that had 
been made to her and her department and said that she had been pleased by the 
tone of the discussions. Whilst she acknowledged the criticisms that had been 
373 LPA, Minutes of a Party Meeting held on Wednesday, WhFebruary 1969 
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made, she also noted that 'no alternative solutions had been put forward'. 
Similarly, she argued that the proposals for the attachment of wages had caused a 
'good deal of unnecessary alarm', and that she was open to suggestions as to other 
forms of sanctions apart from attachment. However, she felt that there was now a 
much better understanding of the subordinate role played by legal sanctions and 
re-emphasised that the main focus of the white paper lay in the elimination of the 
causes of strikes. Since the publication of the white paper, there had been more 
forward thinking by the trade union movement, which had been the 'whole aim' 
of the government, who wanted to 'help the Trade Unions to help themselves'. 
Finally, she 'denied categorically that the scheme was hitting at the workers' and 
ended by re-emphasising her belief that the white paper 'represented a totally 
viable philosophy which would enable Trade Unions to reassert their own 
374 authority and be true Socialists' 
Castle's speech indicates how little either side had moved over the course of the 
debate. From her perspective, whilst many criticisms had been made, no one had 
emerged with viable alternatives, and the majority of the speakers came from the 
dissenting left. For her opponents, the penal clauses remained at best 
unacceptable and undermined the positive proposals in the rest of the white paper, 
whilst at worst they represented the beginnings of state control of the trade union 
movement. However, as has been demonstrated, there were clear indications that 
concern and opposition had spread beyond the left, and that Castle had failed to 
pick this up. Subsequently, when a call to amend the government motion from 
'this House approves of the White Paper' to 'this House takes note' was rejected 
at a PLP meeting prior to the parliamentary debate 375 ý 
it was inevitable that the 
parliamentary debate would become a focal point for opposition. It was perhaps 
equally inevitable that Castle would be surprised by the size of the revolt. 
3.6 The Parliamentary Debate - Monday 3 March 1969 
The white paper was debated on Monday, 3 March and, as has been noted, 55 
members of the PLP voted against the government, with more than 40 further 
374 
ibid. 
375 LPA, Minutes of a Party Meeting held on Thursday, 27thFebruary 1969 
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members abstaining. Castle reacted with a mixture of surprise and disdain. 
However, having analysed the make-up of the PLP and the substance of the 
debate, it is clear that what happened was consistent with the PLP debates and 
should not have come as a surprise to anyone. 
The debate opened with the speaker rejecting a number of amendments, two of 
which echoed the main themes that had emerged in the PLP debates. The first, 
moved by Tony Gardner, welcomed the positive aspects of the white paper, but 
rejected strike ballots, the conciliation pause and attachment of earnings. The 
second, moved by Stan Onne was more extreme and rejected the entire white 
paper on the grounds that it contained proposals that would 'destroy certain 
fundamental rights of a free trade union movement' 
376 
. 
Castle opened the debate with a detailed defence of the philosophy of the white 
paper, putting the penal clauses into the wider context of an extension of trade 
union rights. She concluded by noting that the parliamentary debate was the start 
of a discussion that would go on for many months, and finished with her now 
familiar, to the PLP at least, coda; 
We intend to make these discussions meaningful. We do not say that we 
have a monopoly of wisdom in this field. What we do say is that the 
philosophy of the White Paper is wholly consistent with the extension and 
the defence of trade union rights. What we say, too, is that there are 
problems here which have to be faced. So far, no one has produced any 
alternatives. If the trade union movement in its anxiety about certain 
proposals, were to come to us with alternatives whose effectiveness could be 
guaranteed, we should happily consider them. 
377 
Following Castle, six Labour MPs were called. Of these only one, Stan Orme, 
voted against the govenunent. Reflecting his rejected amendment, Orme stated 
that he rejected the philosophy of the white paper because 'it is a philosophy of 
Government intervention 078 . 
Of the remaining five; Tony Gardner justified his 
proposed amendment, noting that he opposed the penal clauses, 
'not so much 
because they are anti-trade union ... 
but because we believe they will not work 
079; 
376H 
, of 
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Ben Ford supported the majority of the white paper, but expressed reservations on 
the use of strike ballots, hoping that an alternative could be found; and Charles 
Pannell noted that his support was based on the government's commitment to 
continued consultation which meant 'not just listening', but acknowledging that 
'if the Minister is to get her legislation in due course she will have to give way on 
380 some points' In this context, he rejected the proposal for attachment of 
earnings and questioned the validity of the other penal clauses. 
Two speakers offered unconditional support; Dan Jones, who argued that the 
white paper was, 'an imaginative and fraternal step in the direction in which the 
country should have moved 20 years ago' 381 ; and Michael McGuire, who quoted 
examples of the strike ballot and conciliation pause working in the mining 
industry. In closing the debate for the government, Harold 
Walker 382 acknowledged the reservations and doubts that had been expressed and 
stressed that Castle had asked him to repeat 'with all the emphasis at my 
command' her commitment to further discussion and consultation. He concluded 
with the plea that, 'the words of the Motion, insisting that the Governinent 
383 
continue consultations, are clear in purpose and sincere in intent' 
The parliamentary debate followed the lines of the February PLP discussions. 
Whilst there were moves to reject the white paper in its entirety these were in a 
minority. The views of Gardner and Parnell reflected those of many in the PLP, 
as not naturally opposed to the government, and at this stage they were prepared 
to support it, but they questioned the effectiveness of the penal clauses and called 
for further discussion and consultation before final decisions were made. Thus, 
within six weeks of publication, it was clear that a significant minority within the 
PLP opposed three of the main planks of Castle's proposals. Whilst 40 MPs voted 
against the white paper and a further 60 abstained, it is evident that a number of 
those who voted for the government were not prepared to support the penal 
clauses. Faced with the breadth of opposition within the PLP, 
Castle's response 
was to emphasise her commitment to continued consultation and 
her willingness 
180 ibid. Col 143 
381 
ibid. Col 126 382 Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Department of Employment and Productivity 
383H. 
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to consider any alternative proposals. However, as her diary indicates, she was 
sceptical as to the likelihood of this and remained committed to continuing with 
the white paper in the absence of any alternatives. Furthennore, a steady stream 
of industrial disputes was starting to loosen her resolve not to introduce an interim 
bill. 
3.7 Strikes 
On 12 March 1969, Castle made a statement to the House of Commons on the 
lack of progress in resolving the current strike at Fords. Afterwards her junior 
minister Roy Hattersley commented that 'we could get the penal clauses of the 
White Paper through at this moment'. Castle replied that the same idea had 
occurred to her and that she 'had already given instructions for an interim Bill to 
384 be prepared urgently' It is impossible to overestimate the extent and 
importance of Castle's volte-face. Less than two months previously she had 
rejected completely the arguments of Crossman and Jenkins that an interim bill 
was essential: In Place of Strife was to be regarded as a philosophic whole or not 
at all. What then had caused this dramatic u-turn? The answer was 
straightforward, ever increasing unrest in the motor industry and the Fords dispute 
in particular. 
Throughout February and March 1969, the business pages were full of industrial 
disputes. A typical report in The Times on 1 March highlighted; a ten man 
unofficial strike at Vauxhall's Ellesmere Port component plant which was likely 
to cause a complete closure of plants in Luton and Dunstable affecting 3000 staff, 
an ongoing strike at a Rover factory in Cardiff that had already led to 400 workers 
being laid off at a pressed steel plant in Oxford; a new set of protests in the 
ongoing steel recognition strike; and a speech by Roy Mason, Minister of Power, 
in which he argued that the TUC were powerless to stop the wrecking action of 
unofficial disputes and should therefore support the proposals in In Place of Strife 
because they offered, 'a twentieth-century package of reform, most of which is 
designed to enhance their leadership' 
385 
. 
Against this backdrop, the well 
respected industrial correspondent, and member of the Donovan Commission, 
384 Castle (1984) p. 618 entry for 12 March 1969 
385 The Times, I March 1969 
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Eric Wigham, concluded, 'In a period when the Labour Government are 
proposing legal restrictions, and the Conservatives want to go much further, the 
unions seem almost as if they were trying to demonstrate that they are not able to 
run themselves properly or to play a constructive or even honourable part in 
collective bargaining on a wholly voluntary basis' 386 . 
However, whilst most of the disputes were confined to the business pages, it was 
the dispute at Fords that spilled over onto the front page and had much wider 
political implications. The dispute centred on an agreement that had been 
negotiated between Fords and the National Joint Negotiating Committee (NJNC), 
made up of the representatives of the eighteen unions that had members working 
at Fords. Significantly, each union had a single vote, regardless of membership, 
meaning that the TGWU and the AEF, who had in the region of 17,500 and 
15,000 members respectively and whose members constituted over 45% of all 
union membership, had the same number of votes as the Amalgamated Society of 
Builders and Decorators who had a membership of less than 100387. 
On 11 February, the NJNC agreed to a new pay deal that offered; a pay increase 
of between 7 and 10%; equal pay for equal shifts; a guarantee of two thirds of 
basic rates for up to ten days to employees laid off because of strikes at supply 
factories or trade recession; and raised the annual holiday allowances from f-5 to 
f25 on top of basic rates. However, as part of the agreement, any worker who 
undertook unofficial strike action would forfeit the increased holiday allowance 
and two third payment in the event of lay off. These conditions, which soon 
became known as the Fords penal clauses, were agreed by the NJNC, but crucially 
the AEF representative opposed them, whilst the TGWU representative abstained. 
Subsequently unofficial strikes broke out amongst members of both the AEF and 
the TGWU. By 24 February, 3500 workers at the Halewood transmission plant, 
making 3000 gearboxes a day for the entire Ford range and probably the key plant 
within the Ford set-up, were on strike at an estimated cost of f2 million per day. 
On the following day, the AEF national executive met and decided to make the 
strike official, followed by the TGWU executive, which on 27 February also 
386 The Times, 28 February 1969 
387 The Sunday Times, 2 March 1969 
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agreed to make the strike official388. In response Fords sought an injunction, 
claiming that the strikes were in breach of a legally binding procedural agreement, 
and were successful in gaining a temporary injunction to that effect, with a full 
hearing scheduled for 3 March, the same day as the House of Commons debate on 
In Place of Strife. 
The injunction hinged on an interpretation of the Trade Union Act 1871 under 
which agreements between a trade union and an employers association could be 
legally enforced, and which, it will be recalled, Castle had included within the 
white paper as an option that unions and employers might wish to undertake, and 
which the Conservatives had sought to make a compulsory element of all 
procedure agreements. The ruling hinged on whether an agreement with the 
NJNC could be held to be binding on the individual unions that constituted the 
NJNC, with both the AEF and the TGWU issuing sworn statements saying that 
they had never regarded the agreement as such. In the event, the courts ruled that 
the agreement could not be considered legally binding and both sides were forced 
back to the negotiating table. Consequently, Fords asked the DEP to intervene 
and Castle and her officials were involved in a series of meetings before an 
agreement was eventually reached on 18 March under which the holiday bonus 
and lay-off benefits would be reduced according to the time lost as a consequence 
of industrial action, but with no one receiving less than af 15 holiday bonus. 
The Fords dispute was a pivotal moment. Peter Jenkins has argued that, 'the 
muddle, the bitter recriminations and the double dealing which caused and 
prolonged the Ford dispute finally disillusioned Barbara Castle of any remaining 
hope that the unions might put their own house in order' 
389 
, whilst 
Jack Jones has 
commented that Castle's support for Ford made it clear to him that she was not on 
the side of the workerS390. Certainly, the dispute confirmed many facets of the 
contemporary industrial relations debate. The dysfunctional working of the NJNC 
highlighted the problems associated with multi-union workplaces, lending weight 
to the argument for industry specific unions, as well as proving a perfect example 
388 For detailed discussion of the TGWU reaction and decision see Jones (1986) pp. 207-209 
389 Jenkins (1970) p. 61 
390 Interview with Jack Jones, London, 4 March 2000 
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of Donovan's critique of the division existing between fori-nal and informal 
negotiating structures. For many, the breakdown of the NJNC reflected a 
reassertion of local shop steward power over a remote national bod Y391. 
Furthermore, the failure to obtain a pennanent injunction seemed to support 
Castle's view over the impracticality of seeking to make procedure agreement 
legally binding, whilst the speed with which the AEF and TGýW moved to 
support unofficial strikes seemed to add grist to the mill of Castle's critics who 
argued that attempts to outlaw unofficial action would be countered by unions 
making almost all strikes official. Finally, the strike brought home the 
vulnerability of the economy to strikes in such major export industries, once again 
392 reinforcing the need for safeguards in the national interest 
In the circumstances it was hardly surprising that both supporters and opponents 
of In Place of Strife made much of the dispute. After the court injunction was 
lifted, the communist Morning Star ran a headline, 'First Round Won - Now for 
the K. O. ', linking the dispute directly to opposition to the govenu-nent's 
proposals 393 . Similarly, Harold Wilson, 
in his first major speech on industrial 
relations since the publication of In Place of Strife, chose to focus on industrial 
unrest in the motor industry. Speaking on Merseyside on 14 March, he stressed 
how much government subsidy had been given to attract the motor industry to the 
area, only for it to be met by, 'Strike after strike frustrating the effort of 
Government, signalling a question mark to those industrialists who are attracted 
by the inducements the Government provide and who are considering establishing 
themselves here'. In the circumstances he warned, it was difficult to see why 
companies such as Fords would continue to invest in Britain, and that, he argued, 
was why the government's proposals for industrial relations reform were so 
important, and why, it should be, 'clearly understood that the Government means 
business about these proposals', because, 'All that had happened in these last three 
weeks provides powerful support for the measures we shall be introducing in 
Parliament' 394 . 
Thus it was, that when Castle responded to Hattersley she was 
well on the way to accepting the need for prompt action. The only question that 
391 The Times, 25 February 1969 
392 Fords were estimated to contribute f 200m per annum to British exports 
393 Morning Star, 7 March 1969 
394 Quoted in Panitch, (1976) p. 181 
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remained was how far was she prepared to sacrifice the careful balance of rights 
and responsibilities at the core of In Place of Strife for a short bill focusing on the 
more prescriptive elements of her proposals, a decision that will be considered in 
detail in the next chapter. 
3.8 The trade union response. 
On 20 March the TGWU submitted a motion to the TUC calling for the convening 
of a special congress on the grounds that, 'there is a serious danger that the 
Cabinet could arrive at firm decisions well before the September Congress' 395 
The motion was moved by Jack Jones and discussed at a meeting of the TUC 
general council on 26 March at which he asked if the committee were satisfied 
that legislation would not be ready until after the September CongresS396 . Not for 
the first time it is possible to wonder at Jones' prescience; he had raised a similar 
question over rumours of draconian legislation in December 1968. He was either 
reacting to newspaper comments over the rash of unofficial strikes, or had an 
inside track on Castle's discussions of the introduction of an interim bill: Castle 
held her first discussions with Wilson and Jenkins on the 25 March, the very day 
before the general council meeting. 
Feather sought to reassure the general council that his infonnation was that 
legislation was not due until November, although he recognised that, 'the 
Government might find themselves under strong pressure to bring their 
programme forward ý397 . Jones' concerns were echoed 
by Frank Cousins who 
argued it was imperative to persuade the Cabinet not to reach firm decisions at an 
early stage, and Danny McGarvey 398 . who enquired whether 
further consideration 
would be given to the suggestion of a special congress if it were found that 
legislation would be introduced earlier than expected. In the circumstances the 
general council agreed that they should seek an urgent meeting with Wilson to 
make clear their opposition to the 'objectionable features of the White Paper', and 
seek reassurance about the timing of legislation. It was further agreed that they 
395 MRC, MSS 29213/40.2/6 Trades Union Congress, Industrial Relations Bill Special Congress 
1969 
396 MRC, MSS 29213/20/9 Trades Union Congress, Minutes of the eleventh meeting (1968-69) 
held on Wednesday, March 26,1969 
397 ibid. 
398 Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers 
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consider the case for a special congress situation in the light of the outcome of the 
meeting with Wilson. 
The decision to meet Wilson was the culmination of nearly two months of 
pressure from individual unions calling for a special congress in response to the 
government white paper. Motions calling for a special congress started to emerge 
in early February. The first came from the Watermen, Lighterinen, Tugmen and 
Bargemen's Union on 7 February. This was followed by the Society of Graphical 
& Allied Trades (SOGAT) on 18 February and the Amalgamated Union of 
Building Trade Workers on 20 February. On February 22, the AEF executive 
requested a special meeting of trade union executives on the grounds that the 
matter was so important that 'it is necessary for the trade unions to have a coherent 
plan of action if their opinions are to be truly effective 399 . 
However, following the publication of the white paper, the TUC had published its 
own response under the title, Action on Donovan 400. Arising from this, they 
organised a series of industry-specific conferences to discuss the implications of 
the Donovan report within individual industries and it was envisaged that these 
would provide the main response to In Place of Strife. Working on the basis that 
legislation was not planned until the autumn, Feather and his officials were 
content to play the long game in the belief that the more unacceptable elements of 
401 the white paper could be, 'finessed out' Consequently, as requests for a special 
congress reached the general council, Vic Feather, by now acting general 
secretary, was keen to reject them on the grounds that they distracted from the 
longer game. 
The matter reached the general council on February 26 when George Dought Y402 
asked if the general council was going to make a specific pronouncement on the 
white paper apart from motions submitted by unions for the Congress agenda. 
Feather replied that the report to Congress would cover fully all of the general 
council's discussions with groups of unions as well as their views and conclusions 
399MRC, MSS292B/40.2/6 - Industrial Relations Bill Special Congress 1969 
400 Action on Donovan (TUC, 1969) 
401 interview with Lord Murray of Epping Forest, House of Lords, II May 2000 
402 Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA) 
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au about the white paper. Tom Jackson 403 queried whether the group conferences 
were the best place to discuss the problems arising from the white paper, but 
Feather replied that the views of the groups would be reported to the committees 
and it would be their conclusions that would be reported to the general council and 
embodied in the report to Congress. Richard Briginshaw of SOGAT said that his 
union believed that steps should be taken to drop certain offending paragraphs in 
the white paper, and once again Feather rejected the proposal, saying that if a 
special conference were to be called now it would only serve to approve what the 
general council had decided in JanuarY404. 
In pursuing his gradualist strategy, Feather appears to have underestimated the 
strength of opposition among individual unions, as evidenced in the extracts from 
individual union newspapers and j ournals that were quoted above, and, as rumours 
became stronger about the prospect of early legislation, it became ever more 
difficult for him to maintain the TUC line. In the circumstances, a meeting with 
Wilson, the first since the white paper had been published, seemed the easiest way 
out. Needless to say, if Wilson were to confirm the prospect of early legislation, it 
would be almost impossible to deny the calls for a special congress and the 
meeting was therefore crucial. However, before the meeting could take place, the 
Labour Party's national executive committee were due to meet to consider a 
motion proposing that the Party refuse to support legislation based on the penal 
clauses. This was prove a culmination to the two months of internal discussions 
and debates, as the two wings of the Labour Party united to reject the white paper. 
3.9 NEC Debate - 26 March 1969 
The events of the meeting of the NEC on 26 March are well documented. At a 
meeting on 22 January 1969, Joe Gormley of the National Union of Mineworkers 
(,, ýUM)405 
, requested 
that a discussion take place on the government's proposals 
403 Union of Post Office Workers 
404 MRC, MSS292B/20/9, Trades Union Congress (TUC), Minutes of tenth meeting (1968-69) held 
on Wednesday, February 26 1969 
405 At that point Gormley was Secretary of the Lancashire Area of the NUM. He was elected 
national president of the NUM in 1971 
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for trade union reform, and it was agreed that a special meeting would take place 
on 10 February to discuss the proposals. At the special meeting, Castle outlined 
ý406 the main features of the white paper and 'a full expression of views took place 
Following this discussion, Gormley submitted a motion to the next meeting of the 
NEC to be held on 26 th February, the full text of which was as follows; 
In view of the discussion at the special meeting of the National Executive 
Committee on 10 February, 1969, held to discuss the Government's White 
Paper "In Place of Strife", the National Executive Committee agrees to 
inform the Minister that they cannot agree to support any legislation being 
introduced based on all the suggestions contained in that document. 
We. therefore, ask the Minister to seriously consider the views expressed, 
both at that special meeting of the National Executive Committee of the 
British Labour Party and by the T. U. C., before attempting to involve the 
Labour Government in the introduction of any proposed legislation. 407 
Following discussion, it was resolved that the motion should be considered at the 
next meeting of the NEC on 26 th March. Subsequently the motion was passed, 
with a minor amendment, formally setting the Labour Party in opposition to the 
Labour government. This would have been significant on its own, but the position 
was compounded by the decision of Jim Callaghan, the Home Secretary, to vote in 
favour of the motion, seemingly breaking with collective Cabinet responsibility 
and establishing himself as the leader of the rebels' cause. 
The NIEC minutes for 26 March record simply that Gormley introduced the 
motion and accepted a minor amendment. Subsequently a further, substantial 
amendment was moved that proposed the deletion of 'agrees to inform the 
Minister that they cannot agree to support any legislation being introduced based 
on all the suggestions contained in that document', and its replacement with 
'welcomes the Minister's assurances that there will be the fullest consultation with 
the Trade Unions before legislation is framed. ' This amendment was defeated by 
fifteen votes to seven. The NEC then voted on the original motion, including the 
minor amendment and it was passed by sixteen votes to five. As printed 
in the 
406 LPA, Labour Party, National Executive Conunittee Minutes, IO'hFebruary 1969 
407 ibid. 26thFebruary 1969 
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minutes, the minor amendment had altered 'cannot agree to support any 
legislation5, to 'cannot agree to support legislation )408 . 
In his memoirs, Gormley makes clear the bitterness that he felt over the white 
paper, quoting his own remarks, 'For God's sake will you realise you're souring 
the very voters that you're going to have to rely on' 409 , whilst Castle's diary 
provides more detail on the movers of the two amendments. According to her 
account she rejected Gormley's opening claim that the resolution was reasonably 
worded and that he couldn't see why she would not support it. Castle replied that 
this was 'clearly impossible', as it was obvious what the press would make of the 
NEC not supporting 'any legislation based on all the proposals in the WP )410 . 
According to Castle, Callaghan agreed that I had a point about the word "any" and 
suggested that if it were dropped there was no reason not to accept the 
resolution 411 . 
Gormley accepted Callaghan's amendment, at which point 
Anthony Greenwood 412 passed Castle the amendment regarding continued 
consultations, which she then moved. In the subsequent vote, Callaghan voted 
against Castle's amendment and for the original resolution as amended to remove 
the word "any". As Peter Jenkins has noted, 'It was perfectly clear what this 
meant. The executive would not accept legislation which included penal clauses 
and was not even prepared to consult with the Government as far as the penal 
A13 clauses were concerned 
Callaghan's behaviour was enormously significant and widely reported as such. 
Peter Jenkins, writing in the Guardian a week after the event, placed Callaghan's 
behaviour in the wider context of Wilson's leadership, and argued that his actions 
made public 'a belief that he [Callaghan] has long been mouthing in semi-private. 
This is that Labour has no chance of victory under Mr Wilson's leadership but 
may have a sporting chance under his own 
414 
. At a more 
localised level, Castle 
recorded a conversation with Tony Benn, in which Benn argued that Wilson 
408 ibid. 26bMarch 1969 
409 Joe Gormley, Battered Cherub (Hamish Hamilton, London 1982) p. 73 
410 Castle (1984) pp. 625-6 entry for Wednesday, 26 March 1969 
411 
ibid 412 Minister for Housing and Local Government 
413 Jenkins (1970) p. 78 
414 Peter Jenkins, 'End of the Road? ', Guardian, Tuesday 1 April 1969 
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should write to Callaghan saying, 'Dear Jim, As you are no longer prepared to 
5415 defend Government policy in public, I assume you have resigned 
Callaghan's exact motivation remains unclear. He does not mention the NEC 
meeting in his autobiography, leaving the way open for others to interpret his 
actions in line with their own opinions or prejudices. Peter Jenkins, writing after 
the event in 1970, has suggested that it was an opportunistic moment, quoting the 
opinion of someone sitting near to Callaghan in the meeting, that he did no more 
than react spontaneously to the situation as it developed. However, Jenkins notes, 
having voted for the resolution, Callaghan would have been very clear as to the 
implications of his actions. Furthermore, whilst Callaghan may not have clarified 
matters in his autobiography, two separate sources give an indication of what he 
said during the meeting and subsequently in a letter to Wilson, and these provide 
not only an indication of his thinking, but also show how far his actions were the 
logical culmination of the previous two months debates. Tony Benn was present 
at the NEC, and in his diary quotes Callaghan as saying that 'he thought a 
division between the Government and the Party would be disastrous'416 . 
Similarly, Kenneth Morgan quotes from a letter that Callaghan sent to Wilson on 
2 April, following discussions over Callaghan's behaviour: 'The Party situation is 
serious in morale and policy. They are linked and confidence is low.... Can we 
017 
make a fresh start and get PLP, Cabinet, Party and TUs back together? 
Whatever the wider and possibly machiavellian aspects of Callaghan's behaviour, 
publicly he was arguing that his actions were designed to reunite the party and not 
to cause division. The debates within the PLP and among individual trade unions 
had highlighted the breadth and depth of opposition to the government's 
proposals. Many of the white paper's opponents within the PLP occupied the 
cautious middle ground that Callaghan himself claimed to represent. 
Similarly, 
his close relations with many in the trade union movement would 
have given him 
a very strong sense of the extent of the opposition. Against this 
backdrop, 
Callaghan would have been confident that he was playing a very strong 
hand. As 
415 Castle (1984) p. 626 entry for 26 March 1969 
416 Benn (1988), pp. 156-7, entry for 26 March 1969 
417 Morgan (1997) p-334 
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Kenneth Morgan has noted, when faced with Callaghan's rebellion Wilson had 
two options, 'he could drop the bill or sack the minister". However, as Morgan 
concludes, such was the relative weakness of Wilson that both strategies were 
impossible and inevitably, 'the fight was on 418 . Nowhere was Wilson's 
difficulty more evident than in his failure to give Callaghan a dressing-down at the 
next Cabinet meeting. According to Castle, Wilson failed to criticise Callaghan in 
the meeting, but promptly briefed the press that he had done just that, as Castle 
put it 'Harold has clearly compensated to the lobby for what he failed to do in 
Cabinet. 419 Wilson may have been buying time, but the dilemma remained. 
However, if Callaghan's actions represented the culmination of the opening 
skirmishes, they were also to provoke Castle into the next stage, which would 
pitch the labour movement into full-scale war. On 31 March, Castle recorded a 
conversation with Crossman; 
I took the opportunity of sounding him out about an interim Bill ... I said I had always been against it in principle but thought that the Jim incident had 
highlighted the dangers of allowing the discussion with the unions to drag 
on for months, particularly as they showed no signs of being ready to 
negotiate about anything in it. 420 
Fifteen days later, as part of his budget speech, Roy Jenkins announced the 
proposal to introduce an interim industrial relations bill during the current 
parliamentary session, and the scene was set for some of the bitterest in fighting 
that the Labour movement had seen. 
3.10 Summary 
Castle's decision to push ahead with an interim bill marked the beginning of a 
descent into unreality. If the parliamentary and PLP debates indicated nothing 
else, they showed just how far the arithmetic was stacked against her. The white 
paper succeeded in uniting left, right and centre in a way that made it virtually 
impossible to see how any legislation that included the penal clauses could 
be 
successful. Castle may have been correct in her assessment of press and public 
reaction to the Fords' dispute, but the minutes indicate just 
how hermetically 
418 Morgan (1997) p-334 
419 Castle (1984) pp. 631-2, entry for 5 April 1969 
420 Castle (1984) p. 628 entry for 31 March 1969 
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sealed the PLP debates were. The press failed to provide the kind of 
overwhelming support that might have influenced the centre-ground of the PLP 
and consequently, from the first meetings between Castle and the trade union 
group it was evident that opposition went well beyond the normal confines of the 
left, and was founded on the intrinsic links between the trade unions and the PLP. 
In the circumstances it would have been pragmatic to at least plan some form of 
retreat, especially once the NEC had rejected the white paper, however there is 
nothing in the evidence to suggest that Castle considered this, in fact, as we have 
seen, she chose to press ahead with the very interim bill that she had rejected less 
than two months earlier. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTERIM BILL: MARCH - APRIL 1969 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections; the first analyses the origins of the bill, 
and considers the political pressures that led to Castle's decision to draft the bill; 
the practical problems that came close to derailing it; the crucial role Callaghan's 
rebellion played in Castle's final decision to go ahead; and the wider 
considerations that led to Wilson, Jenkins and Crossman arguing for the bill to be 
linked to the future of prices and incomes policy; and Wilson's decision to use the 
bill to reassert his own control over the party. The second section examines 
reactions to the interim bill; focusing on lukewarm press reactions and the failure 
to capitalise on any sense of public support for reform; the growing anger within 
the PLP leading to a series of plots to remove Wilson; the TUC decision to 
convene a special congress; and finally, considers the significance of Wilson's 
May Day speech in which he appeared to open the way for negotiation and 
concession. 
Section A- Origins 
4.2 'A short bill?. ' 
As we have seen, arguments in favour of an interim bill began to emerge almost as 
soon as In Place of Strife was drafted, and, initially at least, the parliamentary 
timetable allowed for the introduction of a short bill in May 1969. The two 
principal proponents of such a measure were Richard Crossman and Roy Jenkins, 
both of whom were concerned that the lengthy period of consultation would play 
into the hands of the white paper's opponents. They each argued that it was better 
to take the more controversial proposals 'on the run', and introduce them during 
May 1969, rather than waiting for the autumn. 
Castle opposed their strategy, arguing that the proposals needed to be supported as 
a philosophical whole. However, whilst she may have opposed the idea, Castle 
did go as far as commissioning some work on the possible outline of a shorter bill 
as early as January 1969. On I January, Castle met Crossman at his request to 
discuss the draft white paper. According to her diary, Crossman used the meeting 
to berate her over the lack of consultation before agreeing to shore up support for 
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the white paper among the Cabinet 421 . However, the official records indicate that 
Crossman also took the opportunity to argue the case for a short bill, a discussion 
that is missing from both their published diaries. In a memorandum dated 2 nd 
January, John Burgh, who was present at the meeting, recorded that Castle had 
asked for a note on the possible contents of an 'advance' bill, the purpose of such 
a bill being to 'avoid the hiatus between the publication of the White Paper and 
the enactment of an Industrial Relations Bill incorporating all the proposals in the 
draft White Paper'422 . In the event, Wilson closed the Cabinet debate over interim 
legislation, commenting that the issue of timing should be reconsidered in the 
light of the reactions of the PLP and TUC. 
However, following the Fords' debacle, Castle was convinced that the atmosphere 
was such that the House of Commons would agree the penal clauses 423 . 
She made 
her comments to Roy Hattersley on 12 March, and indicated that she had already 
instructed her officials to start work on an interim bill. It is not clear when she 
gave the instructions, and she may have been referring to the Burgh note of 2 
January, but on 24 March, Castle met Hattersley and officials to discuss the 
contents of an interim bill. In her diary, Castle recorded their view that the bill 
should only include the penal clauses, that a 'package' would look like a gimmick 
and that it was the penal clauses that were needed urgently. 
However, Castle was determined to maintain a balanced approach and insisted 
that three things were needed immediately; reform of disputes procedure which 
had been set in train by establishing the CIR; a change in the attitude of 
management which would flow from giving statutory rights to trade unionism; 
and a change in the attitudes of the trade unions. Castle's aims, as ever, were both 
ambitious and impractical. Burgh's note in early January had indicated that, to 
maintain the balance she required, a 'short bill' would at best be a 'medium 
measure' and, even if it were possible to produce it for introduction in May, it was 
424 
'likely to be at the expense of thorough preparation and consultation' 
However, Castle remained determined to produce balanced proposals and the 
421 Castle (1984) p. 581 entry for I January 1969 
422NA, PRO, LAB 10/3478 Memorandum from J. C. Burgh to Mr A. W. Brown, 2 January 1969 
423 Castle (1984) p. 618 entry for 12 March 1969 
424 Ibid. pp. 624-625 entry for 24 March 1969 
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official note recorded her request that work proceed on an interim bill with four 
main provisions: the conciliation pause; strike ballots; a statutory right to trade 
union membership; and the power of unilateral arbitration to require employers to 
recognise trade unions. In addition officials were asked to consider the inclusion 
of a provision to deal with inter-union disputes. 
If the discussion over the contents of the interim bill and Castle's determination to 
retain a balanced package echoed earlier discussions over the content of In Place 
of Strife, so too did the issues of timing and consultation. Just as Wilson had 
vetoed discussion of the white paper in the Industrial Relations Committee, the 
note of Castle's meeting with her officials indicated he had already told Castle 'he 
would personally give authority for drafting in advance of a Cabinet decision. 
Furthennore Castle was meeting Wilson and Jenkins on the following day and it 
was proposed to seek agreement to the putting of her proposals before Cabinet, 
'only when the Bill was drafted and only shortly before its introduction', although 
it was acknowledged that consultation with the law officers would be necessary 
and that as a consequence, 'she might have to seek the agreement of her 
colleagues collectively somewhat earlier than she might otherwise wish'. Finally, 
the note recorded that Castle was, 'strongly adverse to giving more than the 
minimum notice possible of intentions to either body 425 
The official note indicates just how closely Castle was working with Wilson at 
this point. As was noted in the previous chapter, Wilson's first major speech on 
industrial relations after the publication of In Place of Strife came two days after 
Castle's discussion with Hattersley. It seems highly probable she would have 
discussed her change of mind with him, and that this was reflected in his comment 
that, 'All that had happened in these last three weeks provides powerfill support 
for the measures we shall be introducing in Parliament 
426 
. 
Similarly the desire to 
avoid lengthy discussions with the Cabinet or TUC seems indicative of a 
belief 
that there was sufficient external support to risk further accusations of bouncing 
through another set of proposals at short notice and with the minimum of 
425NA, PRO, LAB43/536 D. B. Snuth to Mr Burgh, 'An Interim Industrial Relations Bill', 24 
March 1969 
426 Quoted in Panitch (1976) p. 181 
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consultation, and that evidence of external support would be enough to quell the 
doubters in both the PLP and the TUC. Events, of course, were to prove the 
opposite to be the case. In the meantime, there remained the practical problems 
with the short bill. 
Following the meeting with Castle on 24 March, Frank Lawton, the departmental 
solicitor discussed her proposals with the parliamentary draftsman. In a briefing 
note for Castle, Lawton reported that the draftsman saw problems with both the 
interim and the full bi, 1427. According to Lawton, the draftsman expressed the 
'confident opinion' that the scope of the main bill would be so wide as to allow 
the subjects debated in the interim bill to be debated again. Furthermore, unless 
the interim bill dealt with no more than two topics, 'its scope would be wide 
enough to allow debate and amendment of the Interim Bill to cover other subjects 
of proposed legislation for the time being retained for next Session's Bill 428 . In 
the circumstances, Lawton suggested, it might be useful to present parliamentary 
officials with a copy of the completed interim bill as soon as possible in order to 
try and gain a ruling on the possibility of it being re-opened. However, he felt that 
there was no guarantee that they would be able to offer such a ruling. 
Thus the bill looked vulnerable on two fronts. Castle and Wilson's detennination 
to follow the same pattern of consultation as with the original white paper was 
likely to inflame Cabinet, TUC, and PLP. As Callaghan commented later, "'In 
Place of Strife" was suddenly to be turned into instant government'429 . In 
addition, even assuming that a majority in the PLP supported the interim bill, 
there would be plenty of scope for the battles to be re-fought by its opponents 
when the main bill was introduced in the autumn. Against this backdrop that 
Castle met Wilson and Jenkins on the following day, Tuesday 25 March. 
The meeting is not recorded in Castle's published diaries nor does it appear in the 
original transcript. However the official note records that Castle opened by 
echoing her views as expressed to Hattersley earlier in the month, saying that 
427NA, PRO, LAB43/536 'An Interim Industrial Relatlons Bill, Supplementary BrIef by the 
Solicitor', 24 March 1969 
428 Ibid 
429 Callaghan (1987) p. 274 
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following the Fords dispute, 'the psychological atmosphere was right for a short 
bill 5430 , but once again stressing that it was imperative that this didn't leak before 
she was ready to discuss the bill with the TUC and CBI. Having outlined the 
main proposals, Castle highlighted the problems that had been raised in Lawton's 
briefing and noted that these could create a 'serious difficulty'. Furthermore, she 
noted the problems relating to the attachment of earnings for the collection of 
fines. It had been hoped that this could achieved via the 'pay as you earn' 
(PAYE) scheme but this had not proved possible, leaving no alternative but to 
make attachment optional, which left the way open for the seizure of an 
individual's property, 'distraint' in the absence of an agreement to pay the fine. 
The meeting closed with Castle agreeing to keep them both informed of 
developments. 
To this end, on Friday 28 March, Castle sent a note to Wilson updating him on her 
discussions with the Attomey-General and the Parliamentary Counsel on the 
problems of the interim bill being re-opened in the autumn, in which she informed 
him that both she and the Attomey-General had concluded that the problems were, 
'insuperable'. Thus, given that the longer bill would inevitably contain the same 
general subject matter as the interim bill, 'the second bill would inevitably provide 
the opportunity for new clauses to be put forward in amendments to replace 
clauses in the interim bill' and consequently, 'the whole debate on the contents of 
the interim bill would thereby be re-opened'. In the circumstances, Castle 
concluded that: 
Although I remain convinced of the political and tactical advantages which 
could have been gained by the introduction of an interim bill this Session if 
its subject matter could not be re-opened later during the passage of the 
second bill, I have had to reluctantly conclude that this is not now possible. 
431 
The interim bill looked dead in the water. Wilson, who had flown out to Lagos on 
the 27 March, confirmed that he received a telegram from Castle whilst flying 
back home, a telegram that contained her final judgement on the interim 
bill432. 
430NA' PRO, LAB43/536 Note from Derek Andrews to Douglas Smith, 25 March 1969 
431 NA, PRO, LAB43/536 Note from Barbara Castle to Harold Wilson, 28 March 1969 
432 Wilson, (1971) pp. 804-5. 
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According to Wilson's memoirs Castle confin-ned that the interim bill could not be 
got ready in time to be announced in Jenkins' April budget. Wilson's account is 
significantly different to the official record; as is clear from Castle's note, her 
reasoning was nothing to do with timing, although, given the decision 
subsequently to go ahead with the bill it is perhaps not surprising that Wilson 
failed to highlight its most significant weakness. However, later on the same day 
Wilson met with Jenkins and Castle only to be told by Castle that, 'the Bill could 
be got ready' and it was agreed that the proposal be put to the Cabinet. 
4.3 Callaghan intervenes 
Castle's volte-face was driven entirely by the NEC vote on 26 March and 
specifically by Callaghan's decision to support the anti-white paper resolution. 
The NEC meeting took place on the day after Castle's meeting with Wilson and 
Jenkins, and Wilson flew out to Lagos early on the 27 March. In his memoirs he 
indicated that he was aware of Callaghan's behaviour, but decided to deal with it 
on this retUM433. Castle's bitterness was all too clear, 'I've merely registered 
434 another reason why I should despise him' . 
Castle reflected over the weekend, 
and, by the following Monday she was telling Crossman that one of the major 
reasons for the interim bill was to put Callaghan on the spot. 'I said that I had 
always been against it (the interim bill) in principle but thought that the Jim 
incident had highlighted the dangers of allowing the discussion with the unions to 
drag on for months, particularly as they showed no signs of being ready to 
435 negotiate about anything in it' 
Castle's reflections were undoubtedly assisted by newspaper reports such as that 
in The Times that reported both Conservatives and Liberals calling for Callaghan 
to resign if he was conducting a public campaign against the industrial relations 
proposals, with the support of the Labour party general secretary, Harry Nicholas, 
quoted as saying that, 'He [Callaghan] has said what a great many people have 
said up and down the country: there are certain parts of it which I believe ought to 
be modified 5436 . 
Similarly, the Sunday Times, ran a headline, 'Callaghan v Castle: 
433 Ibid. p. 789 
434 Castle (1984) p. 626 entry for 27 March 1969 
435 Ibid p. 628 entry for 31 March 1969 
436 The Times, 29 March 1969 
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must one goT, which suggested that one or the other could be forced to resign 
over the approach to trade union reform, and reported that Callaghan's action had, 
(struck a responsive chord' among Labour back-bencherS437. 
Unsurprisingly, given his previous advocacy of the short bill, Crossman supported 
her, commenting that an interim bill would put Callaghan on 'the spot' and that 
they may have to be prepared for his resignation. The following morning Castle 
met with her officials and confinned that she wanted to go ahead with five items; 
the right to join a tTade union; unilateral arbitration to force employers to 
recognise a union; the conciliation pause; strike ballots; and the setting up of the 
Industrial Board 438 . Once the decision had been made to continue with the 
interim 
bill it was necessary to inform Wilson and Jenkins and, as Wilson recorded, Castle 
arranged to see them both on Wednesday, 2 April following Wilson's return from 
Lagos. 
4.4 Wider considerations 
Wilson flew home to be confronted by a leading article in The Times stating, 
starkly that; 'The Labour Party is in worse shape than at any time in the buffetings 
of the past couple of years'; that, 'There is despondency if not despair about the 
coming general election'; and concluding, 'The Prime Minister and most of his 
colleagues are in conflict with the organisations of the mass party' 
439 
. In the 
circumstances, whilst he may have been surprised by her decision, Castle's 
announcement that she wanted to go ahead with the interim bill seemed to provide 
a way to reassert his control over the party. 
The fateful meeting opened with Castle, Jenkins and Wilson and, having 
explained why she now thought the bill 'practicable and desirable', Castle was 
'homfied' when Jenkins proposed to make the announcement as part of the 
budget speech, linking it explicitly to the decision not renew prices and incomes 
legislation. Playing for time, Castle argued that they should bring in Crossman to 
discuss the political implications of this new strategy. In the reconvened meeting 
437 Sunday Times, 30 March 1969 
438 Castle (1984) p. 629 entry for I April 1969 
439 The Times, 2 April 1969 
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with Crossman present, Wilson argued that the time had come to reassert control 
of the part Y440. Jenkins' joint announcement of the interim bill and the non- 
renewal of prices and incomes legislation, coupled with the dropping of the 
Parliamentary Bill (on the grounds that the time was required for the interim 
industrial relations bill) would provide the foundation for just such a reassertion. 
According to Castle, Crossman agreed with Wilson's analysis, but warned that 
Callaghan might resign over the interim bill and form an overt alliance with the 
TUC to defeat it. In the circumstances, Crossman asked, was Wilson prepared to 
face him down. According to Castle, Wilson waived this aside, 'the Party must 
realise that, unless they accepted the package, they would be faced with an 
Election and a large number of them would lose their seats'441 . Crucially, 
therefore, it was at this point that Wilson seems to have made the decision not 
only to back the interim bill, but also to explicitly link it with the future of the 
government and his own future as prime minister. As will become evident, 
Wilson's meetings with both the TUC and PLP were littered from this point on 
with references to the wider political implications of not supporting the 
government's proposals. As The Times noted, industrial relations reform had 
now, 'become invested with a symbolic and therefore a political importance of an 
442 altogether higher order' 
Castle however remained reluctant to link her policy explicitly with the demise of 
prices and incomes policy, arguing that it would be fatal for the PLP to think that 
the interim bill was dictated by the need to pacify the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)443 
. 
Finally, on 1 Oth April Castle agreed, albeit very reluctantly, to the joint 
announcement. In her diary, she recorded that she had 'now resigned' herself to 
accepting the strategy, whilst Crossman reported that she remained reluctant 
throughout to link the two proposals and only agreed when opposed by Crossman, 
Jenkins and Wilson 444 . 
For Castle this was a major defeat. In the two months 
since In Place of Strife had been published, she had been forced to concede on two 
440 Castle (1984) p. 629-30 entry for 2 April 1969 
441 lbid 
442 The Times, 2 April 1969 
443 Castle (1984) pp. 632-633 entry for 8 April 1969 
444 Crossman (1977) p. 434, entry for 10 April, 1969 
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fundamental points; the introduction of the interim bill; and the explicit linking of 
industrial relations reform with prices and incomes policy. It is not surprising 
that, when asked over thirty years later why she had agreed to these concessions, 
she replied, wearily, that, 'there are some battles you lose 5445 . For Wilson, 
however, the decision to align himself so clearly with the interim bill and to place 
it at the centre of his strategy to regain control of the party was one that was 
nearly to defeat him. 
4.5 What to tell the unions? 
Before the Cabinet could discuss the interim proposals, however, Wilson faced his 
first meeting with the TUC general council, which was scheduled for II April. As 
was noted in the previous chapter, the TUC had become increasingly concerned 
over rumours of an interim bill, and the meeting with Wilson was requested, in 
part, as an attempt to allay these fears. In order to prepare, the finance and general 
purposes committee held a special meeting on 9 April at which it was agreed to 
provide Wilson with a note of the work that the TUC was doing as part of its 
response to Donovan, and to stress that, 'the alternative to the penal clauses was a 
programme of voluntary action based on the Donovan report which could only be 
carried out on the basis of tripartite co-operation'. The committee agreed that it 
provided an opportunity for Wilson to 'free the Government from the difficult 
situation which it had created 446 . 
The note was sent to Wilson ahead of the meeting and copied to Castle who was 
broadly dismissive. In her diary, she noted that she had received 'a curious 
document' from Vic Feathef447. She recorded that the document showed, 'how 
much the TUC is already doing through trade union conferences etc. 
' to 
implement Donovan, whilst only 'vaguely hinting' at possible tripartite action 
between TUC, CBI and government for dealing with unofficial strikes. The 
TUC's high hopes for their proposals, and Castle's reaction to it epitomised the 
state of relations between TUC and government. The TUC remained constant 
in 
their determination to pursue the Donovan analysis and solutions, whilst 
445 Interview with Baroness Castle of Blackburn, Buckinghamshire, 3 
March 2000 
446 MRC, MSS29213/24.1/8 - TUC Finance and General Purposes 
Cornmittee. Minutes of the 
tenth (special) meeting held on Wednesday, 9 April 1969 
447 Castle (1984) pp. 633-4 entry for 10 April 1969 
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remaining equally determined to ignore the calls for a more rapid response that 
had emanated from Castle. For Castle, however, the TUC's obduracy simply 
confirmed her own decision to push ahead with the interim proposals as means of 
provoking change. 
Later that day, Castle and Crossman met Wilson to prepare for the meeting with 
the TUC and discussed press reports that the unions were going to ask for an 
assurance that the government was not planning an interim bi11448. Castle, no 
doubt with the 'curious document' in mind, argued that Wilson should not 'run 
away' from the issue and that his aim should be 'to leave them with the 
, 449 impression that we are contemplating interim legislation . In the event, Wilson. 
The TUC minutes record that when asked specifically by Vic Feather about 
changes to the timetable, Wilson replied that, 'there had been no decision by the 
Government with regard to the timing of the legislation', but, 'obviously the right 
of the Cabinet with regard to the timing of the legislation had to be reserved' and 
450 
consequently, he could 'give no forecast on this' . 
Feather reiterated that they 
had been given to understand that November was the target for the first reading, to 
which Wilson responded that 'the timetable had always been an open question'. 
Wilson's ambivalence angered Castle who passed him a note commenting that he 
had left the TUC with the 'impression that there is a lot of time for consulting 
them on an "alternative ... , and wondering 
if he was going to reply to the TUC 
451 
point that they are opposed to 'acceleration of legislation? ' Wilson replied that 
9452 he was "holding that back' 
Wilson's decision to equivocate was a poor one. He may have had in mind 
Castle's decision to consult the TUC in advance of the Cabinet over the original 
white paper, or the fact that the interim bill was now linked to the budget strategy 
and hence should be governed by pre-budget confidentiality. However, all 
he 
448 'The Trades Union Congress will warn the Prime Minister tomorrow that any attempt to rush 
industrial reform through this session of Parliament will mean an all out clash with 
the unions', 
Guardian, 10 April 1969 
449 Ibid. 
450 MRC, MSS292B/24.1/8 - TUC Finance and General Purposes 
Committee. Minutes of the 
twelfth meeting, Monday 12 April 1969 
451 Quoted in Perkins (2003) p. 295 
452 ibid. 
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succeeded in doing was angering the TUCGC at a time when it was trying to hold 
its own members back from demanding a special congress and pursuing outright 
opposition to the government's proposals. As Feather said at the end of the 
meeting, they had been given no assurances of any kind on the matters that they 
had raised and, 'if the Government took the road they were proposing, and 
introduced such laws, and then found that they were not effective, the country 
j453 would be in serious trouble indeed 
However, if Wilson equivocated on the issue of the interim bill, he was much 
more forthcoming in his general views. Responding to Feather's introductory 
comments on the work already being undertaken by the unions to implement the 
Donovan proposals, Wilson was unequivocal: 'in the public mind, Donovan 
represented three years consumed ... and we are no further on'454 . Moving on to the 
wider political picture, the TUC minutes record Wilson responding to the 
comment that it was not for a Labour government to introduce such powers with 
the prophetic remark that, 'if we don't deal with strikes we will get the Tories 
anyway 455 . Finally, 
he reminded them of his quote to the 1968 party conference 
that nothing could destroy the Labour movement but the movement itself, but 
concluded that the movement 'could be destroyed economically and politically if 
it did not do something about unofficial strikes'. 
Significantly, in the two newspapers that covered the meeting in detail, it was 
these general remarks that gained the most coverage; the Guardian quoted Wilson 
talking, 'angrily' of, 'the state of anarchy' in industrial relationS456 , whilst The 
Times report opened with Wilson's, 'We can be destroyed economically and 
politically if we have no answer to unofficial strikes 457 . However, 
The Times did 
think it detected a hint of a compromise, in that Wilson appeared to have made 
one concession, in that he left it open for the TUC to come back with some 
equally effective alternative 'but it had to be equally effective not only in terms of 
453 MRC, MSS292B/24.1/8 - TUC Finance and General Purposes Cornnuttee. 
Minutes of the 
twelfth meeting, Monday 12 April 1969 
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significance but in terms of time I. Wilson's phrase was significant and he was to 
return to it throughout the negotiations, claiming that the eventual settlement was 
acceptable because it met his initial requirements regarding effectiveness and 
speed of impact, and thereby implying that a negotiated settlement had been his 
aim from the outset. At this stage, however, it is sufficient to note that the 
rhetorical emphasis was on strong government, not on concession, and, as will 
become clear, the emphasis was to shift only as his own position became weaker. 
4.6 Cabinet Approval 
The final hurdle that interim bill faced was a full meeting of the pre-budget 
Cabinet on Monday, 14 April, and prior to that a meeting of the industrial 
relations committee earlier on the same day. In her opening remarks to the 
industrial relations committee, Castle stressed the likely level of TUC opposition 
and the need to legislate for the controversial penal clauses in advance of the 
autumn conferences. She also raised the practical concern that had caused her to 
reject the interim bill at the end of March, noting that 'she was advised that the 
titles could not be drawn as to exclude amendments covering the whole field of 
industrial relations; nor, when the main bill followed next session, would it be 
possible to prevent discussion of amendments re-opening subjects already dealt 
with'. Nevertheless, 'the advantages of dealing urgently with the more 
controversial provisions outweighed the difficulties'. In the ensuing discussion it 
was claimed that there was 'general agreement' that the bill should be introduced 
as quickly as possible, but it would be difficult to proceed with the proposal for 
strike ballots that was both 'highly unpopular and technically complex'. 
Consequently, it was suggested that the proposal be dropped and replaced with 
that for dealing with inter-union disputes. It was argued that the decision could be 
justified on technical grounds rather than as a 'surrender to pressure'458 . 
According to Castle, Anthony Crosland suggested dropping the strike ballot, and 
this was accepted on the grounds that the proposals for 
inter-union disputes were 
"more valid and more urgent 
459. From the onset Castle had been unenthusiastic 
about the strike ballot, stressing that it was Wilson who 
had wanted them included 
458NA, PRO, CAB 134/2937 Ministerial Comrmttee on Industrial Relations, Minutes of a meeting 
held on Monday, 14 April at 12.00 noon. 
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in the original proposals, and the ease with which they were dropped was a 
testament to her lack of enthusiasm. However, tactically the decision was a poor 
one, as became evident when the interim bill was put before the full Cabinet. 
Wilson opened the Cabinet with an update from his II April meeting with the 
TUC. He stressed the TUC's outright opposition to the penal clauses and 
proposed financial penalties, but concluded that there was no indication that they 
were able to suggest any effective alternatives. In the circumstances, he 
concluded, 'it would be wrong to delay the introduction of legislation until the 
next session'. Castle then outlined the features of the proposed bill, stressing that 
the bill would 'categorically rule out imprisonment for failure to pay financial 
penalties'. Finally, Jenkins' set out the Treasury view. Having argued that it 
would be 'virtually impossible' to replace the Prices and Incomes Act, 1968, when 
it expired at the end of the year, he stressed the need to announce the decision in 
the budget, in parallel with the announcement of the interim bill. In his view a 
failure to legislate at this stage would open the government to ever increasing 
pressure, 'both from the great weight of public opinion which was concerned 
about the damage being done to our economy by industrial disputes and from 
opponents of such legislation within the trade union movement and amongst the 
Government's supporters'. 
The Cabinet's reaction was predictable. The Cabinet conclusions record that a 
number of members questioned the haste of the decision and argued that what was 
needed was continued working with the TUC to arrive at an acceptable package. 
This confirms Castle and Crossman's accounts both of which identified 
Callaghan, Hart, Marsh and Mason as the main advocates of this line. There was 
however, a consensus on the need to devise a means of collecting financial 
penalties that avoided the attachment of earnings, and a general acceptance of the 
decision to drop the proposal for strike ballots. There was some discussion as to 
whether it would be better to drop the conciliation pause and keep the strike 
ballot, but the overall conclusion was that the pause should be retained, 'because 
of its relevance to the problem of unofficial strikes, which was of great public 
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5460 concern However, whilst some opposition was expressed to the general 
prmciple of the bill, overall there was an acknowledgement that, if penal clauses 
were required, it was better to get them out of the way as quickly as possible, and 
on this basis the Cabinet agreed that the bill should go ahead. 
It was noted above that the decision to drop the provision for strike ballots was a 
tactical mistake, and there were two reasons why this proved to be the case. 
Firstly, one of the stated objectives of Castle and Crossman in introducing the 
interim proposals was to 'force' Callaghan's hand. However, while he voiced his 
concerns during the Cabinet discussions, no resignation was forthcoming. As 
Crossman recorded, 
His [Callaghan's] whole attitude at Cabinet was that his presence was 
essential to retain the unity of the unions and if he thought he saw, as I 
thought I saw, that we had dropped the idea of a compulsory strike ballot 
and were going to modify the clauses on attachment of wages he clearly felt 
that this justified him in staying and in adopting the line he was going to 
take. So he made a long speech about how we must now work together and 
461 how pleased he was at the decision 
By dropping the strike ballot, Castle had played directly into Callaghan's hands. 
He was able to present it as a key concession and continue to promote his own 
role as a unifier. Rather than forcing his hand, the interim bill appeared to have 
strengthened it, a point made by a number of commentators when the proposals 
were made public. 
VA-iilst Callaghan was happy to see the decision as a key concession, Peter Shore 
regarded it as a capitulation. The Cabinet conclusions record that a view was 
expressed that the ballot should not be dropped as it was damaging to retreat from 
any proposals at this stage. Whilst not mentioned by name in either Castle or 
Crossman's account, Shore had been a keen advocate of the strike ballot since the 
initial discussions at Sunningdale. As was discussed in an earlier chapter his main 
concern was with the economic effects of industrial action, and he regarded the 
strike ballot as creating an opportunity for the government to spell out to potential 
460 PROXAB 128/44, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on Monday, 14'hApni, 1969 at 
4p. m. 
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strikers the economic implications of their action. As he has since confirmed 462 9 
once strike ballots were removed from the bill, he ceased to see its effectiveness. 
Consequently, he was to speak out with great effect against the interim bill in the 
final Cabinet discussion sealed its fate. 
Section B- Reactions 
4.7 Losing Momentum 
If the interim bill was to have any chance of gaining parliamentary support, a 
sense of momentum was required in which MPs would be carried along on a tide 
of popular support for Castle's proposals, and the starting point was her speech to 
the House of Commons introducing the interim bill. Jenkins had announced the 
intention to introduce interim legislation in his budget speech on 15 April, and 
Castle was required to provide the detail on the following day. Anne Perkins has 
recorded the pressure Castle was under, noting that, not only did she record 
sections of the speech and play them back, but she also had Wilson offering 
advice and remarking that it was 'the most important speech ever made in 
463 parliament by a woman' In the circumstances, it was not perhaps surprising 
that the speech was a flop. 
The Daily Telegraph, albeit not a supporter of the government, reported that 
Castle spent the first thirty-five minutes of her fifty-five minute speech, 'in a 
dreary attempt to demolish Tory economics', when it was her plans for the unions 
that the majority wanted to hear. More worryingly for Castle, the paper was quick 
to highlight the strength of Callaghan's position, noting that he would be able to 
claim that his 'rearguard action' against the white paper had been partly 
successful. 'It could be said that he has lost one game - the conciliation pause - 
but won another, the pre-strike ballot, and drawn a third, by getting his colleagues 
to moderate their instincts on attachment of earnings' 
464 
. The paper concluded 
that that it was now clear why he had not resigned from the Cabinet, 'if indeed he 
ever contemplated doing so'. 
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Similarly, the Guardian was scornful of her attempts to avoid any hint of 
imprisonment, noting that many MPs were 'so unmannerly as to laugh out loud' at 
her suggestion that any fines could be paid into a fund for the benefit of workers 
as a whole 465 , and The Times concluded that, 'All the details of how the fines will 
have to be paid is blurred in a Micawberish hope than something will turn up that 
the T. U. C and its constituent unions will be able to swallow more easily than the 
ý466 attachement of wages through employers 
If Castle's speech had failed to create a groundswell of support among her 
colleagues, what of the press reaction to the detail of her proposals? Press reports 
focused on two aspects, the detailed proposals themselves, and the likelihood of 
them being supported by the PLP. The Times commented that the measures 
looked 'overpriced', and that any credit the government would get for tackling the 
problem was 'dimmed by the weakness of the diluted proposals'467 . 
Similarly, the 
Daily Telegraph queried the absence of the strike ballot and concluded that 
Castle's courage must have failed. While, 'she [might] in consequence get less 
trouble from her own party. She will get and deserve more trouble from the 
country. ' 468 
The Guardian argued that action on union reform might have been the right 
priority but that Castle's proposals would not 'achieve their object ý 469 In a 
second editorial, the paper considered the options open to the average Labour 
backbencher, 'the evils of the Bill and its consequences, or the evils of opposing 
the Bill at the risk of bringing the Government down', and concluded that, 'the 
Bill is not so harmful as to be unacceptable'. The best option in the 
circumstances, therefore, was to support the bill, whilst seeking to amend the less 
palatable elementS470 . Finally, the 
Daily Mirror, from the outset the government's 
strongest supporter, concluded that the bill would go through because whilst there 
was considerable opposition, it did not believe the majority thought the issue of 
465 Guardian, 17 April 1969 
466 The Times, 17 April 1969 
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such fundamental importance that 'the Labour Government must be destroyed to 
. )471 prevent it being passed 
Castle's speech had hardly had the impact that either she or Wilson had hoped 
either among Labour MPs, or within the press. In the circumstances, were then 
any other sources of support? Wilson's detennination to find indications of 
popular support was reflected in a series of memoranda from his office to Castle 
requesting inforination on sales of the original white paper, and progress on the 
472 
production of a 'popular' version . On 15 April, the day Jenkins announced the 
interim bill, he was informed that 46,500 copies of the white paper had been sold 
and that, whilst this was 'above the average for normal White Papers', it was 
below that of reports of the Prices and Incomes Board 473 . 
On 18 April, a note 
confirmed that 220,000 copies of a popular version were planned but that progress 
was slow 474 . 
The popular version had been discussed in January, and both Castle 
and Wilson had favoured it as a means of getting the key messages across to the 
public. However, production was delayed and, by 29 April, Wilson was informed 
by the minister chairing the Home Publicity Committee, Judith Hart, that the 
popular version should be dropped, on the grounds that 'the Government would be 
open to the charge that public money was being spent in popularising 
475 controversial measures that were being discussed in Parliament' . Instead, the 
committee proposed publication of a 'mini' white paper, written in popular 
language, at the same time as the interim bill was published. This was rejected in 
turn by Castle on the grounds of avoiding 'apparent gimmickry'476 . Joe Haines 
has since confirmed that this failure to get the message of In Place of Strife across 
was a major problem that reflected the general antagonism of the majority of the 
press towards Wilson and the governnient, and it was this that drove the desire for 
a popular version of the white paper 
477 
. 
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If sales of the white paper indicated less than overwhelming interest, what of those 
writing to Wilson on the subject? On 29 April, his private office responded to a 
request from Wilson for a breakdown of letters received on the subject of the 
white paper, with a table indicating that eighty four letters had been received with 
forty two in favour of the proposals and forty two against, hardly the groundswell 
of public support that he was hoping for 478 . The only crumb of comfort was to be 
found in a briefing on overseas reaction to the interim bill, which concluded that, 
'the political difficulties and a possible clash with the British TUC are also widely 
reported but the general view is that the Government has been right to grasp the 
nettle 479 , although, in the battle for the hearts and minds of the PLP, the opinion 
of the overseas press was unlikely to figure large. 
Finally, whilst the attitude of the PLP was well known, what of the constituency 
Labour parties (CLPs)? Support for Wilson here would have provided valuable 
ammunition for claims of grassroots support. Once again, however, there was 
little comfort to be found. NEC papers reveal that between 7 February and 5 May 
1969, the Home Policy sub-committee received 25 resolutions from CLPs and 
other affiliated organisation relating to the white paper and the interim bill, and of 
these only three supported the government480. In the circumstances, there was 
little to give a sense of momentum, the Labour party appeared from top to bottom 
to oppose the proposals, the press were at best lukewarm, and, to make matters 
worse, the decision to drop the strike ballot was taken as a victory by opponents of 
the bill and a sign of weakness by its supporters. It was against this backdrop that 
Wilson and Castle prepared to face both the PLP and the TUC. 
4.8 A growing sense of crisis 
Once the Cabinet had decided to proceed with the interim bill, Wilson arranged to 
see Feather informally on the evening of Monday 14 April with Castle present. 
According to Castle, Feather 'didn't bridle or declaim' when told the latest 
proposals, rather 'he even entered into a discussion as to what kind of fund we 
478NA, PRO, PREM 13/2725,29 April 1969 
479 
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might set up to absorb the penalties', but she acknowledged that she could not tell 
how far he was genuinely unalarmed at the proposaIS481. 
On budget day, Wilson sent a letter to the TUC setting out the main proposals in 
the interim bill and asked to meet them on the following day. Immediately before 
the meeting there was a special meeting of the TUC Finance and General 
Purposes Committee. Wilson's letter reiterated his willingness to consider other 
proposals if they were 'as effective in their operation for preventing irresponsible 
and damaging strikes' as the government's own proposals, but the committee 
agreed there was nothing in the letter to change their view of the government's 
proposals and that inviting them to propose an alternative to the use of fines or the 
attachment of earnings was of minor importance when compared to their 
opposition to the penal clauses. However, it was significant that the committee 
also reaffirmed that it was not enough to express negative opposition, and 'it was 
urged that the General Council should seek from the unions authority for the TUC 
to play a more active part in the avoidance and settlement of disputes' 482 . 
At the meeting Wilson sought to stress three issues: that strike ballots had not 
been included because official strikes were considered to be less damaging than 
unofficial ones; that there was no question of the legislation imposing any form of 
criminality; and finally that, whilst the government 'could not negotiate on the 
principle of the subjects to be covered by its proposed legislation', they intended 
to consult fully on 'methods of operating under the powers to be provided ý483 . In 
their response the unions focused almost entirely on the issue of financial 
penalties. Feather made it clear that the use of fines as penalties for striking 
would meet with 'absolute opposition', whilst Sidney Greene argued the method 
of collecting fines was 'not material'. In his view, the fact that financial penalties 
existed would, 'exacerbate industrial relations and prolong strikes which the 
procedure aimed at shortening. John Newton, the TUC chainnan, stressed that 
the white paper would have been accepted without the penal clauses, but would be 
48 'Castle (1984) p. 636 Entry for Monday, 
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rejected as long as they were included. He argued further that, whilst the 
Conservative proposals appeared even more draconian, he doubted they would be 
prepared to carry them out, 'since this would provoke a similar situation to the 
1926 General Strike In the circumstances, Newton argued, the government 
should have confidence in the TUC to put its own house in order. 
Wilson replied that whilst he welcomed the TUC's efforts, 'these could not be 
effective quickly enough to meet the country's economic needs', and Castle 
stressed that the TUC had a standing invitation to discuss any aspect of industrial 
relations, but since the publication of the white paper, 'there had been no 
indication of any willingness by trade unions to consider the Government's 
proposals on some of the more serious and difficult issues' 484 . The meeting closed 
with Wilson's assurance that the government would be open to representations up 
until the 'last possible moment', and the committee confin-ned that the General 
Council would discuss the proposals on the following Wednesday, 23 April. 
The frustration of Wilson and Castle at the intransigence of the General Council 
was evident in these exchanges, and in her diary Castle noted her concern at 'the 
intransigence of people like Sid Greene' who she considered to be a reasonable 
moderate, and her worry at 'the quietly stubborn hostility of the TUC'. However, 
it was clear that Wilson was determined to leave the door open for TUC 
proposals, for as Castle noted, 'Harold thinks we might get over our difficulties by 
having a provision in the Bill to suspend the appointed day for the introduction of 
485 
the penal clauses in order to give the TUC the chance to show what it can do' 
It was this determination that he returned to at the meeting with PLP on the 
following evening, Thursday, 17 April. 
With Castle away at the Scottish TUC Conference, it fell to Wilson to explain the 
reasoning behind the bill to the PLP. In advance, the signs did not look good. 
Three days previously, sixteen members of the Tribune Group had signed a letter 
to the PLP chairman, Douglas Houghton calling for a joint meeting of the PLP 
484 NA, PRO, PREM13/2725 Note of a meeting with representatives of the Trades Urnon Congress 
held at 5.30pm on 16 April 1969 
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and the NEC, at which Wilson should be called on to 'state the intentions of the 
Government about trade union legislation' 486 . To make matters worse, one of the 
signatories James Dickens said that there were precedents for such a meeting, 
including one that took place in 1931 after the fall of the Labour Government. On 
the same day, Ray Gunter, Castle's predecessor, declared that Labour had no hope 
of winning the next election under the present leadership, although he declined to 
say whether he was referring to Wilson or the government as a whole 487 . Finally, 
on the day of the PLP meeting, Tribune published a front-page editorial by 
Michael Foot, entitled 'The maddest scene in modem history', in which he 
condemned, in apocalyptical terms, the interim bill and those who supported it as 
(a wanton, menacing decision [that] could threaten to break the Government and 
tear it to shreds', and called on the whole Labour movement to show that 'anti- 
trade union legislation will not be tolerated 5488 . 
Despite Foot's warning, Wilson decided to come out fighting. In a lengthy 
opening statement, he concentrated on three key messages; that the government 
were prepared to consider any proposals from the TUC, as long as they were 
(equally effective' and 'equally urgent in time' to the government's own 
proposals'; that the government acknowledged concerns over the 'taint of 
criminality' and the use of attachment of earnings, but reiterated the message that 
the criminal courts were not involved and that the attachment of earnings was a 
last resort; and, finally, that reform of the House of Lords had been dropped 
because this bill was essential to the 'economic success of the govemment'... It is 
on that economic success that the recovery of this nation, led by this Labour 
Government, depends'. As such, he concluded, 'the passage of this Bill is 
essential to its continuance in office. There is no going back on that. ' 489 
It was a powerful statement. Whilst many of those present would have doubted 
his justification for dropping reform of the Lords, especially as a significant 
number had been instrumental in making reform unworkable, Wilson left them in 
no doubt that, as the Guardian was to comment, he had 'nailed his own reputation 
486 Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1969 
487 Guardian, 15 April 1969 
488 Tribune, 18 April 1969 
489LPA, Minutes of a Party meeting held on Thursday, 17 April 1969 
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and his Government's to the interim Industrial Relations Bill)490. However he was 
careful to leave the door open. Using the same phrase that he used with the TUC, 
he stated his willingness to consider any proposals that could match those of the 
government in both speed and effectiveness. For Wilson this was as important as 
the confidence issue, and, when the 'solemn and binding' agreement was agreed, 
he was to quote these words back to the PLP as proof of his willingness from the 
outset to accept a TUC solution if it matched his criteria. In his memoir of the 
period he was to refer angrily to subsequent press reports that he focused only on 
the confidence issue and not on his plea to the TUC to come forward with an 
alternative 491 . However, in their reports, the Daily Telegraph, Daily Mirror and 
Guardian covered both statements, although they all focused on the fact that 
Wilson had now made passage of the bill an issue of confidence 492 . 
How did the PLP react to Wilson's statement? The official minutes record almost 
universal opposition. There were complaints over the lack of prior consultation 
with the trade union group, the conciliation pause was condemned as 
'unworkable', and there was a warning that, if the policy were pushed through on 
the back of ministers' votes, the government 'would still have to face the Party "in 
industry"' and trade unionists would 'solve the problem outside, and the 
Government would not survive the coming struggle 493 . Richard Crossman 
reflected this sense of bitterness in his own account of the meeting where he 
focused on Wilson's perceived failure to articulate its wider aims: 'Harold was a 
complete flop ... there was no attempt whatsoever to give people a vision of our 
policy or to indicate our new line in terms of broad strategy'. He subsequently 
discussed MPs' reaction to the interim bill and Wilson's speech with his PPS, 
Tam Dalyell. Dalyell reported that all sides of the party felt it had been a 
disastrous evening, for 'they all feel that a gratuitous blow has been imposed on 
ý494 them and that we have picked a quarrel in order to push a gimmick 
490 Guardian, Monday April 21 1969 
491 Wilson (1974) pp. 808-809 
492 Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1969, concluded 'if ever a Government went out of its way to make 
a Bill an inescapable issue of confidence, this Government 
has done it with its Industrial Relations 
Bill'. 
493 LPA, Minutes of a Party meeting held on Thursday, 17'h April 1969 
'9' Crossman (1977) p. 444-446, entry for 17 April 1969 
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The growing seriousness of the situation was evident in a Guardian report of a 
meeting that had taken place on Friday 18 April, the day after the PLP meeting, 
between sponsored MPs and trade union leaders. At the meeting it was believed 
that trade unionists from the AEF argued that if their conference, due to be held 
that weekend, rejected the White Paper, sponsored MPs should also vote against it 
in parliament495. In the same article, it was reported that right wing MPs were 
looking to the Tribune Group to support them in getting rid of Wilson, and in an 
article on the following day, 'Wilson and the Left wing: the end of the affair 5496 9 
Peter Jenkins quoted Michael Foot's Tribune editorial as evidence that the left no 
longer supported Wilson, and commented that Eric Heffer, who he considered to 
act as a bridge between the organised left and other dissident elements within the 
PLP, had 'as good as called for Wilson's replacement at Thursday's unhappy 
party meeting' 497 . 
Similarly, whilst the TUC may have agreed to reflect on the government's 
proposals, it was clear that others within the union movement had already made 
up their minds. As was noted, Castle missed the first discussion with the PLP 
because of the Scottish TUC conference. However, as the Guardian reported on 
Friday 18 April, Castle's presence did not stop the conference from voting in 
favour of two resolutions opposing the white paper. A composite resolution that 
indicated support for a number of aspects of the white paper but recommended 
outright rej ection of it as a 'package deal', was carried on a card vote by 1,13 3 to 
613, whilst a more radical resolution condemning the government for 
'undemocratic measures' was passed by a smaller majority of 979 to 630498. 
4.9 The leadership challenge 
Castle and Wilson may have believed that, 'psychologically' the time was right 
for legislation, but this was insufficient to counter the extreme hostility being 
generated within both the PLP and the trade unions. In the circumstances, 
Wilson's decision to make the passage of the bill an issue of confidence laid him 
open to the leadership challenge that almost inevitably followed. 
495 Guardian, 21 April, 1969, 
496 Guardian, 22 April, 1969 
497 Ibid. 
49' Guardian, 18 April 1969, 
'Left-Wing talk of new leader as unions met' 
'Scottish TUC rejects Mrs Castle's plan on two votes' 
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The leadership crisis of April 1969 has been well documented, but what is of 
interest here is the impact that it had on the progress of the interim bill and the 
negotiations with the TUC and, from this perspective, it seems clear that the 
challenge to his authority was instrumental in getting Wilson to the negotiating 
table 499 . What follows, therefore, is a brief summary of events, followed by a 
more detailed consideration of Wilson's response. 
As we have seen, Wilson's attempts to reassert his leadership with the 
announcement on the interim bill rapidly backfired, and it soon became clear that 
he faced opposition to both the interim bill and his continuing leadership. Peter 
Jenkins has argued that Labour backbenchers 'embarked on two overlapping, 
sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting enterprises' 500 . one to 
defeat the industrial relations bill, the other to overthrow the Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, according to Jenkins, each had a synergistic effect on each other. 
Whilst those organising against the bill were not interested in challenging 
Wilson's leadership, it was Wilson's continuing commitment to the bill and the 
opposition that it generated that enabled those anxious to get rid of him to 
consider the possibility of a coup. Similarly, the activity of the plotters provided 
opponents of the bill with an active threat to use against Wilson; drop the 
legislation or face a leadership challenge. Jenkins' analysis continues to ring true. 
In using such an unpopular measure to try to reassert control over the party 
Wilson not only antagonised those opposed to industrial relations legislation, but 
the very act of choosing the interim bill for this purpose was taken as proof by 
those disillusioned with his leadership ofjust how out of touch he was. 
This double challenge led to an intense period of manoeuvring within the PLP 
during late April and early May, as those opposed to the bill counted prospective 
votes, and differing factions sought to promote their prospective leadership 
candidates. These quickly coalesced around Callaghan and Jenkins as the two 
principal contenders. During the course of their intense manoeuvnngs, opponents 
of the bill had identified fifty MPs prepared to vote against the govemment, and a 
499 One of the best accounts is found in Pirnlott (1992) pp. 533-539 
500 Jenkins (1970) p. 106 
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further thirteen prepared to abstain. These were sufficient numbers, if combined 
with Conservative opposition, to prevent the bill being sent to committee and 
force the committee stage of the debate to be held on the floor of the House, 
exactly as had happened with the ill-fated Parliament Bill. Similarly, those 
wishing to remove Wilson and replace him with Jenkins had identified sixty Mps 
prepared to sign a motion of no confidence 501 . 
As the manoeuvring continued, Wilson sought to further reassert his leadership 
when, on 29 April, he replaced John Silkin with Bob Mellish as Chief Whip, and 
bowed to the demands of Castle, Jenkins and Crossman by creating a small 
Cabinet committee, to be known as the Management Committee, charged with 
providing a greater sense of co-ordination and focus to government policy. 
Mellish had a reputation as a right-wing political bruiser and his appointment only 
served to antagonise those, particularly on the left and including Castle, who 
considered his appointment to be little more than a direct threat to those opposing 
the interim bill: 'Mellish! How the hell could I get my Bill through if the 
Healeyites had won their battle for a Chief Whip who would dragoon the Party 
and who would have no subtlety? 502 Mellish did little to disavow them of this 
view when, at his first PLP meeting as chief whip, he was quoted as saying, 'If 
members of the PLP divide against the Industrial Relations Bill the Government 
must go to the country'. As David Wood, political editor of The Times said, 
'Must? It widened the gap between Government and backbenchers that Mr 
Mellish thought he was bridging. ' 503 
Inevitably, news of the plotting leaked out, and Ben Pimlott cites a report in The 
Times on 2 May stating that thirty MPs wanted to force a vote in the PLP with the 
aim of replacing Wilson with Callaghan. Pimlott notes that these stories alerted 
Wilson to the extent of the plot, and quotes an unnamed Wilson aide as saying that 
they had heard from the whips that 'there was a round robin, and that Jim and 
Douglas Houghton were probably behind it, and that they had 80 MPs' 
504 
- 
Finally, as the leadership manoeuvring intensified, Houghton made a public 
501 Quoted in Jenkins (1970) p. 106 
502 Castle (1984) p. 641, entry for 29 April 1969 
503 The Times, 5 May 1969 
504 Quoted in Pirnlott (1992) p. 537 
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statement in which he called for an end to divisions over industrial relations 
reform, the cause of which he placed firmly at the government's door: 'Ministers 
must not fall into the error that their determination and their resolve to force things 
through the party and through Parliament is either desirable or possible. It can 
only be done with us, it cannot be done without us. ' 505 
However, as quickly as the leadership challenge blew up, so it was over. On 9 
May, the Cabinet held a joint meeting with the NEC at which Callaghan, once 
again, sided with the NEC over the Cabinet Castle records him saying that the 
Government's job was to build up the popularity of the trade union movement not 
describe it as 'ante-diluvian' 506 , and Wilson was left with little choice but to sack 
him from the management committee. Similarly, two days later, Roy Hattersley 
abandoned the Rugby League Cup Final visit Jenkins with a plea that he allow his 
name to go forward and actively oppose In Place of Strife. According to 
Hattersley, Jenkins refused on both accounts, 'He had told Barbara Castle that he 
would support her to the end and he was not prepared to risk the accusation of 
betrayal. 5507 The leadership challenge was effectively over. 
4.10 Signs of compromise? 
On 4 May, Wilson was scheduled to make a speech to the Labour party May Day 
Rally at the Festival Hall. Coming as it did, in the middle of all this activity, and 
only two days after the report in The Times, he took the opportunity to address the 
-)ý508 
plotters head on with his famous, "I know what's going on, I'm going on 
Commentators both then and since have focused on this aspect of the speech to 
virtual exclusion of all else. Pimlott, for example, refers to 'an audible intake of 
breath from the audience', as the listeners waited for 'some embarrassingly 
paranoid accusation' 509 . 
However, much of the substance of the speech was 
devoted to the industrial relations bill, and it is here that the first signs of 
compromise began to emerge. 
505 Quoted in Jenkins (1970) p. 199 
506 Castle (1984) p. 649, entry for 9 May 1969 
507 Guardian, 6 January, 2003. Hattersley's memories of Jenkins 
508 Quoted in The Times, 5 May 1969 
509 Pin-dott (1992) p. 538 
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We have seen how Wilson referred to his willingness to consider any proposals 
from the TUC that were as urgent and as effective as those of the government, and 
how this phrase was used with both the TUC and the PLP. However, in his May 
day speech, he only referred to the trade unions providing an 'effective 
alternative". Furthermore, the door was 'wide open' for the unions to provide 
such an alternative and not just until the legislation was introduced, for, even 
when the legislation was on the statute book, he was prepared 'to give the trade 
union movement their head in showing that they can do better before the 
legislation is invoked 15 10. The change was a subtle one, but on such subtle 
changes were the negotiations of the next few weeks to hinge. 
Wilson was not the only one looking for a compromise. On 21 April, the TUC 
finance and general purposes committee met to consider their response to the 
interim bill. It was noted that fourteen requests had been received calling for a 
special congress. As we have seen, the general council previously had rejected 
such calls on the grounds that legislation was not expected until the autumn. 
However, it was now agreed that the prospect of early legislation created a new 
situation and that, on balance, a special conference was more appropriate than a 
conference of executives, and that it should be recommended to the general 
council that a special congress be convened on Thursday, 5 June. Significantly, it 
was agreed that the conference would only be useful if it were based on a 
Cconstructive statement' from the general council which not only set out the 
'fundamental objections' to the legal penalties but also put forward proposals to 
deal with some of the more 'pressing problems', including inter-union disputes 
and unconstitutional strikes. 
Two days later, the general council met to consider the recommendation to hold a 
special congress, and the production of a, 'constructive statement'. The majority 
were in favour of the congress, and a significant number supported the need for a 
constructive statement. Les Cannon, for example, argued that there was a danger 
that the congress would simply'provide a platform for those who wished to defeat 
whatever attempts the Government made to bring order into industrial relations', 
510 Quoted in The Times, 5 May 1969 
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unless the GC could put forward 'realistic and effective' proposals of its own. 
Similarly, Walter Anderson was in favour of the congress as long as it was 
positive and 'not just the banging of big drums against government PoliCY, 51 1. 
Furthermore, he argued, if the general council felt that it needed certain additional 
powers, it should put them before the congress and take the consequences of its 
decision. 
Supporting the arguments in favour of a positive statement of trade union refonns, 
Jack Jones argued that the structure of the statement should reflect the need to 
both express opposition to the penal clauses, and support the general council's 
own proposals. As such, he argued, 'he would favour radical reform within the 
TUC structures for dealing with some of the unions' problems, including 
demarcation disputes, but he did not think it should be mixed up with concrete 
opposition to the penal provisions of legislation'512 . He was supported 
in this by 
Alan Fisher, who proposed that the statement should be structured to enable three 
separate votes on three issues; the penal provisions; the positive and acceptable 
proposals in the white paper; and the general council's own proposals for reform. 
The meeting ended with Feather noting that all of the points that had been raised 
would be considered in the drafting of the statement. 
On the following day, Eric Wighani noted that 'speaker after speaker urged that 
[the general council statement] should be devoted mainly to the consideration of 
positive proposals and not just made an opportunity for lambasting the 
Government 
. 
However, he stressed, this new found moderation should not be 
exaggerated; the general council had not tempered its opposition to the penal 
clauses, but was 'a good deal calmer about it, 
513. In the circumstances, given 
Wilson's new found determination to negotiate, 'beyond the eleventh hour', this 
new found calmness could pave the way for a negotiated solution, and, when 
Wilson invited the general council to a meeting to discuss their proposals, it 
looked like the beginning of the end. 
51 'MRC, MSS 292B/20/9 - TUC General Council Minutes. 
Minutes of the twelfth meeting held on 
Wednesday, April 23,1969 
512 MRC, MSS 292B/20/9 - TUC General Council Minutes. Minutes of the twelfth meeting 
held 
on Wednesday, April 23,1969 513 The Times, 24 April 1969 
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4.11 Summary 
If In Place of Strife was an attempt to develop a coherent philosophy, Callaghan 
was surely right to say that the interim bill was 'instant government'. Driven by a 
combination of union intransigence, damaging industrial disputes, political 
rebellion and the need to reassert control over the PLP, Castle and Wilson decided 
to push ahead with the most controversial proposals in the white paper: the strike 
ballot and the conciliation pause. In doing so they finally forced the unions to the 
negotiating table, but the cost, both in terms of Wilson's leadership and Castle's 
political standing was immense. 
Perhaps the most striking fact to emerge was the legal advice that the bill could be 
legitimately unpicked if further legislation was introduced in the autumn. Castle's 
decision to press ahead despite this advice was founded entirely on the desire to 
force Callaghan's hand. In this and in the attempt to take advantage of a 
perceived public momentum to carry the legislation through, the interim bill was a 
failure. Callaghan did not resign, and any sense of momentum foundered on poor 
performances by Castle and Wilson, and the intransigence of the PLP. However, 
having been relatively quiet during February and March, the interim bill did bring 
Wilson back to the forefront of events, a position he was to remain in until 
agreement was eventually reached. Studying Wilson's rhetoric during these early 
meetings it is now clear that, whilst remaining outwardly firm, he was preparing 
the way for a compromise from the outset. He had clearly heard Castle telling the 
rest of the Cabinet that the penal clauses would not be needed if the TUC could 
produce their own proposals and, in continually stressing that any such proposals 
would need to be as 'equally effective' and 'equally urgent' as the those in the 
interim bill Wilson was not only inviting the TUC to produce their own proposals, 
he was carefully establishing himself both as the arbiter of what was to 
be 
considered 'equally effective', and the judge of whether his criteria 
had been met. 
The flexibility that this gave him was almost immediately obvious when he 
responded to the leadership challenge by 
loosening his definitions, referring only 
to an 'effective alternative, and he was quickly rewarded with 
the reassertion of 
the moderate voices within the TUC and the general council's 
decision to produce 
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aý constructive statement' of its own. Wilson's flexibility did, of course, have its 
limits and, in the weeks that followed, it would be tested to utmost. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: OPENING NEGOTIATIONS: MAY - JUNE 1969 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the period from the production of the TUC general council's 
statement for the special congress at the beginning of May, to the immediate 
aftermath of the special congress in early June. After a review of the respective 
positions of the government and the TUC, consideration is given to the 
development of the general council statement, 'A Programme for Action', in 
terms of content, the tensions it revealed within the general council, and the 
reactions of press, government and civil service. Following publication of the 
TUC programme, focus is placed on the detailed pattern of negotiations between 
the government and the general council, identifying the shifting balance of 
advantage as it played out in both the public and the private spheres, and the 
emergence of areas of agreement and compromise. Detailed attention is given to 
the emergence of Wilson's 'missing link', the crucial measure of effectiveness he 
felt was lacking in the TUC proposals, and Castle's notion of 'cold-storage', the 
proposal that the penal clauses be suspended pending assessment of the 
effectiveness of the TUC proposals. Finally, consideration is given to two crucial 
meetings held at the beginning of June. The first was a secret meeting held at 
Chequers, famous subsequently for Wilson's supposed riposte to Hugh Scanlon to 
cget your tanks off my lawn, Hughie', at which the intransigence of both Scanlon 
and Jack Jones did much to harden Wilson's attitude. The second was the TUC 
special congress held on 5 June, at which an overwhelming majority voted in 
favour of 'A Programme for Action', putting the general council in a seemingly 
unassailable position for the remainder of the negotiations. 
5.2 'The Sun Climbs Slow, How Slowly' 
514 
In many respects, May 1969 represented the beginning of an improvement in the 
government's fortunes. The economy began to show the first signs of a post- 
devaluation recovery as Roy Jenkins was able to announce a visible trade deficit 
of only f 13 million. This was followed by a deficit of no more than f20 million 
in June and the announcement that the overall balance of trade was showing a f67 
515 
million surplus . 
In addition, opinion polls began to show the beginnings of an 
514 Jenkins (1994) p. 273, Chapter fifteen 
515 Jenkins (1984) p. 279 
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improvement. A Gallup Poll carried out for the Daily Telegraph between 13 - 16 
June 1969 indicated that Labour had cut the Conservative lead by over five 
516 
percentage points from the position a month previously . When coupled with 
the fizzling out of the Jenkins/Callaghan leadership challenges and the decision to 
lance the boil of House of Lords reform, it was evident that the sun was beginning 
to rise for Wilson at least. However, his determination to pursue trade union 
refonn risked reopening the leadership challenge, splitting the party from top to 
bottom, and losing those vital points in the opinion polls. It was hardly surprising, 
therefore, that increasing numbers within the PLP began asking if it was worth it. 
After all, Wilson had argued that trade union reform was essential to economic 
recovery and yet the economic recovery appeared to have started without the 
reform. Similarly, there were strong hints that the TUC were preparing to launch 
their own proposals, a clear indication to many in the party that they had 
responded to government pressure, so why not give them a chance to work? 
Against this backdrop, Wilson's behaviour appeared quixotic to many within both 
the PLP and Cabinet and much would hinge on his ability to convince them that 
there was an important principle at stake. In the meantime, there were the detailed 
negotiations to consider. 
5.3 The state of the parties: May 1969 
'What were the relative strengths of each side as they prepared to open 
negotiations. At first glance Wilson and Castle were in the weaker position. Both 
the NEC and a significant proportion of the PLP had been opposed to the original 
proposals, and there was nothing in their reaction to the interim bill to suggest that 
they had shifted from this position. On the contrary, reactions within the PLP 
highlighted the difficulties the government would face in trying to get the bill 
through parliament. Similarly, resolutions from the constituency parties suggested 
that the majority were opposed to the penal clauses. Furthermore, regardless of 
opinion polls indicating a majority of the public in favour of the penal clauses, 
lukewarm responses in the press had failed to provide the level of external support 
that Wilson and Castle needed if they were to win over internal opposition. In the 
516 Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1969 
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face of these weaknesses, Wilson had accepted the need to negotiate, as evidenced 
by his 'I'm going on' speech on 4 MaY517. 
However, in spite of these obvious weaknesses, Castle and Wilson did retain some 
important cards. Most importantly, as Wilson had hinted, and Bob Mellish made 
exp IC t 518 , Wilson remained Prime Minister and as such retained the ultimate 
sanction in his authority to dissolve parliament and call a general election. Wilson 
had deliberately raised the stakes by declaring that the proposals were essential to 
the country's economic recovery. However, as with any such deterrent, it had to 
be used carefully, but the knowledge that the government could well lose, 
heralding a much more draconian Conservative approach to industrial relations, 
was a very powerful tool, which Wilson was to use to maximum effect as the 
negotiations progressed. For Wilson to dissolve parliament in these 
circumstances, as well as pre-echoing Heath's 1974 question of 'who governs? ' 
would make the trade unions the obvious target of any new administration's 
legislation, regardless of political colour. At a more visceral level Wilson was 
also aware that the fizzling out of the leadership challenge proved once again that 
the party could not agree on anyone to replace him, and that as such a threat to 
resign was also a powerful card that could be played as necessary. Finally, at this 
stage Wilson could still command a majority in the Cabinet. Whilst opponents 
within the Cabinet were well known and vociferous, they had not been able to 
block the interim proposals. Once again this gave Wilson a formal position of 
strength that he reinforced with the establishment of the management committee. 
This meant that for the first time since the publication of the white paper, Wilson 
and Castle could call on the support and advice of a wider group of Cabinet 
colleagues. 
There was also evidence that opinion, both within and the outside the labour 
rnovernentý was shifting in favour of negotiation, with resultant pressure on the 
TUC to come forward with proposals of their own. Externally, both the Guardian 
517 For detailed discussion Of Wilson's changing approach to negotiations, see chapter four 
518 Attending his first meeting as Chief Whip, Mellish had told the PLP that a failure to support 
legislation would be treated as a vote of no confidence. The Times, 5 May 1969 
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and The Times 519 published editorials that were critical of the tardiness of the 
TUC's response, and The Times reported on what it perceived to be a cooling off 
of anti-government rhetoric on the part of the trade union leadership in the face of 
growing rank and file support for a negotiated settlement. Internally, the PLP 
welcomed the onset of negotiations and gave support to Wilson and Castle for an 
effective outcome, though this was not by any means an endorsement of their 
proposals. At the same time there was a subtle change in the tone of CLP 
resolutions; whilst the majority submitted during May remained opposed to the 
penal clauses, a significant number called for a negotiated settlement rather than 
just expressing outright opposition 520 . 
Tactically, therefore, Wilson's negotiating stance was a complex one. Whilst he 
had no wish to make a threat of dissolution explicit for fear of the TUC calling his 
bluff-, he wanted it understood that it remained the ultimate sanction. As such he 
chose to focus on the emerging pressure for a compromise, making it very clear 
that he was prepared to consider any and all proposals coming from the TUC. 
This attitude of reasonableness would achieve several objectives; it would allow 
the TUC to come forward with genuine proposals; it would encourage the press to 
support the government in its search for solutions; and, in the event of talks 
breaking down, it would enable him to seek both Cabinet and PLP support on the 
grounds that he had tried all other solutions. Furthermore, by setting his own 
criteria for agreement, that any proposals be as effective and as fast acting as those 
of the government he was seeking to retain control of the negotiating process and 
its definition of success. Finally, by drawing out the negotiations, he was 
allowing for the prospect of splits to emerge within the TUC. 
For the TUC on the other hand, the government's weaknesses became their 
strengths. Formal and informal inks into the NEC, PLP and the Cabinet meant 
that they were fully aware of the lack of support for the government's proposals 
and this intelligence proved vital, enabling the TUC negotiators to determine the 
5 19 For example see Guardian, 22 April 1969. The Times and the Guardian are quoted extensively 
throughout this section as they provided the most detailed coverage of both day-to-day events, and 
commentary. Other newspapers tended to focus 
less on the day-to-day events and confined 
themselves to commentaries at significant points, which are quoted as they appear. 
520 LPA, Labour Party Home Policy Sub-Committee, resolutions received 5 May -3 June 
1969 
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real strength of Wilson's position. However, Wilson's strengths were also the 
TUC's weaknesses. The pressure to negotiate required concrete and effective 
proposals and these in turn required unanimity among the TUC leadership. It was 
already clear that the effectiveness of TUC proposals would hinge on their ability 
to manage individual unions, something that they had failed to do in the past, and 
this is turn centred on the willingness of the unions to cede authority to the TUC. 
Whilst there was a core of moderate trade union leaders prepared to consider a 
wider role for the TUC, opposition to the penal clauses within many unions, but 
most notably the TGWU and the AEF, meant that the general council would have 
its work cut out in convincing both the government and wider public opinion of its 
ability to keep its own house in order, whilst managing trade union opinion in 
such a way as to keep the likes of the AEF on board. Tactically, therefore, the 
TUC had to be careful. They were all too aware of their strength, but a refusal to 
negotiate would lead to charges of inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise. 
However, if they were drawn into negotiations, they would need to be confident 
both of carrying individual unions with them, and of producing proposals that met 
Wilson's effectiveness criteria. 
5.4 The general council's response: 'A Programme for Action' 
As we have seen, the TUC general council agreed on 23 April that a statement 
should be produced for the special congress 521 . 
The decision marked a significant 
shift in attitude, as a series of moderate voices, led by Les Cannon, argued that the 
congress would provide little more than 'a platfonn for those who wished to 
defeat whatever attempts the Goveniment made to bring order into industrial 
relations'. unless the general council could put forward 'realistic and effective' 
522 
proposals of its own. Cannon was supported by fellow moderate Walter 
Anderson 523 who was in favour of the congress as long as it was positive and 'not 
524 just the banging of big drums against government policy' 
521 See chapter four 
522 MRC, MSS29213/20/9 - TUC General Council Minutes. Minutes of the twelfth meeting 
held 
on Wednesday, April 23,1969. 
523 Anderson had a consistent history of calling for greater action from within the trade union 
movement. In January 1969, he was quoted by Eric 
Wigham of The Times referring to the 
Girlings' dispute. According to Wigham, Anderson thought it 'pretty silly' that a handful of 
strikers at Girlings had been able to throw thousands out of work without 
the TUC doing anything 
about it. 'Unless and until we do something ourselves we must expect 
to be up against the threat 
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The subsequent draft statement, 'Industrial Relations -A Programme for Action', 
reflected, in both its structure and content, the tensions that had emerged within 
the general council. Part one of the statement reiterated the general council's 
opposition to the penal clauses, but sought to balance this by an acknowledgement 
that a number of proposals in the white paper could help to strengthen collective 
bargaining. Thus a statement that the government had 'greatly exaggerated' the 
effects of industrial action when it led 'at most' to the loss of a tenth of one per 
cent of production, was balanced by an acceptance that, however limited the 
impact, 'every effort should be made to reduce the number of stoppages 5525 . 
However, whilst attempting to provide a balanced set of arguments, the first 
section could not disguise the fundamental differences between the TUC and the 
government. Overall, it concluded, 'the improvement of collective bargaining 
arrangements and industrial relations generally, can only be secured by patient 
526 discussion leading to an agreement between trade unions and employers' 
Furthermore, trade union experience, in 'the practical world of industrial 
relations', had convinced them that 'the Government is profoundly mistaken if it 
believes that the threat of punishment will accelerate the introduction of necessary 
changes' 527 . The patronising and superior tone of that 
final statement reflected the 
widely held view within the movement that neither Castle nor Wilson understood 
either trade unions or industrial relations. It conveniently forgot that many of the 
officials within Castle's department were as experienced in industrial negotiations 
as their colleagues within the TUC and did little to foster the constructive 
atmosphere that the likes of Cannon and Anderson had called for. 
When the draft was considered by the general council, and perhaps as a 
consequence of this heightened rhetoric, concerns were again expressed that 
setting out opposition to the penal clauses in the opening paragraph would simply 
of legal restrictions by the Government and even more serious restrictions 
by a Tory 
administration'. The Times, January 11,1969 
524 MRC, MSS29213/20/9, TUC General Council Minutes. Minutes of the twelfth meeting held on 
Wednesday, April 23,1969 
525NA, PRO, LAB43/534, 'Draft Report to Special Congress, Industrial Relations -A Programme 
for Action', 7 May 1969 
526 Ibid. paragraph 9 
527 Ibid. 
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result in too much time being spent on negative opposition, rather than in 
constructive debate. However, Feather was adamant that the general council had 
been clear throughout that outright opposition to the penal clauses was an accurate 
reflection of the mood of the trade union movement. Perhaps more importantly, 
with an eye to the forthcoming negotiations, he stressed the importance of the 
congress being given the opportunity to express a 'clear view' on the penal 
clauses in the light of government claims that the general council did not speak for 
the rank and file. Thus, the opening section sought to fulfil two perhaps 
contradictory functions. For the moderates it was important in setting a 
constructive tone for the negotiations, whilst for the more praginatic Feather it 
provided a means of strengthening the TUC's opening position.. 
If the first section was important in setting the tone, the second section provided 
the 'meat' of the TUC proposals and as such was central to the moderates' call for 
a constructive approach. The section dealt with three areas; relations between 
unions and employers; relations between unions themselves; and relations within 
unions. It was the first two areas that were of interest to the government. The 
first dealt with the TUC's proposed response to unofficial strikes, whilst the 
second dealt with mechanisms for dealing with inter-union disputes. 
On examination, it was immediately obvious that the TUC was prepared to go 
much further in trying to resolve inter-union disputes than they were in trying to 
resolve unofficial action. In many ways this was inevitable given that managing 
inter-union relations was central to the TUC's original 'raison d'etre'. However, 
the point had been reinforced in the TUC's response to In Place of Strife 
published in January 1969, and which indicated a willingness on the part of 
individual unions to cede autonomy to the TUC in cases of inter-union disputes. 
The draft statement proposed substantial amendments to rule 12 of Congress that, 
in its existing form, placed an obligation on the general council, 'to use their 
influence to promote a settlement where a dispute arises between affiliated 
organisations' 528 . 
The proposed amendments would place an obligation on all 
affiliated organisations to notify the general council when a stoppage was 
528 NA, PRO, LAB43/534, 'Draft report to Special Congress, Industrial Relations -A Programme 
for Action', 7 May 1969, see paragraph 71. 
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proposed, and prevent organisations from calling a stoppage until the general 
council had investigated and made a ruling. In the event of an individual 
organisation failing to implement the ruling, the amended rule 12 gave the general 
council authority to report the matter to the next annual congress, or deal with it 
itself under the provisions of rule 13, which gave the general council the authority 
to suspend a union from congress. These proposals represented a substantial step 
forward. In a briefing for Castle and Wilson, Castle's chief negotiator, Conrad 
Heron 529 , confirmed that the proposals went considerably further than those 
contained in the interim bill. The government's proposals were confined to inter- 
union recognition disputes, whereas the general council envisaged TUC 
intervention in disputes over job demarcation, union membership, wages and 
terms and conditions. Furthermore the proposal that affiliated unions would have 
an 'obligation' to inform the general council of a potential dispute was a 
substantial change from the existing arrangements under which the general 
council could only intervene, 'on application' from an affiliated union, an 
arrangement which, according to Heron, both the TUC and its affiliates, 
4particularly the AEF, had 'often hidden behind it in the past'. 
Heron's assessment was crucial to the impact the proposals would have with 
Castle and Wilson. He was an old Ministry of Labour hand and, as the head of the 
industrial relations side of the department was a seasoned negotiator who could 
not be dismissed as having limited knowledge of industrial relations or the trade 
union movement. If Heron thought the proposals were a 'big step forward', there 
was a good chance that both Castle and Wilson would agree. He was not so 
530 
enthusiastic, however, about the proposals relating to unofficial disputes 
Whilst the draft statement acknowledged a growing concern over the 'question of 
unofficial strikes' 531 ý it questioned 
the use of the term. According to the 
statement, the majority of so-called unofficial strikes arose in 
instances where 
existing procedure agreements were too tightly 
defined and where management 
529 Deputy Secretary, Department of Employment and Productivity industrial 530 NA, PRO, LAB43/534, Note from C. F. Heron to D. B. 
Smith, 'T. U. C. proposals for 
relations reform', 9 May 2003 
53 1A Programmefor Action, paragraph 16 
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insisted on 'their prerogative to make decisions unilaterally' 532 . In such instances 
workers were left with little alternative but strike action. The solution, therefore, 
was for both sides to adopt mutually agreed procedure agreements, with the status 
quo applying until such agreements were in place. In such circumstances, a strike 
could only be declared unofficial if action was taken in breach of mutually agreed 
procedures. In the absence of such procedures it would be 'misleading' to terni 
any such disputes unofficial. As such, it was argued, the answer to most 
unofficial disputes was to be found in the work of the post-Donovan industry 
specific conferences and worked through at a local level. This analysis, whilst 
perfectly consistent with the general council's support for Donovan, had more 
than a touch of sophistry about it. Redefining the rash of unofficial strikes that 
were plaguing the motor industry, for example, would do little in itself to either 
prevent them from happening or bring strikers back to work. It was precisely in 
this area that the government was looking for TUC intervention. 
The general council statement noted that individual unions already had an 
obligation under rule 11 of congress, to keep the general council informed about 
official disputes, and the general council was 'empowered on certain conditions to 
use their influence to effect a just settlement of a difference between a union and 
an employer' 533 . Whilst the general council 
had always used its power to 
intervene with discretion, they 'were bound to interest themselves actively in 
disputes which significantly affect the wages or employment of large groups of 
workers who are not parties to the dispute' 534 . Therefore, 
it was proposed that rule 
II be amended to include 'unauthonsed and unconstitutional stoppages which are 
likely to have serious repercussions ý535 . 
Such an approach was hardly the kind of 
effective and fast-acting intervention that Wilson and Castle had in mind. Whilst 
the problems of inadequate procedure agreements were undoubtedly valid, and 
accepted as such by the government, there was nothing in these proposals 
for 
intervention in unofficial disputes to indicate how the general council would effect 
a resolution in such cases and, more importantly, how it would 
impose it on the 
relevant union(s) and ensure that it was adhered to. 
"' ibid. Paragraph 17 
533 ibid. Paragraph 32 
534 
ibid. 535 ibid. paragraph 34 
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Heron was suitably succinct: not only were the proposals 'unimpressive', the 
suggestion that the responsibility for increased unofficial action lay entirely at the 
door of faulty procedures and unilateral employer action was 'to say the least one 
536 sided' . 
Whilst the proposed amendment to rule II was a 'positive action', the 
proposals did little more than 'regularise the present position under which the 
TUC, usually on the suggestion of the Department, attempts to exercise moral 
persuasion to get officials of the union concerned to bestir themselves to secure a 
1537 return to work Finally Heron questioned the willingness of the general 
council to tackle the bigger unions such as the AEF and TGW`U. His experience 
showed that the general council had tended to be 'noticeably cautious' in 
approaching either of them, and he thought it unlikely that these proposals would 
bring about any change. 
What is striking about the initial draft is how clearly the issues emerged that 
would dominate the negotiations. The proposals for dealing with inter-union 
disputes, with the explicit rules for intervention, enforcement and sanctions were 
in such a marked contrast to those relating to unofficial strikes that it was 
inevitable that all attention would be focused on the latter. As has already been 
noted, there was a longstanding willingness to cede authority to the TUC in the 
case of inter-union disputes, going back at least as far as the 'Bridlington 
Regulations' of 193 9538 . However, the reluctance to intervene in unofficial strikes 
can only be explained by the historical antipathy of individual unions to any 
interference in their workers' right to strike. Whilst inter-union disputes involved 
the management of issues between unions, intervening in an unofficial dispute 
could lead to the charge of interfering with internal management arrangements 
and with the rights of an individual worker to take strike action. Indeed, not only 
was there a reluctance to brook any interference to an individual's right to strike, 
it was clear that opposition extended to any restrictions on the right of an 
individual to strike regardless of whether or not the action was sanctioned by their 
536 NA, PRO, LAB43/534, Note from C. F. Heron to D. B. Smith, 'T. U. C. proposals for industrial 
relations reform', 9 May 1969 537 ibid. 
538 The 'Bridlington Regulations' were drawn up by the TUC in 1939 to provide a framework for 
the governing of inter-union relationships and to prohibit poaching between unions. Though not 
formally a rule of Congress, they had been strictly observed. 
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union. It was the acknowledgement of this that led Wilson and Castle to focus on 
the need for individual unions both to adopt rules enabling them to take action 
against unofficial stnkers and to use them. 
Furtherinore, as Heron highlighted, not only was there historical antipathy to TUC 
intervention, there was a well-established tendency for the TUC to avoid 
confrontation with the larger unions that suggested not just a reluctance to 
intervene but an acknowledgement that any attempts to do so were likely to be 
rebuffed. For Wilson and Castle, therefore, the issues were straightforward: if the 
TUC wanted the government to drop its own proposals they would have to 
overcome union antipathy to external intervention, and their own reluctance to 
conftont the larger unions: the battle lines were clearly drawn. 
5.5 The first meeting: 12 May 1969 
Such was the tightness of timescales, that the general council endorsed the draft 
'Prograrnme for Action' in the morning of 12 May and sent it immediately to 
Wilson in order that he have sight of it prior to their meeting in the afternoon. The 
short notice meant that Castle and Wilson could delay a formal response on the 
grounds of needing time to consider the document. However, at a private meeting 
with Castle and Wilson on 5 MaY539 , 
Feather had promised to send them a draft as 
soon as it was ready. He was as good as his word, and a copy was sent to Castle 
on 7 May. These private meetings were an important part of Feather's negotiating 
strategy, as he sought to play the role of honest broker between government and 
TUC. According to his biographer, Feather was careful to keep the TUC 
chairman, John Newton, informed of these discussions 540 , 
but his tactics did lead 
to disquiet among members of the general council. Jack Jones, for example, has 
remarked of the private meetings that they led Castle and Wilson to believe that 
Feather was on their side, and that the TUC might have made more progress 'had 
he presented our case strongly, as if it was his own 
541 
. 
Government officials were 
certainly aware of the potential difficulties of Feather's position. In a covering 
note, sent with a copy of the draft to Wilson's office, Douglas Smith, Castle's 
private secretary, stressed the need for confidentiality, commenting that it would 
539 Castle (1984) pp. 644-45, entry for 5 May 1969 
540 Silver (1973) p. 137 
541 Jones (1986) p. 205 
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'of course gravely embarrass Victor Feather if it was in any way made obvious 
that Ministers knew the contents of the general council memorandum or had 
542 
obtained copies' . Feather's action meant that Castle and Wilson were much 
better prepared for the meeting with the TUC than they let on. 
As well as sending a copy to the government, it was clear that someone had leaked 
details to the press. On 8 May, the Daily Mail ran a short article under the 
heading, 'TUC throws Wilson a lifeline'. noting that the TUC had produced a 
report which Wilson could 'grasp at', although it did not provide any details. In 
the following days, The Times, Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times and 
Observer all carried articles on the substance of the proposals in advance of the 
meeting, and, importantly for the government, the majority were lukewarm. 
According to The Times, the TUC scheme was 'very far from an equivalent' to the 
government's proposals and 'nobody could rely on this working 1543 , whilst the 
Daily Telegraph took the view that the proposals, 'measure up to no conceivable 
544 
measure of effectiveness Similarly, the Observer commented that, 'the 
deathbed conversion of the trade unions to the idea that they should play a larger 
part in regulating disputes comes too late to carry much conviction' 545 , and the 
Sunday Times agreed that the document 'proposed little more than an extension of 
the TUC's existing powers' 546 . The only paper to appear more positive was the 
Guardian. In its leading article, the paper commented that the proposals 'appear 
stronger than expected 1,547 , and 
in a front page report suggested that they could 
form the basis for a compromise under which the government proposals were put 
on ice while the TUC plans were given a chance to work. However, even the 
Guardian's support was qualified. Whilst the proposals were welcomed, proof 
was needed of their practical effectiveness and the TUC would need to avoid them 
being watered down by the special congress before they could be accepted as an 
alternative to the government's own proposals. 
542 NA, PRO, PREM13/2726 Note from D. B. Smith to R. J. Dawe, 7 May 1969 
543 The Times, 9 May 1969 
544 Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1969 
545 Observer, II May 1969 
546 Sunday Times, 11 May 1969 
547 Guardian, 9 May 1969 
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How did these comments affect the negotiations? On one level they strengthened 
Wilson's line regarding the ineffectiveness of the TUC proposals. With the 
majority of the press supporting Heron with regard to effectiveness, and even the 
Guardian calling for practical evidence, Wilson's negotiating position was clear: 
to push for evidence of the effectiveness of the proposals, with press support. 
However, this in itself did nothing to guarantee the outcome, and on this point the 
press were again united. The Times agued that, following Douglas Houghton's 
speech 548 , it was clear that the industrial relations bill could not be carried and that 
consequently, whatever the failings of the TUC proposals, they were under no 
pressure to improve their offer. The paper concluded that the government had 
'lost control' of the trade unions, who had shown that they could 'dictate to the 
Government on a matter of vital interest to both sides'. Similarly, the Daily 
Telegraph, whilst feeling that Wilson was 'all ears for any conceivable 
compromise', concluded that he would be forced to abandon any legislation and 
with it what was left of his credibility. The Sunday Telegraph went considerably 
further and called for the formation of a national government on the grounds that 
it would be the only form of administration to 'carry the authority to bring the 
trade union movement within the law' 549 , an argument with which even the Daily 
Mirror agreed, and neither Wilson, Heath, 'nor the trade unions' could afford to 
ignore 550 
. This sense of the trade unions 
being beyond control was again picked 
up The Times on the day of the meeting. It accepted that both sides were too 
entrenched to reach an agreement, but argued that they could arrive at a 'modus 
vivendi j551 to reduce political and industrial tension. Furthermore, there was a 
great incentive for both sides to do so, as it was not in the interests of either the 
labour movement or the country as a whole to see a major political party torn 
apart. To this end, it proposed that the government agree not to activate the anti- 
strike clauses for an agreed period of time in order to see if the TUC alternative 
worked. Similarly, the Guardian whilst wanting to see the proposals in detail, felt 
that they had the potential to be more effective than the government's, but 
reiterated the need to see their effectiveness in action before the government's 
legislation was put on ice. 
... See chapter four 
549 Sunday Telegraph, II May 1969 
550 Daily Mirror, 12 May 1969 
55 1 The Times, 12 May 1969 
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The call for a national government, and the general sense of the trade unions being 
beyond political control heightened the atmosphere surrounding the talks, and 
once again it is arguable that they shifted the balance towards Wilson and the 
government. In considering the strength of Wilson's position we noted that his 
ultimate sanction was dissolution and, with much of the press suggesting that he 
had little option, it was for the unions to consider how far they were willing to 
push him. An indication of their willingness or otherwise to compromise came on 
the day before the meeting at a conference of the Union of Post Office Workers 
where, ironically, both Wilson and Feather were speaking. Wilson made his now 
familiar plea, 'The Government, even at the eleventh hour, are prepared to give 
the fullest consideration to their proposals. Even beyond the eleventh hour the 
door is wide open to the trade union movement to work out a procedure which 
provides an effective alternative to our proposals'. However, he continued, in the 
event of a failure to arrive at such an alternative, 'I must repeat that few will deny 
to the Government the right, indeed the duty, to introduce legislation' 552 . By now 
Wilson's words were being pored over for every linguistic nuance, and much was 
made of the reduction of 'equally effective', as used in his 4 May speech, to 
'effective'. However, his stance remained clear, effective alternatives, or the 
government continued with its legislation. By way of a riposte, Feather took to 
the platform, and confirmed outright opposition to fines, which were wrong and 
'the movement cannot accept it' 553 . Furthermore, whilst acknowledging 
that the 
areas of difference covered a very small area, Feather stressed that they were 
'fundamental' and centred on the penal clauses, 'relating to fines on working 
people'. In a radio interview, he was asked about the prospects for the meeting 
and said that the thought it would be a long, argumentative session', during which 
neither side would convince the other. Thus, the lines were drawn, for all the dire 
warnings of national governments and irrevocable splits, the TUC would not 
accept the penal clauses and Wilson would only accept an effective alternative. 
The prospects were hardly promising. 
552 The Times, 12 May 1969 
553 ibid. 
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After these dire warnings, the meeting proved to be an anticlimax. The TUC 
proposals were endorsed formally with only one dissentient, Les Cannon of the 
Electrical and Plumbing Union who felt that the scheme was ineffective 554 . 
However, concerns were once again expressed at the negative tone of the opening 
section, bringing a swift rebuttal from Feather who made it clear that they 'were 
an accurate reflection of the mood of the trade union movement , 555 . Wilson and 
Castle were limited by the fact that they had only 'officially' received the 
proposals an hour or so before the meeting and as such had to be careful in 
making any detailed comments so as not to give away the fact that they had seen 
the report several days earlier. Instead, they focused on three points of 
clarification, all relating to unofficial strikes; would the amended rule 11 enable 
the TUC to intervene in all unofficial strikes and make binding awards? How 
would the general council deal with situations in which unions were unable to get 
members back to work? and how quickly could they act?. In response Feather 
stressed that the general council would be empowered to make binding awards, 
and that union executives wielded considerable power over members, including 
fines and expulsion. However, he was undermined by Cousins who suggested it 
would be 'unwise' for the TUC document to propose that affiliated organisations 
use all of their powers to comply with a general council ruling for, in his view, 
such a ceding of authority would not be acceptable to congress. Wilson, summing 
up, commended the TUC on the 'real progress' the proposals represented. 
However, he was not convinced that they satisfied his criteria of equal 
effectiveness and he returned to the need for clarification on the practical 
operation of the plans. To this end, it was agreed that the government would send 
the TUC a list of detailed questions, and that the meeting should be adjourned 
pending their response 556 . 
Press reports of the meeting noted that Wilson's only concession had been the 
announcement that the bill would not now be introduced until after the special 
congress, giving both sides more time to arrive at some form of compromise. 
554 See The Times, 13 May 1969 
555 MRC, MSS 292B/20/9 - TUC General Council Minutes. Minutes of the thirteenth 
(special) 
meeting held on Monday, 12 May, 1969 
556 See NA, PRO, PREM13/2727 Notes of a meeting with representatives of the TUC held at 10 
Downing Street on 12 May 1969 
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However, on the substance of the proposals, both The Times and the Guardian 
were alert to the potential for compromise. The Times noted that, 'in trade union 
negotiations, when heels are dug in, no one gives until the last possible 
moment -)557 , and suggested that the most likely form of agreement would be a 
decision to put the penal clauses on the statute book but put into cold storage 
while the TUC was given the opportunity to prove that its own proposals could 
work. In a similar vein, the Guardian considered that Wilson had done enough to 
leave his options open. 'He (Wilson) can still say at some stage in the game either 
that the TUC plan is effective enough for him to put the penal sanction in cold 
storage or that it is not' 558 . 
As if to confirm this point, Castle, delivering her fifth speech at the seventh ftill 
meeting of the PLP on the white paper, spoke of her hope of a 'copper bottomed 
compromise 559 and emphasised the spirit of co-operation and goodwill shown by 
the TUC. However, as Castle spoke of her hopes for a compromise, she and 
Wilson were faced with a reminder of the weakness of their position, for the 
Labour 'action committee' forined to fight the bill, indicated that it had the 
support of 61 Labour members in its intention to oppose the bill at second reading, 
and to vote with the Conservatives in opposing a procedural motion to take it in 
committee upstairS560 rather than on the floor of the House, a move that could 
condemn the bill to same fate as the reform of the House of Lords 561 . 
5.6 Searching for the 'missing link' - The government's response. 
In this new climate of compromise and co-operation everything rested on the 
TUC's ability to convince Wilson and Castle of the effectiveness of their 
proposals, and it was here that things began to unravel. In its letter to the general 
council, the government sought the answer to six questions relating to the 
amended rule 11; 
557 The Times, 13 May, 1969 
558 Guardian, 13 May 1969 
559The Times, 15 May 1969 
560 See The Times, 13 May 1969 
561 See chapter four 
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1. How speedily would the TUC intervene? 
2. Would the general council issue binding 'recommendations' and if so 
would they have the same binding force as those made under the revised 
rule 12? 
3. If issuing 'advice' what steps would they take to ensure 'advice' was taken? 
4. If the general council took action under rule 11, would there be an 
obligation on affiliated unions to use all of their available powers to get 
people back to work? 
5. Would the general council require to be satisfied that this has been done 
and would it be able to require more effective measures where existing 
rules were inadequate to secure the necessary powers? 
6. What powers would the general council ask for from Congress to ensure 
that (a) affiliated unions had rules adequate to discipline unconstitutional 
strikers where necessary and (b) that affiliated unions would exercise 
them in appropriate cases? 562 
Feather received the questions on 14 May, and moved quickly to produce a 
response for the general council, meeting on the following day. The response 
took the form of six additional paragraphs that, Feather was at pains to point out, 
were aimed at making explicit what was already implicit in paragraph 34 of the 
first draft, which simply referred to the scope of rule 11 being extended to 
unconstitutional and unauthonsed stoppages 563 , and as such should be regarded as 
C 564 an addendum' rather than an amendment 
The six paragraphs, which are reproduced in full at appendix 2, sought to flesh out 
the procedure that the general council would follow in the event of an unofficial 
dispute. As has been seen, the crucial issue for Wilson was the ability of the TUC 
562 NA, PRO, LAB43/534 Memorandum on the T. U. C General Council document, 'Industrial 
Relations -A Programme for Action', 14 May 1969 563 'Nevertheless, the General Council do not believe that development of the TUC's own role in 
dealing with particular disputes need depend in the future, any more than it has in the past, on the 
active participation of the CBI. The General Council propose that the scope of Rule 11 should be 
extended to include unauthorised and unconstitutional stoppages, which are likely to have serious 
repercussions. They ask the Special Congress to endorse this course of action, and will submit the 
consequential changes in Rule II formally for the approval of the September Congress. In the 
meantime the General Council will operate on this new basis. ' Paragraph 34 'Draft Report to 
Special Congress, Industrial Relations, A Programme for Action' PRO/PREI\4/LAB43/534,7 May 
1969 
564 MRC, MSS29213/20/10, TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2) Minutes of the fourteenth 
(special) meeting (1968-69) held on Thursday May 15 1969 
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to achieve compliance with its recommendations, short of the threat of sanctions. 
The new paragraphs sought to offer reassurance on two fronts. Paragraph 38 
pointed out that, over the years, individual unions had done, 'their utmost to 
implement recommendations by the TUC for the settlement of disputes', and that 
as such the general council was confident that individual unions would both 
impress on members the advantage of accepting TUC assistance, and 'accept 
responsibility for doing everything within their power' to ensure that members 
accepted the recommendations. Paragraph 39 stated that the general council 
would 'expect' unions to 'satisfy them that they had done all that they could 
reasonably be expected to do to secure compliance with a recommendation', and 
this would include taking action within their own rules if necessary. This was 
subsequently tightened further to say that the general council would 'require' 
unions to satisfy them that they had done all they could to ensure compliance. 
Furthermore, the paragraph continued, 'They recognise that a few unions may 
need to review their own rules to ensure that they are in a position to comply with 
recommendations or awards by the TUC 565 . Finally, the paragraph confirmed 
that, as with the proposed action on inter-union disputes, a failure to comply with 
a recommendation made under rule 11 could lead to disciplinary action under rule 
13, that is suspension or expulsion from Congress. 
Regardless of Feather's insistence that the new paragraphs did not represent a 
policy change, Heron felt that they added 'some precision and toughness which 
was noticeably absent in the original document'. Similarly, he accepted that there 
was 'a hint of a "slipper"' in paragraph 39, in the requirement for unions to take 
action to secure compliance. However, regardless of these elements of 
compulsion, he concluded that the proposals left an element of 'permissiveness' in 
the exercise of the general council's powers and returned to the theme of his 
previous briefing, asking whether they would be prepared to take a 'tough and 
impartial line with the big and difficult unions like the AIEF, the bollermakers and 
the T&GWU '. He concluded that an element of flexibility was essential to the 
working of the proposals, and that as such it was difficult to see what 'further 
explicitness' the government could expect to see written into the proposals. The 
565 NA, PRO, LAB 43/534 Report to Special Congress, proposed additions May 14 1969 
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key question remained the same, 'whether the General Council will have the will 
to operate effectively under the ground rules they have laid down where the big 
unions are involved'. His own answer was straightforward, 'They have been 
reluctant to do so in the past', and as such he doubted they would do so in the 
future unless, crucially, 'an effective threat of further measures by the 
Government if the T. U. C fail is kept in being' 566 . 
The general council meeting, whilst agreeing the new paragraphs, was very hostile 
to the approach it perceived the government to be taking. 'The Government, it 
was said, seemed to have an obsession that the cure for certain industrial relations 
problems was to impose a fine and that they wanted to extract from the general 
council a guarantee that everything which the general council proposed would so 
happen, inevitably and precisely. ' Furthermore, as had often been the case 
previously, Feather implicitly questioned Castle and Wilson's understanding of 
the trade union movement; some of the questions were 'irrelevant and envisaged 
situations which were not likely to arise'; whilst others asked for guarantees when 
the general council could 'equally well ask the Government what guarantees they 
567 could provide in respect of the effectiveness of their proposed legislation' 
Specifically, however, the general council were angry at the fact that the 
government memorandum sought to introduce an element of "crime and 
punishment" into their proposals. It was pointed out that the general council's 
proposals had arisen because they were convinced that fines would not work, and 
if the government persisted in introducing the penal clauses, the proposals would 
not be given a fair chance. Similarly, talk of government 'reserve powers' was 
dismissed because 'every penalty was in a sense a reserve power in the last 
analysis' 568 . 
Therefore, it was agreed that, whilst the general council's proposals 
would come into operation immediately, assuming they were accepted on June 5, 
should the government then go ahead with legislation, they 'would 
halt the 
operation of their own proposals and would report the decision to the 
September 
566NA, PRO, LAB 43/534 'General Council Report to Special Congress: additional paragraphs', 
note from C. F. Heron to D. B. Smith 16 May 1969 
567 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2) Minutes of the 
fourteenth 
(special) meeting held on Thursday May 15,1969. 
568 ibid. 
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569 Congress for their decision' . This was a key decision and a dangerous one. As 
has been seen, Heron questioned the general council's willingness to intervene 
unless the government maintained the threat of 'further measures'. The absence 
of such measures,, under the terms of his analysis, weakened seriously the general 
council's proposals for it removed their incentive to intervene. Furthermore, it 
gave the impression of intransigence at a time when the government were being 
seen to be flexible, a position likely to ham-i their support among the general 
public. 
The general council decided to publish its proposals, albeit with the additional 
paragraphs indicated the limitations of its willingness to compromise. In his 
covering letter to Castle with a copy of the report, Feather made it clear that whilst 
many of the points she had raised were covered in the additional paragraphs, she 
would understand, 'that it is impossible for the general council to attempt to say 
how they would deal with every hypothetical situation' 570 . However, he was clear 
on two crucial points; that the general council did not think it appropriate for 'the 
TUC to impose fines on affiliated unions' 571 ; or that the protection of Section 3 of 
the 1906 Act should be withdrawn from officers or members of trade unions 
failing to accept a TUC ruling. Feather's letter effectively scuppered Castle's 
much vaunted 'copper-bottomed agreement'. It was clear that the general council 
were not prepared to go beyond the actions set out in their proposals and whilst 
they might contain the 'hint of the slipper', question marks remained over their 
willingness to use it on the more powerful unions. However, as Heron had 
pointed out, it was difficult to see how the TUC could go any further without 
losing the flexibility that was an inherent element in all industrial relations 
negotiations. 
This sense of an emerging stalemate was picked up in the two newspapers that 
reported the general council meeting. The Guardian reported that the TUC had 
launched a 'two-pronged attack'; on the one hand approval of their own scheme; 
and on the other, instructing Feather to make it clear that the scheme would 
be 
569 
ibid. 
570 NA, PRO, LAB 43/534 Letter from Vic Feather to Barbara Castle, 'TUC Report to Special 
Congress', 16 May 1969 
571 
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1 abandoned if the government proceeded with its own legislation. Comme " 1 nting on 
Wilson's position, John Torode, the labour correspondent, noted that the TUC 
stance represented a 'real problem' 572 for Wilson who now had to decide if he 
could 'take the screws off , 
by which he meant had the TUC done enough for him 
to feel confident that dropping the penal clauses would not merely be a climb 
down? Similarly, The Times led with the TUC 'ultimatum' over the dropping of 
the penal clauses, and highlighted the fact that the general council had been 
'exasperated' by the government questions', which unnamed members said were 
6silly or to show a lack of understanding of the way the trade union movement 
. )573 works 
Both papers followed up with a commentary on the proposals themselves. The 
Times commented that the proposals gave the general council 'far more central 
authority than they have ever had before' 574 , and argued that the government 
would have to consider very carefully before introducing legislation that could 
lead to 'this notable advance' being lost. However, whilst acknowledging that 
these were grounds for abandoning the penal clauses, the leader reminded readers 
that it was the threat of legislation that had taken the TUC this far, and if removed, 
I is there not a danger that the union leaders will fall back into their accustomed 
vague and leisurely habits? )575 . In the circumstances, 
it was important to retain 
the gains that had been made, without abandoning the possibility of legislation 
should it be needed. This pointed towards the 'reserve powers' options that the 
The Times had raised previously and which had been rejected so clearly by the 
general council. However, applying a criteria of rationality, the paper argued that, 
from a union perspective, 'there was a lot to be said of settling for the kind of 
legislation this Government would introduce instead of waiting for what the next 
government will do'. As has been seen, however, the general council, who had 
little regard for any legislation regardless of political colour, did not share this 
rational view. 
572 Guardian, 16 May 1969 
573 The Times, 16 May 1969 
574 The Times, 19 May 1969 
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The Guardian shared with The Times the view that it was government pressure 
that had brought the TUC this far, and that both sides had a 'tremendous interest' 
in averting a collision. Therefore, if the special congress backed 
'wholeheartedly', the general council's programme, the government should revise 
the draft bill to remove the penal clauses, acknowledging that they could be 
reinstated latter if necessary. The paper acknowledged that such a change would 
be difficult for Wilson, and that the TUC would need to very quickly demonstrate 
the effectiveness of its proposals. However, ultimately, 'TUC action is better than 
Government action and will carry a more genuine promise of improved industrial 
, 576 relations 
Following the discussion of the new paragraphs at the general council, Feather 
had a private meeting with Wilson. The Prime Minister was cautiously positive, 
telling Feather that the new paragraphs represented a 'further advance' 577 , 
but 
crucially also that, 'although the "missing link" was smaller it was still 
"missing"'. For Wilson, the missing link was the coercive powers he required as 
part of his 'equally effective' formula. Feather countered with reference to the 
new paragraph 39 that 'required' unions to take action to ensure compliance with 
general council recommendations. Wilson replied that paragraph 39 referred only 
to the fact that unions 'may' have to revise their rules to enable them to take 
action to enforce general council recommendations, but that there was still 'no 
requirement to use the rule book', a point he regarded as crucial. 
Whilst Wilson remained to be convinced, he confided to Castle his fear that, 
'whilst not still fully effective', the TUC proposals would 'look so good that the 
Government might be criticised by many of its own supporters for turning them 
down' 578 . In the circumstances 
he concluded, the government might have to feel 
its way towards a "double barrelled system". The official note does not make it 
clear what Wilson meant by such a system, however, it seems likely that this 
marked the emergence of the so-called 'cold storage' proposal that had been 
referred to by both the Guardian and The Times; the proposal to legislate for the 
576 Guardian, 19 May 1969 
577NA, PRO, PREM 13/2726 Secret note for the record, 16 May 1969 
578 ibid. 
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penal clauses, but delay implementation until an agreed later date, thus giving the 
TUC the chance to prove the effectiveness of its own proposals. What he did not 
know at this stage, however, was that the general council had already ruled out a 
compromise involving reserve powers, and more importantly, that they would 
withdraw their own proposals if the government continued with legislation. 
The government's response to the general council proposals undoubtedly 
hardened the union position. As far as many within the general council were 
concerned, the points of clarification simply served as further evidence of Castle 
and Wilson's lack of understanding of the way in which union's worked. 
However, they could well have over-played their hand. The growing popularity of 
relegating the penal clauses to the status of reserve powers was already a victory 
of sorts. In the circumstances, the general council's refusal to countenance 
reserve powers, and the decision to rescind their own proposals if the government 
decided to go ahead smacked of the kind of unreasonableness that Wilson could 
well cite as a reason for continuing with the legislation. 
For Castle and Wilson however, there was still a worrying lack of firmness about 
the proposals, the so-called 'missing-link', and the reaction of the TUC to their 
points of clarification indicated just how far they remained apart. However, it was 
also generally accepted that the government lacked the votes to get the legislation 
through parliament. In the circumstances, the scope for compromise was limited 
and outside observers were left wondering who would blink first. Surprisingly, 
perhaps, it was Castle. 
5.7 'Cold Storage' 
On Monday, 19 May, Castle had a meeting with her officials to discuss the 
contents of the bill. Several days earlier, she had had a private talk with Kenneth 
Lomas MP. According to her diary, he was one of the few Labour MPs to support 
the interim bill and as such was speaking as a fiiend. Lomas told her that he 
thought she could not get the financial penalties through parliament, and that as 
such she should drop them from the bill in return for a guarantee from the TUC 
that they would do the disciplining in the case of unofficial strikes and on the 
understanding that, if they failed, the penalties would be reintroduced at a later 
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stage. Castle revised this proposal and presented it to her officials as a two-stage 
idea: 
a) get into the Bill the penal powers on inter-union disputes, which 
would enable us to set up the Industrial Board and establish the 
principle, and b) legislate for TUC intervention in unconstitutional 
strikes, backed by a statutory status quo at my discretion, but postponing 
any powers against strikers until the next Bill579. 
The main advantage, as Castle saw it, was to put the TUC under such 'fierce 
limelight' that they would not be able to 'run away from their responsibilities'. 
Castle had obviously discussed her proposals with a joumalist, because on the 
same day that she met her officials, a front page report appeared in The Times. 
According to this, the government was considering giving the TUC the legal right 
to try and settle unofficial strikes before the government imposed the conciliation 
pause, a move made possible by the strengthening of the TUC's powers in the 
revised proposals. Castle was indulging in some kite flying, and indicating the 
scope for a potential compromise. However, at this stage Castle was crucially not 
aware of the TUC decision to suspend its own proposals if the government 
decided to go ahead with legislation. She found this out from David Basnett 580 on 
the evening of the 19th, and its impact was evident at the meeting of the 
management committee on the following daY581 . 
The management committee met to discuss the forthcoming meeting with the 
general council, and Castle lost no time in setting out the options that she felt were 
available to the committee in the light of her conversation with Basnett. 
According to Castle's account, she set out three options; to postpone the bill, 
which, she commented with some understatement, would be 'a great let down'; to 
legislate on the basis she had set out to officials on the previous day; or to legislate 
as set out to officials but with the added inclusion of the conciliation pause, with 
its introduction deferred 582 . The official minutes, 
however, indicate that five 
oPtions were considered, which are worth listing in 
fL, 11583; 
579 See Castle (1984) p. 655 entry for 19 May 1969 
580 Executive member of General and Municipal Workers Union and TUC General Council. 
See 
Castle (1984) pp. 655-6 entry for 20 May 1969 
58 1 For origins of the management committee see chapter 
four. 
582 Castle (1984) pp. 655-6 entry for 20 May 1969 
583 Author's comments in italics 
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They could abandon their intention to legislate in the current 
Session and could defer all action until they introduced the more 
comprehensive Bill which was in any case envisaged in the 
following session. (Castle's option 1) 
2. They could introduce in the current Session a Bill containing the 
(penal' clauses in relation to inter-union disputes (the principle that 
such provisions in this context having already been accepted by trade 
union opinion) but omitting any similar financial sanction against 
individuals participating in unofficial strikes. This would imply that 
they had abandoned their intention to take statutory powers to 
enforce the conciliation pause which it was proposed to seek to 
institute in strikes of this kind. (Castle's option 2) 
3. They could introduce in the current Session a Bill containing 
'penal' clauses in relation to both inter-union disputes and unofficial 
strikes, with provision that in the latter case the implementation of 
those clauses would be deferred for a specified minimum period and 
could be further deferred indefinitely thereafter, provided that the 
TUC demonstrated that their alternative proposals for dealing with 
the unofficial strikes could be effective. (Castle's option 3) 
4. They could introduce in the current Session a Bill which would 
incorporate 'penal') clauses in relation to unofficial strikes but would 
provide no specific deferment of their implementation, which would 
then depend simply on its becoming apparent whether the TUC's 
own proposals were adequate when an attempt was made to put them 
into effect within a reasonable period. 
5. They could introduce in the present Session a Bill which, in 
relation to unofficial strikes, would empower the Government to 
prescribe a conciliation pause in appropriate cases but would make it 
the responsibility of the TUC to enforce this pause by sanctions of 
their own. 584 
According to Castle's account the first option was dismissed out of hand and 
attention focused on options two and three. Opinions were divided, with option 
three supported by Wilson, Stewart, Healey and Peart, whilst Mellish backed 
option two. This is supported by the official minutes, which record the decision to 
reject option one as damaging government credibility 'beyond repair', and options 
four and five because they would be unacceptable to the TUC. 
Neither Castle"s account nor the minutes, indicate a clear resolution. Castle noted 
that it became clear to her that 'we must at least have a shot at getting TUC 
connivance, if nothing else, on 3' 
585 
, and that Wilson said there must 
be another 
584NA, PRO, CAB 134/3188, Management Committee, Minutes of a meeting held on Tuesday, 20 
May 1969 
585 ibid. 
193 
meeting with the TUC after the special congress and before the introduction of the 
bill. The minutes, however, whilst recording the preference for option three, 
concluded with a reminder of the weakness of the Castle/Wilson position and 
served as an ominous portent of things to come: the final decision would, 'depend 
to some extent on the degree to which dissident elements in the PLP were satisfied 
that the TUC would acquiesce in the Bill in whatever form it was finally 
5586 introduced 
Thus, in the space of the eight days between the first meeting on 12 May and the 
management committee on 20 May, attitudes had changed considerably. The 
general council position had hardened to the point almost of no return and whilst 
the government was still looking for a 'copper-bottomed' compromise it was 
difficult to see a constructive resolution. However, in the constantly shifting 
battle for hearts and minds, the unions were about to hand the government a 
powerful card. 
At the general council meeting on May 15, John Boyd (an engineering 
representative of the AEF) had voted against the proposals on the grounds that it 
was the policy of the AEF executive to oppose the penal clauses, everything in the 
white paper, and increased powers for TUC intervention. This decision was 
endorsed by a meeting of the engineering executive of the AEF on May 20, at 
which members voted 4 to 3 to reject the TUC plan 587 . 
Significantly, Hugh 
Scanlon, AEF president, although without a vote, supported the 3 members voting 
588 to support the TUC proposals . The press was quick to pick up on its 
significance. The Guardian noted that such was the size of the AEF block vote, 
that unless the union changed its mind before the special congress, an overall vote 
586 ibid. 
587 The Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AEF) was formed in 1968 
from the merger of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and the Foundry Workers. The 
engineering workers continued to be represented by a separate executive and policy committee, 
and it was the engineering executive that voted against the general council proposals. 
588 Ironically, the vote had more to do with internal power struggles within the AEF that a 
principled stand against the TUC proposals. Boyd had unsuccessfully challenged Scanlon for the 
presidency a year earlier, and was a well known 'right winger' within the executive. His actions 
were widely felt to have more to do with seeking to damage Scanlon's authority than any serious 
opposition to the proposals. 
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of support for the general council proposals would be 'meaningless 5589 . The 
leader column was vitriolic; the union's action weakened the TUC position ahead 
of the meeting with the government to the point where, 'everyone present will 
know that the TUC document has become less credible'; it raised crucial questions 
about the ability of the TUC to deliver without the AEF; and, 'just when the 
Government seems to be preparing itself to postpone or drop some of its proposal, 
the AEF gives those who want to legislate further encouragement for doing SO-)590. 
Similarly, the Daily Telegraph noted that the vote represented a 'savage rebuff to 
the general council and concluded that it must 'strengthen the Government's 
hand' for introducing legislation. 
It was not only the press that recognised the significance of the decision. Castle 
recorded being confronted by Stan Orme 591 on the evening of 20 May; "'What 
about your friend Johnnie Boyd now? " he almost raved. I was interested to see 
how appalled the Left are at the decision of the AEF Executive to turn down the 
592 TUC proposals' . They were only too aware of the political capital it gave the 
government, and, as if to acknowledge this, Wilson was quick to take the 
opportunity to raise the issue of the vote during an interview with the BBC on the 
same evening. When asked about the AEF decision Wilson reiterated the line that 
the TUC had been given every opportunity to produce a 'satisfactory alternative', 
but added that the AEF vote 'makes me wonder' about their ability to do so. He 
went on to develop this theme, arguing that, if he was told that the 'whole future 
of our economy is going to depend on the vote of seven men', then he required 
something more definite from the TUC than they had offered up until now. 
Wilson was seeking deliberately to raise the temperature. Not only did the AEF 
decision confirm all of the doubts expressed by Heron about the ability of the 
TUC to deliver the larger unions, it also enabled him to appeal over the heads of 
entrenched interests to the wider public, arguing for the right of the government to 
act. As Wilson put it, 'If we have a situation where, by one man's vote, you fall to 
589 Guardian, 21 May 1969 
590 ibid. 
591 MP for Salford West, sponsored by the AEF and strong opponent of the bill 
592 Castle (1984) p. 657 entry for 20 May 1969 
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get the machinery to deal with a devastating crisis - if that is the situation, then 1 
5593 think everybody would agree the Government have got to act 
5.8 The second meeting: May 21 1969 
The signs for the second meeting did not look good. Wilson and Castle were 
buoyed up by the AEF decision, although they decided not to refer to it during the 
meeting594. Equally, the general council could take heart from press reports that 
over 60 members of the PLP had signed a letter to Douglas Houghton calling on 
the government to withdraw the penal clauses on the grounds that the TUC 
595 'Programme for Action' provided a better solution On the face of it the 
meeting did not make any significant progress. Wilson acknowledged that 
'Programme for Action' was a major achievement and advance, but lacked the 
"missing link', which would give necessary assurances that 'the unions involved 
(in strike action) would use their full powers to bring back to work members on an 
unconstitutional strike which the general council had ruled against' 596 . Feather 
replied that the proposals gave 'every reasonable assurance' 597 and that whilst he 
could not guarantee 100% success, nor could the government. He was supported 
by Frank Cousins, who reiterated the general council's unanimous opposition to 
legal intervention, and Sir Harold Collison 598 who made it clear that 'legal 
penalties and voluntary action of the kind now proposed by the general council 
could not in practice exist side by side' 599 . In the 
face of this deadlock, Wilson 
was forced to acknowledge that they could not get any further and should meet 
again after the special congress. However, in an attempt to raise the stakes, he 
introduced a wider political judgement that, 'the passage of an Industrial Relations 
Bill on the lines which had been indicated was essential to the continuation in 
office of the present Government or indeed of any Labour Government'. 
593 
, The Times, 
21 May 1969 
594 See Castle (1984) p. 657 entry for 21 May 1969. 'Got an urgent note from John Homer [AEF 
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Whilst the deadlock was predictable and Wilson's final comments dominated the 
ensuing press coverage, they obscured the fact that Wilson had sought to define 
the 'missing link' and in doing so opened the way to the eventual compromise. 
Wilson's proposal hinged on the wording of a specific paragraph of the TUC 
report. Paragraph 42 600 dealt with the action to be taken by individual unions in 
response to a TUC ruling and requires quoting in full; 
The General Council would also require unions to satisfy them that they 
had done all that they could reasonably be expected to do to secure 
compliance with a recommendation (or an award where this has been 
made), including taking action within their own rules if necessary. They 
recognise that a few unions may need to review their own rules to ensure 
that they are in a position to comply with recommendations or awards by 
the T. U. C. The General Council also consider that it should be made 
clear in Rule 11 (as is already implicit in that Rule, and is explicit in 
Rule 12) that in the unlikely event of a union refusing to abide by a 
decision of the T. U. C. the General Council can take action under Rule 
13 601 
As we have seen, the general council had already tightened the wording changing 
4expect' to 'require' in the opening sentence. Wilson went further and said that 
the report needed to make it clear that where the general council ruled against an 
unconstitutional stoppage, 'they would give a ruling that the men must go back to 
work; and that the union concerned must then do everything within its power - 
amending the rules if need be - to get them back to work ... 
The unions concerned 
should enter into a binding commitment with the General Council that they would 
use their best endeavours in this way. ' If the document could be amended along 
602 these lines, he believed that they would be 'very close to agreement' 
Immediate reaction was muted, but Wilson's proposal was discussed at a meeting 
of the general council that was held immediately afterwards and dismissed out of 
hand. The TUC chairman, John Newton, summed up Wilson's proposal as 
requiring the replacement of, 'may need to review their own rules', with 'must 
review their own rules' 603 , and with the 
insistence that those who fail to return to 
work, 'should automatically be penalised by rule'. Collison said that Wilson was 
600 Previously paragraph 39, and one of the six additional paragraphs included in Feather's second 
draft and reproduced as appendix 2 
601 Quoted in TUC Report 1969, Report of 10 I't Annual Trades Union Congress 
602 NA, PRO, PREM13/2726 
603 MRC, MSS292B/20/9 TUC General council, Minutes of fifteenth meeting (1968-69) held on 
21 
May 1969 
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in effect asking the general council to write into paragraph 42 the requirement that 
unions should expel by specific rule members who failed to work when instructed, 
and he thought it would be, 'impossible and unwise' to write in such a 
requirement. Cousins, Scanlon and McGarvey all spoke out against any such 
amendment. Feather concluded that there was no desire on the part of the general 
council to change rule 42, and it was agreed that the report should go unamended 
to the special congress. However, as will become clear, Wilson's proposal that 
the rules be tightened along these lines became the single focus of negotiation 
after the special congress. 
At this stage, however, a settlement looked as far away as ever. The general 
council concluded that things had reached the 'end of the road'. As Cousins put 
it, the stage had been reached of, 'either the General Council or the Government 
backing down )604 
. 
As for Wilson, he had two cards left to play, exploiting the 
splits emerging in the TUC position, and following through with his earlier threats 
to dissolve parliament and/or resign. On the former, his position was strengthened 
considerably by a leader in The Times that used the AEF decision as a 
demonstration of the correctness of Wilson's position in doubting the capacity of 
the TUC to deliver, concluding that, 'it is that doubt about the capacity of the 
T. U. C. to deliver what it undertakes which makes the plan that it published last 
weekend an inadequate substitute for the measures proposed by Mrs Castle' 
605 
. 
Furthermore, in seeking to link his ability to govern with the passage of the 
legislation, Wilson had no choice but to carry on, for 'He has now worked himself 
into a position in which the passage of legislation answers to the description of 
606 
governing and its abandonment answers to the description of abdication' The 
Times was to make this latter point consistently throughout the final stages of 
negotiations, and whilst it could be seen as a compliment to Wilson's 
determination it was distinctly double-edged, the implicit message was that any 
compromise at this stage would amount to an abdication of responsibility on 
Wilson's part which, given the paper's overall lack of support to Wilson, was very 
probably a deliberate strategy on its part. 
604 ibid 
605 The Times, 22 May 1969 
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The Guardian also highlighted the growing likelihood of splits within the TUC 
leadership. In an article entitled, 'The TUC: together to the barricades? ', John 
Torode reported that the TUC's 'astonishing degree of unity' was close to the 
point at which, 'unity begins to crack and the leadership ends up divided, 
embittered, and full of mutual recriminations'607 . Wilson was surely right, against 
this backdrop to continue the negotiations beyond the special congress. The 
possibility of splits within the TUC weakened the general council's position and 
gave him good grounds for seeking the endorsement of the PLP for his own 
proposals. 
The second, and final, card was his ongoing ability to govern. Mellish had 
already indicated to the PLP that the failure to enact the bill could lead to a 
general election. Now Wilson seemed ready to play this card himself Once again, 
it was The Times that picked up the significance of Wilson's closing comments to 
the general council, choosing to lead its coverage with his words, 'The question is 
whether this government can continue' 608 , and noting that his comments had been 
calculated to increase the pressure on trade union leaders in the lead up to the 
special congress. Similarly, Castle recorded a conversation with Wilson that took 
place immediately after the meeting with the general council at which he 
'astonished' her with his admission that, 'he didn't see how we could get a 
settlement with the TUC, but he and I were now too committed to back down'609 . 
Consequently, 'he intended to make this an issue of confidence in him and, if we 
were defeated, he would stand down from the leadership 9610 . Castle noted that 
he 
had moved away from dissolving the government and was prepared to make it an 
issue of his own personal survival. For a man who had just faced down several 
would-be leadership challenges this was a dangerous ploy 
611 although, as was 
noted at the outset, it remained unclear as to what extent this was a credible threat. 
However, the manner in which the threats had petered out indicated the cleverness 
607 Guardian, 22 May 1969 
608 The Times, 22 May 1969 
609 Castle (1984) p658 entry for 21 May 1969 
610 ibid 
611 See chapter four 
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of Wilson's move; as Castle indicated, 'He clearly visualized that it wouldn't be 
5612 long before he staged a comeback 
5.9 The state of the parties revisited: June 1969 
After a month of negotiations even Feather had been forced to acknowledge that 
the TUC would not have moved as far if it had not been for the sustained pressure 
from Castle and Wilson. There was a similar acknowledgement among the 
majority of the press such that even those pushing for a compromise argued for 
creserve powers' in order to keep the TUC focused on its own good intentions. 
However, the extent of support for the TUC proposals within the PLP underlined 
the weakness of the Castle/Wilson position, as evidenced by the reluctance of the 
management committee to endorse any single course of action, while most 
newspapers considered the legislation to be dead in the water. In the 
circumstances, it was difficult not to agree with the Daily Telegraph's conclusion 
that Wilson, 'is isolated to an extent to which there are few, if any parallels in the 
, 613 history of his office 
As stressed at the outset, the government's weakness was the general council's 
strength. However, the AIEF decision exposed the fragility of the unified front to 
an extent that it threatened the credibility of the TUC programme. Similarly, the 
intransigence shown in rejecting the reserve powers and in threatening to 
withdraw its own proposals if the government went ahead was further evidence of 
the limits the general council placed on its own flexibility. Crucially, though, the 
weakness of the Castle/Wilson position was well known and provided little 
incentive to offer a further compromise. In the circumstances, the overwhelming 
endorsement of the special congress was vital; a failure to gain support would 
weaken their negotiating position, perhaps to the point that they would have to 
give way on reserve powers, whilst a substantial majority in favour would make it 
very difficult for Castle and Wilson to pursue further concessions. Before the 
congress met, however, Wilson hosted a meeting at Chequers, at which Jack Jones 
and Hugh Scanlon laid bare the true depth of antagonism and opposition to the 
government's proposals. 
612 ibid 
613 Daily Telegraph, 22 May 1969 
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5.10 The Chequers weekend: June 1- June 2 1969 
In the folklore that has grown up since In Place of Strife, nothing has captured the 
imagination more than the secret meeting between Wilson, Castle, Feather, Jones 
and Scanlon. Castle, Wilson and Jones have all provided published accounts of 
the weekend, but the official records offer an extensive, blow-by blow account of 
the meeting written by Wilson immediately afterwards, a contemporary in-depth 
account of the meeting and its aftermath. At this point it is worth noting just how 
unusual this was. Generally meetings were minuted by civil servants. The fact 
that Wilson produced his own account suggests that civil servants were not 
present but that Wilson still wanted a written record of the meeting. His account, 
therefore, needs to be treated with an element of caution, although it is largely 
confirmed by Castle's account and that of Jones, and the fact that it was only 
circulated to Castle suggests that he did not seek to embellish for the benefit of 
those who were not there. 
The meeting had been proposed by Wilson several weeks earlier as a means of 
getting the most powerful members of the general council together to discuss 
general attitudes and establish a way forward. Castle was due to be on holiday, 
cruising the Mediterranean with the Crossman family on Charles Forte's yacht, 
614 
and complicated arrangements were put in place to bring her back . 
Initially it 
looked as if Roy Jenkins might have to substitute for Castle, as Wilson was 
anxious not to hold the meeting on his own 
615 
. 
However, Jenkins' reluctance 616 5 
coupled with Castle's determination to attend, ensured her presence, much to the 
horror of Jack Jones, who had been assured of her absence by Feather 
617 
. 
Jones' 
view was coloured by his belief that Castle was the more dogmatic of the two and 
that there was more chance of a compromise if she was not present 
618 
. 
Wilson 
was only too aware of this. As Castle recorded, 'he wasn't going to 
let them try 
614 See Perkins (2003) pp. 309-314 for details 
615 See Castle (1984) p. 656 entry for 20 May 1969 
616 Interview with Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, London, 20 September, 
2001 
617 See Jones (1986) pp. 203-4, "'Will the queer one be present? ", making it clear that I thought 
it 
should be a meeting with Wilson alone' 
618 ibid. Jones acknowledges that the publication of Castle's diaries 
demonstrated that she had a 
much more flexible approach to the negotiations 
than he had given her credit for at the time. 
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and drive a wedge between him and me on the false assumption that he was a 
9619 dove and I was a hawk 
Following the now well-establi shed pattern, Heron supplied the briefing. His 
advice was straightforward; Wilson and Castle should continue to push for the 
tightening of paragraph 42; seek views on the options agreed by the management 
committee 620 ; and clarify the true extent of support for Feather's statement that the 
general council would abandon its own proposals if the government continued 
with its legislation 621 . In addition, he provided a note of a conversation that had 
taken place between Feather, Denis Barnes and himself622 . During the 
conversation Feather had confirmed that the general council were not prepared to 
amend paragraph 42 any further. Significantly, he had gone further and added 
that opposition to the penalty clauses extended to the inter-union dispute 
provisions, and that many unions were likely to use these alone as grounds for not 
proceeding with the general council proposals. If this were the case, options 2 and 
3 became irrelevant: the TUC were effectively rejecting any legislation, regardless 
of whether it related to unofficial strikes or inter-union disputes. Feather also 
hinted that whilst the TGWU were likely to back the general council's proposals, 
it would be with the proviso that they should only be implemented if the 
government abandoned all of the 'penalty clauses'. It was clear, as Heron noted, 
that Feather's preference, 'would be for dropping the interim bill as a whole (i. e. 
the "sugar" as well as the ', pill") while the T. U. C. proposals were put to the test'. 
Feather was playing his usual game of presenting himself as the reasonable man in 
the midst of rival extremists. However, the mask appeared to slip when he 
acknowledged that 'the general council's proposals could not be completely 
effective', and 'in practice the general council would be forced to rely very 
heavily on the qualifications limiting the types of disputes in which the general 
council could intervene'. Whilst he was quick to point out that he 'did not see any 
better chance of success for the Government's proposals' 
623 
, and that the only way 
619 Castle (1986) p. 656 entry for 20 May, 1969 
620 Options 2&3, see above 
621 NA, PRO, LAB43/534 'Note for meeting between Prime Minister, the First Secretary, Mr. 
Newton, Mr Victor Feather, Mr Jack Jones and Mr Hugh Scanlon on the 1" June 1969', C. F. 
Heron, 30th May 1969 
622NA, PRO, LAB43/534 Note for the Record, C. F. Heron, 30thMay 1969 
623 
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out of the 'impasse' was to drop the bill and give the union proposals a chance to 
work, it was a damaging admission. 
How should we read Feather's comments? Was it yet another negotiating ploy or 
something more significant? The news that the government proposals for inter- 
union disputes were now also unacceptable was clearly designed to increase the 
pressure to drop the bill, but he must have known that an admission of a weakness 
on his own proposals would be grist to the mill for Wilson and Castle in their 
search for the 'missing link'. Perhaps it was simply a genuine, weary admission,, 
from a negotiator who had reached the end of the road. Certainly the attitudes of 
Jones and Scanlon did little to lift the gloom. 
As Heron had suggested, Wilson pressed Scanlon and Jones on paragraph 42, but 
it was clear that neither was prepared to countenance any greater transfers of 
sovereignty, with Scanlon stressing that he 'was personally opposed even to the 
transfer of sovereignty which had been agreed )624 . Furthermore, 
he made it clear 
that whilst he was confident of gaining the support of his national executive for 
the TUC proposals, this was 'conditional on there being no Government 
legislation which included penal clauses' 625 , and that 
included the so-called 'cold 
storage' option. 
As the depth of this intransigence became clear, Castle pushed them on the real 
reasons behind their opposition, and it became clear that neither was motivated by 
the problem of strikes. Scanlon confirmed 'that he was in effect manoeuvring 
in 
order to defeat the legislation, that his motivation in supporting the T. U. 
C. had 
nothing to do with seeking to deal with the problem of strikes, and that 
it was 
legislation he was against not strikes' 
626 
. Jones agreed, arguing 
that 'the question 
of legislation raised a fundamental principle about unions, and about the whole 
system of collective bargaining'. Similarly, whilst concerned about 
Conservative 
legislation, both were 'totally confident on their ability to make Tory-type 
624 NA, PRO, LAB/43/534, 'Note of a discussion at dinner', Chequers, Sunday, 
1 June 1969 
625 ibid 
626 ibid. 
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legislation unworkable', and had no time for the argument that a failure to deal 
with problems now would make such legislation more likely. 
It was at this point that things began to get heated. Wilson fell back on the 
constitutional question; if the TUC sought to 'crack their whip' over the trade 
union group they would clearly be acting as a 'state within a state' and 'putting 
itself above the Government in deciding what the Government could and could 
not do". Once again, according to Wilson's account, they made no attempt to 
deny it, because 'a fundamental principle was at stake', to which Wilson replied 
that an even more fundamental principle was at stake, 'namely the right and 
possibility of a Labour Government to govern, and the very essence of democracy 
in this country'. Scanlon parried Wilson's threats of constitutional breakdown 
with the ghost of 193 1, at which point Wilson cracked. J reminded him sharply 
that in that context I was not a Ramsay MacDonald, but in the context of his 
previous comment I wasn't Dubcek ý 627 , and, according to Castle's account, told 
him, 'I'm not going to surrender to your tanks, Hughie 628 . Feather made an 
attempt to calm things down, and yet again the union leaders proposed the 
dropping of legislation to give the TUC proposals a chance to work. Wilson 
failed to see how this differed from the 'cold storage' option, other than in 
delaying legislation to the point where it was too close to a general election to risk 
its introduction. At this point Feather called time, it was agreed that 'we couldn't 
take it any further', and the meeting broke up. 
In many respects the Chequers meeting was the most remarkable of all. Four 
years later, the Scottish miner, Mick McGahey, was to cause outrage when he 
appeared to threaten to bring down Heath's govenunent with extra-parliamentary 
action 629 , 
but here were the leaders of Britain's two largest unions threatening to 
make any trade union legislation unworkable in direct defiance of the Labour 
627 Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslavakia. In April 1968, 
Dubcek began a process of reform that became known as the 'Prague Spring'. In August 
1968 the 
reform was crushed by an invasion of Warsaw pact 
forces and Soviet tanks were seen on the 
streets of Prague. Dubcek spent the next twenty years working 
for the Slovak forestry service. 
628 See Castle (1984) p. 662 entry for I June 1969. Getting the tanks off the lawn has passed 
in 
folklore, although the exact words are unclear, Jones 
for example denies hearing the words used at 
all (Interview with Jack Jones, London, 
2 June 2000) 
629 See, John Campbell, Edward Heath, a biography (Pimlico, London 1993) pp. 566-7 
for a 
detailed account of the event. 
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government of the day. Wilson was right to see this as a direct threat not only to 
his government, but also to the principle of a democratic state, and this goes a 
long way to explaining what happened next. 
Castle and Wilson met privately on the following morning to reflect on the 
meeting. There are two accounts of their discussions, Wilson's memorandum, and 
Castle's diary. According to Castle, the initial meeting took place whilst Wilson 
was eating breakfast in bed. He acknowledged that, "'It's about as black as it can 
be" -)630 , but saw no alternative but to go on with option 3, although with 
suspension of both sets of powers. Castle responded that the time had come to 
restore the initiative by sending the general council a letter setting out their 
requirements for the amendment of paragraph 42, with the intention that it be 
debated at the special congress. If congress rejected the amendments, she argued, 
'they would be on the defensive when the crunch came, not ourselves' 631 . 
Secondly, she pointed out that option 2 had been wrongly recorded in the 
management committee minutes. As recorded, option 2 proposed legislating for 
financial penalties in relation to inter-union disputes, but omitting any such 
sanction in relation to unofficial strikes. According to Castle, It should have 
included legislating for the conciliation pause, but not the financial penalties that 
accompanied non-compliance. These could be left out until it was seen what joint 
action by the TUC and CBI could do. Such was the antipathy to fines, that she 
proposed an alternative solution to be included in the second bill that was due to 
follow in the autumn. 'If necessary we might legislate for model union rules, 
including discipline against unofficial strikers, in the following Bill'632. Wilson's 
account suggests she went further in spelling out the implications: 'Failure to 
adopt them (the model rules) would lead to the Union losing its registration, and 
therefore the protection and privileges which it enjoyed under the law' 
633, and it 
was a measure of just how far they had come, that this proposal was virtually 
identical to one contained in Fair Deal at Work. 
630 Castle (1984) pp. 662-3 entry for 2 June 1969 
631 ibid. 
632 Castle (1984) p. 663 entry for 2 June 1969 
633NA, PRO, LAB43/534, 'Postscript', 5 June 1969 
205 
Following this initial discussion Castle left Wilson to meet her officials. When 
the meeting resumed, she was surprised to find that Wilson had become an 
enthusiast for Castle's revised option 2, 'with the proviso that we legislate on 
model rules now' 634 - According to Wilson's account, the inclusion of model rules 
could be presented as a direct response to the attitudes of Scanlon and Jones; 
Jones & Scanlon had made it pretty clear that they would find a means of 
wrecking the penal clauses, and that in any case they would not co-operate 
in a situation where the penal clauses co-existed with the T. U. C. proposals. 
It was essential that this power to lay down model rules should be taken in 
this year's legislation. We could say that after all these consultations we 
welcomed what the T. U. C. had done, but felt it lacked teeth and provided no 
guarantees that Unions would be dealt with who themselves failed to deal 
with their recalcitrant members [sic]. In default of the T. U. C. coming 
through with this we would provide the necessary sanctions to make 
Paragraph 42 effective. 635 
Castle made it clear that this had, 'far-reaching Draconian implications' 636 5 to 
which Wilson replied that the TUC was in no position to complain, for the 
government could say, "'You refused our 10s fine so we're going to hang 
YOU ý5.3637 . The discussion ended at this point, with agreement that Heron prepare a 
paper setting out the pros and cons for the next management committee, and that a 
draft letter be prepared to send to the general council setting out amendments 
Castle proposed to paragraph 42. 
The Chequers meeting was, after the final Cabinet meeting on 17 June, the most 
significant event in the course of the negotiations. Finally, for Wilson and Castle, 
the real nature of the opposition was revealed. It may be argued that this 
illustrated once and for all their naivete in trade union matters. To their critics, the 
lack of any emotional understanding was their biggest failing, and perhaps it 
needed Jones and Scanlon to spell it out in such blunt ternis. However, it does 
need to be remembered that, as was highlighted in the introduction, Jones and 
Scanlon were a new breed of trade unionist leaders totally unlike those Wilson 
would have encountered as minister in the 1940s and early 1950s. Consequently, 
there were genuine reasons for both Wilson and Castle to be taken unawares by 
634 Castle (1984) p. 663 entry for 2 June 1969 
635NA, PRO, LAB43/534, 'Postscript', 5 June 1969 
636 Castle (1984) p. 663 entry for 2 June 1969 
637 ibid. 
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the uncompromising nature of their attitude. Nevertheless, in taking such a line, 
Scanlon and Jones appeared to set the trade union movement not just outside, but 
above the law. Scanlon, in particular, appeared to be challenging directly the right 
of a democratically elected government to govern. In this context, the decision to 
pursue model rules and de-registration can be read as both a knee-jerk reaction to 
intransigence, and evidence of a much more significant shift. Here were Labour 
politicians actively considering the withdrawal of rights enshrined in the 1906 
Trade Disputes Act, something Castle had rejected from the outset as being 
completely unacceptable. For her to say that this at least had the benefit of being 
in line with the majority Donovan recommendation that protection under the 1906 
Act be withdrawn from unregistered unions 638 , and that it was closer to the CBI 
proposals, was a measure of the distance travelled. However, before the 
management committee could digest this latest proposal, the special congress met 
at Croydon. If the general council succeeded in presenting a united front, then 
surely the negotiations were at an end, whereas if not, all bets were off. 
5.11 The TUC Special Congress -5 June 1969 
The two most significant events to take place prior to the congress were the 
sending of Castle's letter, and the decision of the AEF to revise its opposition to 
the general council's proposals. Castle's letter has been the subject of some 
confusion. Her intention was for it to be debated by the special congress where its 
undoubted rejection would highlight once again the unreasonableness of the TUC, 
putting them on the back foot. In fact, Feather did not disclose the letter to the 
general council until after the special congress, on the grounds that it would 
inflame an already delicate situation. The letter was drafted by Heron, who then 
flew out to Italy on 3 June to clear it with Castle prior to sending it to the TUC. 
The meeting took place in Herculaneum and, over 'omelette and vino 
bianco 
secco 639 a few minor changes were made to what Castle's 
husband, Ted, dubbed 
'the Treaty of Herculaneum'. Feather received the letter that evening and 
'hit the 
638 See Wilson's account, NA, PRO, LAB43/534. Perhaps significant that it 
is not mentioned in 
Castle's diary 
639 See Castle (1984) p. 663 entry for 3 June 1969 
207 
roof, demanding to speak to Wilson. When he did so, he told him that the letter 
was a 'catastrophe' 
640 
. 
What was in the letter to cause such anger? In her biography of Castle, Anne 
Perkins implies that it included, not only amendments to paragraph 42, but also 
the proposal for legislating for model rules 641 . If this had been the case, Feather's 
reaction would have been understandable. However the letter indicates otherwise. 
It was simply a restatement of Wilson and Castle's attitude towards paragraph 42 
and a follow up from the meeting held on 21 May; no mention was made of the 
model rules. Rather, the letter sought to 'put on record before the Special 
Congress on 5 th June the Government's views'. Specifically, the letter drew 
attention to the fact that; 
The discussion on 21" May showed that the General Council do not 
regard paragraph 42 as a commitment to ensure that where the TUC have 
recommended a return to work and persuasion by the union fails to 
secure this, the union will take action within its rules , including the 
exercise of disciplinary powers against members who remain on strike. 
Subsequently, the letter called for the amendment of paragraph 42 to place 'an 
obligation' on affiliated unions to revise their rules to ensure that they had the 
necessary powers to take such action as was required to ensure a return to Work642. 
In itself the letter did little more than reiterate the arguments of 21 May. 
However, in setting them down in black and white with an expectation that they 
be discussed at the special congress, Castle was making the government's position 
explicit not just to the general council but to the whole trade union movement and 
the press. Feather was obviously concerned that such an overt display of 
govenu-nent intransigence would spark a similar response among the trade unions, 
leading to a vote of outright opposition, rather than one of support for his own 
carefully crafted proposals. Such a vote would of course play directly into 
Castle's hand, since she could then claim that trade union intransigence left her 
with little alternative but to go ahead with her own proposals. In masterly 
fashion, however, Feather turned the situation to his own advantage. Not only did 
640 Quoted in Perkins (2003) p. 314 
641 See Perkins (2003) p. 314 
642NA, PRO, CAB 134/3118. Copy of a letter from Barbara Castle to Vic Feather, 4 June 1969 
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he persuade Wilson not to publish the letter 643 , but he also presented it to the 
general council immediately after the special congress. Thus he was able to claim 
that he was 'puzzled' by the letter. After all, the government had been sent a copy 
of 'Programme for Action' immediately after it was published and, 'he did not 
see that there could be any further discussion with the Government on various 
)644 points in the document after the Special Congress had given their mandate 
He neglected to mention that the entire purpose of the letter had been to put the 
government's case before the special congress gave its mandate. As Frank 
Cousins pitched in that the letter was, 'another indication of the Government's 
lack of understanding of the situation', it was clear that Castle and Wilson had 
been outmanoeuvred once again. 
In many respects, however, Castle was entirely to blame for the situation. Whilst 
she may have been clear in her intention to get the congress to debate the 
government's proposals, and Feather may well have know that this is what she 
meant, the letter was not explicit. The opening paragraph simply said, 'I think we 
should put on record before the Special Congress on 5th June the Government's 
views we expressed at that meeting', and the closing paragraph concluded that it 
would 'be useful then to discuss further the points sent out above in the light of 
the Special Congress' 645 . There was nothing requesting that either the general 
council or the special congress considered the letter and given that Castle had an 
opportunity to comment on the draft before it was sent to Feather, it was clearly an 
oversight on her part not to make the request explicit. 
Part of the reason for Feather's violent reaction to Castle's letter was undoubtedly 
his concern over the continuing opposition of the AEF. However, on 3 June, as 
Castle was drafting her infamous letter, the decision was overturned. In the 
convoluted structures of the newly merged union, 52 members of the policy 
committee of the engineering section of the AEF met to consider the proposals, 
and voted by 30 votes to 22 to overturn the executive and support, 'A Programme 
for Action'. The Guardian noted that the AEF decision meant that Croydon 
643 See Castle (1984) p. 664 entry for 6 June 1969 
644 MRC, MSS 292B/20/9 TUC General Council Minutes, Minutes of slxteenth (special) meeting 
(1968-69) held at the Fairfield Hall, Croydon on Thursday June 5,1969 at 3.30pm 
645 NA, PRO, CAB 134/3118, Management Committee, Industrial Relations, 
0 June 1969 
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would be a 'massive demonstration' of union willingness to put their own house 
in order 646. However, both the Guardian and The Times also noted Scanlon's 
comment that he had given delegates a 'specific assurance' that the TUC would 
not proceed unless the government dropped the penal clauses 
647 
Following the decision of the AEF, the special congress became a predictable 
affair. The congress voted overwhelmingly in favour of three separate motions. 
The first, carried by 8,252,000 to 359,000 condemned the government's proposed 
financial penalties; the second, carried by 8,608,000 to 144,000 confirmed that 
some of the government's proposals could improve industrial relations; and 
finally, and most importantly, congress voted by 7,908,000 to 846,000 to endorse 
the amendments to rules II and 12 of congress, empowering the general council 
to intervene in unofficial and inter-union disputes. Clearly the size of the vote 
indicates that the 'Programme for Action' would have been carried even without 
the backing of the AEF, but this ignores the potential impact of AEF opposition 
both in terms of the size of its vote and the psychological impact on the other 
unions. Of equal significance to the size of the three votes was Feather's 
confirmation of Scanlon's line that "'a necessary prerequisite of the operation of 
'Programme for Action' is that the Government do not proceed with their 
proposed penal clauses" , 648 . He was echoed by Briginshaw, 
Cousins, McGarvey 
and Scanlon himself, who, reprising his threats to Wilson and Castle, warned the 
government that persisting with the interim bill in the face of, 'this now united 
trade union movement'. would lead to more than resolutions, a clear hint of future 
industrial action. 
For Feather and the general council the outcome could not have been better. 
Congress had spoken and, with an overwhelming display of unity, made it very 
clear that the government could either accept the TUC proposals or persist with 
the interim bill and risk tearing the labour movement apart. From a trade union 
perspective the negotiations were effectively over for, as Feather noted 
in the 
646 Guardian, 4 June, 1969 
647 For example see The Times, 4 June 1969 
648 Quoted in Guardian, 6 June 1969 
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post-congress general council, congress had given its mandate. Crucially, 
however, Wilson did not see it like this. 
Issued under the name of the First Secretary, but effectively the work of Wilson, 
the government's formal response was clear. It acknowledged that the TUC 
proposals were a 'major advance' 649 and that those for dealing with inter-union 
disputes seemed, 'broadly' satisfactory', but retained, 'considerable reservations' 
about the proposals for dealing with unconstitutional strikes, especially the 
arrangements for ensuring that TUC recommendations were implemented. The 
press were quick to pick up the implications. The Guardian's front-page report on 
Croydon was headed, 'Government is unmoved by big TUC vote 5650 , whilst the 
Daily Telegraph reported that, 'Mrs Castle, speaking for the Government last 
night rebuffed the T. U. C. )651 , and The Times reported that the government 
'reacted coolly' 652 to the special congress. Castle was furious that the government 
response had been released without her involvement and yet over her name, and 
felt that it reduced their room for manoeuvre. Arriving back in England on 6 June 
she immediately phoned Wilson, who was 'very relaxed', and justified his actions 
on the grounds that it was necessary to, 'do something to check the post-Croydon 
euphoria' 653 . In case the country had not got his message, Wilson followed up the 
statement with a speech to a rally of Yorkshire Labour women in Barnsley in 
which he condemned unofficial strikes, 'This problem must be solved. It will not 
be solved by any abdication by the Government of its responsibilities. Nor will it 
be solved by any threatened abdication by the TUC of theirs'. 654 He re-stated the 
government's view that there was not enough assertion of authority in the TUC 
proposals to, 'give reasonable hope that what the TUC propose can alone solve 
this problem. ' 655 
649 NA, PRO, CAB134/3188, Statement issued by the Department of Employment and 
Productivity on 5thJune 1969 
650 Guardian, 6 June 1969 
65 1 Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1969. Clearly it wasn't 'Mrs Castle', and much of her anger stemmed 
from this assumption. 
652 The Times, 6 June 1969 
653 Castle (1984) p. 664, entry for 6 June 1969 
654 Quoted in the Observer, 8 June 1969 
655 ibid 
211 
In the aftermath of the negotiations, several commentators remarked that this was 
the point at which Wilson could have surrendered with honour. Anthony Howard 
cited Wilson's failure to grasp the opportunity as the final nail in his political 
credibility, commenting that his admission to having drafted the statement, 'may 
have not done any harm to his reputation for courage: it did little to alter anyone's 
656 mind about his loss of judgement' . Similarly, Peter Jenkins remarked that 
'hopes that a stirring display of trade union determination and responsibility at 
Croydon would give the Prime Minister the opportunity to begin lifting himself 
off the hook were now dashed. The message was clear: Harold Wilson intended 
to press on regardless' 657 . However, neither Jenkins nor Howard had been at 
Chequers and there seems little doubt that Wilson's response to the special 
congress was influenced considerably by the attitudes of Scanlon and Jones. 
What price a TUC resolution when he felt that his right to govern was being 
questioned? 
In the days following Croydon, therefore, Wilson deliberately sought to raise the 
stakes and in doing so removed any last lingering doubts that he was as committed 
to the bill as Castle. But what was his motivation, given that it would have been 
possible to withdraw the bill at this point? At the most straightforward level, the 
basic objections to the TUC proposals, the so-called 'missing link' had not altered 
with the votes at Croydon. The objections spelt out in Castle's letter remained, 
and Wilson could find support among the majority of the press for his concerns. 
For despite positive coverage on the front pages, the majority of editorials raised 
doubts as to the efficacy of the TUC proposals. Only the Guardian, which 
had 
never been a supporter of legislation, called on Wilson to withdraw the 
interim 
bill, saying the time had come for the government to 'take its courage 
in its hands, 
avoid the temptation to take political short cuts and give the 
TUC a chance to 
show what it can do' 
658 
. 
However, The Times was more measured. It noted that 
Wilson had three options; to drop the penal clauses; carry on with the bill as 
it 
656 'To many Labour MPs hardest of all to forgive 
is the grudging, patronising statement that came 
out of the Department of Employment and 
Productivity within an hour of the TUC emergency 
meeting ending', Observer, 22 June 
1969 
657 Jenkins (1970) pp. 13 9-140 
658 Guardian, 6 June 1969 
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stood; or amend the legislation to enable some form of compromise 659 . To drop 
the penal clauses would convince the public that the government had 'sacrificed 
the nation to pressure from a vested interest', whilst to continue would lead to 
renewed infighting. In the circumstances a compromise was most likely, but 
ultimately Wilson was too committed to back down and would have to try and 
push some form of legislation through. The Daily Mirror, always a strong 
supporter of In Place of Strife, doubted the effectiveness of the TUC proposals; if 
Wilson was to accept them in place of legislation the public would need a lot of 
convincing that they would work. Finally, the Financial Times, whilst 
acknowledging that considerable progress had been made in 'a remarkably short 
time by TUC standards )660 . 
highlighted the need for assurances that the TUC 
would use their new powers to maximum effect and to this end argued for the 
tightening of rule II along the lines previously called for by Wilson and Castle. 
In many respects the press confirmed Wilson in his determination to continue for, 
as The Times noted, why should the government have changed their objections, 
661 'just because there was a big vote yesterday' 
However, there was also a more fundamental rationale at work that had its origins 
in the Chequers confrontation with Scanlon and Jones. Peter Jenkins was aware 
of the confrontation when writing The Battle of Downing Street. According to 
Jenkins, Feather had made a 'major miscalculation' in bringing Scanlon, Jones 
and Wilson together, because instead of persuading Wilson to drop the penal 
clauses their intransigence led him conclude that the TUC proposals were not 
worth the paper they were written on, unless 'Scanlon and Jones could be pinned 
down' 662 . Jenkins 
did not have access to the official papers, but the release of 
Wilson's account confirms his view. As we have seen, according to Wilson, 
Scanlon barely stopped short of threatening to bring down the government. There 
is little doubt that, following Chequers, Wilson was convinced that the dispute 
went beyond industrial relations and turned on the fundamental right to govern. In 
the circumstances he saw little alternative but to carry on regardless. 
659 The Times, 6 June 1969 
660 Financial Times, 6 June 1969 
661 The Times, 6 June 1969 
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5.12 Summary 
Post Croydon, the TUC was in a very strong position. Its 'Programme for Action' 
was generally accepted as representing a significant step forward in trade union 
governance, as well as a victory for the pressure exerted by Castle and Wilson. 
Whilst many doubted the ultimate effectiveness of the proposals, Wilson and 
Castle could hardly promise that their legislation would offer a greater chance of 
success. Similarly, whilst the AEF had threatened to expose the fragility of the 
general council's position, its decision to rally to the cause ensured the 
overwhelming mandate that made Croydon difficult to ignore. However, the 
refusal to countenance any forin of legislation, including reserve powers or 'cold 
storage', was a worrying sign of the intransigence that had been demonstrated in 
such a spectacular fashion at Chequers. From this perspective, Feather was surely 
right to react to Castle's letter as he did, for anything that provoked outright 
opposition with little by way of alternative proposals could still leave the unions 
in weak position. 
For Wilson, alongside his genuine doubts as to the effectiveness of the TUC's 
proposals, it was this growing awareness of intransigence and the threat that it 
posed not just to the legislation but also to wider notions of a 'right to govern' that 
began to dominate, and it was here that his influence began to increase. As we 
have seen, the trade unionists, at least initially, were convinced that Wilson was 
the dove to Castle's hawk but, particularly after Chequers, they were left in little 
doubt that this was not the case. Whilst still vulnerable to Feather at their one to 
one meetings, his reaction to Croydon demonstrated his view that the issue had 
gone beyond the acceptability of a pragmatic compromise. As Peter Jenkins 
noted, writing in the Guardian after Wilson's Barnsley speech, 'No one should 
again accuse the Prime Minister of lacking the courage of conviction', and 
furthermore, 'it is important to understand the extent to which reform of industrial 
relations is a matter of principle and personal conviction with the Prime 
Minister'663 . 
If this were the case, observers were left wondering where Wilson 
could go next. He had used almost every trick in the book to get this far, the only 
weapons left being his personal position and the continuance of the government, 
663 Guardian, 9 June 1969 
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and he had already indicated to Castle that he was prepared to use the fornier if 
necessary. 
As for Castle, she had continued to focus on attempts to provide rational solutions 
to the problem of fines and the penal clauses but inevitably took more of a back 
seat as Wilson's involvement increased. Nevertheless, her decision to continue 
with her holiday after Chequers was tactically naYve. Whilst her frustration at the 
behaviour of Scanlon and Jones was justified, and her decision to send the letter to 
Feather no doubt appeared tactically astute, her absence, coupled with slack 
drafting, allowed Feather to run rings round both her and Wilson, with the result 
that, once again, she was perceived to lack the sensitivity to nuances of trade 
union behaviour expected of one in her position. 
However, running alongside the detailed negotiations were constant reminders of 
the weakness of the Wilson/Castle position. The majority of the press now 
considered the legislation dead in the water, a sizeable minority of the PLP was 
prepared to vote against any legislation, the management committee was too 
mindful of PLP views to offer support with any great conviction, and the Cabinet 
was yet to be tested on moves to disregard the TUC proposals, let alone endorse 
the tearing up of the 1906 Trade Disputes Act. Wilson's options were running 
out. He could continue to seek a meaningful compromise or put his own position, 
and that of Castle, on the line and make the legislation an issue of personal 
confidence. The following two weeks would see both positions tested to the 
utmost before a solution eventually emerged. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE FINAL STAGE: JUNE 6- JUNE 19 1969 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the final stage of negotiations. It opens with the first post- 
Croydon management committee on Sunday, 8 June and finishes with the signing 
of the 'solemn and binding' agreement on Wednesday, IS June. The resulting ten 
days were marked by a series of intense negotiations, initially between Wilson, 
Castle and the general council, and then between Wilson, Castle and a smaller 
negotiating committee drawn from the general council. Events fall into four 
distinct phases; the immediate post-Croydon phase during which Wilson and 
Castle assessed reaction to the special congress and fleshed out their negotiating 
strategy; the detailed negotiations, during which they pressed for an amendment to 
rule 11, and which culminated in the amendment being rejected by the general 
council; a period of stalemate, during which Castle and Wilson sought alternative 
solutions, including the proposal to restrict immunities offered under the Trade 
Disputes Act, 1906; and the final resolution, that opened with the Cabinet revolt 
of 17 June and ended with agreement being reached on the following day. Such 
was the frequency of meetings during this period that a detailed chronology is 
included as appendix 4. 
Taking the temperature 
6.2 Management Committee -8 June 
Judging by the newspaper headlines, Wilson's attempts to burst the post-Croydon 
bubble were effective. The Observer headlined, 'It's not good enough, Wilson 
warns TUC 5664 the Sunday Times, 'Wilson: We'll not abdicate on Castle bill ý 
665; 
and the Guardian, 'Mr Wilson rejects TUC alternatives' 
666 
. 
However, for every 
action there was an equal and opposite reaction, and there were similar levels of 
coverage for the remarks by the Labour Party general secretary, Harry Nicholas, 
who indicated that there had been no relaxation in the opposition of the party's 
national executive committee to the interim bill. Nicholas was quoted as saying, 
that 'I agree wholeheartedly, after 32 years as a trade union official, that you 
664 Observer, 8 June 1969 
665 Sunday Times, 8 June 1969 
666 Guardian, 9 June 1969 
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667 won't overcome this by legislation. You have to find the causes'. Whilst 
Feather reiterated the TUC refusal to tighten further the 'Programme for 
,, 668 Action', 
, and the uncompromising Scanlon for whom, "the TUC has gone as 
far as it can or as It Will go,, 
669 
. 
Of perhaps greater concern to Wilson, however, than all of these predictable 
responses, were two reports in the Guardian. The first, by Francis Boyd, 
highlighted the emergence of a new mood among backbenchers previously 
inclined to support the government. According to the report, the size of the 
Croydon majorities, 'somewhat cowed 670 the government's backbench 
supporters, who were worried that the level of endorsement for the TUC proposals 
made them very difficult to ignore. This report was then followed with another by 
Ian Aitken on Monday, 9 June entitled, 'Uneasy men in the Cabinet 671 1 
suggesting that Wilson was to face demands for a settlement from a growing 
group of ministers concerned at the uncompromising tone struck in his response to 
the special congress, and his subsequent speech in Barnsley. The report listed the 
usual malcontents, Callaghan, Mason, Hart and Marsh, but then added Crossman, 
Greenwood and Hughes who were said to be in two minds on the issue. The 
report concluded that whilst this group was not powerful enough to defeat the 
triumvirate of Wilson, Castle and Jenkins, it could, 'precipitate an argument' that 
would be very damaging to Wilson at such a key stage in the negotiations. 
It was against this backdrop that the management committee met to review the 
situation post-Croydon and determine the way forward with both the general 
council and the Cabinet at the meetings scheduled for the following day. 
According to Castle, it was also the point at which the committee members 
revealed themselves to be rattled both by the special congress and Wilson's 
reaction. Castle recorded Healey's admiration for Feather's brilliant 
manoeuvring, and Jenkins' concern that public opinion had been, 'favourably 
667 Guardian, 7 June 1969 
668 Daily Telegraph, 9 June 1969. In a BBC interview, Feather said, 'He wants "must" instead of 
"may"... But we are not prepared to make a commitment which we know at some point or other we 
may not be able to fulfil. ' 
669Guardian, 9 June 1969. 
670 Guardian, 7 June 1969 
671 Guardian, 9 June 1969 
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impressed' by the TUC's efforts 672 . This led her to 'lose patience' and remind 
them that, 'the history of the Government in the past few months has been one of 
capitulation'. Eventually Wilson, 'rallied' them and it was agreed that the line 
should be to 'give the TUC a try and take penal powers only on a suspended 
appointed day' 673 . In the event that the general council refused to negotiate on 
this basis further discussion would be needed on the way forward. 
Castle's account conveys the underlying uneasiness of the management committee 
and emphasises how little support they were able to provide to Castle and Wilson 
as the negotiations continued. However, in confining her comments to the 
decision to, 'give the TUC a go', she does little to convey the detailed position 
that was emerging. The minutes recorded the key facts that had emerged during 
the Whitsun recess. The committee was inforined that the TUC remained opposed 
to any legislation, would withdraw its own proposals if the government went 
ahead, and would adopt this course even if the penal clauses were put into 'cold 
storage'. Furthermore, whilst the Chequers meeting was not mentioned, the 
minutes recorded what were presumably Wilson's comments reflecting the 
response of Scanlon and Jones at Chequers, that the more intransigent unions were 
likely to, 'deliberately', try and frustrate the introduction of the penal clauses 
through strike action or by arranging for unions to pay any fines imposed on 
individual strikers. Against this, it was reported that there were, 'some private 
indications' that the, 'TUC themselves, who were naturally concerned to 
consolidate their position in relation to individual unions and were adverse from 
appearing to be subject to their dictation", were prepared to continue negotiations 
in the hope that, should the penal clauses be introduced, 'some acceptable 
alternative could be devised before it became effective'. 
The minutes also confirmed Castle's account of the emerging concern over the 
likely attitude of the Cabinet, noting that some ministers were, 'questioning afresh 
the wisdom of pursuing to its logical conclusion the course to which the 
672 Castle (1984) pp. 665-6, entry for 8 June 1969 
673 ibid. 
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Government were still publicly committed 674 . However, the minutes stressed that 
the Cabinet needed to be reminded that, 'no Government could afford to accept 
dictation by one section of the community in pursuit if its own interests', a clear 
echo once again of Wilson's reaction to Jones and Scanlon at Chequers, 
concluding that the negotiating strategy should, 'concentrate on seeking to devise 
some means of maintaining a fin-n posture in public while continuing confidential 
negotiations with the trade unions in the hope of finding some alternative 
solution' 675 ,a tactical stance that only served to magnify the later humiliation. 
Moreover, Wilson and Castle suggested that the 'alternative solution' should 
involve the introduction of model rules along the lines that they had discussed in 
the immediate aftermath of the Chequers debacle 676 . As we have seen, Wilson 
677 had become very attracted to this idea, both in itself and as a negotiating tactic 
According to Castle, Wilson told her that he had raised the idea with Feather at a 
private meeting on 6 June and Feather had become, 'almost lyrical', saying that 
'this could be a historic week which brought a settlement ý678 . 
Castle does not 
make it clear whether Feather was responding to the prospect of introducing 
model rules, but recorded her own scepticism, 'Frankly I can't see it if Vic really 
knows what is involved in de-registration ý 679 . 
In line with Wilson and Castle's post-Chequers discussions, it was proposed that 
unions be required to adopt model rules directed specifically at the disciplining of 
members engaged in unconstitutional action. This would be coupled with an 
amendment to the 1906 Trades Disputes Act to confine legal protection under the 
Act to registered trade unions, with the adoption of the model rules as a condition 
of registration. The aim of the model rules solution, and the minutes refer to it 
674 PROý CAB 134/3118, Management Committee, Minutes of a meeting held on Sunday, 8 th June 
1969 
675 ibid. 
676 Castle records that Conrad Heron was tasked with preparing a briefing paper for Sunday's 
management committee (see Castle (1984) p. 663, entry for 2 June 1969). An undated draft of the 
paper, heavily annotated by Castle, exists in the DEP files (NA, PRO, LAB43/534, 
Secret, 
Industrial Relations Bill: Possible Courses of Action) but it does not appear in the official records 
of the management committee and as such it is assumed that the committee's 
discussion was based 
on Castle's verbal commentary rather than a written paper. Given that no mention of the proposals 
was made in the press during this period, it is reasonable to assume that a 
decision was made to 
avoid paper briefings for fear of just such a 
leak. 
677 See, chapter five, pp. 37-38 
678 Castle (1984) pp. 664-665, entry for 7 June 1969 
679 ibid. 
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explicitly as a 'tactic', was to offer legislation along these lines as an alternative to 
the 'cold storage 1) proposal. Tactically, this proposal was seen to be attractive for 
a number of reasons; 
If the TUC rejected this approach, they would be seen to have refused to 
co-operate with the Government not merely in the implementation of the 
Government's own proposals in the White Paper "In Place of Strife" but 
also in the voluntary strengthening of their own proposals (in their 
document "Programme for Action") which the Government considered 
to be essential if that document was to be effective and in the statutory 
enforcement of model rules which would be designed to have the same 
result. 680 
Furthermore, it was suggested that many in the TUC would find model rules, 
ceven more repugnant' than the existing penal clauses and as such might bring 
creluctant acquiescence' to the bill as it stood. As a negotiating ploy it had 
something to recommend it, but even the official record noted that the model rules 
proposal was at odds with all of the government's previous comments on the 
Donovan report. It seems incredible that the committee was contemplating it 
seriously. Castle had, on numerous occasions, upheld the sanctity of the 1906 Act 
and, judging from her diary, remained doubtful of Feather's real intentions. Yet 
Wilson obviously gave weight to Feather's reaction and was prepared to follow it 
through. The committee agreed to update the full Cabinet on progress and ask it 
to consider the 'desirability of adopting the tactic of pursuing negotiations with 
the TUC (in which the concept of model rules might play an important part) while 
interim legislation, based on penal clauses with a deferred operation, was 
introduced ý 681 
. 
However, in a return to the theme that dominated Wilson's post- 
Chequers thinking, it was also noted that, should the TUC refuse to contemplate 
further negotiations if the 'cold storage' option went ahead, the Cabinet would 
need to consider, 'whether they could accept a position in which they would in 
effect be required to abdicate in favour of the TUC It is a measure of how 
serious the situation had become that this was being discussed openly in private 
meetings, and not just being used as a rhetorical device to scare the party into line. 
680NA, PRO, CAB134/3118, Management Committee, Minutes of a meeting held on Sunday, 8 th 
June, 1969. 
681 ibid. 
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It was clear that the overwhelming endorsement of the special congress had 
strengthened significantly the hand of the trade unions. Press reports, coupled 
with the reaction of the management committee indicated the fragility of the 
Wilson position. Post-Croydon, his tactics revolved around keeping the general 
council at the negotiating table and in this he was heavily reliant on Feather who, 
as the management committee minutes indicate, was as keen to keep the 
negotiations going as Wilson. If, as was likely, the general council refused to 
strengthen its own proposals, it is clear that Wilson was prepared to carry on with 
the interim bill despite the TUC threat to withdraw its own proposals. Whether 
the Cabinet would back him remained to be seen. Prior to the Cabinet meeting, 
however, Wilson and Castle were scheduled to meet the general council. The 
management committee agreed that the meeting should be confined to seeking an 
agreement for continuing negotiations, the scope and nature of which were to 
remain undefined, giving the government, 'the maximum of flexibility and room 
for manoeuvre, 682. The outcome could then be reported to the Cabinet meeting in 
the afternoon. 
6.3 General Council, 9 June 
The meeting with the general council was, as Castle termed it, 'shadow 
boxing' 683 The general council minutes indicate that, at their preliminary 
meeting, the members agreed that the main purpose of the meeting was to infonn 
ministers of the result of the special congress. In the event that Wilson should put 
forward a new set of proposals it was agreed that they should, 'reserve their 
position until they had a chance of discussing them between themselves' 
684 
. As it 
was, both sides stuck to their pre-determined positions; Feather stressing that their 
proposals, whilst not claiming to solve all industrial relations problems, 'had the 
best chance of succeeding 685 . and that the general council would withdraw 
its 
proposals if the government continued with the legislation; whilst Wilson returned 
to the lack of rigour in paragraph 42 and rule 11 , 'the key question 
in his view was 
682 ibid. 
683 See Castle (1984) pp. 666-667, entry for 9 June 1969 
684 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting 
between the Prime Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Monday June 9,1969 
685 ibid. 
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whether paragraph 42 could be strengthened, and in what way ý686 . Wilson also 
reiterated that the government would be prepared to drop the penal clauses if 
paragraph 42 could be amended, 'to make it as effective as the Government 
thought necessary', stressing that, 'that had been the basis of discussions all 
along -)687 . He also gave a very broad hint at the strategy agreed by the 
management committee when he speculated on the means by which paragraph 42 
could be strengthened, 'It could be worth looking again at the Donovan Report to 
see if there was anything in that which would help ý688 . He also indicated that if 
they could come to an agreed position, 'then penal clauses might be provided in 
legislation but never be applied. 
However , if Feather picked up the hint he did not respond to it. The meeting 
closed with Wilson confinning that the Cabinet would not reach a final agreement 
on the contents of the bill at the afternoon's meeting and were likely to re-convene 
on Thursday to come to a conclusion. It was agreed that that they should hold two 
further meetings, one on Wednesday 11 June after the first Cabinet and the second 
on either the evening of Thursday 12 June or morning of Friday 13 June, after the 
second Cabinet meeting. The general council minutes indicate that they then held 
their own discussion, at which they confirmed the central planks of their own 
negotiating position; that if the government introduced penal sanctions, even in 
the form of reserve powers, they would withdraw 'Programme for Action'; that 
they were prepared to consider any further proposals arising from the Cabinet 
discussions, although any proposals involving penal sanctions remained 
rcompletely unacceptable'; and that the only way to amend 'Programme for 
Action' would be through the calling of another special congress. 
6.4 Management Committee, 9 June 
Prior to the full Cabinet, Wilson and Castle met with the management committee 
to update them on the discussion held with the general council. Castle recorded 
that the atmosphere was, 'much steadier' than at Sunday's meeting, with Mellish, 
686 ibid. 
687 ibid. 
688 ibid. it was Donovan that had raised the possibility of removing protection under the 1906 Act 
from those involved in unofficial strikes. 
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in particular, praising her and Wilson for keeping the negotiations open 689 . Once 
again, according to the official minutes, Wilson reported on a private meeting with 
Feather he had held immediately after the general council meeting, to discuss the 
'model rules' option, to which, once again, Feather had reacted, 'not 
unfavourably'. The central uncertainty, however remained: would the more 
'intransigent unions' be prepared to consider any alternatives if the government 
remained detennined to introduce a bill incorporating the penal clauses? This in 
turn led to the conclusion that it was more important to 'bring the negotiations 
with the TUC to as advanced a stage as possible' before the bill was introduced, 
even if this meant that the bill was delayed for a further week or two. The crucial 
consideration was the impact on the PLP, if they could be reassured that the 
negotiations were making progress and that the penal clauses would be revoked in 
favour of an alternative arrangement agreed with the TUC then, the committee 
concluded, 'it should be possible to maintain control 5690 . The weakness of the 
verb 'should', however, suggests that they were not too confident of success. 
Once again, Wilson was placing considerable weight on the discussions with 
Feather when there is no evidence from the general council minutes to suggest 
that Feather had even discussed the possibility of model rules with his colleagues. 
Similarly, the view that the PLP could be managed if they could only see the 
prospect of an agreed alternative was shot out of the water by a statement released 
by the self-styled 'action committee'. It will be recalled that the committee had 
produced previously a list of 61 MPs prepared to vote against the penal clauses. 
Following the special congress, it released a statement noting with 'deep regret' 
the government's failure to respond positively to the decisions of the congress. In 
the event that the governi-nent failed to support the TUC proposals, the committee 
announced its intention to conduct a survey of all Labour MPs on the question of 
support for the penal clauses in the light of growing anger over the government's 
failure 'to meet the TUC statement halfway', and to follow this with a 'report 
689 Castle (1984) pp. 666-7, entry for 9 June 1969 
690 NA, PRO, CAB 134/3118, 'Management Committee', Minutes of a meeting held on Monday, 
96 June 1969 
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back' meeting of all those participating in the survey to 'determine tactics for the 
long haul and debate into August )691 
6.5 Cabinet, 9 June 
Wilson, and his opponents, would have been fully aware of these threats as they 
entered the Cabinet and Wilson very sensibly avoided asking the Cabinet to make 
a decision on the future of the legislation. Rather, he confined himself to an 
outline of the morning's discussion with the general council and made it clear that 
there remained considerable differences over the TUC proposals for unofficial 
strikes. The crucial question, he told the Cabinet, was whether the TUC was 
prepared to strengthen its procedures for dealing with unofficial strikes as set out 
in paragraph 42 of 'Programme for Action'. Alluding to the 'model rules' 
proposal, he suggested that it might be possible to, 'provide statutory backing' to 
the TUC proposals, and repeated his post-Mayday mantra that, 'If they could 
reach agreement with the TUC on acceptable alternatives, then the "penal clauses" 
could be dropped -)692 . 
He also outlined his negotiating strategy, 'further intense 
consultations to see whether by strengthening their proposals or in some other way 
the TUC could satisfy the Government that they would be able to deal effectively 
with the problem of unconstitutional stoppages, 693 , and 
his willingness to continue 
. )694 discussions, 'up to and beyond the introduction of the interim Bill 
In the absence of any need to make a decision, discussion was limited. Concerns 
were raised about the relative effectiveness of the TUC and government proposals, 
but Castle recorded that it was, 'a not unencouraging Cabinet' 695 . The tone of the 
press reports on the following day vaned. The Daily Telegraph reported that the 
Cabinet was 'shirking' 696 a final decision, and provided an accurate account of 
Wilson's desire to keep the discussions open for as long as possible. The Times 
noted that the, 'most hopeful sign' 697 was that neither side had broken off talks. 
691 Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1969 
692 NA, PRO, CAB 128/44, CC(69)26thConclusions, Meeting of the Cabinet held on Monday, 9 
June, 1969 
693 ibid. 
694 
ibid. 695 Castle (1984) pp. 666-7, entry for 9 June, 1969 
696 Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1969 
697 The Times, 10 June 1969 
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However, in a leader article, it raised concerns over the, 'disproportion between 
5698 the practical usefulness of the measure and its political consequences 
concluding that Wilson and Castle had invested their proposals which such 
significance, that they could not back down and had no choice, 'in public 
reputation' but to 'proceed or quit' 699 . The Guardian, clearly reflecting a briefing 
from Cabinet opponents of the bill, reported that several members of the Cabinet 
had, 'spoken out strongly 5700 for the withdrawal of the government's proposals in 
favour of the TUC's, and that there was an increased readiness to seek a 
compromise. Significantly, the paper reported that the 'outstanding' factor in this 
mood shift was a belief that Roy Jenkins was beginning to entertain doubts as to 
the future of the bil1701 . As the report concluded, if Jenkins were to join the 
opposition, 'it is difficult to see how Mrs Castle could continue to hold the 
Government on what appears to be its present collision course with the trade 
ý 702 unions 
Wilson's success in this initial period was to keep the negotiations open, and in 
this he was aided by Feather's desire to avoid outright confrontation. However, as 
the negotiations narrowed down to the specifics of paragraph 42 and rule II there 
was a considerable danger that few outside the negotiations would grasp the 
significance of its wording, a fact already evidenced by the statement of the 
caction committee' and opponents within the Cabinet that they saw little in the 
government's proposals to better those of the TUC. When this was coupled with 
the unwillingness of the general council to countenance further amendments and 
the sense that supporters of such importance as Roy Jenkins were beginning to 
express doubts, it was difficult to see how Wilson was going to avoid an outright 
confrontation. However, he did have the Cabinet's backing for continued 
discussions, and he had yet to bring the model rules into play. It was here perhaps 
that his last hope lay. 
698 ibid. 
699 ibid. 
700 Guardian, 10 June 1969 
701 'There were hints yesterday, and at the weekend, that Mr Jenkins' was at last becoming 
seriously alarmed about the danger of a confrontation between the Government and the TUC over 
industrial relations', Guardian, 10 June 1969. 
702 Ibid. 
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Intense Negotiations 
6.6 General Council, 11 June 
We are fortunate in that both the government and the TUC kept a record of the 
final sequence of meetingS703 . As appendix 4 indicates, the negotiations from 
June II onwards were conducted initially by the general council and then by 
smaller sub-committee that reported back to the full general council at regular 
intervalS704. 
The initial meeting involved the full general council, and Wilson wasted no time 
in setting out the three alternative lines of approach; the strengthening of 
paragraph 42 and with it rule 11; the dropping of the penal clauses to be replaced 
by other forms of legislation; and, legislating for the penal clauses but with an 
effective date some time into the future to give the TUC proposals time to work, 
the so-called, 'cold-storage' option. In his talk of strengthening paragraph 42 and 
rule 11, Wilson did not explicitly refer to the model rules, but rather to following, 
6some alternative suggestions made by the Royal Commission'705 . It was a 
measure of Wilson's enthusiasm for the model rules proposal that the original 
transcript of Castle's diary for II June records her warning him 'desperately' not 
to make any mention of revising the Trade Disputes Act 1906 on the grounds that 
it would inevitably leak 706 . Similarly, on the following day, the transcript records 
that she was still 'trying to warn him off spelling out his alternative proposals for 
703 In the case of the TUC, this included the general council pre-meetings and the discussions that 
took place during adjournments, and as such these provide an invaluable account, both of the 
meetings and of the general council's tactics. Furthermore, the TUC records tend to be less 
guarded than the government records and are more inclined to include the overtly political 
discussions. Unfortunately, the government records are confined to the meetings themselves, and 
consequently, we are reliant on Castle's diaries for accounts of her adjournment discussions with 
Wilson and officials. However, the government records do have the advantage of identifying 
individual speakers. Therefore, the accounts that follow are taken largely from the TUC records, 
with identification of speakers taken from the government records, with support from Castle's 
account where necessary. 
704 Feather and Wilson had discussed the practicality of the general council delegating the detailed 
negotiations to a sub-committee at a number of their private meetings, and the general council 
agreed to set up a six-man committee consisting of Sir Frederick Hayday (chairman), Alfred Allen, 
Sidney Greene, Jack Jones, Hugh Scanlon and Vic Feather to undertake the detailed negotiations. 
705 MRC, MSS 29213/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting between the Prime Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Wednesday June 11,1969 
706 BCC, entry for II June 1969 
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removing the immunity of the 1906 Act', but that 'he was detern-fined to keep it in 
play' 707 
After some points of clarification the meeting adjourned to allow the general 
council to discuss Wilson's proposals and agree on the membership of the sub- 
committee. Their discussion shows that the general council had picked up the 
significance of Wilson's reference to 'other forms of legislation' and views were 
expressed that this represented, 'an implied and unidentified threat'. Whilst no 
mention had been made of what the other legislation involved, it was enough for 
the general council to agree they should continue the discussions but, 'provided it 
was made clear' that these would be confined to the first of Wilson's options, the 
strengthening of rule 11. At this point the sub-committee was convened to discuss 
a way forward. Wilson had played his hand wonderfully, by holding back on the 
detail of the 'model rules' option he had avoided the inevitable outrage, but he had 
done enough to focus attention on the need to clarify rule 11. Castle recorded the 
admiration of her officials, "'He's like an eel", said Frank Lawton approvingly. 
"He's handling Vic marvellously", added Denis Barnes. 3708 
Consequently the sub-committee agreed to draft a note of clarification on the 
procedure that would operate under rule I l(c) that could be included in a circular 
to all unions explaining how the general council intended to implement their new 
powers 
709 
. The 
draft read as follows; 
Having ascertained all the facts relating to the difference, the General 
Council shall tender to the organisation or organisations concerned their 
considered opinion and advice, which may take the form of an award or 
recommendation: in cases where they find that the negotiations should 
proceed on the basis of a return to work, they will place an obligation on 
the organisation or organisations to take immediate and energetic steps 
to obtain a resumption of work 710 
Whilst not an amendment to the rule, this did represent a significant tightening of 
its intended usage. The final phrase, 'they place an obligation on the organisation 
707 ibid., entry for 12 June 1969 
708 Castle (1984) pp. 668-9, entry for 11 June 1969 
709 Rule I I, clause (c) as endorsed by TUC special congress is included as appendix 5 
710 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting between the Prime Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Wednesday June 11,1969 
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or organisations to take immediate and energetic steps to obtain a resumption of 
work', was identical to that used in the revised rule 12 that dealt with inter-union 
disputes and which had been accepted by both Castle and Wilson 71 1. Furthermore, 
Castle and Wilson referred throughout to the general council placing unions under 
an, 'obligation' to obtain a return to work. However, there was no mention of the 
use, or amendment, of the rule book, so it remained unclear what action a union 
would take to get strikers back to work. 
During the adjournment, Castle had also been at work, this time on a revised 
version of rule 11, which proposed the addition of two new clauses; 
d) Where a dispute has led to an unconstitutional stoppage of work 
which involves directly or indirectly large bodies of workers or which if 
protracted may have serious consequences, the General Council shall 
ascertain all the relevant facts and shall tender to the organization or 
organizations concerned their considered opinion and advice, which may 
take the form of an award or recommendation; in cases where, having 
regard to the principles set out in Paragraphs 20 to 27 of 'Programme for 
Action'. they find that the workers are constitutionally in the wrong, they 
will place an obligation on the organization or organizations concerned 
to take immediate and energetic steps to obtain a resumption of work, so 
that negotiations can proceed. 
e) Should the organization or organizations concerned refuse the 
assistance or advice of the Council under Clause (c) above, or not 
comply with an obligation under Clause (d), the General Council shall 
duly report to Congress or deal with the organization under Clauses (b), 
(c), (d) and (h) of Rule 13 712 
There were three significant differences between the drafts; Castle proposed an 
addition to the rules, whereas the sub-committee text was intended as a 
clarification of the existing rule; Castle's clause (d) made explicit the general 
council's involvement in unconstitutional disputes, whereas the sub-committee 
text did not; and finally, Castle's clause appeared to include the universal 
requirement of a return to work in all cases where workers were found to be acting 
unconstitutionally, regardless of the merits of the dispute, whilst the sub- 
committee guidance referred to a selective return to work based on the findings of 
the general council in individual cases. 
71 1 Relevant clauses of rule 12 attached as appendix 5 
712 See Castle (1984) p. 669 footnote 
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In the reconvened meeting, the sub-committee was concerned immediately that 
Castle's amendment was, 'only concerned to secure a return to work when a 
dispute arose, irrespective of its merits' 713 , and reiterated that rule II, as agreed by 
the special congress, would give the general council all the powers the 
government were asking of them. Similarly, whilst Wilson was prepared to 
concede that the sub-committee's note was, 'another big step forward 1714 , he was 
concerned that there remained a 'substantial' difference between the two sides: 
Castle was emphasising the need for legislation to deal with unconstitutional 
stoppages whilst the general council did not seem to be prepared even to condemn 
unconstitutional stoppages. 
It was at this point, according to Castle, and much to her annoyance, that Wilson 
suggested amending the sub-committee draft, a point confinned by the minutes 715 . 
For the first time he referred to the draft as a binding, 'statement of intent' and 
asked why they referred to 'difference' when they meant, 'dispute', and failed to 
mention paragraphs 20-27 of 'Programme for Action', when these contained the 
general council's definition of an unconstitutional dispute and the circumstances 
in which they would expect a return to work. He then proposed the following 
amendment; 
In cases where, having regard to the principles contained in paragraphs 
20-27 of 'Programme for Action', they find that there has been an 
unconstitutional stoppage and therefore that negotiations should proceed 
on the basis of a return to work, they will place an obligation on the 
organisation or organisations concerned to take immediate and energetic 
steps to obtain a resumption of work 716 
At this, Castle's frustration boiled over and she passed Wilson a note, 'I think it is 
impossible to settle on any other basis than an amendment to rule 119717. 
713 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting between the Prime 
Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Wednesday June 11 
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715 Castle (1984) pp. 668-69, entry for II June 1969, 'Then to my horror Harold suggested that we 
should look at their paragraph first' 
716 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting 
between the prime Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Wednesday June 11 
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Eventually, getting the message, Wilson adjourned the meeting to give the sub- 
conimittee an opportunity to consider their position. 
Meeting in private, the sub-committee agreed to replace 'difference' with 
'dispute' and include reference to the relevant paragraphs of 'Programme for 
Action'. However, in their view, including reference to the 'Programme for 
Action' made it unnecessary to refer to unconstitutional disputes as they were 
covered implicitly in the statement. Consequently, the draft note now read; 
Having ascertained all the facts relating to the dispute, the General 
Council shall tender to the organisation or organisations concerned their 
considered opinion and advice, which may take the fonn of an award or 
recommendation: having regard to the principles set out in paragraphs 
20-27 of 'Programme for Action', in cases where they find that the 
negotiations should proceed on the basis of a return to work, they will 
place an obligation on the organisation or organisations to take 
immediate and energetic steps to obtain a resumption of work 718 
(amendments in italics) 
However, the sub-committee was unanimous in its rejection of the re-drafted rule 
11 and made this clear to Wilson and Castle when the meeting re-convened. In 
response Wilson agreed that their revised draft was stronger than the original, but 
weaker than he had suggested. The meeting then closed with an agreement that 
Wilson would send a draft to the TUC on the following morning setting out the 
form the government would expect rule 11 to take if the government was to agree 
to drop the penal clauses from the legislation, and that Wilson and Castle would 
meet the general council on the following evening to hear their response. 
How significant was the distance between the government and the general council 
at this point? On the face of it the difference came down to an unwillingness to 
insert an explicit reference to 'unconstitutional strikes', and much of the post- 
settlement commentary focused on how minimal the differences were. However, 
it is clear from the reaction of both sides that it reflected more than a difference 
over a form of words. The general council was not prepared to insert what it 
considered to be a blanket condemnation of unconstitutional strikes because, as set 
out on a number of occasions, including paragraphs 20 to 27 of 'Programme 
for 
718 ibid 
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Action5 there were a range of circumstances in which unconstitutional action was 
the only available action, most notably in industries or factories that lacked 
appropriate disputes procedures. Similarly they were not prepared to adopt a 'one 
size fits all' approach to industrial disputes, something they consistently accused 
the government of trying to do, but crucially it remained unclear how individual 
unions were to coerce strikers back to work without an explicit reference to action 
under their own rules. 
By contrast Wilson and Castle had identified the political and economic damage 
inflicted by unconstitutional or unofficial disputes as the central issue to be 
resolved through legislation. The 'conciliation pause' had been drafted in such a 
way as to ensure a return to work in cases of unconstitutional or unofficial action, 
with the status quo ante being employed to ensure that whatever had triggered the 
dispute was nullified for the duration of the pause. Therefore, if the penal clauses 
were to be dropped, it seemed reasonable to expect the TUC to be explicit about 
the measures proposed to ensure a return to work in the case of an unconstitutional 
strike, and for a clear distinction to be made between constitutional strikes and 
those in breach of procedures. As Castle, in deep frustration, told the sub- 
committee, 'If the TUC did not like the penal clauses they should say how they 
intended to get people back to work, because Rule 11 in its present form was 
permissive' 719 . In the circumstances it remained difficult to see how the two sides 
could be reconciled. 
6.7 Management Committee and Cabinet, 12 June 
Despite the rigours of the previous day, and newspaper headlines suggesting 
deadlock 720 
. 
Castle's diary was surprisingly upbeat, 'Management Committee was 
easy; everyone was so confident that, having promised to drop the penal clauses if 
we got a change of Rule 11, a settlement must be in sight )721 . 
Similarly, she 
records, 'Cabinet was easy-going, too' 722 , with even Callaghan seeming positive. 
Once again, however, the Cabinet was not asked to make a decision, rather Wilson 
719 ibid. 
720 Daily Telegraph, 'Deadlock in TUC Talks at No 10', Guardian, 'Midnight talks falter on penal 
clauses', The Times, 'Formula sought in deadlock over penal clauses' 721 Castle (1984) pp. 669-670, entry for 12 June 1969 
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had agreed with the management committee that all that was required of the 
Cabinet at this stage was its authority to offer to abandon the legislation on penal 
clauses if the general council accepted the proposed changes to rule 11. He 
acknowledged that, if the general council rejected the revised rule, it would be 
necessary for the Cabinet to meet again to consider its policy but, 'there was no 
need for the Cabinet to concern itself with this hypothetical possibility at this 
723 present stage' Consequently, the Cabinet was not asked to address the 
possibility of a general council refusal. Wilson suggested in the vaguest of 
language that it would 'presumably' entail the introduction of a bill incorporating 
the penal clauses, 'but in such a way that they could not be invoked for a stated 
period after Royal Assent' 724 , or the alternative legislation that did not involve the 
imposition of fines, a veiled reference to the model rules proposal, but he was 
careful to avoid a detailed discussion. The general council, however, was in no 
mood to accept the amendment. 
6.8 General Council, 12 June 
As on previous occasions, the general council met in advance of the negotiations 
to discuss their approach and the minutes record an unequivocal rejection of the 
revised rule 11. The arguments had a familiar ring: 'what the First Secretary 
wanted to do was to transfer in some form the penal clauses from her legislation 
into the TUC Rules'725 , and, referring to the requirement to order a return to work 
in the case of unconstitutional strikes, the government seemed to expect the 
general council to 'become a disciplinary body without any discretion in dealing 
with unconstitutional strikes which had been provoked by the employer 
726. When 
they met Wilson and Castle they were uncompromising, for 'there was no hope of 
727 
proceeding on the basis of the Government's proposed amendment to Rule 11 5 
In reply, Wilson was equally forthright, 'there was no possibility of an 
understanding between the Government and the TUC on the basis of dealing with 
723 NA, PRO, CAB 134/3118, Management Cornnuttee, Minutes of a meeting held on 12t' June, 
1969 
th 724 NA, PRO, CAB 128/44,27h Conclusions, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on 12 
June 1969 
725 MRC' MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
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Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Thursday June 12. 
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such vital problems as unconstitutional strikes without a commitment to a stronger 
change to Rule 115728. In the circumstances, there was little more to say. Wilson 
suggested that each side report back to their colleagues and that they reconvene on 
18 June at which point he would indicate, 'what the Government had in mind 5729 
after a meeting of the Cabinet on 17 June. Castle and Wilson remained upbeat 
although, with ominous significance, Castle recorded that, 'I myself believed that 
Cabinet and the PLP must be prepared to back us now that what everyone 
730 believed was a generous offer had been turned down' The next six days would 
be crucial. 
6.9 Stalemate 
The decision to reconvene on 18 June left six days for intense lobbying by both 
sides and the press coverage focused on two developments, the growing 
opposition to Wilson and Castle from within both the Cabinet and the PLP, and 
the possibility that Wilson was considering proposals to withdraw the penal 
clauses and replace them with the 'model rules' proposal. The Daily Telegraph 
reported that Wilson faced opposition from Callaghan, Marsh, Mason and 
Crosland 731 , and whilst there was 
little new in this, the Sunday Telegraph went 
further and reported that Crossman was, 'now known to question whether the 
struggle with the unions is worthwhile' 732 . Whilst the press went out of 
its way to 
report that sources close to Jenkins had denied the earlier reports that he too was 
wavering, there were clear indications that support was shifting and that it was not 
just Cabinet members who were having doubts. 
Alongside reports of changing allegiances, hints began to emerge over the likely 
form of government legislation. Reporting on the 12 June meeting, both the 
Guardian and The Times alerted readers to the prospect of fines against individual 
strikers being dropped. Whilst The Times was not specific about a replacement, it 
suggested that both Wilson and Castle had 'strong faith' that the removal of 
fines 
gave their legislation a chance, 'even if they can scarcely hope to win enthusiastic 
728 ibid. 
729 ibid. 
730 Castle (1984)fV. P7 I, entry for 12 June 1969 
73 1 Daily Telegrýpr, 14 June 1969 
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support, 733. The Guardian went further and raised the prospect of fines being 
replaced with Donovan's proposal to enable employers to seek damages from 
unofficial strikers 734 . By the weekend, however, the stories were becoming much 
more specific. 
The Observer ran a front-page report that Wilson was suggesting changing the law 
which 'now protects wildcat strikers from court action 5735 . whilst the Sunday 
Telegraph reported that the government was considering two options, removing 
the immunity granted under the 1906 Trades Disputes Act from unofficial strikers, 
and modifying the Contracts of Employment Act and the Redundancy Payments 
Act so that unofficial strikers would forfeit accumulated rights to periods of notice 
and redundancy benefits based on length of service 736 . Similarly, the Sunday 
Times, under the heading, 'I 10 words which split Wilson and Feather', printed the 
full text of the general council's suggested note of clarification, and suggested that 
the government was proposing to partially remove immunity under the 1906 Act, 
to give the TUC a 'cold-turkey cure' to shock it out of opposition to the 
government's own proposalS737. 
Whilst the press speculated, Castle and Wilson were working feverishly on 
alternative proposals, and nothing more clearly indicates the totality of Wilson's 
involvement in the final stages of negotiations, than the extent of his involvement 
in the development of the model rules proposal as it emerged over the weekend of 
14 - 15 June. Wilson's official papers indicate that Castle's private secretary, 
Douglas Smith, sent Wilson's office a draft paper entitled, 'Alternative Forms of 
Sanctions against Unconstitutional Strikers' on Friday, 13 June 738 . The paper was 
intended for discussion at the Cabinet meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 17 June, 
and was placed in Wilson's weekend box with a covering note that indicated the 
sense of urgency, 'The attached arrived late in the evening and has not been 
733 The Times, 13 June 1969 
734 Guardian, 13 June 1969 
735 Observer, 15 June 1969 
736 Sunday Telegraph, 15 June 1969 
737 Sunday Times, 15 June, 1969 
738NA, PRO, PREM13/2758, Note from Douglas Smith to Roger Dawe, 'Alternative Forins of 
Sanctions Against Unconstitutional Strikers', undated but sent to Wilson's office on Friday 13 
June 1969 
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examined by a Private Secretary. You may wish to see over the weekend 
however. ' 739 Castle's diary indicates that Wilson had requested the paper and it 
was indicative that the paper was sent to him at the same time as it went to Castle 
740 and that Wilson read the paper before she did . Once he had read it he 
telephoned Castle on Saturday, 14 June to discuss the finer points and followed 
741 this with a note of suggested amendments . These were incorporated into a 
revised version of the paper that was then sent back to Wilson on the evening of 
Monday, 16 June 742 . 
The paper certainly offered 'cold-turkey'. There were two proposals; use of the 
conciliation pause backed by the withdrawal of protection offered under the 
Trades Disputes Act, 1906; or action by the Registrar backed by the withdrawal of 
the protection of the 1906 Act. The former assumed the use of the conciliation 
pause as previously, but backed by withdrawal from the strike leaders and the 
trade unions concerned of the protection given under the 1906 Act. Under the 
proposals, the secretary of state would order a conciliation pause with a clear 
responsibility on union(s) to use their 'best endeavours' to ensure a return to work 
during the period of pause. However, during the period of the pause protection 
afforded under the 1906 Act would be in abeyance in relation to strike action by 
the employees covered by the order. If the strike continued during the pause it 
would be open to the employer to sue the strike leaders or the union or both for 
damages. A tribunal, which could be the Industrial Board or an ordinary court of 
law would consider the case and be required to satisfy itself that appropriate 
disciplinary steps had been taken or threatened by the union (the absence of 
adequate rules to enable union to discipline members would not be considered a 
defence). Financial penalties against employees, strike leaders or unions could be 
limited to a specified maximum sum or left to the discretion of the tribunal. 
739 ibid. Note from Dawe to Wilson, 13 June 1969 
740 See Castle (1984) p. 672, entry for 16 June 1969, 'When I walked into the office this morning 
my little group of officials were waiting with the paper on the 1906 Act 
for which Harold had 
asked', and NA, PRO, PREM13/2727 Memorandum from Harold Wilson to 
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The main limitation of this approach, according to the paper, was that it relied on 
a decision by the secretary of state as to when and where to order a pause, 
meaning in effect that government was in the position of having to decide whether 
it was prepared to 'license' an employer to take action against a union, especially 
when 'an action which could well lead to crippling damages'. In these situations, 
the minister might be inclined not to order the conciliation pause, 'rather than run 
the risk of financially crippling a trade union'. It concluded that employers were 
as likely as at present not to sue individual strikers and, 'In any event, if an 
employer were awarded the kind of damages awarded to the Taff Vale Company 
in 1902, the pressure to change the law would probably prove irresistible'. 
The second option would also bring pressure on trade unions to amend their rules 
but avoided, 'ministerial intervention of any kind in relation to penalties on trade 
unions or individuals'. Under this option registration with the Registrar of Trade 
Unions would be a necessary prerequisite for a body to be a trade union in law. In 
line with the Donovan recommendations, a union would have to satisfy the 
registrar that it had adequate rules to ensure the proper conduct of its business, 
including 'the existence of rules, or the incorporation of model rules, which 
specifically enable disciplinary action to be taken against those of its members 
who engage in unconstitutional strikes'. Registered trade unions would be then 
under an obligation to use their best endeavours to secure compliance by their 
members with the rules relating to unconstitutional action. In the event that an 
employer felt that this had not taken place, it would be for the employer to take 
the union to court and for the court to determine whether it had used its best 
endeavours and what level of damages should be awarded. Alternatively, to 
avoid employers' action, all registered unions would remain under the supervision 
of the registrar. 
If the registrar was satisfied that the registered union had not used its best 
endeavours to secure compliance with its rules he would be empowered to 
withdraw registration from the union. Non-registration or deregistration might 
then have the legal result of withdrawing protection under the 1906 Act with the 
practical consequence that damages could be awarded against anyone who 
induced an employee to break his contract of employment. 
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As we have noted, Wilson read the paper and telephoned Castle with his 
comments that were subsequently turned into a short note. In the note, Wilson 
dealt with the concerns raised by officials, both over the issue of ministerial 
discretion and the potential size of damages. He rejected the registrar option on 
the grounds that 'I think we were all less excited about a resolution which 
involved action by the registrar particularly if the registrar had to take the 
initiative, rather than leaving this to ministerial discretion. I could suggest 
possible improvements for the second scheme, but I presume it is the first scheme 
in which we are more interested. ' Turning to the first option, he suggested two 
amendments; under the proposals it was suggested that unions would lose 
immunity immediately the pause was ordered. Instead, Wilson proposed that the 
conciliation order would be given a day or two to see if real efforts were being 
made to get the men back to work. As soon as its was concluded that this was not 
being done then 'hike the union before the Industrial Board to show cause why 
immunity under the 1906 Act should not be withdrawn'. If union were unable to 
show that they had used their best endeavours it would be at this point that they 
would be open to action, 'the damages being limited to the harm done in the 
period from the promulgation of the Pause onwards'. The advantage of this 
743 approach, according to Wilson, was that it preserved 'ministerial discretion' 
The revised paper retained the two options, with an amendment to the first to 
reflect Wilson's comments; in the case of a strike continuing during the period of 
the pause, the secretary of state 'might require the union(s) concerned to appear 
before the Industrial Board to give evidence that it (they) had done what it (they) 
could to stop the strike'. In addition a further line was added outlining the 
advantages of this approach, in that it would limit 'the liability of unions to 
actions for damages to certain grave unconstitutional strikes; an employer would 
not be able to sue the union whenever it chose to do so' 
744 
. 
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The revised paper was prepared on Monday, 16 June and sent over the Wilson in 
order that Castle might discuss it with him first thing on the following morning. 
However, Castle was no longer prepared to support Wilson's approach; 
When I walked into the office this morning my little group of officials 
were waiting with the paper on the 1906 Act for which Harold had 
asked, but I brushed this aside. ('This is nonsense', they had written over 
the submission 745. ) We agreed unanimously that I should refuse to be 
associated with the paper if Harold insisted on putting it to Cabinet. 
Instead I told them of my new idea to go ahead with the conciliation 
pause on a different basis. My chaps got quite excited about it. 746 
What was to follow was policy-making on the hoof Over the weekend Castle had 
attended a social event in Lincoln and during a tour of a 'gaily crowded Labour 
club' had been coriftonted by an AEF shop steward who said, 'What you should 
do is to make us discipline unofficial strikers under our own rules'. Castle asked 
what she should do if a union refused to which he replied, 'You should fine the 
union -)99747 - Reflecting on this on the way 
home she realised that the concept of 
making individual unions responsible for the behaviour of their members, 'fitted 
in with the whole of the argument we have been having with the TUC', and it was 
this that she sought to incorporate into a new version of the penal clause. 
Consequently, a second Cabinet paper was drafted. In the event that the general 
council refused to modify rule 11, the Cabinet could proceed with one of two 
options; the 'cold storage' proposal, ensuring that the penal clauses would not be 
activated until at least 6 months after the Bill received Royal Assent; or Castle's 
revised conciliation pause under which a union would have a responsibility to use 
its best endeavours to ensure members returned to work. If the strike continued 
and the secretary of state considered that the union was not serious in its attempts 
to achieve a return to work then, 'she would be empowered to take proceedings 
before the Industrial Board on the grounds that they had not used their "best 
endeavours" to secure a return to work. If the Industrial Board found against the 
union(s), they would be subject to a substantial maximum financial penalty'748 . 
745 Sadly this version has not survived in the official records. 
746 Castle (1984) p. 672, entry for 16 June, 1969 
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Castle's paper was duly sent to Wilson, along with the paper on the 1906 Act and 
a letter in which she rejected the removal of protection under the 1906 Act and 
requested a meeting in the morning before the meeting of the management 
committee at 9.30am. Castle made it clear that she had concluded that the, 
'seeming advantages' of removing protection would be 'greatly outweighed' by 
the disadvantages'. She doubted if the ideas could be presented credibly and they 
would be, 'the worst possible grounds on which to face a break with the T. U. C. ' 
By contrast, she was confident that the revised version of the conciliation pause 
was defendable, 'not only publicly but also within the P. L. P. 9749 
Thus, by the morning of 17 June, both Castle and Wilson were ready with their 
revised plans. Wilson had phoned Castle the previous midnight to ask her to spell 
out the implications of her new proposal, and when they met fifteen minutes 
before the management committee he was 'now ready to drop the 1906 Act 
formula and go nap on [Castle's] new proposal instead'. Indeed, 'he was full of it, 
walking up and down and spelling out its advantages'. Subsequently he told the 
management committee that deadlock had been reached and the time had come to 
consider alternative proposals for legislation. With this he asked Castle to 'outline 
750 
my new sc eme . 
Wilson's determination to achieve a credible solution was clearly evidenced in his 
pursuit of the model rules option and there seems little doubt that, until Castle 
came up with her alternative, he was prepared to recommend it to the Cabinet as a 
workable alternative to the TUC proposals. How far was he serious in his pursuit 
and how far was it a negotiating ploy? We have seen that the general council 
picked up the threat at the meeting on II June, and that it prompted the 
negotiating committee to draft their statement clarifying the workings of rule 11. 
It also seems likely that Wilson was behind the spate of reports in the weekend 
press over amendments to the 1906 Act. The only other likely source was 
Castle 
and, as we have seen, she had little enthusiasm for the proposals. 
749 ibid. Letter from Barbara Castle to Harold Wilson, 16 June 1969 
750 Castle (1984) p. 672, entry for 17 June 1969 
239 
Wilson was equally aware, however, of just how unacceptable the proposal would 
be, both to the general council and to large sections of the PLP. flis argument 
rested on his ability to convince both the Cabinet and wider public opinion that it 
was the obduracy of the general council that had forced him into this position. As 
the Observer commented, the Castle/Wilson strategy was, 'to enlist as much 
public support as possible by showing how small is the gap between the two 
sides 751 , as evidenced by Castle's weekend speech in Nottingham during which 
she made it clear that, 'All we are asking is that the trade union movement should 
accept clearly and unequivocally that, where the TUC itself recognises that 
strikers are in the wrong, unions should discipline them. ' Furthermore, she found 
it 'incredible' that the union movement was prepared to 'set us on a collision 
course I by rejecting the government's minor amendments to 'A Programme for 
Action 752 . The main weakness 
in this approach, of course, was that it was 
equally open to the counter-challenge that, if the differences between the sides 
were so small, why was the government not prepared to accept the TUC proposals 
rather than risk outright collision? As will become clear, it was this argument that 
was to swing a significant number of the Cabinet behind the TUC position. 
What then of Wilson's rapid adoption of Castle's proposal? Pursuit of the model 
rules option was contrary to all of the government's post-Donovan statements and 
Wilson should have been only too aware of the enormous significance of a Labour 
prime minister amending the 1906 Act and the likely consequences. This coupled 
with Castle's refusal to endorse the proposals and the credibility of her own option 
would have been enough to convince him of the need to drop his own proposals. 
However, whether it was enough to justify Castle's optimism that, 'Cabinet and 
the PLP must be prepared to back us now that what everyone believed was a 
generous offer had been turned down 
753 
, remained to 
be seen. 
In all of these manoeuvrings, however, the significance of 
both Wilson and 
Castle's proposals should not be lost. To varying degrees 
both papers 
reintroduced the law into industrial relations and accepted much of the 
framework 
"' Observer, 15 June 1969 
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set out in Fair Deal at Work. Whilst both proposals sought to maintain a degree 
of political discretion, the ultimate sanction was a referral to some form of legal 
body for an interpretation of union behaviour and the issuing of penalties, aligning 
both much more closely with the Conservative proposals than had previously been 
the case. 
Castle and Wilson's optimism, however, was about to receive a rude awakening. 
On June 17, both the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian reported that Wilson had 
received a letter from Douglas Houghton as chairman of the Labour Party Liaison 
Committee warning him that there was 'no chance' of the government carrying 
the penal clauses through the Commons, and that he would also not be able to 
carry a motion to commit the bill to a committee upstairs as opposed to being 
forced to debate it on the floor of the House 754 . The mood within the PLP and 
Cabinet was neatly captured in a Guardian article by Keith Harper, 'The farce 
over penal clauses', with one paragraph in particular summing up the prevailing 
mood; 
The whole point about both sides' proposals is that neither of them 
would be very effective in practice, although at least the TUC's have a 
sense of realism running through them. Seen against this background it 
is extremely foolish of the Government to stretch the nerves and patience 
of the Labour Party to breaking point on such trite and ill conceived 
proposalS755 
Locked into the negotiations, however, this was not how Castle and Wilson saw it, 
and from Wilson's perspective, Houghton's letter was little short of outright 
treachery. Wilson's papers indicate that Houghton sent him the letter on 
Monday, 16 June immediately following the meeting of the liaison committee. As 
the press suggested, the letter made it clear that, since Croydon, 'opinion in the 
Parliamentary Party has hardened against proceeding with any Bill containing the 
so-called "penal clauses"', and that consequently 'the Government could not 
count upon enough support within the Parliamentary Party to get this Bill through 
the House'. In the circumstances, therefore, the committee urged Wilson to reach 
754 Daily Telegraph, 17 June 1969 
755 Guardian, 14 June 1969 
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a settlement and take the TUC, 'at their word' in order to avoid a 'grave split' 
within the PLP 
756 
The letter, both in its contents and timing, was a clear shot across Wilson's bows, 
especially as it came from Houghton whose previous intervention had proved so 
significant757 . However, it was the leak to the press that especially angered 
Wilson, as he made clear in his reply. Writing on 19 June, after the settlement had 
been reached, Wilson's anger was evident, 'What concerns me, however, is the 
fact that even before I had myself seen the letter, being as you know at the 
Socialist International all day, the Press had been informed of its drift and tenor. 
It was clear it had been presented to the Press as a warning to the Government not 
to proceed with the Bill'. Furthermore, he concluded, whoever had leaked the 
letter must have realised that it would only 'make the Government's position 
much more difficult in what all recognised to have been one of the most vitally 
important meetings for very many years' 758 . As we 
have seen, throughout the 
negotiations Wilson's strategy was to a considerable extent reliant on the 
impression that ultimately he could carry the PLP with him. Whilst, as we have 
also seen, sections of the PLP sought to unden-nine him at regular intervals, the 
timing of this intervention was particularly bad and undermined his position ahead 
of both the Cabinet meeting and the final meeting with the TUC. 
Resolution 
6.10 Management Committee, 17 June 
ý759 The day that Castle described as, 'the most traumatic day of my political life 
began with her meeting with Wilson and the decision to put her alternative 
proposal to the management committee that was meeting at 9.30am. As we have 
seen, the management committee had not proved to be the source of strategic 
advice and support that Wilson had hoped for. Rather, it had shown itself as 
susceptible to political pressure as the rest of the Cabinet. If Wilson was to carry 
756 NA, PRO, PREM13/2728, 'From the Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party', 16 June, 
1969 
757 See Chapter Four 
758NA, PRO, PREM 13/2727, Letter from Harold Wilson to Douglas Houghton, 19 June, 1969 
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the Cabinet it was essential that he received the backing of the committee, so it 
was his failure to gain their support that marked the beginning of the end 
Both Castle and Crossman have provided contemporary accounts of the meeting. 
Castle recorded Crossman's unwillingness to commit himself to her latest 
proposal ahead of soundings with the TUC and Mellish's view that 'you won't get 
it through the House, or a guillotine, if the TUC rejects it' and Castle concluded 
that they had no choice but to go into Cabinet 'divided and unprepared ý 760 . In his 
account, Crossman confinned that he thought it 'unwise' to try and get the 
Cabinet committed to the new proposals ahead of the meeting with the TUC 
although, he felt, this was clearly Castle and Wilson's intention 761 . Both accounts 
are supported by the official minutes. Normally government minutes identify the 
prime minister and any minister introducing a specific subject, but beyond that are 
confined to an anonymous summary of views. This approach leaves the reader 
attempting to identify individual contributions by comparing the official record 
with the contemporary accounts of those such as Castle and Crossman. The 
management committee minutes conform to this approach but, on this occasion, a 
copy of the first draft was sent to Wilson, and survives in his official papers. This 
provides a much more extensive account and identifies each of the speakers, 
providing an invaluable official record of the meeting. 
A number of significant strands emerge. Wilson explained that he had rejected 
the removal of immunity granted under the 1906 Act because it was 'going too 
far". and the TUC could accuse the government of 'lashing out madly' and 
returning to Taff Vale. He did acknowledge that it would be more effective than 
the conciliation pause, but 'hanging was more effective than finingl. He also 
explained the reasoning behind his support of Castle's latest proposal; it followed 
the general approach of the white paper and left the discretion to act with the 
Secretary of State; it did not involve penal clauses on individual workers or 
attachment of wages, 'on which most of the hostility of the P. L. P. had focused'; 
and finally, the bill could be short and simple. 
760 Castle(1984)p. 672, entry for 17 June, 1969 
761 Crossman (1977) pp. 520-521, entry for 17 June, 1969 
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The depth of Wilson and Castle's anger at Houghton was explicit. In his account 
of the subsequent Cabinet meeting, Crossman expressed surprise that Wilson 
made no mention of the Houghton letter, even though its contents had been leaked 
to the press. However, there was no such reticence with the management 
committee. Castle said that she thought the TUC had been 'immensely 
influenced' by the attitude of the PLP and by Houghton's 'one-man campaign'. 
Wilson responded that Houghton 'seemed to be working hand in glove with a 
Member of the Cabinet', a clear reference to Callaghan, and that he and Castle 
were I in the position of union negotiators a half of whose side were saying to the 
other side that they need not listen to them'. 
The central roles played in the discussion by Crossman and Mellish, along with 
Wilson's reaction are laid out with great clarity and point both to the weakness of 
Wilson's position, and the abiding importance to Wilson of the right to govern 
that had dominated his thinking since Chequers. Thus, Wilson acknowledged that 
the new proposal would not be easy to get through the PLP, 'but it was not right 
that a Labour Government should be dictated to by those Labour Members who 
took their orders from the Trade Union Movement'. When Mellish argued that 
rejection of the proposal by the TUC would mean that the government would not 
get the bill through parliament, Wilson countered that Mellish was essentially 
saying that the government should always give in to pressure from the PLP and 
the unions and that this 'was in effect saying that the T. U. C should govern which 
would totally destroy the credibility of the government 
By contrast to Wilson's appeal to the right to govern, Mellish reported that the 
'protracted negotiations' had led many in the PLP to assume that a compromise 
was in the offing and they had been 'very disappointed' by the speed with which 
the government reacted against Croydon. This was reinforced by Crossman who 
argued that Wilson and Castle had dragged the TUC forward, 'to an astonishing 
degree', and that as such he was 'desperately disappointed' by the government's 
reaction to Croydon. Whilst he thought that the government still had the goodwill 
of the party, 'they would be bewildered if the Government now decided to pick a 
quarrel with the T. U. C. and not to take the credit for what had already 
been 
achieved'. In the circumstances they should do all they could to reach agreement. 
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Finally, and with wonderful prescience, Crossman asked if would 'not be 
sufficient' for the government to 'get its own words into the circular the T. U. C. 
were proposing to issue', and whether such an outcome would really be the 'total 
surrender' that Wilson and Castle had painted. Castle responded that the TUC 
were not prepared to accept any tougher wording, and that a willingness on the 
government's part to consider the circular would be interpreted as a sign of 
weakness. She was supported by Wilson who said it was clear that the TUC were 
not prepared to go beyond the issue of an interpretative circular and at this point 
the meeting broke up to allow the full Cabinet to assemble. 
The management committee discussions gave invaluable pointers to the likely 
mood of the Cabinet. Crossman and Mellish's line that the TUC had moved so far 
that it was not worth splitting the party over the remaining, minor, differences was 
both powerful and widely held, and was evidence of the gulf that had emerged 
between the two negotiators and the rest of the goverm-nent. However, Wilson 
was probably correct in his assessment that a significant number within the PLP 
were prepared to support the TUC regardless of the merits of their case and that 
this, when coupled with Houghton's leaked letter, put him in a considerably 
weakened position. Nonetheless, this did not prevent him fTom pursuing his own 
line that the issue was now as much about the right to govern as it was about a 
particular solution. However, as we have seen, at no stage had he given the 
Cabinet any clear indication of the nature of the discussion with Scanlon and 
Jones and consequently they were not in a position to judge the merits of 
his 
claim. In the circumstances the likelihood of gaining Cabinet approval 
for 
Castle's latest proposal were very slim. 
6.11 Cabinet, 17 June 
The full Cabinet meeting is one of the most thoroughly documented of all the 
meetings that took place during this period. Castle, 
Crossman and Benn all 
provide contemporary accounts, whilst both Wilson and 
Jenkins have written of 
the events in their memoirS762. Consequently, the general 
facts are well known. 
The Cabinet met immediately after the management committee. The 
discussion 
762 See Castle (1984), Crossman (1977) & Benn (1989) 
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continued all morning, with Mellish confirming his view that the PLP would not 
support the government if the general council rejected the latest proposals, and 
Peter Shore, one of the architects of the penal clauses, coming out strongly against 
Castle's latest proposals. Cabinet was adjourned at 12.30 and during the 
adjournment Jenkins met Castle to tell her that he could no longer support the 
legislation. The meeting reconvened at 4.30pm and continued for another three 
hours. At the end, with significant numbers refusing to support him, Wilson 
closed the meeting with an agreement both that he and Castle would have a free 
hand with the general council on the following day, and that the Cabinet would be 
free to endorse or reject anything that had been agreed. Wilson then attended a 
meeting of the PLP trade union group at which he was forced to remain bland and 
non-committal in the face of Cabinet indecision 763 
According to all of the published accounts, the tone of the Cabinet became 
increasingly bitter as it progressed. Crossman described the re-convened meeting 
as, 'the most devastating Cabinet meeting I have attended', with Wilson becoming 
increasingly bitter at what he saw as outright betrayal, 'a terrible exhibition in 
which the P. M. was rasped, irritated and thoroughly demoralised, really shouting I 
won't. I can't, you can't do this to me, terribly painful because he expressed a 
764 
loathing, a spite and a resentment which is quite outside his usual character' 
Similarly, Benn noted that, 'Harold and Barbara then became extremely bitter', 
with Wilson threatening to resign several timeS765. How serious was the 
resignation threat? Castle commented that 'He [Wilson] is clearly determined to 
resign on this if necessary' 766 , whilst 
Joe Haines is more equivocal. In Haines' 
view, there was always a danger of Wilson's bluff being called and if it had been 
he would have had to resign. However, he is also clear that Wilson would 'never 
ever' be painted into a comer and that he was banking on the Cabinet running 
scared from such a threat767. Wilson's emotional commitment to the proposals 
is 
763 The Daily Telegraph reported that MPs acknowledged having to make allowances for the fact 
that Wilson was inhibited from disclosing the Cabinet discussions whilst still in negotiation with 
the TUC, but noted that several expressed their disappointment at, 'not having been given cause 
for a successful outcome'. Daily Telegraph, 18 June, 1969 
764 Crossman (1979) pp. 523-524, entry for 17 June, 1969 
765 Benn (1989) pp. 186-7, entry for 17 June, 1969 
766 Castle (1984) p. 674, entry for 17 June 1969 
767 Joe Haines, Glimmers of Twilight, (Politico's Publishing, London 2003) p. 16 and interview 
with the author, 29 September 
2004 
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clear, and the impact of the exchanges with Scanlon at Chequers cannot be 
underestimated. However, his determination to achieve a settlement had seen him 
reach for every tool in the negotiators box and, angry though he was, the Cabinet's 
attitude was hardly a surprise. Therefore, it seems likely that Haines got it right, 
and it was a final negotiating ploy. Its effectiveness, however, was questionable. 
Benn's comment offers a hint of crying wolf and it was perhaps a weakness of 
Wilson and Castle's case that they failed to convince the Cabinet of the 
seriousness of the issue as they saw it. Whatever the authenticity of Wilson's 
threats, it remains clear that the meeting was emotionally charged and became 
increasingly bitter as Wilson and Castle failed to gain support for their proposals, 
especially in the light of Jenkins' decision to withdraw his support and Shore's 
apostaSY768. In the circumstances, it is helpful to turn to the official calm of the 
769 Cabinet conclusions to deterinine what was formally agreed 
The meeting opened with Wilson's summary of the last meeting with the general 
council on 12 June and their rejection of any amendment of rule 11. He 
confin-ned that he and Castle had considered amendments to the 1906 Act and that 
they had rejected these as unacceptable for the reasons given in In Place of Strife. 
Castle then outlined her latest proposals relating to the revised conciliation pause 
and the meeting proceeded to a general discussion. Opponents of the Castle line 
argued that the gap between the government and TUC positions was now so 
narrow that negotiations should continue. Specifically it was noted that, 'It would 
be unreasonable - and would seem so to public opinion - to allow the negotiations 
to break down on the single and not easily comprehensible issue of whether the 
TUC's own sanction against unconstitutional strikes should take the form of an 
amendment to Rule 11 or an interpretative document. ' Furthermore, the 
government had already secured a very 'substantial' advance by the TUC with the 
potential for a more significant refonn of industrial relations than had been 
achieved in fmany years'. In the circumstances, it was considered 'foolish' to put 
768 Wilson is alleged to have told Shore, 'I knew you were green, but I didn't know you were 
yellow'. Professor John Ramsden, April 2004, from a Nuffield College seminar, autumn 
1969. 
According to Joe Haines, Wilson commented of the whole Cabinet, 'I don't mind leading a green 
Cabinet ... 
but I'm buggered if I'm going to run a yellow one. ' Haines (2003) p. 16 
769NA, PRO, CAB128/44, CC(69) 28thConclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on 17 June, 
1969 
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this at risk for the sake of 'a difference of presentation which would, in any event, 
be of little practical importance'. 
When the meeting re-convened, opposition was broadened, and it was argued that 
it was unrealistic to threaten the TUC with the prospect of legislation when the 
TUC would be fully aware of that it could not be enacted, 'except at the cost of 
grave and lasting damage to Party unity'. In the circumstances, the Cabinet 
should continue to suspend judgement on the courses of action to be taken if it 
proved impossible to reach agreement, and focus on reaching an agreement, 
(probably on the basis of a further strengthening of the proposed interpretative 
circular'. 
In his summing up, Wilson acknowledged that Cabinet was not yet ready to reach 
a decision either on the form the sanctions might take, or to make a choice 
between the original proposals and Castle's latest suggestion. Furthermore, it was 
clear that there remained a 'division of opinion' over whether, in default of an 
agreement, legislation should be introduced at all. However, Wilson stressed that 
he and Castle could not resume negotiations on this basis alone and neither could 
a positive result be expected if the TUC were allowed to believe that the 
government would not introduce sanctions. Therefore, whilst he and Castle would 
not commit the government to any precise form of sanctions, 'it would not be 
possible for them, in exploring whether the TUC were prepared to strengthen their 
own proposals, to avoid indicating the advice which they themselves would feel 
compelled to give their Cabinet colleagues if the negotiations reached a final 
deadlock'. Crucially, however, 'it would then be for individual Ministers to 
consider their respective positions in reaching the final decision'. 
The Cabinet conclusions give an indication of the extent and nature of the 
opposition to anything other than a negotiated settlement. The overwhelming 
impression is of a desire to reach a negotiated settlement in the face of what 
appeared to many to be minor differences between government and TUC. The 
fact that neither Wilson nor Castle could convince them of the gulf that they 
perceived to still exist reflected the insular nature of the negotiations and Wilson's 
negotiating tactics. As Jenkins said to 
Castle, the long drawn out nature of the 
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negotiations meant that a break was now, 'unrealistic -)770 , echoing Crossman's 
early comments that, such had been the length of the negotiations that many in the 
PLP assumed a settlement was imminent. However, it also reflected the grim 
political reality that perhaps the price was no longer worth paying. Certainly this 
was the view of both Jenkins and Shore. Jenkins told Castle as much when he met 
her prior to the reconvened Cabinet, that 'he no longer thought that the fight was 
worth the cost', and confirmed this in his autobiography and again in a recent 
intervieW771 
. As for Shore, whose intervention in the Cabinet meeting was 
described by Crossman as the most effective he ever made 772 , he thought they 
should concentrate on what they had already achieved rather than on prolonging 
the fight with the TUC773. 
By the end of the meeting there was no question that both Wilson and Castle felt 
betrayed by their Cabinet colleagues, 'the cowards and capitulators' as Castle 
called theM774. What then should we make of Wilson's apparent jubilation at the 
end of the meeting when he told Castle that he had enough votes to carry the 
Cabinet? In terms of simple arithmetic he may well have had the votes, but it 
would have been the height of folly to assume that his opponents would rally 
behind him and help to carry the PLP. Giving the impression that he could carry 
the Cabinet was, however, one of the few remaining cards he had left to play, as 
indicated in his own account of a meeting held with Feather later that evening. 
According to Wilson he told Feather that, 'lest he or others should receive 
messages that I could not carry the Cabinet, I told him that I held the proxies'775 . 
Feather's biographer, however, suggests that this was a hollow threat, 'Feather 
was tempted to laugh in the Prime Minister's face. He had talked again to 
Douglas Houghton and knew the position in the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
Regardless of the Cabinet, Feather could feel the trout on the end of the line. , 
776 
770 Castle (1984) p. 675, entry for 17 June 1969 
771 ibid. Plus see Jenkins (1994) and interview with the author, 20/09/02 
772 Quoted in Castle (1984) p. 674, entry for 17 June 1969 
773 When interviewed, Shore stated that he had begun to lose faith in the interim bill when the 
strike ballot proposals were dropped. As an economic minister, he had been attracted to 
levers that 
could be used to avert the large official strikes, rather than the smaller, unofficial ones. 
Interview 
with Lord Shore of Stepney, House of Lords, 
11 November 2000 
774 Castle (1984) p. 676, entry for 17 June 1969 
775 Wilson (1974) p. 827 
776 Silver (1973) p. 15 8 
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Once again, Wilson seemed to have forgotten the essential interconnectedness of 
his own party. 
Therefore, on the eve of what was to prove to be the final meeting with the 
general council, Wilson had next to nothing left. The Cabinet was divided and 
any attempt to push it into a decision was likely to lead to a very public division, 
while Houghton's letter coupled with Mellish's assessment indicated the strength 
of opposition within the PLP. In the circumstances it was difficult to see what 
Wilson could achieve short of capitulation. However, Wilson was in it for the 
long haul, and at the meeting of the trade union group that followed immediately 
after the Cabinet, he made it clear that, 'the gap may look small but the bridge 
must be formed by the TUC as well as the Government 777 
6.12 General Council, 18 June 
If Wilson's aim was to portray a united Cabinet front, the press soon disabused 
him. The Daily Telegraph reported that Callaghan's position was now 'said' to be 
shared by at least five other members of the Cabinet 778 , whilst the Daily Mail, 
under the title 'Wilson wobbles on the brink' reported that the Cabinet was 
779 'divided' and had failed to reach agreement . In a more sober assessment, the 
Guardian noted that the government seemed to moving towards a new attempt to 
reach a compromise, but also reported that 'something like' one-third of the 
Cabinet were known to oppose a breach with the TUC780 . Finally, The Times 
summed up accurately Wilson's best hope, 'that the general council will have a 
change of mind and agree to tighten up Rule I V, whilst being brutally realistic 
about his chances, 'the general council firmly rejected that solution a week ago. 
Now that they can see they command an overwhelming majority in the PLP it 
seems futile to imagine that they will suddenly go into reverse. )78 
1 However, as so 
often in the past, Feather had seemed to offer a glimmer of hope. 
777 Daily Telegraph, 18 June, 1969 
778 
ibid, 18 June, 1969 
779Daily Mail, 18 June, 1969 
780 Guardian, 18 June, 1969 
781 The Times, 18 June, 1969 
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Late on the evening of the 17 June, Wilson and Castle met Feather. Castle 
recorded Wilson asking, yet again, "'Is an amendment to rule ruled out on 
principle"', to which Feather responded, "'No, I wouldn't say that"' before going 
on to outline the general council concern that, as worded, Castle's amendment 
ruled out all freedom of action. Wilson replied that this had not been the intention 
and agreed that he and Castle would have another look at the amendment prior to 
the meeting, to which Feather responded that, "'It would help"', leaving Castle to 
return home in a state of euphoria, 'Wouldn't it be heaven if we could get an 
amendment to rule after all and show our colleagues up for the cowards and 
capitulators they are? 5782 . Once again, Feather hinted at more than he could 
perhaps deliver, and once again Wilson and Castle appeared to take him at his 
word. 
What then were Wilson and Castle's tactics on entering the meeting with the 
general council? It is clear that the Cabinet were divided, and that through both 
personal contacts and press reports the general council would have been fully 
aware of the extent of the division. In the circumstances, Wilson had little option 
but to confirm to Feather that the Cabinet had yet to work out an alternative and to 
focus his attention on an amended rule 11783 . Feather's response seemed to 
indicate a slight opening of the door, but if it were to be slammed shut by the rest 
of the general council, Wilson would have little option but to recommend some 
form of legislation to his Cabinet colleagues. As The Times continued to stress, 
Wilson had upped the ante on industrial relations reform to such an extent that he 
could not back down without immediate accusations of surrender. In the 
circumstances, he needed a settlement, however difficult that would be. 
The general council held its usual pre-meeting at l0am at which Feather updated 
them. He claimed that he had 'no idea' what the government would propose as 
alternative legislation, but referred to Wilson's earlier reference to the 1906 Act 
and the weekend press reports. It was agreed that, in the event of Wilson 
proposing amendments to the 1906 Act, the general council should seek an 
... Castle (1984) p. 676, entry for 17 June, 1969. Wilson confirms the detail of Castle's account. 
See, Wilson (1974) p-827 
783 See Castle above 
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adjournment in order to discuss the proposals. Feather also raised the proposed 
amendment to rule 11 and the two reasons why it was not acceptable; it would 
present 'most serious difficulties' in regard to the mandate from the special 
congress; and the terms of the government's amendment included an automatic 
'go back to work' regardless of circumstance, which the general council had 
already rejected as impractical. As is now clear, Feather was much more aware of 
the Wilson's proposals than he was letting on, for Wilson had sounded him out 
about amending the 1906 Act on a number of occasions. More seriously, Wilson 
had undertaken to revise the amendment to rule 11 to modify the automatic 'back 
to work' clause, on the basis of Feather's comments that this might make the rule 
change more acceptable to the general council. Judging by Feather's comments in 
the pre-meeting, it was clear that whilst this would help, it would do nothing to 
address the procedural refusal to accept government amendments to rule changes 
that had already been agreed by the special congress and, as became clear very 
quickly, this was to prove the major sticking point. 
The meeting was opened by Wilson, stressing immediately the seriousness of the 
position that had been reached at the end of the last meeting 'If that situation was 
the end of the road, it would mean a deep split in the Movement, not only at top 
level between Ministers and the General Council but right down through the Trade 
Union and Labour Movements'. In the circumstances, he said, he would rather 
focus on amending rule 11 than discussing the legislative options left open to the 
government. This was clearly an attempt to draw attention away from the 
inability of the Cabinet to agree on a solution, and, with this in mind, Wilson 
focused on the wording of rule 11. Castle and her officials had worked quickly to 
produce a further amendment to the return to work clause, so that it now read: 
In cases where they the General Council consider it unreasonable to order an 
unconditional return to work, they will tender the organisation or 
organisations concerned their considered opinion and advice with a view to 
a settlement784. 
784 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting between the Prime Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Wednesday, June 18. 
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If the general council were prepared to accept this amendment, he was, 'prepared 
to shake hands that morning on an agreement that there would be no legislation of 
the kind to which the General Council were opposed. ' 
In response, Feather asked whether a rule change was considered to be 
4sacrosanct' or whether the government would accept an explanatory circular 
relating to interpretation of the rules. Wilson replied that he was only prepared to 
drop the penal clauses if the rule were changed, to which Feather responded that it 
was congress policy that was important, making explicit reference to the 
Bridlington Principles, that whilst not rules of congress, were treated to all intents 
and purposes as if they were. This was a theme he had raised immediately 
following the abortive meeting on 12 June and again in a speech over the 
weekend 785 . At this point the meeting adjourned for the general council to 
consider the revised draft. 
It its discussion, the general council was clear, that the issue was no longer about 
wording, for 'there was no great difficulty with the Government's form of words'. 
The outstanding issue remained Wilson's determination to gain an amendment to 
the rule book, and it was on this that 'there was a sharp division between the 
General Council and the Government'. For the general council the issue turned on 
the charge that they would be asking the September TUC congress to approve an 
amendment to the rule change agreed by the special congress, 'virtually on the 
instruction of the Government', and, in order to honour the agreement, be forced 
to oppose any amendments to the rule that were submitted by individual unions. 
In the circumstances, it was agreed that the negotiating sub-committee should 
meet Castle and Wilson, and that they would stick to the position that the 
government's amendment to rule 11 was unacceptable. 
Before moving on, it is worth considering the significance of the general council's 
almost casual agreement to Castle's amendment. In her diary, Castle comments 
that, on hearing that the wording didn't present any difficulties, 'We could hardly 
785 See the Guardian, 13 June 1969. Feather was reported as saying that, Trograrrime for Action' 
was a policy document and, 'with the trade union movement policy 
is just as strong as rules'. 
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believe our ears: a volte-face! 5786 ,a perception that was critical to her subsequent 
acceptance of the 'solemn and binding' agreement. How far, however, did it 
represent a 'volte-face'9 As we have seen, there were three crucial differences 
between Castle's original amendment to rule II and the general council's note of 
clarification; Castle required an amendment to rule, which remained 
unforthcoming; her original proposals implied an automatic return to work from 
all unofficial strikes, something that had been dealt with by her subsequent 
amendment; and her original proposal made explicit the extent of the general 
council's involvement in unconstitutional or unofficial strikes, and the obligation 
they placed on affiliates to return to work. It was on this latter point that the 
extent of the general council's volte-face hinged. The general council argued 
throughout that rule 11 , as published in a 'Programme for Action', gave the TUC 
all the authority it needed in dealing with both official and unofficial strikes. 
Indeed, the rule referred to affiliated organisations keeping the general council 
informed of stoppages involving large bodies of workers, including 'unauthonsed 
and unconstitutional stoppages of work', and therefore, by implication, when 
clause (c) referred to the general council tendering their, 'considered opinion', it 
related equally to unauthorised and unconstitutional stoppages. However, as has 
been seen, it was the failure to place affiliated organisations under any forrn of 
obligation to return to work that made it unacceptable to Castle and Wilson. 
In many respects, therefore, the note of clarification offered on 11 June 
represented a much more significant concession. It undoubtedly strengthened the 
working of rule 11 and its reference to situations in which organisations, should 
'take immediate and energetic steps to obtain a resumption of work' was fully in 
line with Castle and Wilson's requirements. Similarly, the note made it clear that 
there were circumstances in which unofficial strikes could not be supported. The 
question therefore, was how far the acceptance of Castle's wording marked a shift 
of substance and how far one of presentation. In referring to a 'volte-face' 
Castle 
clearly considered this to mark a shift of substance, and yet, on paper, the shift 
was marginal. Castle's amended rule 11 referred to disputes which 
led to can 
unconstitutional stoppage', and circumstances in which workers could 
be found to 
796 Castle (1984) pp. 676-7, entry for 18 June, 1969 
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be 'constitutionally in the wrong', but the outcome, that 'they [would] place an 
obligation on the organisation or organisations to take immediate and energetic 
steps to obtain a resumption of work', and the ultimate sanction, a referral to 
congress under rule 13, was exactly the same as that set out in the general 
council's note of clarification on 11 June. Consequently, given the concessions 
already made in the original note of clarification, it is arguable that the change 
was largely one of presentation, a view supported by the casual manner in which 
Castle's words were accepted by the general council. The outstanding point of 
substance centred on the unwillingness of the general council to accept Castle's 
text as an amendment to rule, and this had not changed. 
Hence, whilst Castle was pleasantly surprised by the ease with which her revised 
wording had been accepted, the remaining differences had, if anything, 
crystallised. The committee reiterated what they saw as the 'constitutional' 
problems that could arise ftom an amendment to rule 11; 'it would cut across the 
procedure whereby affiliated unions could suggest amendments to the draft rule'. 
Wilson responded that he saw no problems with amendments as long as they did 
not directly contradict the main intention of rule change. He then went 
considerably further than before and confirmed that, if they could reach an 
agreement, not only would the existing penal clauses be rejected, so too would the 
interim bill and there would be no attempt to introduce any alternative forms of 
penal clauses during the lifetime of the government. However, to reach an 
agreement he needed something to indicate the TUC's commitment, and 'a piece 
of paper was not sufficient'. 
It was at this point that, according to Castle's account, and confirmed by the 
government record, both Jones and Scanlon attempted to help out. Jones re- 
introduced the Bridlington agreement, arguing that, whilst it did not appear in the 
TUC rule book, 'In substance and in public presentation, the undertaking which 
they were offering was as binding and important as an amendment to the rules'787 . 
He was followed by Scanlon who, according to Castle, 'leaned forward with one 
of those pieces of frankly taking us 
into his confidence which are rather touching, 
787 NA, PRO, pREM13/2728, Notes of a meeting with representatives of the Trades Union 
Congress held on 18 June 1969 
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and I think impressive' 788 , and made the point that his national committee had 
agreed to back the TUC programme by the narrowest of margins. If the 
government insisted on an amendment to rule 11 he would have to recall the 
committee and, 'could not predict the outcome. It would not be necessary, 
however, to recall the committee to authonse an agreement between the general 
council and the government, and he thought this would be the case in many of the 
other unions. Wilson responded by making it clear, once again, that the 
government was prepared to drop the legislation not only now but for the rest of 
the parliament, in return for 'clear and binding' procedures by the TUC for 
dealing with unconstitutional strikes but, 'So far as he could see, the latter could 
not be achieved except by a change of Rule 11,789. At this, the meeting adjourned 
once more. As Castle put it to Wilson, 'Let us give them food and drink - no one 
to leave the building. We must settle something today., 790 
Were they any closer to an agreement? Castle clearly regarded the general 
council's acceptance of her revised wording as a significant concession. Whilst 
this is questionable, Wilson's agreement to abandon the interim bill and any threat 
of penal clauses for the remainder of the lifetime of the government was a 
substantial shift. Until this point, the prospect of penal clauses in the future was 
held as surety against the TUC being unable to deliver. Even if Castle's amended 
rule 11 was accepted as a rule change, there remained no guarantees as to its 
effectiveness. Wilson's concession was then an acknowledgement that it was as 
good as he was going to get. However, despite these concessions, there still 
seemed to be no way out of the impasse created by Wilson's desire for a rule 
change, and, in their discussion during the adjournment, the general council did 
little more than confirm their opposition to the rule change, although they 
remained willing to discuss a joint statement. If there was to be any further 
movement, it was going to have to come from the government. 
It is at this point that we are reliant on Castle's account of her discussion, during 
the adjourmuent, with Wilson and her officials. According to her diary, she and 
788 Castle (1984) p. 677, entry for 18 June, 1969 
789NA, PRO, PREM13/2728 
790 Castle (1984) p. 677, entry for 18 June, 1969 
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her officials agreed that Scanlon's intervention had been 'a telling one', and that 
they should consider something along the lines of the Bridlington formula: 'After 
. )791 all, said Conrad, that really had worked When interviewed Castle recalled 
Heron's intervention in more detail. Heron told her that he didn't see how she 
could turn down this offer, because 'no union has ever breached the Bridlington 
agreement, and it is the equivalent of a rule change'. In the circumstances, he told 
her, 'he did not think the party would forgive me if I were to resign on such a 
narrow point 792 . Heron's intervention was crucial, as throughout the negotiations 
his advice was tempered by many years of industrial relations experience, and if 
he thought a Bridlington-type agreement was the equivalent of a rule change it 
was good enough for Castle. 
On the back of this, she went to see Wilson and recommended that they have one 
final attempt to achieve the rule change and, if the general council was not 
prepared to back down, they should propose a 'binding undertaking, providing 
that 'our words are approved' (Castle's italics). As she recorded, 'After all, I had 
drafted them in the form of a rule so that they were as precise as we wanted them 
to be about unconstitutional strikes', and, in an echo of Heron, 'Harold and I both 
agreed that to break now, when the TUC was accepting our wording and the 
concept of a binding undertaking, would put us in an impossible position with the 
, 793 PLP and even our own friends 
This then was the point at which political pressure, pragmatism and practical 
considerations came together. As Heron had pointed out, the differences were 
now so small that the chances of convincing the Cabinet, never mind the PLP, of 
the continuing need for legislation were almost non-existent. The Bridlington 
formula not only offered a way out, but also appeared to offer a credible 
alternative to an amendment to rule. Ultimately, Heron's recommendation, 
coupled with the endorsement of Scanlon and Jones, was a powerful argument 
for 
acceptance. 
791 Castle (1984) p. 677, entry for 18 June, 1969 
791 interview with Baroness Castle of Blackburn, Buckinghamshire, 3 March 2000 
793 Castle (1984) p. 677, entry for 18 June, 1969 
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So it was that Wilson and Castle broached the proposal with Feather and the TUC 
chairman, John Newton, before putting the detail to the full meeting of the general 
council. Wilson made it clear that the intended, 'solemn and binding' undertaking 
must have the same standing as the Bridlington declaration, and it was agreed that 
the proposal should be considered by the negotiating sub-committee, who would 
then be responsible for finalising the draft with Wilson and Castle. This was the 
first time that 'solemn and binding' was used. Reference had been made to a 
'binding undertaking' but, according to Joe Haines who was present during the 
final meeting, someone else offered a 'solemn' agreement, and the two were then 
combined to make 'solemn and binding'794 . Castle and her officials had reworked 
her amendment to rule II to take the form of a declaration; 
The General Council have agreed unanimously to a solemn and binding 
undertaking the text of which is set out in the annex to this statement. The 
General Council have further agreed that this undertaking will forthwith 
govern the operation by the General Council of Congress Rule 11 as 
recommended by the General Council to the Special Congress on June 5. 
This undertaking unanimously given by the General Council will have the 
same binding force as a rule of Congress. (the TUC Bridlington Principles 
and Regulations) 
(a) Where a dispute has led to an unconstitutional stoppage of work 
which involves directly or indirectly large bodies of workers or 
which if protracted may have serious consequences, the General 
Council shall ascertain and assess all the relevant facts,, having 
regard to the principles set out in Paragraphs 20 to 27 of 'Programme 
for Action'. 
(b) In cases where they consider it unreasonable to order an 
unconditional return to work, they will tender the organization or 
organizations concerned their considered opinion and advice with a 
view to promoting a settlement. 
(c) Where, however, they find that there should be no stoppage of work 
before procedure is exhausted they will place an obligation on the 
organization or organizations concerned to take energetic steps to 
obtain an immediate resumption of work, including action within 
their rules (if necessary), so that negotiations can proceed. 
(d) Should the affiliated organization not comply with an obligation 
placed on it under (c) above, the General Council shall duly report to 
Congress or deal with the organization under Clauses (b), (c), (d) and 795 
(h) of Rule 13 . 
794 Haines (2003) p. 17 
795 Sections in italics were rejected by the general council negotiating committee. Subsequent 
replacements are shown in brackets 
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Castle was determined that the declaration be as binding as a rule, and to this end 
had asked the Attorney-General, Sir Elwyn Jones, to attend the final meeting796, 
and included the words, 'as binding as a rule of Congress' in the explanatory 
statement. However, even at this stage the general council were not prepared to 
have any explicit reference to rules, and Jack Jones argued there was no such 
thing as a rule of congress and that it should be replaced by 'same binding force as 
-)797 the TUC Bridlington Principles Castle agreed, with the addition of 
(regulations' so that it read, 'same binding force as the TUC Bridlington 
Principles and Regulations'798 . Similarly, the negotiating committee, while 
accepting the reference to unions taking action within their rules, asked for the 
qualifying 'if necessary' to be added at the end of the sentence. Thus, right up 
until the end, both sides were pressing their own agenda, Castle to make the 
declaration as close to a rule change as possible, and the general council to avoid 
any explicit reference to the rule book. In doing so, the general council made 
another important concession on the requirement for individual unions to 
discipline unofficial strikers via their existing rules. However, as was the case 
throughout this final stage, the words had much less importance than avoiding a 
rule change, and in this context, the general council could be happy at what they 
had achieved and, having seen the final draft they, 'made no demur. As Castle 
recorded, 'the deal was on', and both sides agreed that no one should claim a 
victory. However, in her original transcript, Castle recorded an ironic tableau that 
served to disabuse anyone who thought that this was really the case - 
Jo[sic] Haines had passed Harold a note saying some members of the G. C. 
had been calling out of the windows to the industrial correspondents, 
"Another half hour and we've won". Vic [Feather] was shocked at the very 
idea. 799 
6.13 Overwhelming relief 
Once Wilson and Feather had shaken hands, the Cabinet was called to ratify the 
deal and, at a meeting of the PLP that followed, Wilson explained the terms of the 
796 See Castle (1984) p. 678, entry for 18 June, 1969, 'brought in to emphasize that they were 
committing themselves to the equivalent of a rule'. 
797 MRC, MSS 292B/20/10 - TUC General Council Minutes 1968-69(2), Minutes of the 
seventeenth meeting held on 25 June 1969, Minutes of a meeting 
between the Prime Minister, First 
Secretary of State and the General Council on Wednesday, June 18. 
'98 Castle (1984) p. 802 
799BCC, entry for 18 June, 1969 
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with which Castle and Wilson had conducted the negotiations, and the unanimous 
endorsement of the outcome, whilst Castle recorded, with some bitterness, that a 
'ragged cheer' went up as Wilson made the announcement. Despite this, Castle 
could not resist a barbed comment: 'Considering the background of press reports 
against which we had to negotiate, it is surprising we achieved anything at all. ý799 
The overwhelming sense of relief spilled over into the PLP meeting. Wilson 
made a lengthy statement, in which he painted a picture of unrelenting 
government pressure leading to historical and unprecedented movement by the 
TUC, telling the meeting that, 'it was the White Paper and the negotiations that 
followed its publication which more than anything else was responsible for 
"Programme for Action"'. Similarly, and with a clever piece of rhetoric, he 
sought both to align himself with the trade unionists amongst the PLP, and to 
evoke trade union history; 
A very large number of colleagues here with trade union experience will 
understand what I mean when I say that the representatives of the Trades 
Union Congress have confirmed to me today - and this is in the public 
statement - that the undertaking they have now given is as binding as the 
Bridlington Declaration and Regulations of 30 years ago - and all of us 
know the central and sustaining role which the Bridlington Declaration 
has played in T. U. C. history 800 . 
Finally, he reminded those present of his statement, made at the outset of the 
negotiations, that he was willing to consider any proposals from the TUC that 
were, 'equally effective, equally urgent in time', and concluded that, 'our 
requirements have been met today'. Wilson's rhetoric was superb, for not only 
did he suggest that the outcome was the one he had sought all along, but by 
evoking trade union history he was placing himself back fin-nly in the trade union 
roots of the party at a time when many, not least in the PLP, were accusing him of 
tearing the party apart. 
However, whilst Wilson's speech may have proved the necessary emotional balm 
within the PLP, the outside world was less susceptible to his rhetoric. For, despite 
Wilson's plea to the Cabinet that, 'neither side should claim that its views had 
799 NA, PRO, CAB128/44, CC(69) 29h Conclusions, 18 June, 1969 and Castle (1984) pp. 678-9, 
entry for 18 June 1969 
800 LPA, Minutes of a Party Meeting held on 18 June, 1969 
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prevailed over those of the other', he could not stop the press, or the opposition, 
from picking winners and losers. The Daily Mail declared, albeit predictably 
'This is the greatest surrender in modem British politics.. a "solemn declaration" 
5801 which is hardly worth the paper it is written on , while the Daily Telegraph 
commented that any audience would try to, 'suppress its ribald laughter at the idea 
of the TUC being "solemn" about anything except its determination to put trade 
802 
unions still further above the law' . The Daily Mirror, probably the strongest 
supporter of the white paper, concluded that it had been neither climb down or 
tnump ut that Wilson had, 'as a Labour Prime Minister', no alternative but to 
settle with the terms that he had been given. Even for this paper, however, there 
was one outstanding fact; 'There exists in Britain, rightly or wrongly, a power 
outside the precincts of parliament as great as that which exists within' 803 . 
Among the less partisan publications the Financial Times thought both sides could 
claim some sort of victory, but that the TUC claim was more credible. Ministers 
would not find it easy to rebut the charge that they were 'over-confident and then 
over-yielding', and ended up striking a bargain which is 'bound to be widely 
804 regarded as humiliating' . However, the paper acknowledged that the threat of 
legislation had forced the TUC to move 'further and faster than most people 
expected earlier in the year', and if they were willing to exercise their new powers 
it would go a long way to making real progress. Similarly, the Guardian, which 
had not supported either the white paper or the interim bill, thought the terms 
looked 'good and workable', and represented a 'near-historic change of attitude 
and purpose' by the TUC. However, it was now up to the TUC to make the 
proposals work 805 . The 
Times, at best a sceptical enthusiast for the government's 
proposals, acknowledged that, if the proposals worked, both sides would deserve, 
'credit and support'. If not, then Wilson stood convicted for 'having abandoned a 
measure he considered essential in return for mere assurances'. Ultimately the 
testing point would come when unofficial strikers refused a union order to go back 
to work and whilst in these circumstances, the paper concluded, 'It is not 
801 Daily Mail, 19 June, 1969 
802 Daily Telegraph, 19 June, 1969 
803 Daily Mirror, 19 June, 1969 
804 Financial Times, 19 June, 1969 
805 Guardian, 19 June, 1969 
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absolutely clear that the new system will not work', it is clear that, ' the Prime 
Minister has not got what he wanted' 
If the press response ranged from sceptical to derisory, the opposition parties 
made no attempt to hide their contempt when Wilson next faced the Commons. 
According to the Guardian, he was met with a 'merry chorus of laughs and jeers' 
from the Conservative benches and a single question fTom the leader of the 
opposition, 'What will happen when unofficial strikers ignore the advice of their 
union leaders and go on striking? ' Wilson's reply, that the TUC would 'place an 
obligation on the union concerned to get them back to work', was in turn met with 
806 a 'torrent of derisive laughter' . 
Conservative contempt was backed by a hard- 
edged detennination to exploit the situation in the months remaining before the 
general election. The Conservative's campaign guide devoted 21 pages to 
industrial relations policy, including a section on 'The Industrial Relations Bill 
Fiasco' 807 . 
Similarly, an analysis of election addresses revealed that 72% of 
Conservative candidates included a reference to trade union reform whilst the 
10% of Labour candidates mentioning the subject opposed existing party policy, 
although it is not indicated whether they were in favour of less or more reform. 
During the general election Harold Wilson made seventeen speeches amounting to 
17,714 words and failed to mention proposals for trade union reform in any of 
them. By contrast Edward Heath made 15 speeches amounting to 8,860 words of 
which two percent dealt with Labour's record on industrial relations and two 
808 
percent with his own proposals 
So ended one of the most divisive episodes in Labour Party history. For those 
within the party the relief at the outcome was palpable, for as Douglas 
Houghton, 
summing up the PLP meeting, put it, 'this was the most significant and moving 
day in the history of the Movement since the General Strike on 
1926 )809 . 
However, for those outside the movement, the ending was considerably more 
inauspicious. The Times concluded, 'A Labour Government is seen to be 
806 Guardian, 20 June 1969 
807 The campaign guide 1970 (Conservative Central Office 1970) 
808 David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 
(Macmillan, 
London 1971) 
809 LPA, Minutes of a party meeting held on 18 June, 1969 
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incapable of challenging the most powerful interest in its party's political 
combination 8 10. For those who sought to invoke 'history' at every turn, it would 
be for 'history' to decide whether it was Houghton or The Times that was proved 
right. 
6.14 Summary 
The final negotiations opened with Wilson's dismissal of the 'Programme for 
Action' and ended with his proclamation of the 'solemn and binding agreement' 
as a historic achievement. In the midst of the final week he was consistently 
calling for, at the very least, a rule change; was seriously considering amendments 
to the 1906 Trade Disputes Act, the nearest thing to an act of God in trade union 
mythology; and had become convinced that a credible solution was intrinsically 
linked to his ability to govern. Yet at the end, he was welcomed back into the 
party fold with open arms by the PLP, whilst being condemned by much of the 
press for 'surrendering' to a single, vested interest. How far was the agreement a 
surrender and, given that politics is largely, 'the art of the possible' 811 , how 
far a 
reasonable, pragmatic solution? Similarly, how far did it satisfy Wilson's own 
criteria of being as effective and as urgent as the government's own proposals, and 
how far was Wilson, as he implied at the final PLP meeting, using the interim bill 
to extract concessions from the TUC? 
There is little question that, following Croydon and the Chequers meeting, Wilson 
was determined to achieve a credible outcome. We have seen how affected he 
was by the attitudes of Jones and Scanlon and there is no doubt that he regarded 
their behaviour as a direct challenge to his right to govern in the interests of all. 
This translated into the minimum requirement for a rule change and a genuine 
willingness to use proposed amendments to the 1906 Act as both a negotiating 
tool and, if necessary, an alternative forin of legislation. The depth of his 
involvement in the development of Cabinet papers over the weekend of 14/15 
June is a clear indication of how far he was willing to go. However, there was 
little doubt that, after the Cabinet meeting on 17 June, he had no alternative but to 
810 The Times, 20 June, 1969 
"' Otto von Bismark in conversation with Meyer von Waldeck, II August 1867, The 
Oxford 
Dictionary of Political Quotations (Oxford University Press, paperback edition 1997 p. 46) 
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try and reach a negotiated settlement. As we have seen, he may have had the 
votes in his pocket, but the likely divisions were such that a consensus would have 
been impossible. Pragmatically, therefore, Wilson and Castle had to compromise, 
the question remained as to the extent of that compromise. 
The problem throughout these latter stages was that the agreement hinged on one 
hundred or so words and the relative status of a rule change against a note of 
clarification. As we have seen, by the time both sides came to agree the final text, 
the words had ceased to have as much relevance as the need for a rule change. 
However, this should not detract from the fact that, in the agreement to a note of 
clarification and the words used, the TUC did make a series of considerable 
concessions. Not only did they agree to the same wording being used in rule 11 as 
was used in rule 12, placing an obligation on individual unions to carry out 
general council rulings, they also accepted explicit reference to unconstitutional 
strikes and acknowledged that circumstances existed in which a return to work 
was required before a settlement could be reached. In this respect the agreement 
did go considerably further than previously in enshrining the right of the TUC to 
intervene in unofficial and unconstitutional disputes. However, it did not 
constitute a rule change 
How are we to read the general council's refusal to countenance a rule change? 
The argument that it would present a constitutional difficulty seems somewhat 
hollow. As Wilson pointed out, an agreed amendment did not preclude further 
minor amendments on the part of the September congress, and it did not follow 
that an agreed amendment would require another special congress. The Croydon 
agreement already required endorsement in September, the general council would 
be asking congress simply to endorse a further amendment. Against this, 
Scanlon's argument, that he could not guarantee the support of his executive did 
carry weight, but it is difficult not to see the main objection as a more visceral 
reaction to any government attempting to amend trade union rules, a perception 
that the Conservatives would have done well to take on board as they prepared for 
government. Whilst the Bridlington principles were endorsed by both the general 
council and Castle's officials as having the same authority as a rule change, they 
undoubtedly represented a convenient way out. 
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In the circumstances, it Is difficult not to conclude that the 'solemn and binding 
agreement' was the best that Castle and Wilson could get. They were to be 
congratulated for gaining significant concessions, but ultimately they foundered 
on the inability of significant minorities within both the Cabinet and the PLP to 
see how one hundred words and a limited debate about rule changes was worth the 
tunnoil it would undoubtedly create. As for its wider significance, the press was 
undoubtedly correct in seeing the agreement as a surrender to a singularly 
powerful vested interest and the Daily Mirror's conclusion, that it would be for 
Mr Heath to decide whether there should exist a 'power outside the precincts of 
Parliament as great as that which exists within' seems ominously prescient812. 
812 Daily Mirror, 19 June, 1969 
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CONCLUSION 
At the outset it was stated that four general propositions have emerged from 
historiography of In Place of Strife: that Barbara Castle was unduly influenced by 
anti-trade union officials; that the contents of the white paper were an ill thought 
out, knee jerk reaction to the Conservative proposals contained in Fair Deal at 
Work, and were neither philosophically coherent, nor practically effective; that 
neither Castle or Wilson were of, or understood the trade union movement, and 
consequently failed to anticipate the likely impact of any proposals impinging on 
the right to strike; and that the final, 'solemn and binding' agreement, however 
much it was dressed up by both sides as an honourable compromise, was a failure 
for Castle and Wilson that demonstrated the inability of a Labour government to 
escape from its trade union roots. 
What has emerged from this study is that role of the civil service in the creation of 
In Place of Strife was a complex one. The reorganisation of the department 
clearly introduced a new source of policy advice that operated outside the 
traditional culture of the Ministry of Labour. All of those interviewed who were 
present in the DEP during this period attest to the pressure that was building up at 
senior levels for the development of 'Donovan plus'. Yet the policy documents 
produced rejected the Donovan plus approach. The reason for this appears to be 
twofold. Whilst there was a significant influx of new blood, its impact on the 
formal policy making process was limited. As John Burgh has indicated, his 
initial ignorance of the detail of industrial relations policy inclined him to be 
cautious in the first instance. Whilst he was a strong supporter of In Place of 
Strife once conceived, he could not match the detailed knowledge of industrial 
relations that was held by the long standing Ministry of Labour officials within 
his 
department. 
Secondly, there were practical problems with the adoption of a more 
interventionist approach. Donovan had exhaustively examined the application and 
effectiveness of sanctions, concluding that none of them would 
deliver improved 
industrial relations. Similarly, Burgh's department had repeated the exercise and 
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arrived at the same conclusions. In the circumstances, the decision to press ahead 
with any of the more coercive measures required a political leap of faith rather 
than cold intellectual calculation, and, as has been demonstrated, the decision on 
content, especially the inclusion of the penal clauses, remained with Castle, and 
this brings us back to the second proposition: that In Place of Strife represented a 
knee-jerk reaction to Conservative proposals rather than a well thought out 
philosophy of industrial relations. 
It is clear that In Place Of Strife, sought to balance a number of considerations; it 
accepted and supported the Royal Commission analysis whilst rejecting the 
legalistic approach being proposed by the Conservatives; it recognised however, 
that the Commission's proposed refonns could not take place fast enought to 
avoid ongoing disputes and therefore measures would be required to control strike 
action. To this end it proposed two specific measures which were designed 
carefully to control those strikes which were considered damaging to the national 
interest without placing blanket restrictions on the basic right to strike. However, 
it sought to balance this with the proposed extension of trade union rights into a 
number of important areas. 
The white paper was undoubtedly an extremely political document, Castle was all 
too conscious of the need to out flank the Conservatives, but it was also grounded 
in a sound philosophy of state intervention in industrial relations going back over 
a hundred years. Consequently, it can be argued that the white paper contained a 
well balanced set of proposals which provided a coherent analysis of the current 
state of industrial relations, and sought to couple enhanced trade union rights with 
a wider set of responsibilities. However, it can equally be argued that it was nalve 
of Castle to assume that this carefully balanced set of rights and responsibilities 
would survive the realities of Cabinet and trade union negotiations, an argument 
which turns on Castle and Wilson's alleged failure to understand the trade union 
movement and its history. 
As we have seen, the time spent attempting to arrive at a set of sanctions that fell 
short of imprisonment suggests an awareness of the totemic nature of the law and 
the courts in trade union history. Similarly, Castle's determination not to adopt 
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the Donovan recommendation to remove the protection offered under the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 demonstrated her understanding of both its practical and 
historical significance. However, this needed to be set against the wider 
consideration of a right to govern in the interests of the wider community. As 
Wilson had told the TUC in 1964, 'we shall say what in our view the national 
interest demands' 813 . Both Castle and Wilson were clear that, along with 
enhanced rights came enhanced responsibilities and this meant being prepared to 
accept restrictions on strike action if, by means of that action, wider community 
interests were being threatened. It is significant that it was only after the 
Chequers meeting at which Jones, and particularly Scanlon, made it clear that they 
had little time for a wider set of community interests if they were to the detriment 
of the interests of their members, that Castle and Wilson contemplated removing 
the protections offered under the Act. 
Finally, for Wilson and Castle, the real nature of the opposition was revealed. It 
may be argued that this illustrated once and for all their naivety in trade union 
matters, and perhaps it needed Jones and Scanlon to spell it out in such blunt 
terms. However, if they were naYve, it was naivety of a different order to that with 
which they have usually been charged, in that they were genuinely shocked at two 
trade union leaders setting the trade union movement not just outside, but also 
above the law. Hence the importance of Wilson's 'tanks' phrase regardless of the 
actual words used. Scanlon, in particular, appeared to be challenging directly the 
right of a democratically elected government to govern. Peter Jenkins, who was 
aware of the confrontation at Chequers, was surely right in his assessment that 
Feather made a serious miscalculation in calling for the meeting, because the 
intransigence of Scanlon and Jones merely served to confirm Wilson's opinion 
that 'no undertaking by the TUC would be worth the paper it was written on 
814 
unless Jones and Scanlon could be pinned down' 
It is in this context that the question of naivety must be addressed. It is arguable 
that what both Castle and Wilson were attempting was to widen the traditional 
debate about trade union rights and responsibilities in order to ask legitimate 
813 Taylor (1993) p. 13 1 
814 Jenkins (1970) p. 140 
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questions about the limitations of trade union power in an era of full-employment, 
and that their naivety was in believing that the trade unions were as willing to take 
part in the debate as they themselves were. However, whilst such a view may go 
some way to countering the charges, is difficult to deny that they did demonstrate 
considerable naivety in failing to anticipate the depth of antagonism shown by 
trade unions towards any prospect of the introduction of the law into industrial 
relations, and finally demonstrated a lack of understanding of the emotional ties 
that existed between the trade unions and the PLP. For Wilson, whose deft 
handling of the Clause IV debate had appeared to demonstrate an instinctive 
understanding of such tieS816 , this was a damming conclusion. 
Castle and Wilson failed ultimately because, at a visceral level,, a substantial 
minority in both the PLP and the Cabinet were not prepared to accept any 
legislation that sought to restrict the unfettered fight of the trade unions to protect 
the interests of their members. They were undoubtedly nalve in thinking that a 
majority within the PLP would support their proposals, when the government had 
a majority of no more than 96 and when over 120 MPs were sponsored by trade 
unions, and it is a measure of this naivety that Castle was surprised by the size of 
the revolt that took place during the government debate on In Place of Strife in 
March 1969, and seemingly failed to realise the significance of the fact that of the 
55 Labour MPs who voted against the white paper, 25 had not previously opposed 
the goverment. 
Finally, therefore, there is the issue of failure or defeat. As was said at the outset, 
with the exception of Wilson, everyone else involved regarded the outcome as a 
defeat for the government. It seems reasonable, therefore, to consider success or 
failure in the terms that Wilson set for himself when he met the general council 
for the first time in April 1969. As he made clear at the meeting, he was prepared 
to consider any alternatives that could be shown to be both effective and operate 
as quickly as the government's own proposals and, speaking to the PLP in the 
aftermath of the settlement, he claimed that this was just what the "solemn and 
816 When asked about Gaitskell's proposal to remove clause IV, Wilson replied that 'We were 
being asked to take Genesis out of the Bible ... You don't have to be a fundamentalist to say that 
Genesis is part of the Bible. ' Quoted in Pimlott (1992) p. 227 
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binding' agreement offered. Studying Wilson's rhetoric from March onwards , it 
is clear that he had sought to create the grounds for a possible compromise from 
the outset, but it is equally evident that his definition of what constituted a 
reasonable compromise became looser as the negotiations progressed and the size 
of the opposition became clearer, and that no-where was this clearer than in the 
middle of the leadership crisis in early May. Furthermore, whilst, in the aftermath 
of the Chequers meeting, he was prepared to adopt a much tougher line, this too 
had to be tempered when it became obvious that, in the aftermath of the special 
congress, public opinion was shifting in favour of the TUC. Finally, faced with 
likely defeat in Cabinet, he was forced to accept any terms offered by the general 
council. 
However, if in his own terms the final agreement was a defeat, what of the 
apparent movement of the TUC? After all, Wilson, Castle and Feather all claimed 
that the rule changes gave the TUC greater powers of intervention than ever 
before, and, at least from Wilson and Castle's perspective these would not have 
been achieved without In Place of Strife as the catalyst. The effectiveness of the 
TUC measures requires another study, and there was little time to test them before 
the 1970 general election changed all of the circumstances anyway. However, 
Eric Wigham has noted that there was a determination within the DEP to ascribe 
all successes in the immediate aftermath to the TUC, regardless of the level of 
intervention 816 . From the perspective of this study, 
it is clear that the rule changes 
did enshrine a new level of intervention, although this was clearly circumscribed 
by the degree of co-operation from the larger unions as evidenced by a much 
greater willingness to agree to intervention of inter-union disputes than on 
unofficial strikes. Ultimately, however, the question as to what the TUC could do 
in the event of unofficial strikers refusing to return work remained unanswered. 
At another level, Castle and Wilson's failure, however much it reflected their own 
naivety, was a failure of the wider labour movement. If In Place of Strife was 
undoubtedly the last in a sequence of defeats for a tired and embattled 
government, whose final negotiations came to resemble arguments over angels 
816 Wigham (1982) p. 153-4 
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and on pinheads, its wider significance as a defining moment in post-war political, 
labour and economic history cannot be denied. The government's defeat 
confirmed that the Labour Party could not govern without the consent of the trade 
unions, which, for a Prime Minister seeking to establish his party as that of the 
national interest, was a devastating conclusion. The very fact that the proposals 
united those on both the left and right of the party, leading previously loyal 
backbenchers to vote against the govenu-nent, indicated the extent to which loyalty 
to the union movement extended above and beyond the wider national interest,, 
and laid bare the harsh reality of the balance of power inside the labour 
movement. Subsequently, considerable emphasis has been placed on the how the 
two sides had healed the rift by 1974 to produce the 'social contract'. However, 
the events of 1979 indicated that this was at best a pasting over of the cracks in a 
distinctly uneven relationship, and the fact that Callaghan's government was 
brought down was hugely ironic given his role in the events of 1969. 
Similarly, whilst the interim bill was little more than a knee-jerk reaction to 
events, In Place of Strife did offer a significant tranche of trade union rights and 
did offer the opportunity to debate the wider role of the unions within society. 
However, the prominence of Jones and Scanlon indicated the extent to which 
power had shifted from the older established figures who had been prepared to 
enter into agreements over the national plan, to a younger generation who were 
more interested in representing the interests of the shop floor. This in turn was 
evidence of the seismic shift in trade union power that had been taking place since 
the late 1950s, a shift that was to continue into the 1970s with the arrival of the 
likes of Arthur Scargill, and which echoed the shift to the left within the Labour 
Party itself. Consequently an important opportunity was lost, with the result that, 
6social contract' notwithstanding, the unions were to maintain an essentially 
antagonistic role to the state until their ultimate marginalisation in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, Scanlon's willingness to defy the law was indicative of a growing 
belief that trade unions considered themselves to be above the law, a development 
that, as Edward Heath was to discover, made trade union reform almost 
impossible on anything but the most limited or the most radical terms. 
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Finally, whilst Castle had always been determined to avoid the crudeness of wage 
restraint versus control over strikes, there was no doubt that something was 
required to balance ftill employment, low inflation and maximum productivity. 
Prices and incomes policy had failed and unofficial strikes, in particular, were 
destroying key export industries such as motor manufacturing, which in turn 
placed even more pressure on the fragile pound. Something was needed to escape 
from this downward spiral, and the penal clauses, whilst likely to be limited in 
their effectiveness, would have at least begun to address the issue of unofficial 
strikes and opened a debate about strikes that were considered against the national 
interest. As it was, the failure to agree opened the way for the legalistic approach 
of the Conservatives that was in turn to founder on the willingness of trade 
unionists to break the law. 
In Place of Strife was a missed opportunity, agreement could have opened a much 
needed debate on trade union/state relations, broadened the appeal of the Labour 
Party and laid the foundations for the development of a planned economy in 
which full employment and low inflation could have been pursued8 17 . As 
it was, 
the massive economic shocks of the early 1970s highlighted the fragility of the 
existing system and ultimately brought about the downfall of both the Labour 
Party and the trade unions. Shortly after the failure of In Place of Strife, a leading 
authority on industrial relations asked 'whether we can cease to be victims of our 
history 5818 . For Barbara 
Castle, Harold Wilson, and the wider Labour and trade 
union movement, the answer was clearly no. 
817 
1 
For a fascinating counterfactual argument see, Robert Taylor, 'What if Harold Wilson and the 
unions had agreed In Place of Strife?, in, Prime Minister Portillo and other things that never 
happened, edited by Duncan Brack and lam Dale (Politico Is Publishing, London 2003) 
818 Henry Phelps Brown, The Origins of Trade Union Power (Oxford University Press, paperback 
edition 1986) p. 190 
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Appendix 2 
Paragraphs 38 - 43 
any more than it has in the past, on the active participation of the C. B. I. Ile General Council propose that the scope of Rule 11 should be extended specifically 
to include unauthorised and unconstitutional stoppages which are )&ely to have 
serious repercussions. 
38. Under the revised Rule 11 (see Appendix 1) where the dispute affects a 
significant num of workers or where it seems likely to be protracted and have 
serious repercussions, the General Council propose that it should be an obligation 
on the union or unions concerned to notify the T. U. C. of the circumstances. Even 
before notification the T. U. C. itself might take the initiative to investigate the 
matter: such an initiative might, for example, result from an approach from a 
union whose members were not in dispute or on strike but had been laid off or 
otherwise affected as a result of strike action by the members of another union. 
39. In either event the first requirement would be for the T. U. C. General 
Secretary to discuss with the union or unions concerned the possibility of the 
T. U. C. giving assistance towards the settlement of the dispute. In the light of 
the situation a decision might then be taken to refer the matter either to the Finance 
and General Purposes Committee or to a Disputes Committee. Ile General 
Council have it in mind that, particularly in the case of a localised dispute, a Disputes 
Committee might include members drawn from a panel of experienced union 
officials. Where it was considered that an on-the-spot investigation would be 
useful, it might be appropriate to include as members of a Disputes Committee 
trade union officials drawn firom a region adjacent to the locality of the dispute; 
this would help in bringing to bear on the problem the experience of persons who, 
while not immediately involved, would have knowledge of local circumstances and 
would also help in speeding the investigatiorL 
40. The General Secretary or the Committee could, after consulting the union 
concerned, discuss the dispute with local union representatives and also with the 
management concei ed After investigation of the causes and circumstances of 
the dispute, recommendations for securing a settlement would normally be made 
to the parties concerned. Recommendation might also be made for changes in 
the procedure to avoid simils, situations occurring in future. If it was found in a 
particular case that there was a strong element of inter-union difficulty in the 
situation, and if the employer indicated that he would be. prepared to accept the 
T. U. C. 's findings, the Committee might make an award. In most cases, however, 
the Committee would make a recommendation and would seek to establish that all 
the parties 'concerned were prepared to act on it without delay. This would call 
for a positive response from management as well as from the trade union side. 
41. Unions have demonstrated over the years that they do their utmost to imple 
ment rocommendations by the T. U. C. for the settlement of disputes, and very 
rarely have the General Council had to exercise their ultimate power of suspending 
a union and reporting it to Congress. The General Council are confident that, in 
the case of unofficial and unconstitutional strikes, unions will impress on their 
members the advantages to be gained from accepting T. U. C. assistance in settling 
the dispute and will accept responsibility for doing everything within their power 
to ensure that their members accept recommendations by the T. U. C. 
42. Ile General Council would also require unions to satisfy them that they had 
-done all that they could reasonably be expected to do to secure compliance with a 
recommendation (or an award, where this has been made), including taking action 
within their own rules if necessary. They recognise that a few unions may need 
zo review their own rules to ensure that they are in a position to comply with rccom- 
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mendations or awards by the T. U. C. The General Council also consider that it 
should be made clear in Rule 11 (as is already implicit in that Rule, and as is explicit 
in Rule 12) that in the unlikely event of a union refusing to abide by a decision of 
the T. U. C. the General Council can take action under Rule 13 (See appendix 3). 
43. If the foregoing proposals are accepted by the Special Congress the General 
Council will take action forthwith to give effect to them. They will also submit 
to the September Congress a. formal proposal for a change in Rule 11: it will be 
along the lines set out in Appendix 1, and any observations that unions may wish to 
submit for the General Council's consideration will be taken into account in 
finalising the precise proposal to be submitted to Congress. 
- Aýd%wvý vblr"WýrwlvýwT wmwdýulkTco 
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Appendix 3 
Revised Rule 11 
AppendEx 1 
Rule 11: Industrial Disputes 
(a) It shall be an obligation upon the affiliated organisation3 to keep the General Council 
informed with regard to matters arising as between them and employers, and/or between 
one organisation and another, including unauthorised and unconstitutional stoppages of work, 
in particular where such matters may involve directly or indirectly large bodies of workers. 
The General Council shall, if they'deern necessary, disseminate the information as soon as 
possible to all organisations which are affiliated to the Congress, and which may be either 
directly or indirectly affected. 
(b) The general policy of the General Council shall be that unless requested to do so by the 
affiliated organisation or organisations concerned, the Council shall not intervene so long as 
there is a prospect of whatever difference may exist on the matters in question being amicably 
settled by means of the machinery of negotiation existing in the trades affected. 
(c) If, however, a situation has arisen, or is IdWy to arise, in which other bodies of workpeople 
affiliated to Congress might be involved in a stoppage of work or their wages, hours and 
conditions of employment imperilled the General Council may take the initiative by calling 
representatives of the organisation into oDnsultation, and use their influence to effect a just 
settlement of the difference. In this connection the Council, having ascertained all the 
facts relating to the difference, may tender their considered opinion and advice thereon to 
the organisation or organisations concerned. Should the organisation or organisations refuse 
the assistance or advice of the Council, the General Council shall duly report to Congress 
or deal with the organisation under Clause$ (b), (c), A and (h) of Rule 13. 
(d) WItere the Council intervenes, as herein provided, and the organisation or organisations 
concemed accept the assistance and advice of the Council, and where despite the efforts of 
the Council, the policy of the employers enforces a stoppage of work by strike or lock-out, 
the Council shall forthwith take steps to organise on behalf of the organisation or organisa- 
tions concerned all such moral and material support as the circumstances of the dispute 
May appear to justify. 
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Appendix 4 
DATE MEETING 
Stage I 
Post- 
Friday, 6 June Inforinal meeting between Wilson & 
Feather 
Croydon Sunday, 8 June Management Committee 
position Monday, 9 June 1 10. 
15am, General Council pre-meeting 
2 10.30am, Wilson, Castle & General 
Council 
3 Wilson private meeting with Feather 
4 2.30pm, Management Committee 
5 4.00pm, Cabinet 
Tuesday, 10 June 8.30pm, infortnal meeting between 
Wilson, Castle & Feather 
Stage 2 Wednesday, 11 1 Wilson, Castle & General Council 
Detailed June 2 General Council 
negotiations 3 General Council, negotiating sub- 
committee 
4 Wilson, Castle & General Council sub- 
committee 
5 General Council, negotiating sub- 
committee 
6 Wilson, Castle & General Council sub- 
committee 
Thursday, 12 1 10.30am, Management Committee 
June 2 11.15 am, Cabinet 
3 6.30pm, General Council pre-meeting 
4 7.00pm, Wilson, Castle and General 
Council 
Stage 3 
Stalemate 
Friday, 13 - 
Monday, 16 June 
Intense work between Castle, Wilson and 
Castle's officials on alternatiVes to the penal 
clauses. 
Stage 4 Tuesday, 17 June I 9.30am, Management Committee 
Resolution 2 10.15 am, Cabinet (adj ourried) 
3 4.30pm, Cabinet (resumed) 
Wednesday, 18 1 General Council pre-meeting 
June 2 10.30am, Wilson, Castle & General 
Council 
3 General Council 
4 Wilson, Castle and General Council sub- 
committee 
5 Sub-committee report back to General 
Council 
6 Resumed meeting Wilson, Castle & sub- 
committee 
7 Further discussion by General Council 
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8 Resumed meeting Wilson, Castle & sub- 
committee 
9 Discussion by sub-committee 
10 Resumed meeting Wilson, Castle and 
sub-committee 
11 Final sub-committee report back to 
General Council 
12 Final meeting of Wilson, Castle & 
General Council 
13 5pm, Cabinet 
14 7.15pm, Parliamentary Labour Party 
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Appendix 5 
Rule 11 (c) 
If, however, a situation has arisen, or is likely to arise, in which other bodies of workpeople affiliated to Congress might be involved in a 
stoppage of work or their wages, hours or conditions of employment 
imperilled, the General Council may take the initiative by calling 
representatives of the organisation into consultation and use their 
influence to effect a just settlement of the difference. In this connection 
the Council, having ascertained all the facts relating to the difference 
may tender their considered opinion and advice thereon to the 
organisation or organisations concerned. Should the organisation or 
organisations refuse the assistance or advice of the Council, the General 
Council shall duly report to Congress or deal with the organisation under 
Clauses (b), (c), (q), and (h) of Rule 13 
Rule 12 
(b) It shall be an obligation on the affiliated organisation or organisations 
concerned to notify the General Council when an official stoppage of 
work is contemplated in any dispute between affiliated organisations 
whether relating to trade union recognition, trade union membership, 
demarcation of work, or any other difficulty. 
(c) No affiliated organisation shall authorise such a stoppage of work 
until the dispute has been considered by the General Council as provided 
by clause (f) of this rule. 
(d) Where a dispute between unions has led to an unauthorised stoppage 
of work, it shall be an obligation on the affiliated organisation or 
organisations concerned to take immediate and energetic steps to obtain 
a resumption of work. 
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